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HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

TREITSCHKE'S HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

TRANSLATED BY EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON



VOLUME FIVE

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INTRODUCTION.

THE present instalment of Treitschke's History covers a very short period, for, excepting the survey of intellectual movements contained in the final, and perhaps for the majority of readers most attractive, chapter on "Young Germany," the events narrated fall for the most part to several years preceding and following the July Revolution of 1830. Alike in thought and style the contents of the book are thoroughly characteristic of the historian. His mastery of his material is complete, whatever one may think of his interpretation of facts; his characterisation of the larger figures which enter into his story is marked by great insight and acuteness, though not always by impartiality or sympathy; and the fact that many of his judgments are bold rather than convincing is merely in keeping with his entire theory of historiography, for Treitschke is above all things dogmatic and intensely subjective.

There is, of course, no lack of ill-conditioned snarling at England, which to the end of his days never got off Treitschke's nerves; and in exploiting his fixed idea that mercenary Albion's Continental policy was ever dictated by exclusive concern for her trade and markets and a desire to make difficulties and complications for other Powers, whether hostile or friendly, he shows all his accustomed perversity and resource of invective.

On the other hand, the historian's habitual pose of self-righteousness is also conspicuous in his treatment of international relations. It was not a conscious but a constitutional failing. Treitschke could not conceive of Prussia ever being in the wrong, or of any other country being in the right if it refused to accept the Prussian view of things. Whatever is not in accordance with Prussia's interests, or fails to commend itself to him as their advocate, is usually characterised as "shameless," "scandalous," or "impudent." But if Treitschke is blunt and rude he is so on principle; he is candid enough to recall Goethe's warning to his countrymen, as he urged

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downrightness of utterance: "When we speak German we lie when we are polite."

This is one way of writing history, but it is not the most gracious or the most persuasive way. Treitschke's censorious attitude was also dangerous, for his irrational prejudices frequently led him into arrogant assumptions, which, very unfortunately for his reputation as a moralist and a prophet, proved fallacious.

If the effort were worth the trouble it would be possible to show how again and again events gave the lie to his boastful claims of Prussia's superior virtue and to his suspicion of the honour and probity of other countries unsympathetic to him. Take, for example, the question, now so near to all of us, of the declaration of Belgian independence as dealt with in this volume. When the status of that country was being determined by the Powers in 1830, in consequence of the rising against Dutch rule, it was a Prussian plenipotentiary, Count Bülow, who proposed that Belgium should be declared neutral under the joint guarantee of the Powers, just as it was a Prussian plenipotentiary, Count Bernstorff, who, over a generation later, at the London Conference of 1867, proposed that Luxemburg's neutrality and integrity should be substantiated by a similar collective pledge. Treitschke cannot record the former fact without the usual sneer at his bugbear England. "It remained extremely dubious," he says, "whether England would not some day as tranquilly abandon the new protégé [Belgium] as she was now abandoning the old [Holland]. But the joint guarantee of the Powers might well be expected to make matters safe for two or three decades." The sneer is malicious and pointless. All the Powers were favourable to Belgium's independence, not only as a just solution of the problem but as the only possible solution. Prussia from interested motives would have helped the Dutch to dragoon the Belgians had she dared, but she had no choice but to fall in with the action of the other Powers and make of necessity a virtue.

Again, resenting Palmerston's suspicion that Bülow later was receiving sympathetically Talleyrand's proposal that Belgium should be partitioned between France, Prussia, and Holland, the virtuous historian asks indignantly: "How could the Prussian have agreed to commit his King to such a robbery?" Perhaps Bülow himself was incapable of such an enormity,

for Bülow was an honourable man; yet other times brought other manners. The day came when Prussia was willing, unless the evidence of German and French witnesses must be rejected, to hand over both Belgium and Luxemburg to France as the price of aggression on her own part, and even annexed Danish, French, and German territory without the slightest compunction. In the event, Belgium's security was protected by a later treaty (1839), to which Prussia and England were again parties, for a far longer time than Treitschke pretended to anticipate. How and why it came at last to be violated the world in general and Prussia in particular know to-day to their cost.

The political chapters of the volume have special interest for the present hour, for a host of questions which are now engrossing the attention of European statesmanship are discussed in these pages. The question of Belgium has been named; but there are also the questions of Polish independence, Schleswig-Holstein, Luxemburg, Limburg, and the claims of small States to exist and live their own lives unmolested by greedy neighbours. As to the last, we find Treitschke's well-known doctrine of the State as power and his dislike of small States frequently avowed in these pages. "Small States," he says, "are apt to appear ridiculous, for the State is power, and weakness stultifies itself immediately should it attempt to masquerade as power." In view of the events of August, 1914, how instinct with irony are the following words: "With the exaggerated self-esteem characteristic of weak nations, the Belgians henceforward imagined that their land was the centre of the society of States. With laudable zeal they laid especial stress upon international law, treating it as if it had been a specifically Belgian science, but displaying the while a philanthropic partiality which showed very plainly that unarmed nations are incompetent to take unprejudiced views of international struggles for power."

Throughout these pages, indeed, it is Treitschke the narrow reactionary who speaks. He passes in review the constitutional struggles of the time in Brunswick and Hanover, in Hesse and Saxony; but while he is unable to deny the wrongs of the peoples of these States he has little sympathy with their aspirations, for such little States have no right to exist at all, and when they cause trouble to their neighbours they are doubly obnoxious. For the ideas which were fertilising men's

minds and disintegrating the old European social and political system he has only contumely. He speaks of the current notion of political liberty as the toy of children; he ridicules the self-satisfaction of the French and English with their systems of government; and has hardly a word of rebuke for German rulers whose idea of statesmanship was to allow grievances to accumulate indefinitely at compound interest and hand on their political difficulties, like their castles and coffers, to their heirs.

At the time under notice Metternich was still supreme. Hence the weapon with which the German Governments fought the local insurrectionary movements of 1830 was the familiar one of indiscriminate repression. The first response given by Germany to the Paris revolution was far from alarming. There were ferments in some of the States—Baden, Hesse, Nassau, Würtemberg, and Bavaria—but nowhere was the popular temper dangerous. Some of the Sovereigns who had not hitherto granted constitutions in accordance with article 13 of the Federal Act of June 8, 1815, now did so—Prussia, as before the accomplice of reactionary Austria, still remaining an exception—and had not the Diet kindled a fire where before there was only dead fuel the crisis might have passed over without further trouble. Irritating measures of repression, however, exhausted the patience of the democrats, and now serious outbreaks occurred in various parts of the South. It was the Hambach Festival of May 27, 1832, which stirred Metternich to more resolute action. The festival was a demonstration on behalf of democratic reform and unity which recalled that of the Wartburg of fifteen years before. Like its precursor it was harmless, even Treitschke speaking of it as an innocent sort of drinking bout, yet it served as the pretext for severe reactionary reprisals. Before the summer was out a second edition of the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 had been issued, leading to the drastic repression of the printing press, both in the form of newspapers and books, the prohibition of public assemblies, the control of the universities, and the ruthless suppression of all institutions hostile to existing political conditions and authorities, as well as serious infringements of the powers of the State Diets and the sovereignty of the States themselves.

Even Lord Palmerston believed himself justified in protesting through the British embassies to the federal courts against

this intolerable trampling upon the liberties of the German peoples, basing his action on the fact that Great Britain was a cosignatory of the Treaties of Vienna. The protest was weakened, however, by the fact that the King of England, in his capacity as ruler of Hanover (an anachronism which only continued until 1837), had already accepted the decrees.

A little later events further played into Metternich's hands. Just as the Wartburg Festival was followed by the murder of Kotzebue, so the Hambach Festival had as its sequel an ill-considered attack upon Frankfort and its Diet by a body of insurrectionary fanatics (April 3, 1833). The attack was known to be coming, and it was successfully repulsed, but it afforded a pretext for further repressive measures. As a result of the Vienna Ministerial Conferences of March, 1834, Metternich induced the federal Governments to accept resolutions which virtually annulled constitutional rights in the several States. With a cowardice worthy of the occasion, the Governments kept most of their decisions secret, fearing the effect of publicity in the then excited temper of the people. Of the sixty articles embodied in the protocol which summed up the work of the Conferences few were to be given the form of federal decrees; the great majority were to remain unpublished, though the sovereigns undertook to act upon them all the same.

Nominally the Bund and its Diet now seemed to have the constitutional movement thoroughly in hand. The fact was just the reverse. The new decrees against liberty were only partially enforced, and the democratic movement throve in spite of its persecutors. Victory was to be long delayed, yet there were spokesmen of the popular cause who, impracticable as their ideas seemed at the time, anticipated even then with singular accuracy the later political developments, and even the lines upon which Germany is being reconstituted at the present time. Nearly three generations ago the Badenese publicist P. J. Siebenpfeiffer, formerly a Government official, predicted the formation of the "United Free States of Germany," each of these States the uncontrolled master of its own destinies, as the final solution of his country's struggle for democratic government. He also foretold the time "when the Princes will exchange the ermine mantle of feudalist rule by divine right for the *toga virilis* of German national dignity, when German women will no longer be the servile handmaidens of dominant males, but will become free companions of free

citizens; and when our sons and daughters will begin as sucklings to drink in the spirit of freedom."

At a time when the German sovereigns have all with one consent agreed to become private citizens, when the Empire of 1871 is being converted into a democratic federation of "free States," and when thirty German women have been elected members of the National Assembly which is to determine the future government of the German nation, this remarkable forecast deserves to be recalled.

Nevertheless, though obstructed by Metternich and his reactionary accomplices the unity movement all this time was deriving force from non-political influences. The chief of these was that of the Customs Union, which for some years had been steadily lengthening its cords and strengthening its stakes under Prussian guidance. It is characteristic of the blindness and laxity which so often characterised the statesmanship of Vienna in regard to questions vital to Austria that for many years the significance of the Customs Union movement was never realised by the Hofburg, so that when Austria at last awakened to the danger of Prussia's economic predominance in Germany it was too late to alter it, and all she could do was to accept under futile protest her exclusion from the Customs Union as final and unalterable, and to reflect—if Austrian statesmen ever did reflect—that for that exclusion her own shortsightedness was altogether to blame.

It was not Metternich's only blunder, for he erred in the same way over the question of federal defence, which likewise he left in Prussia's hands, a mistake which cost his country dearly in 1866. The fact is that by concentrating his attention upon the one sterile object of maintaining the political structure of Germany unchanged, with the Hapsburg monarchy at its apex, leaving unchallenged Prussia's aspirations to economic and military primacy, Metternich and his successors unconsciously prepared the way for Austria's extrusion from the Federation and from Germany, for they made her continuance therein superfluous and undermined her claim to be a real leader of the German States and nation.

Treitschke treats the history of the Customs Union from 1830 forward with a fullness of detail which to non-German readers may at times appear prolix and tedious, yet the story is immensely instructive both for the early example which it affords of the Prussian policy of "economic penetration"

and for the light which it throws upon the limitations of Metternich as a statesman. His claim is also justified that already

"There had come into existence two organisations within the Germanic Federation: a fictitious Germany centred in Frankfort and a Germany of honest work centred in Berlin. The Prussian State, by its guidance of Germany's commercial policy, fulfilled part of the duties which properly devolved upon the Germanic Federation, just as Prussia alone, by her army, safeguarded the frontiers of the fatherland. Thus it came to pass that by straightforward industry Prussia grew by degrees to become the leading power of the fatherland; and only because the European world did not think it worth while to acquire a serious knowledge of Prussia's military system and of Prussia's commercial policy, did Europe fail to note the quiet strengthening of the centre of the Continent."

It is true, as the historian says, that Austria was not alone in ignoring the advance of Prussia at this time and later, owing to the influence of the economic and military policies which she was pursuing with unceasing diligence, and with complete openness. English statesmen were no more alive than the statesmen of the Hofburg to the trend of events, showed no greater comprehension of the German question as it was developing under Prussian guidance, and took no more pains to adapt themselves to circumstances which were changing the entire course of European history. The result was that when German unity came, few of these statesmen understood either how or why it came, and because they were totally unprepared for a new and momentous situation they were unable to grapple with it.

Treitschke says in one of these pages, "The continued influence of the past upon the present is inexorably manifested in the destinies even of those peoples who refuse to believe in any such historic law." The truth of this admirable dictum has been exemplified by the modern history of Germany in many and various ways, but never so impressively as at the present time. For that reason the appearance of this new volume of the History is timely in a singular degree.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

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VOL. V.

BOOK IV.

THE INFLUENCE OF FRENCH LIBERALISM.

1830–1840.

CHAPTER I.

THE JULY REVOLUTION AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

§ I. REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND BELGIUM.

THE continued influence of the past upon the present is inexorably manifested even in the destinies of those peoples who refuse to believe in any such historic law. By the first revolution the French had broken with their historic past. They fancied they had shaken themselves free from it, and did not see that when Napoleon gave the new France its permanent constitution he was merely reestablishing in simplified and democratic forms the old centralised official-ridden state of Richelieu. Still less would they recognise in the year 1830 that the July revolution owed its world-shaking consequences chiefly to the influence of the past. After the Vienna treaties, France no longer possessed either the military power or the spiritual energy to claim the leading position among nations. Belle Alliance had proved the superiority of German arms; in art and science, Germany had long ere this acquired new ideals of her own; while the wordy debates and controversies of French parliamentarians and journalists were still concerned with the outworn ideas of '89, and failed to contribute any fertile political conceptions to the contemporary world. Nevertheless, memories of the agelong dominion of French culture, of jacobin propaganda, and of the Napoleonic empire, were still universally active. The anxieties of the courts and the hopes of discontented spirits were concentrated upon the homeland of the revolution.

When the reestablished and legitimate monarchy suddenly collapsed, as if it had been overthrown by an irresistible

cataclysm of nature, the entire new order of the society of states seemed shaken to its foundations. The forces of revolution, encouraged by French example, made head in almost all the neighbouring countries; the catchwords of the rights of man were on everyone's lips. Even the British, in ordinary so refractory to foreign influences, were affected by the wonderworking power of French democratic ideas, and with the passing of the reform bill they began to destroy the venerable edifice of parliamentary aristocracy. Again the French spoke of themselves as "the great nation," cherishing the fancy that the tricolor was once more to start on its triumphant course around the world. Eighteen years later, from the French barricades was to proceed the impulse to a European movement, but on that occasion also a mere impulse from without. The ideas of France no longer dominated the world. The national movement in Germany and the national movement in Italy pursued aims which had little in common with the cosmopolitan doctrines of the revolution. Forty years later, the persistent energies of ancient greatness were at length utterly spent. The sobered world no longer regarded the French as the bringers of light, but considered them disturbers of the peace in the society of states, so that the republican movement of the Parisians in 1870 hardly awakened an echo in Europe. No less gradual and no less irresistible had, two centuries earlier, been the decline in the world power of Spain. In France, as in Spain of old, the great memories continued to exercise a potent influence long after the pillars of power had crumbled to pieces; in France, as in Spain of old, the nation continued to believe itself the leader of the world until, with a single stroke, in nineteenth century France by the battle of Sedan, and in seventeenth century Spain by the peace of the Pyrenees, the transformation in the relationships of power was made plainly manifest.

In the summer of 1830, indeed, it was only a few isolated but perspicacious statesmen who were competent to recognise the incipient decay of France. The "great week" of the Parisians transformed the whole situation of the world, shaking the political system of the legitimist great powers far more violently than had ten years earlier the revolutions of southern Europe, and accelerating on all hands the destruction of the ancient feudal dominion whose decomposition had long since

begun. The fall of the nobility and the rise to power of the bourgeoisie in France inspired the middle classes, whose sense of self-importance was increasing, to new hopes and claims. Meanwhile the second great epoch of discovery and invention was dawning; commerce was expanding, and general prosperity was increasing, in a manner altogether without precedent. The expanding powers of large scale manufacturing industry, the stock exchange, and Jewish finance, were entering into their own; while simultaneously the class antagonism between capital and labour was already becoming obvious. The epoch of the restoration, with its refined manners, its romanticist dreams, and its sedulous intellectual studies, with its diplomatic congresses and court festivals, had still a strong flavour of the aristocratic eighteenth century. Not until after the July revolution, nor completely until after 1848, does the civilisation of the nineteenth century display its characteristic insignia. A new generation is growing up, democratic in manners and in ideas, unpolished and uncouth, insatiable in its claims, firmly convinced of its own goodness and still more firmly convinced of the depravity of its opponents, enterprising and industrious, bold and ingenious in the struggle with the elements, excelling all earlier ages in breadth of view and diversity of interests—but rash, unstable, lacking concentration of mind and fixity of outlook. The whole of popular life is thronging into the market place. Parliamentary elections and debates, the deliberations of the clubs and societies, and the great, new economic enterprises, are men's chief concern; they seek relaxation in cafés and over their cigars. Domestic life is decaying; women no longer rule undisputed in social life, and in compensation for this loss are already beginning here and there to engage in unequal strife with men in the latters' own field of work. Newspapers and the luxuriantly sprouting popular literature are awakening in wide circles a sense of public life, but are also providing a covetous, sceptical, and arrogant half-culture. Many men of exceptional talent are dissipating their energies upon ephemeralities, and there are but a few vigorous spirits who still prove competent to rise superior to the discontented rush of the day, and to create something of permanent value in the fields of art or of research. The democratic character of the epoch is faithfully reflected in male attire, the ugliest, but at the

same time the most convenient and the most comfortable, ever worn in Europe. Hair and beard may still be dressed in accordance with personal taste, but for the rest the democratic laws of respectability are inviolable, laws in accordance with which no one is allowed to distinguish himself from others; everyone must wear the same dingy sack-coat with many pockets, a garment which saves so much time for the busy man; boots and trousers now make their way into the drawing-room, and here the democratic frock coat makes guests and serving-men indistinguishable.

Impoverished Germany could follow but slowly these transformations in social intercourse and modes of life. All the more powerfully, however, did the political ideas of the French permeate our country, where the ground had already been prepared by the radical literature of the twenties. During the years of our classical poetry, during the wars of liberation, and during the splendid youth of the historical sciences, German genius had struck out its own paths in word and in deed, independently of the French, and usually in conflict with them. There now occurred a tremendous retrogression. The old enlightenment, which since Herder's days seemed to have been outgrown, resumed its sway, bearing French lineaments. The profound historical conception of the state which German science was quietly elaborating, but whose elaboration was as yet incomplete, receded into the background. The old doctrines of natural rights, of the rationalised state of equals, of the infallibility of public opinion, of a national authority which was not to rule but to serve the majority, now gained predominance; and since these doctrines had no fresh light to shed, their predominance soon became one of empty phrase-making. The patriotic enthusiasm of the wars of liberation was replaced by a liberal cosmopolitanism which, in the name of liberty, extolled Germany's enemies alike in the east and in the west, its apostles overwhelming fellow-countrymen with abuse. The romanticists' able understanding of artistic relationships was replaced by an arid rationalism, flaunting the phrases of liberty; quite after the manner of Nicolai, this rationalism applied the yard-stick of utility, political utility this time, to all works of genius, judging the teachers of the nation solely in the light of their conformity to the spirit of the age. Undisciplined radicalism, unbridled passion, vain bom-

bast, and then again rigorous persecution, disgraced German life.

None the less, even in this decade of deplorable aberrations, beneath the surface the energy of the national idea in accordance with which our people was striving towards unity continued irresistibly at work. After the profound slumber of recent years, a vigorous shock was essential if the stagnant current of German politics was once more to be set in effective motion. Who should venture to blame the inexperienced Germans if, like all the other nations, they tended to esteem too highly the land that gave the signal for advance? To foreigners, the petty popular uprisings and street fights in our northern capitals might well appear to be no more than a childish imitation of the great week in Paris, and yet their outcome was more enduring than the July monarchy. By these movements the chief among the North German minor states were brought into the constitutionalist camp, so that the contrast between north and south was lessened, and a common ground was secured for the political work of the nation. All these petty revolutions were conditioned by local grievances, and they all pursued one identical aim, the replacement of feudalist or monarchical arbitrary rule in each respective state by a more liberal regime; but the ripe fruit of these particularist revolutions was garnered on behalf of the unifying policy of the crown of Prussia. When Saxony and Electoral Hesse were compelled to recognise the modern principles of national unity and of common law, principles which had long been accepted in Prussia and South Germany, they became competent for the first time to enter into tariff community with their German neighbours, so that the ring which Prussia's commercial treaties had been forging round Germany could at length be closed. The conquests of the liberal parties made it possible to establish that great German customs union to which most of the liberals were passionately opposed. Henceforward for a generation it was the strange destiny of German liberalism that none of the great successes of our political life were to be secured through its work, and yet that none of them could but for it have been attained. The customs union was the greatest political achievement of the decade, more momentous for Europe's future than any of the much admired party struggles in neighbouring lands; it was the last

invaluable legacy handed down to the German nation by the old absolutist Prussian monarchy.

The confused party life of Germany was also somewhat strengthened by the vigorous breeze that blew during these years. Now that the banner of popular sovereignty had been raised in France, party contrasts in Germany became more definite and self-conscious. The conservatives hitherto, trusting to their power in the Landtags and to the favour of the courts, had heedlessly left to the governmental journals the conduct of a paper warfare against the liberal press; but now they closed their ranks, and attacked the doctrines of the revolution through the instrumentality of independent newspapers. Before long the ultramontane party, constituting a well organised power with ramifications extending throughout Germany, suddenly appeared on the battlefield. In the liberal world, aspirations and ideas remained in a state of flux, but certain principles of party doctrine gradually became common property. Even the impulse of the nation towards unity, though still obscure and indeterminate, loomed upon the remote horizon as a recognisable goal now that South German liberals ventured for the first time to speak of a German parliament and of the hegemony of Prussia.

In an age affected with these morbid irritabilities, it was inevitable that imaginative literature should run wild. Nobility of form was replaced by an affected, pretentious, and yet essentially weak feuilleton style; a crude utilitarianism usurped the throne of art; everything sacred to German hearts was defiled and mocked by the literary heroes of the day. Yet the slimy waters of this radicalism did not submerge the peaks of German culture. At this very time appeared Goethe's last and profoundest work. Böckh and Ritter, the brothers Grimm, and Wilhelm and Alexander Humboldt, pursued the even tenour of their way, unheeding the clamour of the market place. The works of Ranke displayed a mastery of the historian's art. Liberal doctrine was rendered more profound by Dahlmann, who fertilised it with the ideas of the historical school of law. Theology was convulsed by a passionate party struggle, and was compelled to subject its historical foundations to pitiless criticism. In the exact sciences, too, young men of talent now appeared, able to rival those of the foreign world. Thus it was that even in this decade, itself so void of peace and itself the seed-time of so

much future disturbance, the poietic energies of our history were still in effective operation.

Far-sighted students of French affairs had long foreseen the approach of a great transformation. As soon as Charles X was forced to summon the moderate Martignac ministry, liberalism regained control of public opinion, to act with irresistible power. A thoroughly democratised society resembles a herd and is dominated by the herd instinct; the two most active forces of the modern French temperament, national pride and moral cowardice, combine to swell the ranks of any party which is temporarily gaining the ascendant. Werther, the Prussian envoy, wrote: "The ultramontane party has now been called to power. This means that France will make an irrevocable and enormous stride towards revolution; for the ultramontanes, detested by the nation, and incompetent to keep their hands on the tiller, will soon be compelled, either to give place to an ultra liberal ministry, or else to advise the king to overthrow the existing constitution. But this would infallibly drag the king's government, the Bourbons, and France herself, into the abyss."[1] This irrevocable step towards revolution was taken, and the infatuation of the liberal parties was responsible for it.

France had many reasons to be thankful to the reestablished monarchy. Recovery from the troubles of the years of war had been wonderfully easy; prosperity was general and intellectual life was flourishing; order had been reestablished in military and financial affairs; the Charte was intact, and the ideas of constitutional monarchy seemed to have gained such widespread acceptance that as late as the summer of 1829 Niebuhr could say, "in the existing posture of affairs there can no longer be any thought of revolution." Not long before, the country had had to endure for three years the police supervision exercised by the European military forces of occupation; at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle the minister of France had been treated by the four powers like a schoolboy, admonished to good behaviour. Now the court of the Tuileries had regained a worthy position in the society of states, one in conformity with its strength; all the great powers sedulously wooed its friendship; the battle of Navarino was fought with its cooperation; and with its aid, through the Morean campaign, the independence of Greece was ultimately secured. Faithful to

[1] Werther's Report, June 5, 1828.

the constitution and chivalrously devoted to the royal house, Martignac might well count upon the support of all the moderate parties when he undertook to provide a firmer foundation for the Charte by the installation of a more liberal communal organisation, for everyone was aware that King Charles tolerated this ministry with reluctance and would never advance further to meet the liberals. Notwithstanding these considerations, in the proceedings concerning the communal elections the cabinet was deserted by its natural friends and forced to retreat. The last straightforward endeavour to reconcile constitutionalist France with the old ruling house had failed. Partisan egoism gained the victory over the demands of duty and prudence. A contributory cause was to be found in the spirit of intrigue, that ancient sin of the French, cultivated to a fine art in the court cabals of the previous century, and long ere this introduced into the parliamentary manners of the new time. Count Molé and General Sebastiani, confidant of the duke of Orleans, organised the resistance to Martignac, hoping to enter into his heritage.[1] King Charles declared with satisfaction: "I said it was impossible to do anything with these fellows." His favourite, Prince Polignac, was entrusted with the formation of the new cabinet.

The situation changed from hour to hour. In the opening years of his reign the king had been regarded with considerable affection, but now he was overwhelmed with invectives and ill wishes. The shadow of the days of the emigration formed a barrier between throne and people. It was remembered that this king and the Polignacs, directly after the taking of the Bastille, had been the first to flee the country, had set the bad example; it was remembered that for years they had fought against their fatherland; it was remembered that for years after the restoration the emissaries of the Pavillon Marsan had continued to urge the foreign powers to intervene in French internal affairs. The two first émigrés were to atone by a terrible retribution for the ancient treason. Vainly did Polignac protest in the Chamber that two hostile peoples were being created in a single nation, that an attempt was being made to sever the new France from the old. The severance had long existed. The chasm between the old age and the new yawned conspicuously from the moment when this man took charge of public affairs, this narrow, honest, bigoted ultra, who

[1] Werther's Report, December 6, 1828

had paid for his conspiracies against Bonaparte by a long term of duress, and whose reactionary sentiments had increased to the pitch of religious fanaticism in the solitude of prison. The opposition journals were exaggerating when, after the July revolution, they scornfully declared that for fifteen years France had been acting a comedy; but it was true that the animating force of monarchy, the sentiment of tribal loyalty, had been lost by the enormous majority of Frenchmen, notwithstanding all the respect paid to the "legitimate ruling house." Despite the benefits accruing from the restoration, the French never forgot that during the decisive days of national history the members of the royal house had been living in the enemies' camp. The Bourbons lacked everything that constitutes the essence of genuine legitimacy: they could neither base their power upon a great past, one held sacred by the entire nation; nor could they look forward with confidence to the future. In addition, now that the country felt reinvigorated, and now that the disorders in the east seemed to furnish a prospect of European complications, the arrogant Celtic pugnacity reawakened. "Denounce the treaties of 1815!"—such was the war-cry of the day. The nation, flattered and spoiled by all parties alike, ascribed responsibility for these treaties, not to itself and to its own infatuation, but to the Bourbons, the protégés of the foreigner.

In view of the general hostility, the tenure of the Polignac ministry was impossible from the outset. In this land of popular sovereignty it was no longer possible for any government to maintain itself enduringly in opposition to the definite desire of the nation; even Napoleon could remain in the saddle so long only as his luck continued, so long only as his victories gratified national vanity. The well-grounded detestation of the cabinet was intensified by the might of doctrine. The self-complacency of the new century delighted to boast that in these enlightened days partisan distinctions were based on principle, and had therefore become clearer, more plainly conscious, than ever before. Nevertheless, now as always, the struggle of parties was a struggle for power; and the modern custom of formulating theoretical programmes served merely to increase the arrogance of the factions, to make them more irreconcilable. Rarely has an empty doctrine had consequences more disastrous than were now the consequences in France of the new doctrine of the one and only true constitutionalist state.

During the opening years of the restoration none but isolated voices, mostly from the camp of the ultras, had ventured to contest the king's constitutional right to nominate his ministers as he pleased.[1] At that time Royer-Collard, the respected leader of the doctrinaires, declared that the monarchy would come to an end on the day when the Chambers compelled the king to accept the ministers of their choice. Before long, however, the liberals began to look towards England, and to consider that the parliamentary dominion of the English aristocracy must be translated into democratised France. Thiers, the ablest among the initiators of the July revolution, summed up the new teaching in the catchword, le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas. After the victory he candidly admitted that at the time when the Polignac ministry had been formed there had been mooted "the great question of the representative system, the question wherein the very essence of that system is comprised, the question that determines its existence or its non-existence, the question whether the king is or is not independent of the majority in the Chambers, whether he is able, should he so desire, to choose his ministers elsewhere than from among the majority." Continuing in still plainer terms, he said: "What did we want before July? Constitutional monarchy, with a ruling house which would recognise constitutional limitations and would therefore owe its throne to us."

In these words the second of that day's doctrinaire articles of faith found expression. Veneration for historic dates is a salient characteristic of routinist neofrench culture. Just as the liberals had long believed that in the wonderful year 1789 their new freedom had been born all of a sudden, and just as they looked down with good-humoured contempt upon every nation that was unable to point to an '89 in its own annals, so now were they intoxicated anew by the novel article of faith, which ran as follows: "England first secured guarantees for liberty through the second revolution of 1688, and France therefore must also close her epoch of revolutions by another '88. The comparison limped on both feet, for where in France could anyone point to a reign of terror resembling the misdeeds of the hanging judge Jefferies, and where to a powerful parliamentary nobility competent to take up the heritage of the expelled kingly house? But for the superficial doctrinairism of the day a few specious resemblances were enough. These resemblances

[1] Vide supra, vol. II, pp. 371, 372.

were obvious. In England, just as in France, the epoch of civil wars had been succeeded by the dominion of a tyrant of genius; then, in opposition to the will of an army proud of its glorious traditions, came the restoration of the legitimate royal house. In France, as in England, when the dynasty seemed on the point of extinction, an unexpected heir was born; in France, as in England, a dissatisfied prince stood near to the throne. Why should not France, too, enjoy the delights of a second revolution? As Thiers cheerfully remarked, "There was nothing to destroy but the dynasty!"

The discontented would not see that solely in the uncontested hereditary right of the ruling house could party ambition find its ultimate barriers, and freedom before the law its ultimate guarantees. For the frivolous younger generation, grown up in the schools of the new university, the age of the revolution had lost its terrors. How attractive were the horrors of those days as pictured in Thiers' famous history. Even in Mignet's quietly written book on the history of the revolution, a masterpiece of concise, clear, and lively narrative, the voice of conscience was silent. Both these authors spoke as if some enigmatic force of destiny had, as far as France was concerned, suspended for five-and-twenty years the eternal moral laws of national life. Thus the liberal parties meandered in the dream world of a doctrine which was considered irrefutable although it was turgid with contradictions; which termed itself monarchical although it was founded upon the republican idea of popular sovereignty. Imagining that they were defending the Charte, the supporters of this doctrine contested a right which the Charte indubitably gave to the crown; they spoke of the monarch as irresponsible, and of the government of his advisers as alone responsible; and yet they contended that the nation was competent to discrown the king should he fail to bow before the will of the Chambers.

This doctrine of justified revolution was countered, no less frivolously and no less arrogantly, by the doctrine of the justified coup d'état. King Charles obstinately asserted his natural right; he would rather, he protested, break stones on the road than allow his crown to be debased as low as the crown of England. Should the worst come to the worst, Polignac had in readiness a legal doctrine obviously borrowed from the kingcraft of the house of Stuart. Since the Charte had been a free gift of the royal grace, the monarch could at

any time resume his primitively undiminished authority and could abolish certain clauses in the constitution, proceeding subsequently by ordinary legal methods; the Charte declared in article 14 that the king could issue such ordinances as he thought necessary for the safety of the state; once before, in the year 1816, the electoral law had, for the sake of public tranquillity, been modified by royal decree. Polignac pursued his course with the confidence of a somnambulist. Bernstorff and even Metternich had long doubted whether he possessed either the character or the ability requisite for the unequal struggle. He honestly believed, however, that he was opposed by a mere handful of clamourers, and he assured the foreign envoys that he had no need of a majority in the Chamber, for in France the king's will was paramount.[1] Thus principle was opposed to principle. On both sides was lacking that conciliatory sentiment which can alone make cumbrous constitutionalist forms workable. In accordance with French tradition, both parties laboured in secret, concealing their ultimate aims.

For months, under Polignac's incapable leadership, the ministers could come to no decision. They went quietly on with their administrative business, and simply would not venture upon any step which might expose them to public censure. Despite this, the opposition newspapers had sworn to make it impossible for the cabinet to govern, and their columns were filled with savage invectives, to which the official newspapers responded with no less violence. Day by day the dispute became more venomous, for the very reason that as yet the government had done nothing wrong. Already there could be everywhere discerned the influence of the society Aide-toi, a body whose membership consisted of republicans and doctrinaires, and which for fully three years had been intriguing for the overthrow of the Bourbons. In the provinces, associations were formed to advocate a refusal to pay taxes should the king infringe the Charte. At the new year of 1830, Thiers and other young men of talent started the newspaper *Le Nationale*, boldly waving the tricolor. For a time Prince Polignac hoped to divert attention from home affairs by successes in foreign policy. Immediately after entering into office he submitted to the king a grand scheme for the reconstruction of Europe. Turkey was to be partitioned; the king of the Netherlands was

[1] Bernstorff to Maltzahn, February 1, 1830; Maltzahn's Reports, January 26, 1830, et seq.; Werther's Reports, August 12, 1829, et seq.

to go to Constantinople and the king of Saxony to Aix-la-Chapelle; Prussia was to be enlarged by the acquisition of Saxony and Holland; France was to secure possession of Belgium without striking a blow. But the peace of Adrianople brought this fantastic design to naught before it had been communicated to the great powers. Subsequently a dispute ensued with the dey of Algiers, and shortly before their fall fortune smiled on the Bourbons to this extent, that by a bold and ably conducted onslaught the most important of her colonies was secured for the new France. But not even this brilliant success sufficed to turn the nation from the idea with which its mind had become obsessed.

In his speech from the throne on the opening of the Chambers on March 2nd the king solemnly declared that he would hand down the sacred rights of his crown undiminished to his successors, and that he would know how to suppress criminal intrigues. In no way did he exceed his privileges, but to his excited audience the words sounded like a threat. The Chambers answered in a disrespectful address. They deplored the monarch's distrust, and enunciated the principle that continued harmony between the views of the government and the desires of the nation was indispensable to the regular course of public affairs. Royer-Collard, the man who had described parliamentary government as the death of monarchy, was now selected to read King Charles the address which declared parliamentary government the only permissible system. The king promptly prorogued the Chambers. How undisciplined, disingenuous, and aimless was the discontent which boiled up again out of the witches' cauldron of Celtic passion! The Chambers demanded from the crown the dismissal of a cabinet which had as yet done nothing, while the king dispersed the representatives of the people before they had rejected any governmental proposal! It was in these very days that Victor Hugo's *Hernani*, the crude product of an overheated imagination, made its first appearance upon the boards. The thunderous applause of the audience showed that the nation had wearied of its classical ideals, and that in the domain of literature too a revolution was in train. In May, the Chambers were dissolved. After a fierce electoral struggle, the popular majority was returned with considerable accessions of strength, a result which had been foreseen by everyone except the king and his confidants. Polignac, however, was unshaken, and

was more firmly convinced than ever that he was in the right. Declaring that the king would mount the scaffold like his brother should he dismiss his present ministry, the minister set seriously to work upon his plan for a coup d'état.[1]

Among the foreign envoys, the nuncio Lambruschini alone stood by his friend. Even Count Apponyi, who had hitherto been in close relations with the apostolic party, drew cautiously back when the decisive hour approached, as Lord Stewart had done before him. Werther and Pozzo di Borgo had from the first shown no liking for this cabinet. All the great powers condemned the attitude of the Chambers, but they all conveyed warnings against the outrageous folly of a breach of the constitution.[2] It was fruitless. On July 25th the king signed the momentous ordinances which, on the strength of the ambiguous article 14 of the Charte, altered the electoral law, suspended the freedom of the press, and dissolved the newly elected Chambers. The crown thus put itself in the wrong, and furnished its enemies with the desired pretext for posing as blameless defenders of the constitution. Two days later a revolt broke out in the capital. While the possessing classes, following the invariable custom of the Parisian bourgeoisie, skulked in their houses, the Napoleonic veterans and the republican youths flocked joyfully to the barricades from schools, factories, and workshops—all sworn enemies of the dynasty. This old weapon of the barricade, a relic of the street fights between the Huguenots and the Fronde, had been revived three years earlier, and, like all the other wonders of neofrench liberty, was docilely adopted by the neighbouring nations, so that during the next two decades nearly every capital on the continent had at least one opportunity of enjoying a barricade fight.

On the first day of the revolt the cry "Long live the Charte!" was still heard. On the second day the watchword was "Down with the Bourbons, Liberty for ever, Long live the republic!"—or "Long live Napoleon II!" Tricolors waved everywhere, and there ensued that war against stone and brass which is so dear to the French spirit; wherever the royal lilies were displayed they were torn down, hacked to pieces, besoiled, committed to the flames. After three days the regular troops, ill led and by no means trustworthy, gave up the game as lost. The hearts of the conquerors were filled

[1] Werther's Report, June 27, 1830.

[2] Bernstorff to Werther, May 14; Werther's Reports, May 22 and June 10, 1830.

with boundless self-complacency. With how much exaggeration, during all these years, had been extolled the heroism of the stormers of the Bastille, the cowardly massacre of a handful of disabled elderly soldiers by an enormous mob. But on this occasion the Parisian populace fought with courage and tenacity, carrying a difficult struggle to a victorious conclusion, and displaying a certain chivalrous magnanimity—for outbreaks of ferocity and cruelty, mainly due to the savagery of the youthful population of the slums, were isolated occurrences. France had again become the admired land of freedom, and felt justified by her revolutionary propaganda in ruling the grateful nations and conferring happiness upon them. It is true that the victors in the July fighting had no more definite plans for the future than had the aged Lafayette who, made commander of the reestablished National Guard, basked once more in the sunshine of popular favour, and knew nothing better than to repeat the old empty phrases about the rights of man. The young radicals had been attracted to the barricades solely by hatred for the Bourbons, by an indefinite passion for revolution.

As soon, however, as success was assured, the leaders of the parliamentary opposition emerged from their lurking-places and the dissolved Chambers reassembled upon their own authority to deprive the street fighters of the fruits of victory. The king meanwhile kept away from Paris. Having completely lost courage, on July 30th he cancelled his ordinances and endeavoured to form a moderate cabinet. Had there still remained among the monarchical parties any remnants of loyalty and resolution, after this admission of past errors the legitimist and constitutionalist order might have been securely maintained for a long time to come. But loyalty existed nowhere, while definite resolve was known only to those who desired to reenact the revolution of 1688. The blood that had been shed cried for atonement, and to the savage spirit of revenge the government of Charles X seemed henceforward impossible. It was at this juncture that Thiers, Mignet, and their friends first ventured to issue leaflets in which the crown was demanded for Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. Behind them stood a man of ominous name, old Talleyrand, who had been ungratefully dismissed by the Bourbons. With infallible insight he had recognised that a change of weather was imminent, and was unconcernedly preparing to trim his sails to the new favourable wind.

As long as the matter still trembled in the balance Duke Louis Philippe hid himself in the park of Neuilly, and would treat with the emissaries of his adherents solely through the instrumentality of his sister Adelaide, the only man in the Orleans family. Vacillating betwixt fear and greed he at length allowed himself to be persuaded to enter the capital. There he accepted the regency which was offered him by the Chambers, appearing, tricolor in hand, upon the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville, the old nursery of Parisian revolution, and publicly embracing General Lafayette. The hero of two continents then gave the new ruler his blessing, magniloquently declaring that the throne was now encompassed with republican institutions. The king's eyes being at length opened, he also nominated the duke of Orleans regent. Next day, August 2nd, he renounced the crown on behalf of himself and the dauphin, and recommended that the regent should declare the duke of Chambord king as Henry V, and should continue to act as regent during the young king's minority. Louis Philippe suppressed the latter part of this command, and merely communicated to the Chambers the abdication of the king and the dauphin. Not a word did he say of Henry V; the guileless nation was to believe that the Bourbons had renounced their succession.

Thus securing the crown by trickery, he betrayed his cousins, less ruthlessly perhaps, but no less unchivalrously, than his father in former days had betrayed the sixteenth Louis. Fear and ambition, the two dominant traits of his character, cooperated in this decision, for if, as was his princely duty, he had accepted the regency on behalf of the young king Henry V, the hatred attaching to the Bourbon name might readily have led to his own destruction and to that of the house of Orleans.

The intrigue now hastened to its close, and by August 7th the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe was formally established. In the interim the discrowned king was solemnly conducting from the country the funeral cortège of the old monarchy. Slowly, by short stages, surrounded by the members of the royal household and a body of loyal troops, he made his way to Cherbourg, thence to seek asylum in England. Unconcerned about their oaths, the army and the officialdom promptly went over to the victorious camp. The old legitimist pugnacity flamed up once more in La Vendée alone. The other provinces

adapted themselves unresistingly to the change. They had long been accustomed to the dictatorship of the capital, and they felt that in reality the revolution altered nothing but the apex of the state. Its essence, the Napoleonic prefectural system, remained unchanged. The only difference was that the crank of the huge administrative machine was now turned by other hands, those of the well-to-do middle classes, who skilfully utilised their preponderance in the Chambers to establish a bourgeois class dominion more absolute than had ever before existed in any great state. The golden age of the bourgeoisie had dawned. The democratisation of society did not bring, as its doctrinaires had so often prophesied, the regime of talent; it brought the regime of the moneybag. The Charte was promptly modified for the advantage of the new ruling class, although the liberals contended that they had fought for the maintenance of the Charte. The noble house of peers vanished with the legitimist crown. Political rights were made dependent upon a high property qualification, the consequence being that everyone discontented with the existing order was forced in the end to direct his criticism against property itself. Thanks to the electoral law and thanks to the impudence of electoral corruption and electoral intrigue, henceforward hardly any but members of the dominant class secured entry to the Chambers; parliamentary life became superficial, parliamentary orators dull; the party struggle lost sense and meaning, being concerned solely with the question, which among the ambitious leaders of faction would secure ministerial portfolios. No less obstinately and arrogantly than the knightly nobility of old did this *pays légal* of the new moneyed nobility look down upon the broad masses of the people, stigmatising them as the dangerous classes.

Once before, however, in the days of the Convention, the fourth estate had ruled France, and now, by its struggles at the barricades, it had again overthrown the old monarchy. It cherished a precocious self-esteem, and harboured an inextinguishable grudge against the *escamoteurs de juillet*, against the rich, who had wrested power from its hands. Oppressed and neglected, it could hope nothing from the class dominion of those who simply ignored the miseries of the common people, and it looked for salvation towards the high-sounding promises of the new socialistic and communistic doctrines. Sanguinary working-class revolts in Paris and Lyons speedily showed how

much affliction and hatred had accumulated in these lower levels of society.

The bourgeois government was pacifically inclined, as money rule invariably is, and yet it was derived from a revolution whose motive force lay in pugnacious radicalism. It was under this pacific bourgeois monarchy that the warlike arrogance of the French attained its highest development, and it was at this time that, thanks to a successful comedy by Scribe, it received the new name of chauvinism. All the nations of the world vied one with another in paying homage to the heroes of the great week, for even the storming of the Bastille had not been celebrated with such unanimous enthusiasm. How could these clouds of incense fail to intoxicate the French? The great majority of the nation seriously believed that, as the chosen people, they enjoyed, not merely the right to revolt, but the right to make unrestricted war. Beyond their frontiers there lived only slaves, who looked to France for liberation. French campaigns of conquest were regarded always as conquests of the ideal. As the inundations of the Nile spread a fertilising slime over the land, so did these conquests leave everywhere the blessings of civilisation and freedom. The youthful shoot of the revolutionary royal house must be watered with blood to help it to strike firm root, and every nation must gratefully accept it as a benefit when the French forced it to shed its heart's blood on behalf of so sublime a purpose. Thus, in honest enthusiasm, chorused the thousand voices of the press.

The new artificial monarchy, however, whose function it was to control all these dangerous passions and social contrasts, was cursed from the outset with indecision and inveracity. The bourgeois king owed his position neither to historic right nor, like Napoleon, to the overwhelming democratic force of a popular vote. As rightful regent on behalf of King Henry V, Louis Philippe could have maintained towards the foreign powers a dignified attitude, and one worthy of France. As king, he had continually to excuse and conceal the stigma of usurpation, and yet was compelled to avoid any open denial of the revolutionary origin of his authority. He did not style himself Philippe VII, for he was not the legitimate successor of Philippe VI; nor did he style himself Philippe I, for he did not wish to display himself simply as a usurper; he reigned, therefore, as Louis Philippe, and not as king of France but as king of the French. This title was admired by the entire

liberal world as a peculiar mark of constitutionalist virtue, although Frederick the Great had upon his coins invariably styled himself *Borussorum rex*. Revolutionary pride could no longer tolerate the use of the term "subject," although its real significance was precisely identical with that of "citizen," now the sole permissible denomination.

It was necessary that the house of Orleans should attempt to maintain the semblance of legitimacy, and not without reason did the court journals declare that Louis Philippe had ascended the throne because he was a Bourbon. But with equal obstinacy the radicals asseverated that the representatives of the sovereign people had appointed the king by their free choice although he was a Bourbon. In actual fact he had recognised popular sovereignty, and had given a solemn assurance that he had concluded a convention, "un pacte d'alliance," with the nation. In accordance with ancient usage, the remodelled constitution continued to speak of the hereditability of the crown; but since of the last four monarchs of France one only had died in peaceful possession of his throne, this was a mere rhetorical flourish. Besides, the Charte was expressly "entrusted to the courage and the patriotism of the National Guard and of all French citizens." In other words, the king was responsible, and could be legally dethroned if the sovereign people considered that the Charte had been violated. Despite the trappings of monarchy, he possessed supreme authority only during good behaviour, and for this reason Odilon Barrot spoke of the bourgeois monarchy as the best of republics.

In so false a position, even a prince of straightforward character and unblemished fame could hardly have escaped the reputation of duplicity. How much less was it possible for this nimble-witted scion of the house of Orleans to escape it, a house whose record was still tarnished by memories of the unworthy regent Philippe, the second duke of Orleans, and of the bourgeois Philippe Egalité. Louis Philippe had been brought up in the principles of the vainglorious enlightenment, and subsequently had fought at Jemappes as a republican general. Having become an émigré, it was his good fortune that his repeated endeavours should fail to secure for him a position in the allied army, and he was therefore at a later date able to boast with a modicum of truth that he had never fought among the enemies of France. During the years of exile he travelled extensively, acquiring a varied knowledge of

the world and of men, but at the same time completely shaking off the traditions of the royal house. He was equally free from the pride of the French princes and from a dynastic sentiment of duty, and in this arid mind the power of history, the right of the Capets that had endured for ten centuries, awakened no veneration. When the hour struck for his return, it was his first aim, as a careful steward, to regain the enormous family property of the Orleans, which had been largely acquired out of rents from the gambling hells in the Palais Royal, and thus to ensure for himself and his family that in any event they should be easy in their domestic finances. It was with this end in view that in the year 1821 he made secret advances to Eugène Beauharnais, suggesting a reciprocal pledge that should a new revolution bring luck to either of the parties to the agreement he should guarantee the other undisturbed residence in France. The Napoleonid, however, displayed a more knightly spirit than the Bourbon, and refused the proposal, saying that it was not in his power to give any binding pledge, for in the event of such a revolution he would merely proclaim the accession of Napoleon II.[1]

Since the duke's whole outlook was that of the new France, he was under no illusions concerning the perilous position of the old dynasty, and already at the close of the hundred days the question of his accession was mooted in diplomatic circles. As had been customary for a century among the Capets, the younger line of the royal house constituted the centre of the opposition. Liberal stockbrokers, members of parliament, and authors, were intimates of the Palais Royal, and P. L. Courier extolled the duke as the only patriotic and liberal prince of the blood. His fame became more widely extended when he had his son given a good middle class education in a Paris lycée. As long as monarchs had existed the world had hitherto been of the opinion that princes must be differently educated from subjects, since princes have a different function in life. But the equalitarian zeal of the liberal bourgeoisie led to a facile neglect of the teachings of experience. The middle classes spoke favourably of the duke's democratic sentiments; although it was obvious that his sons could never enjoy the chief bless-

[1] This incident, to which Du Casse (Mémoires du prince Eugène, x, p. 285) also refers, was recalled by Hortense Bonaparte to the recollection of the courts when Louis Philippe contested the claim of Eugène's descendants to the Belgian throne (Letter from Hortense to the duchess Augusta von Leuchtenberg, Rome, January 27, 1831, communicated to the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin in February 1831).

ing of a public education, the perfectly free competition of youthful heads and hands; while in respect of arrogance, the young princes of the house of Orleans were no whit inferior to other members of their order. When Louis Philippe hesitatingly accepted the crown, his criminal breach of law gave him little concern. The enlightened son of Philippe Egalité, thoroughly sceptical in religious matters, had no serious scruples about "breaking the line of royal prejudices," as the faithful Thiers phrased it. He was, however, seriously disquieted concerning the future of his own family. In accordance with the ancient family custom of the Capets, a custom which had been almost inviolably observed, his possessions should have accrued to the crown when he ascended the throne. But the bourgeois king promptly displayed the mercantile character of his regime by evading this proud royal tradition with the adroitness of a gambler on the stock exchange. Immediately before accepting the royal dignity he made over his property to his children, retaining for himself merely the usufruct, which he then turned to the best possible advantage with the assistance of friendly banking firms. Nevertheless he was daily afflicted with the curse visited on the usurper, and he repeatedly declared, "My children will have to beg their bread."

In order to maintain his position he was compelled at the outset to endure personal humiliations and to have recourse to demagogic wiles. He went so far as to erase the lilies from his family escutcheon; he made an unremitting use of his power of coining sugary phrases; and at public displays he prostrated himself humbly before the sovereign people. When bad weather threatened he would make his way on foot through the streets, dressed as a respectable bourgeois, looking like a bank manager, with his obese, pear-shaped countenance and his well-brushed full-bottomed wig, surmounted by a tall hat. If rain set in he would politely share his umbrella with some passing bourgeois, walking home with the astonished man arm-in-arm. At a later date, when he felt himself more firmly seated on the throne, he would adroitly play off one against another the party leaders in the Chamber, in order to maintain his personal authority under the semblance of parliamentary government. He zealously endeavoured to secure for his house an equality with the legitimist courts, and since war would have involved new dangers of revolution he was careful to bridle the bellicose spirit of the nation. Yet at the same time he made use of

the danger of revolution as a spectre with which to alarm the great powers and to enforce the granting of all kinds of arrogant pretensions put forward by France. By these devices he was long able to maintain his position, and to his moderation the French owed many years of abundant prosperity; but his regime continued to be nothing more than a sterile struggle for existence; it failed to provide the country with a single new political idea; and by its scandalous neglect of the working masses of the population it paved the way for the grave social struggles of the future.

The only admirable thing about this revolution was the personal courage of the men who fought at the barricades. It was brought about quite as much by the fault of the liberal parties as by the encroachments of King Charles. The liberals had overthrown the moderate Martignac ministry, and by their spiteful opposition they had forced the king into such a situation that the only choice left open to him lay between a coup d'état and the formal recognition of parliamentary government. When the king's breach of the constitution had been atoned for by his abdication, the liberals did not even venture an attempt to save the succession for the dynasty. When the British had expelled the Stuarts they could appeal to the incontestable legal principle that a papist could not be king of England nor head of the Anglican church. But there was absolutely no legal barrier to the accession of Henry V. The only obstacles were the blind hatred of the nation and the fashionable doctrine summed up by Mignet in the phrase that after a revolution the throne must be renovated like all other institutions. Thus heedlessly was severed the last slight bond connecting the new France with the old. The July revolution did not, as its promoters joyfully declared, close the epoch of revolutions. On the contrary, it opened the way to an unending series of new civic struggles. For this reason, however excusable in its political consequences, it was the most pernicious among the French revolutions of the nineteenth century. But how could contemporaries be expected to foresee all these consequences? The soundest judgments of the day were perhaps those of the Prussian generals and of a few thoughtful German conservatives. The liberals of all lands judged by appearances, and in the street fights of Paris could see nothing but a splendid and thoroughly justified defence against a violation of the constitution. Since at this epoch the very name of "constitution"

exercised an irresistible charm over the minds of all, while historic dynastic rights were but lightly regarded by adherents of the dominant doctrine, the grave infringement of law was barely noticed, while the heroism of the great week aroused general and unrestrained rejoicing. The rise to power of the French bourgeoisie furnished powerful support to the middle classes in the struggle which in various neighbouring lands they had long been waging against the vestiges of the feudal order of society, and the consequence was that a movement which in France itself eventuated in almost unmitigated disaster, served in other countries, and not least in Germany, to bring about an indispensable and valuable transformation in political life.

The events in Paris found a striking echo in the land which at an earlier date had most tenaciously resisted the first French revolution. After Canning had broken with the league of the eastern powers, England's parliamentary life had resumed a livelier movement: Huskisson had somewhat modified the harsh customs laws; whilst Canning had shortly before his death made some approach towards the whig party, now gaining strength. Public opinion was once more turning towards those plans for reform which Pitt had drafted in his more sanguine days, but had been compelled to postpone amid the stress of the war period. During the long years in which the continental states had been remodelled by enlightened absolutism or by revolution, England had devoted the best of her energies to the foundation of her colonial empire, and had allowed internal legislative progress to be almost completely arrested. At length the nation began to recognise how much had been left undone, and so overwhelmingly powerful was the demand for innovation that several of the boldest reforms of the ensuing decades were inaugurated by strictly conservative statesmen. The first great reform, for example, Catholic emancipation, was the work of Wellington and Peel (1829). Even these tories could not but feel that prolonged delay in this matter might lead to civil war and perhaps to the secession of shamefully ill-used Ireland; they recognised that the ancient hostility of the Catholic Celts, lately stimulated anew by the fiery speeches of O'Connell, must be appeased by an act of justice.

This timely reform secured only what Germany had accomplished long before, and what other continental states had effected since Napoleonic days. The dominion of the

aristocracy, however, was closely interwoven with the privileges of the state church. Just as in the twelfth century the dispute with the Roman church had first weakened the previously unrestricted authority of the Norman kings, and had opened the way for an increase in the power of the estates during the following century, so now the first onslaught on the Anglican church simultaneously shook the power of the parliamentary nobility and opened a breach for the oncoming of a democratic era. Louder and yet more loud became the demand for parliamentary reform. Once again there was manifest, though in completely altered guise, the contrast between the south-east and the north-west which was so momentous for England's history. How often in earlier centuries had the energies of progress been centred in the lowlands of the south-east. Since then, however, the hill country of the north-west had emerged from its seclusion; here were the mines and the factories of the new England; here was being effected a complete transformation of social relationships, for the countryfolk were unceasingly streaming into the towns, and the flourishing industrial centres were imperiously demanding a share in parliamentary government, whereas the rotten boroughs of the south-east were falling more and more into decay. When the new elections began in the summer of 1830, William IV, the sailor king as he was popularly styled, had just ascended the throne. Bluff and genial, of moderate intelligence, he was an honest man, and was more in tune with his age than had been his brother George IV.

Amid the storms of the electoral struggle, the news from Paris now worked with inflammatory power. The ancient national hatred suddenly disappeared. Newspapers and popular orators vied one with another in praise of the great nation; many enthusiasts adorned their hats with the tricolor; the well-to-do flocked to Paris, fraternising there with the members of the national guard, listening greedily to the first-hand reports of these civic heroes concerning the wonders of the great week. The cosmopolitan doctrines of continental radicalism, which during the days of the first revolution had found adherents only among the isolated democratic clubs of the capital, now began to permeate the masses of the people. At meetings of working men, songs were sung celebrating the brotherhood of the liberated nations: "Behold ye, now that France is free, shall freedom smile on Germany, Italy's heroes join the throng, Poland right

the ancient wrong!" Radicals and liberals joined hands in the struggle against aristocracy. While Cobbett was stirring up the masses by his fanatical writings in the *Political Register*, and whilst among the associations formed by prosperous Londoners extreme radical desires found expression, and even a demand that parliamentary representatives should receive a fixed mandate from the electors, in the whig *Edinburgh Review* Brougham and Jeffrey were more cautiously voicing the claims of the middle classes.

Meanwhile the learned radicals of the *Westminster Review* group were laying down the scientific formulas that expressed the outlook of the approaching epoch of democracy. They were disciples of Jeremy Bentham who, in the evening of his laborious life was thus enabled to see the harvesting of the seed he had sown in earlier years. The aged recluse continued to cling to the English philosophy of enlightenment which, when further developed by the French, had come to fruition in the declaration of the rights of man of the year '89. Whilst continental radicals complacently believed themselves to stand on the topmost pinnacles of freedom, the most brilliant of Bentham's pupils, the precocious John Stuart Mill, an honest enthusiast, was declaring with the frankness of all-wise youth that the nineteenth century was essentially reactionary. By Herder and Goethe, he declared, and by the German historical doctrine of law, there had been disseminated the liberticide error that political science can discover relative truths alone, that a constitution must be based upon the natural inequality of man and upon existing discrepancies of social power. It was necessary, therefore, to return to the old doctrine of natural rights, whose ultimate consequences had been expressed by no one so boldly as by Bentham. The state consists of individuals pursuing their own advantage; it has no end of its own, but serves merely as a means to secure the greatest good of the greatest number; were it thoroughly democratised, the energies of work, culture, and free speech would completely annihilate distinctions between persons, races, and sexes, since these distinctions were purely artificial, the product of outward circumstances. Visions of the unrestricted power of democratic legislation were, in truth, opposed to the political traditions of the whole Teutonic world; but since the nation of Baconians lacked speculative profundity, the materialistic conception of the universe which underlay these dreams had in

England never been scientifically superseded. Without transition, side by side with strict religious beliefs there existed the morality of the uninstructed reason, that morality which estimates all moral goods by the measure of utility. Now that a new economic epoch was really beginning, how splendid and how alluring seemed the prospect of unending increase in material prosperity, of everlasting "improvement." It was in these very days that was opened the first great railway line, between Manchester and Liverpool; one of the pioneers of the new age, Huskisson, meeting a tragic death on this occasion. The performances of steam exceeded all expectations, but the miseries attendant upon machine industry on the large scale were already being manifested in the form of disorderly strikes.

The whole country was in a ferment, and the opposition was victorious at the polls. In November, Wellington, who would not now swim with the stream, resigned the reins of government; and before the year closed Lord Grey formed a new cabinet, composed of whigs and a few friends of Canning. It was now that young Lord John Russell introduced his reform bill.

For an entire year, however, a passionate struggle raged in the press and in the clubs, in the streets and in the market places, until at length the lower house, after a fresh election, gave its assent. The resistance of the lords was broken by the personal influence of the king, who requested the opponents of reform to absent themselves from the house when the decisive vote was taken, for he was afraid that the creation of a number of new peers sufficient to ensure the passing of the measure would completely destroy the prestige of the upper chamber, already much impaired. Thus the reform of the lower house was effected by an irresistible popular movement (1832). The reform bill did no more than was indispensable. The numbers of the electorate were doubled, not an extreme step after the sins of omission of many previous years; the worst of the rotten boroughs were abolished, while the new seats of industry and commerce secured representation, though to an extent by no means proportioned to the real relationships of power.

Is it surprising that this peaceful innovation was hailed by the moderate liberals of the continent as a new demonstration of the hereditary wisdom of the English? Even Dahlmann could see in the reform nothing but a salutary cleansing of the existing constitutional organs, for he followed Montesquieu

in the belief that the lower house was the democratic counterpoise to the upper. None but a few far-sighted conservatives were able to estimate the significance of the great transformation. In a brilliant essay published in the *Preussische Staatszeitung* Hegel prophesied that this reform would shake the power of the old parliamentary aristocracy to its foundations, and the event proved him right. Hitherto no more than one fourth of the members of the commons had been freely elected, the other seats having been secured by favour of the great landowners and of the cabinet. Henceforward in half the constituencies the middle classes held the decisive vote; and although the members of the nobility were able under new forms and with considerable success to practise the arts by which they had been accustomed to control the elections, the house of commons gradually became, what it had never before been under Guelph rule, an assembly of popular representatives. On the other hand, the power of the upper house continually declined, for in the past the influence of the lords had to a large extent been exercised inconspicuously, through control of the elections and of votes in the commons. It was to the rotten boroughs that the unreformed house of commons had owed the continued accession of youthful statesmen. Now election had become less easy to secure. The rarity of talent and the decline of eloquence soon showed that the great days of English parliamentary life were drawing to a close.

The vague terms, liberal and conservative, of continental origin, were now becoming current side by side with the traditional designations of whig and tory, for both the hereditary parties of the nobility soon became sundered after the French manner into smaller groups representing divers interests and various shades of opinion—groups which it was difficult to combine under a common leadership. The leader of the new house of commons was no longer in the position which had in former days been held by both the Pitts, able to rule with the prestige of a military commander over a closed phalanx of social intimates and of relatives. The leader had now to win over by flattery those who composed the new gentry of merchants and manufacturers, of bank and railway directors, who were claiming equality with the new territorial nobility; he must satisfy the most conflicting economic, ecclesiastical, and local claims, and must respond to every desire; he must now allow himself to be led, and now lead while appearing

to yield. Whilst the lower house had in earlier days often become estranged from the nation through pride of caste, the doors had now been thrown open to every current, to every caprice of public opinion. The anonymous volunteer statesmen of the newspapers, and especially of the *Times*, acquired enormous power; and it was by no means rare for members of parliament, alarmed by the clamour of the press, to vote measures of which they personally disapproved. The legislative machine, which had hitherto moved so slowly, now worked fast enough, and often heedlessly. In rapid succession, measures were passed separating the royal civil list from state expenditure, suppressing the trading monopoly of the East India Company, abolishing slavery in the colonies, recognising the university of London as a corporation on the same footing with the ancient aristocratic universities, and transforming the decayed urban administrations by a municipal ordinance which, though liberal in spirit, was ill-considered. So powerful was the democratic impulse of the age that the house of commons, though its membership was still almost exclusively composed of the wealthy and the well-born, was compelled to devote its attention to the welfare of the illused masses. In the year 1833 was passed the first factory act, a very mild measure; while a small financial contribution was voted on behalf of the shamefully neglected cause of popular education.

The clamour of the streets had subsided now that the reform bill had been victoriously passed, but the workers were quietly assembling around the new banner of social reform, and at the same time the agitation for free trade was beginning. The radicals demanded an extension of the suffrage, on the ground that the reform bill had imposed arbitrary limits upon the right to vote; and they demanded also vote by ballot. The old English legal view, according to which the exercise of the suffrage had always been regarded as a serious civic duty and not simply as a right of the sovereign individual, was forgotten; the deadly sin of democratic times, the dread of personal responsibility, decked itself with the name of liberal thought. In association with democratic ideas the bureaucratic administrative forms of the continent likewise made their entry into the island state. Since the cumbrous methods of the old self-administration through justices of the peace and lord-lieutenants no longer sufficed for the complicated intercourse of modern society, and since the members of the new moneyed gentry

were disinclined to undertake the arduous duties of personal service in the work of national and local government, the neglected poor of the country were handed over to the care of a great specialised branch of the administration, rigidly bureaucratic. The new poor law system excelled the old in technical convenience, but its administration was exclusively vested in the hands of paid officials, all that was left to local decision being the convenient right of election. Thus to the delight of the radicals was delivered the first decisive blow against the self-government of the counties, the ancient and solid foundation of the parliamentary aristocracy; and before long the new bureaucracy gained control of additional branches of the administration.

On both sides of the Channel people plumed themselves on a bourgeois monarchy and on general freedom. In actual fact the British were beginning to emerge from their proud aristocratic separation, and their new house of commons was afflicted with all the infantile maladies of youthful continental parliamentarism. Amid the incalculable strife of the factions, the Irish, sworn enemies of imperial unity, were already able at times to cast the decisive vote; while the changes of ministry, numbering thirteen during five and thirty years, succeeded one another almost as rapidly as in France. In England, indeed, since the hereditary succession and the irresponsibility of the powerless crown remained unchallenged, there continued to exist a straightforward system of parliamentary government, whereas the unrightful king of the French was a responsible monarch, and was therefore, despite constitutional forms, compelled to rule in person.

The essence of this period of transition was incorporated in the Talleyrand of parliamentarism, in the adroit statesman who, an aristocrat by birth and leanings, henceforward conducted England's foreign policy with demagogic mastery. Lord Palmerston sprang from an Anglo-Saxon stock whose members had attained distinction long before the Norman conquest, and in recent times the house of Temple had ever been an ornament of the whig party. But since during Napoleonic days the whigs had no hope of power, the young viscount promptly went over to the tories. At the age of two-and-twenty he became a lord of the admiralty, and two years later secretary of state for war. He was a man of febrile though irregular industry, and soon became so immersed in public affairs that he felt uneasy unless

in office. He was the most perdurable of English ministers of state. Living fifty-eight years from the time of his first acceptance of office, he passed forty-four of these on the ministerial bench. He acquired wide diplomatic experience during the period when he was helping to equip the armies against Napoleon; and in his first great parliamentary oration he boldly enunciated the guiding thought of his political life, justifying the attack of the fleet on Copenhagen by the simple phrase that in this case natural law was stronger than international law, and that consequently for the sake of self-preservation England was entitled in time of peace to fall like a brigand upon a small neighbour state. Immediate advantage, "the expedient," as he was accustomed to phrase it, sufficed to excuse any breach of faith and any infraction of law. Politician through and through, with no appreciation for art or for the ideal forces of human life, but devoid of excessive self-esteem and free from sentimentalism, he never ceased to follow his native practical instinct, being as little troubled by principles and doctrines as by qualms of conscience. He knew that he could make his own way as long as he remained in the ministry. Tranquilly refusing a high office for which he did not yet feel himself competent, he unprotestingly made shift for a long time with a position of the second rank, although he had expected a greater one.

In the long run success was inevitable, for from the first he was the darling of the drawing-rooms. Public affairs did not prevent his enjoying life to the full and letting others do the same, and he participated eagerly in all the amusements of society. He laughed at the sanctimonious pose of his associates, admitting with genial frankness what a delight he took in women and in all the pleasures of this world; and when advanced in years it pleased him to hear himself spoken of by the pet name of Lord Cupid. When, late at night, after a long sitting of the commons, he would walk home with elastic tread, with a flower always in his mouth or in his buttonhole, shouldering his umbrella, tall hat thrust well to the back of his head, his fellow-countrymen were delighted with this image of old English vigour and vitality. His whole nature exhaled an atmosphere of cheerful content; his strong, square, Anglo-Saxon head, with shrewd wideset eyes, recalling at once the strength of the mastiff and the cunning of the fox. He was kind to his tenants; in accordance with the English custom he

found comfortable posts for his friends and relatives; but he never deliberately gave an important position to an incompetent aspirant. If anyone thwarted him, Palmerston never failed to retaliate sooner or later, but thereafter he speedily forgot, for enduring hatred was foreign to his easy-going temperament. He lacked the greatness and the depth of an elementally powerful nature, one endowed with all the might of reflection. His strength lay in the fine perceptions which enabled him to foresee every change in the popular mood. The longer he remained at the helm, the more perfectly did he and his British fellow-subjects learn to understand one another, so that he ultimately came to seem to the latter the most perfect representative of the national spirit.

He knew nothing and would know nothing of foreign nations, though he had a certain fondness for Italy, where he had lived some years in youth, while the light tone of the Parisian salons was agreeable to him. His view of the Germans was the one shared by all the tories, a view based upon Canning's poisonous lampoons in the *Anti-Jacobin*;[1] he regarded them as slaves, as political children, a nation of unbridled free-thinkers and learned fools. All the more unrestrainedly, therefore, was he able in his parliamentary speeches to indulge in the alluring tones of national self-glorification, and he speedily learned that for British hearers this art of demagogic flattery can rarely be too gross in its methods of expression. During the summer of 1813, whilst in Prussia the whole nation was taking up arms, Palmerston was extolling the incomparable advantages of the English mercenary system, and was assuring the gratified commons that a military commander could better rely upon such an army of recruited volunteers than upon "a hoard of slaves who have forcibly been torn from their homes." Later he went so far as to glorify the cat-o'-nine-tails as one of the treasures of British freedom. Yet the whole difference between English and continental armies was to be found in this, that on the continent soldiers were flogged without enquiry, whilst in England they were not flogged until after sentence by court martial!

The realist could not subscribe to the reactionary doctrines of the court of Vienna, although he hesitated to break on this account with Lord Castlereagh. When Canning restored to honour the traditional English policy of self-interest, Palmerston

[1] See Appendix XVI, vol. IV.

rallied to Canning's side with genuine satisfaction. With the other Canningites he soon seceded from the Wellington ministry, for he felt that this cabinet would shortly be "shipwrecked upon the rocks of public opinion"; and he foresaw the approaching collapse of the Bourbon throne. For two years he remained in the ranks of the opposition, preparing by the use of liberal commonplaces for the bold step which was to take him over to the whigs. "In nature," he declared, "there is only one motive force, that of the spirit; in human affairs this force is opinion, in political affairs it is public opinion; and those statesmen who understand how to control men's passions, interests, and opinions, acquire unrivalled power." He never troubled himself to ask whether it may not also be the statesman's duty to enlighten public opinion when that opinion errs, or with stern countenance to defy the prejudices of popular representatives. When, after the July revolution, he entered the reform cabinet of the whigs, taking over the foreign office from the hesitant hands of Lord Aberdeen, he promptly revived the commercial policy of Canning. He could not, like the two Pitts, inspire the house by the fervour of a great soul, nor could he, like Canning, influence it by the sustained pathos of artful oratory; the new parliamentarism demanded a virtuoso of mediocrity. Palmerston's influence was secured by the infallible method of national self-praise, by petty dialectical legerdemain, by journalese oratory whose meaning was plain to all and which spared its auditors the trouble of thinking. He countered opposition with cheap witticisms, and on occasions by a well-timed roughness, which to his innocent hearers sounded like an honest man's involuntary burst of feeling, so that the audience carried away the impression that it had had a privileged glimpse deep into the recesses of a loyal soul.

While still sitting on the opposition benches he had with an augur's smile expressed the flattering opinion that every member of the lower house was competent to form a sound judgment upon foreign policy if only that policy were conducted honestly and openly. As minister, therefore, he was diligent in the issue of ingeniously compiled blue books, disclosing a little of everything though concealing all that was essential, so that every reader of the *Times* could now pride himself on possessing a thorough understanding of the popular statesman's European policy. Palmerston, like Canning, desired to main-

tain peace, for war would be injurious to British commerce. But, like his master, he no less definitely desired that a certain menace of war should always be felt by the continent, so that England might retain a free hand for the expansion of her colonial empire and for the occupation of the markets of the world. Above all it was necessary that France and Russia, England's most dangerous competitors, should be kept apart; and the converted tory's business instinct soon enabled him to see that this end could readily be secured by adroit exploitation of the political passions of the day. If properly used, liberal phraseology might become an article of export, less costly than coal, iron, and cotton, but no less useful to England. If England were to espouse the cause of the new French ruler, at once supporting him and holding him in leash, if this entente cordiale of the western powers were continually extolled as a league of liberty against despotism, as a league of light against darkness, straightforward understanding between France and the conservative eastern powers would be rendered impossible.

The influence of Metternich's policy had for years nourished the general illusion that the grouping of parties in the society of states was not conditioned by the situation of the powers in the world and by their foreign interests, but was simply due, as had been the case during the epoch of the religious wars, to the internal conditions that respectively prevailed. The sobriety of Palmerston's intelligence had always kept his mind free from this fable of party passion, and he was well aware that contemporary constitutional struggles did not influence the relationships of power in Europe as effectively as in former days religious conflicts had influenced those relationships. Taking advantage, however, of the widely diffused misconception, he did not hesitate to announce that this self-sufficient island realm, which for many centuries had remained utterly unconcerned about the internal affairs of its neighbours, was the natural ally of all constitutionally ruled states. With the inflated verbiage of a cheapjack he extolled the admirable character and the imperishable durability of this league of the western powers, "founded upon the best principles of human nature and upon the most enlightened principles of statecraft"; saying that salvation was to be discovered solely in the power "of those constitutional rights which are a blessing for the nations that possess them and a source of offence to their

neighbours"; adding, "as soon as the forms exist, they gradually become animated by the spirit!" The emptiest catchwords of continental liberalism were welcome to him if he could turn them to account in calumniating the absolute monarchies. He had been a member of the ministry during the diplomatic negotiations of the year 1813, and did not shrink from retailing to parliament the journalistic fable that the nations, "aroused by the magic strains of the song of constitutional rights," had voluntarily taken up arms and had then been betrayed by their despots. Palmerston had accepted the fate of Samuel Johnson's actors. He lived to please and must please to live. Nor did he find it difficult to exploit in any way he pleased the profound ignorance of continental affairs which has always characterised the British. The lower house listened enthralled when the genial trickster related how Prussia and enslaved eastern Europe had lagged in the rear behind the free Spaniards and Portuguese, saying, "the great Spanish nation attempted, though at a distance, to emulate the splendid example of this country!"

Thus the legitimist doctrinairism of the Hofburg was countered by a policy demagogic in tendency, a policy no less injurious to the general welfare, and far more dishonest, for Metternich was genuinely afraid of the revolution, whereas Palmerston was making cunning play with his constitutionalist dicta. The first successes of this singular statecraft were brilliant. It proved possible to keep the continent in a state of such uneasiness that England meanwhile could continue undisturbed to build up her world empire. Through this policy, moreover, and through incessantly repeated flattery of the liberal powers of the west, the parties of the continent were utterly befooled. Europe, to her own disaster but to England's advantage, was split for ten years into the two camps of the constitutionalist and the absolutist monarchies, the liberals greeting "Old Pam" and regenerated France as the protectors of liberty, while the statesmen of the eastern powers execrated "Lord Firebrand," regarding him as a ubiquitous diplomatic incendiary.

Contemporaries can rarely do justice to individual men, and they can rarely do justice to states. Almost invariably, some states are better and others worse than their reputation. States better than their reputation are the younger powers which possess as yet little influence over European public

opinion, and which still have to demonstrate their right to existence. Less good than their reputation are the older powers, and above all England, which cannot fail to lose by the disclosure of her diplomatic history, and therefore guards the treasures of her archives more sedulously than any other state. Wonderful good fortune enabled the island power to conduct a magnificent struggle for the mastery of the seas under such favourable circumstances, that England seemed at first to be defending the European balance of power, and subsequently to be fighting on behalf of the general freedom of the nations. The league announced by Palmerston between England and all the free peoples remained for years an incontrovertible article of liberal faith. In course of time, however, the world began to notice that the policy which so gladly vaunted its invincible fleets displayed courage only against opponents of small physical power and enfeebled will, cautiously furling its sails when a strong adverse gale was encountered. People felt, too, how little reality underlay Palmerston's phrases about freedom; how incompetent he was to understand the most vigorous of the young national lives, that of Germany, now rapidly gaining strength; in how petty a spirit he was endeavouring to hinder the natural growth of Central Europe. Ultimately the boundless arrogance of England became intolerable to the pride of all her neighbours, when Palmerston thundered to the British his *civis Romanus sum*, thus stigmatising all other nations as barbarians in comparison with the one civilised people. Little by little a sentiment of colossal hatred took possession of the continent, and English statesmanship, at one time so generally admired, came to be regarded with distrust and finally with contempt. When Palmerston died (shortly before the victors of Königgrätz cancelled his life's work with a blood-red stroke) England could hardly be considered any longer to rank among the great powers of Europe. She had become severed from the old continent; she was immersed in oriental and transatlantic interests; and her voice no longer counted in continental affairs.

The reckoning came slowly. In those early days when Lord Palmerston first became foreign secretary, filled with vital energy and the joy of life, indefatigable and impenetrable, true to the motto on his family coat of arms, *flecti non frangi*, and sustained by the favour of contemporary liberal opinion, the Viennese court was right in regarding him as a formidable foe. The diplomatic scarecrows of the liberal plague, the jacobin

cancer, and the revolutionary conflagration, could not suffice to daunt this master of parliamentary oratory.

Among the disturbances that followed the July revolution the one which most directly threatened the peace of the world was the Belgian rising against Dutch dominion. Amid all confusions, at least the territorial distribution of the new society of states had remained unaltered, for the treaties of Vienna did not apply to Greece and Turkey. But that territorial distribution was now affected at its most vulnerable point. The new kingdom of the United Netherlands, the celebrated bulwark of the European balance of power, which the diplomats of the grand alliance had vied one with another in supporting, crumbled to pieces at a touch. The Netherlands government was partially responsible for the disaster, but the principal cause was the incurable weakness of the state, its defective and artificial structure. To the Hollanders, proud of their history, the land of Belgium, which since the days of Philip II had continually been subject to foreign rulers, could seem nothing more than an extension of territory for their reestablished national state, and as such it was expressly described in the European treaties. But through the greed of the house of Orange and its English patrons the supplement had been made larger than the main country. There were three and a quarter million Belgians and only two million Dutchmen, and the Belgians did not forget that, under the fortunate sceptre of Emperor Charles V, South Netherland had once formed the nucleus of the united Seventeen Provinces. Subsequently, after the seven provinces of the north had broken loose from the commonwealth of the old united state, what had they not had to suffer at the hands of these hostile brethren? First they had been compelled to measure strength with the northern provinces in a long and bloody struggle, for the eighty years' war of the Hollanders was for the most part a civil war between the two halves of the Netherlands. When vanquished at last, the Scheldt had been closed to them, they had been forbidden to engage in the East India trade, and their strong places had been garrisoned by the Dutch.

Religious hatred exercised an influence even more powerful than these embittered political memories. Not without good reason were the Belgian territories known in popular speech as the Catholic Netherlands, nor had two centuries of intimate

association between the Belgian priests and the religious zealots of Spain been without fruit. Upon this classic soil of religious wars, religious hostility was so intense that racial differences were insignificant in comparison. However great the contrast between the sluggish Flemings and the hot-blooded Walloons, the members of the two stocks held firmly together as a religious unit against the Dutch heretics. Both in France and in England the initiators of the revolutionary transformation had been liberals and radicals, but in the Netherlands the revolution was the work of ultramontanes to whom liberalism was no more than a tool. Hardly had France, voicing maledictions on the Jesuits, dethroned the strictly religious ancient royal house, when there occurred in Belgium an uprising which, at once akin and hostile to the Parisian July conflicts, took the street fights and the liberal catchwords of the French as an example and yet culminated in a brilliant triumph for the Roman church. No less strangely related to the great French revolution had been the uprising of the Brabant patriots against Emperor Joseph II.

From the first it had been impossible that any sentiment of fellowship should arise to unite the two hostile halves of the new kingdom of the Netherlands. A majority of the Belgian notables rejected the new constitution because it prescribed equal religious rights; and its introduction was effected through a detestable act of treachery and by the arbitrary powers of the Dutch crown. Since the two portions of the country were represented in the states general by an identical number of votes, and since the Hollanders, with the pride of the dominant race, worked in unanimity, whereas some of the Belgian votes were unfailingly at the disposal of the government, the Belgians were always outvoted by the Dutch. Most of the important offices were held by Hollanders. All the supreme administrative bodies had their headquarters in Holland, even that which controlled the mines, although mining was an industry about which the Dutch knew nothing. Through the inconsiderate enforcement of Dutch as the language of official intercourse, a valuable opportunity was lost of effecting the peaceful Germanisation of this region of eternal linguistic warfare, and of raising the Flemish dialect, so closely akin to the Dutch, to the dignity of a written speech. Centuries of foreign dominion had served to tame the men of Ghent and of Bruges, animated of old by a passionate love of freedom, but the Belgians retained

a stubborn mistrust of every government. How could their hearts go out to this King William I who, Protestant Dutchman from top to toe, looked down with the harsh pride of reason upon the superstitions of his Catholic subjects, and who, ignoring the modern doctrine of ministerial responsibility, continued to rule after the manner of his Orange forefathers?

The well-to-do bourgeoisie remained tranquil for a considerable period, for prosperity was increasing and Belgian industrial activity could find a lucrative outlet in the Dutch colonies. The first signs of resistance were seen among the nobility and the clergy, while the masses, incited by their parish priests, soon followed suit. The leaders of the clericals looked hopefully towards France, towards the *Congrégation* of the Pavillon Marsan. The king, however, who was not squeamish about the means he employed, was carrying on an underhand war against the Bourbons, and secretly favouring the proposals of the French malcontents. Brussels was for years an Alsatia for French refugees, and the result was that through the influence of these guests Belgian liberalism was thoroughly permeated with revolutionary ideas. Belgian hatred of the Dutch simultaneously favoured a spread of French culture and an increase in the power of the church. With undisguised insubordination the clergy opposed the king's rigidly bureaucratic ecclesiastical policy, complaining, as in the days of Emperor Joseph, of religious oppression, for a seminary had just been founded in Louvain by the state authority. In the official press the presumptuous claims of the ultramontanes were answered by the notorious Libry-Bagnano and his colleagues with a roughness which could not fail to incense the Catholic population.

At length, at the momentous instant when the Martignac ministry collapsed, Louis de Potter, the Belgian O'Connell, gave utterance to the decisive word: "Union of liberals and Catholics." De Potter had hitherto cherished Josephan principles, and had merely attacked the government in political pamphlets; but he now recognised that his ultimate aim, Belgian independence, could be attained only with the assistance of the church. Freedom of the press, trial by jury, ministerial responsibility, free use of the French language, enfranchisement of education (in other words, subordination of the elementary schools to the church)—such was the programme of the new allies. An avalanche of petitions assailed the doors of the states general.

When the king railed against the monstrous league of the two parties and against the infamy of their conduct, the hotspurs, following the old Gueux usage, swore to cleave to their banner, faithful even to infamy.

Such was the ferment in the country when it was surprised by the news of the July revolution. On August 25th the fiery songs of revolt of *The Dumb Girl of Portici* resounded in the Brussels theatre, and the same night the disturbance broke out, being at first nothing more than an aimless mob movement, but it was not long before the tricolor of Brabant floated upon the Gothic tower of the hôtel de ville. The rising became universal throughout the country, French agents, officers, and soldiers flocking to join the banner of revolt. The Dutch armies lacked firm leadership; and the king, beginning to feel that the administration of the two halves of the country must be divided, opened negotiations with the states general to this end. Four weeks after the first outbreak, after three days of savage street fighting, the royal troops were driven out by the citizens of Brussels. Thenceforward men began to desert the colours, the Belgians forsaking their regiments, and the ancient racial hatred flaming fiercely here and there. The attempts at mediation made by the ambitious prince of Orange proved fruitless, and after the Dutch forces in the Antwerp citadel had bombarded the town in revenge for a treacherous onslaught (October 27th), the separation was inevitable. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands was buried beneath the ruins of Antwerp. The leaders of the two allied parties, Félix de Mérode, the ultramontane fanatic, and van de Weyer, the talented young liberal statesman, sat together in the governmental committees of the revolutionaries. However conflicting the views of the two parties, both were animated by the same spirit of national self-confidence. In the intoxication of victory, memories were revived of the proud days when the Roland bell of Ghent had rung out *Victorie in Vlaanderland*. From day to day the idea once enunciated by Mirabeau, the idea of an independent Belgian state, gained new adherents.

The French who had hastened to the help of the Belgians confidently anticipated that Belgium would join free France. The entire radical press of Paris was trumpeting the same note, and General Lamarque, the celebrated chauvinist orator, roundly declared that the law passed by the convention of the year IV of the republic, by which the Belgian departments

were united with France, was still in force. Most of the Belgians were utterly averse from any such proposal. For this reason the republican designs of de Potter were frustrated, for only by the help of France, only through a world war, could a republic hope to maintain itself. The Belgians could not hope for the approval of the great powers to any other than a monarchical constitution. At the beginning of November the newly assembled national congress adopted a reasonable programme, and one enforced by the general situation, demanding independence, monarchy, and separation from the house of Orange.

Thus did this little nation, held together rather by religious sentiment than by any consciousness of political community, win the right to self-government. At the outset the liberal world had regarded the rising with suspicion, for its origins were obscure, and the Belgian mob committed lamentable excesses. But after the fierce street fighting in Brussels the current of opinion changed. "Brussels, too, has her three days and her tricolor!" wrote Eduard Gans joyfully, while other German liberal journalists continued with increasing admiration to discover additional resemblances between Belgium and the pioneer land of freedom, speaking of de Potter as the Belgian Lafayette and of Jouvenel's *Brabançonne* as the Belgian *Marseillaise*. The tricolor, three days, Lafayette, Marseillaise—what more did a nation need for happiness? Could any but the brutalised minions of tyranny now deny that the sun was rising over Europe in the west?

§ 2. RECOGNITION OF THE JULY MONARCHY. THE LONDON CONFERENCE.

When the first news of the great week made its way across the Rhine, the opposition parties in Germany, so long kept in a state of suppression, drew a deep breath of delighted relief. Heinrich Heine voiced the sentiments of radical youth, when with exuberant rejoicing he hailed the Parisian newspapers as sunbeams wrapped in paper, writing: "Lafayette, the tricolor, the Marseillaise—my yearning for rest exists no longer. I know once again what I will, what I shall, and what I must. I am the son of the revolution, and I turn once more to the magic weapons over which my mother has voiced her incantation. Flowers, flowers! I will garland my brows for the death-

struggle. I am nothing but joy and song, nothing but sword and flame!" The alarm at the great courts was no less extreme than the delight of the liberal camp. They had noted the arrogant designs of Polignac with growing concern, but this terrible convulsion, by which the entire laborious and peaceful structure of the Viennese treaties was again imperilled, was nevertheless quite unexpected. In accordance with his usual custom King Frederick William had spent the summer at Teplitz, receiving there a visit from Metternich. Despite the friction at the Bundestag and notwithstanding the secret campaign of the Hofburg against the Prussian plans for a customs union, he had no ill-feeling towards Austria. He continued to regard the grand alliance as the guarantee of the peace of the nations. He hoped to reestablish this league, although its structure had been utterly disordered by the war in the east; and above all he looked forward to restoring a good understanding between the two estranged imperial powers. Since Metternich, for his part, was keenly desirous to emerge from that isolation for which he was alone to blame, a complete harmony of views proved attainable, and the Austrian statesman subsequently admitted that during this conversation he had at times found it possible to imagine that he was in the audience chamber of Emperor Francis.[1]

The king was returning from Teplitz, designing on his birthday (August 3rd) to visit the Saxon court at Pilnitz, when a royal messenger brought him the first news from Paris. On this very evening, in a country house belonging to the envoy Jordan, he held a preliminary consultation with Wittgenstein and Witzleben, already on this occasion expressly declaring that while he should resist any attack by the French with all the force at his disposal, he should not attempt any interference in France's internal affairs. However honestly he might lament the fall of the legitimist Bourbon house, his love of peace, the sobriety of his understanding, his sense of patriotic duty, led him to revolt against the idea of a world war whose first dangers must unquestionably fall upon Prussia. At Troppau and at Laibach he had cautiously rejected every proposal whose results might have been injurious to his own state;[2] how could he now be willing to involve himself in the hazards of another Champagne campaign? "During my youth," he would often

[1] Brockhausen's Report, August 11, 1830.
[2] Vide supra, vol. III, pp. 513, 514.

say, "I witnessed the horrors of revolution, and I desire to pass my declining years in honourable peace." It was his hope that the incalculable powers of the new revolution would be most safely controlled if the great quadruple alliance were to meet the danger in a spirit of unanimous resolve.

In order to secure for the powers a free hand and adequate time for deliberation, he wished for the present to break off diplomatic relations with France, and on August 7th sent instructions to Werther to leave Paris after coming to an understanding on the subject with the representatives of the three other great powers. But when, with this end in view, Werther assembled his colleagues, it immediately became apparent that the quadruple alliance had ceased to exist. England insisted on going her own way, the English envoy declaring that his orders were to remain in Paris whatever befell. The other three envoys all counselled the Prussian to await further advices since his present instruction had been superseded by the course of events.[1] In the interim the revolution had reached its goal, the new throne had been established, and the envoys unanimously described what had happened as an inexorable necessity. Most of them, too, were personally incensed against Polignac who, immersed in his plans for a coup d'état, had utterly neglected the affairs of the foreign office, holding converse only with Apponyi and the nuncio Lambruschini. Without exception they bowed before the accomplished fact. No one could altogether escape the infective power of those universal, and surprisingly sudden changes of mood by which revolutions in France are rendered so terrible. "All the monarchists," wrote Werther as early as August 5th, "urgently desire that the four powers should show themselves friendly to the new crown; otherwise the republic, anarchy, will ensue." [2]

As regards the serious infringement of law, people consoled themselves with the reflection that the Orleans belonged to the ancient house of Capet, and could therefore (as they phrased it in their embarrassment) at least claim a "quasi-legitimacy." Amid the storms of these opening days, the breach of faith which had helped the new ruler to his throne passed almost unnoticed. Louis Philippe overflowed with ardent and unques-

[1] Werther's Report, August 17, 1830, with Protocol concerning the interview between the four envoys.

[2] Werther's Report, August 5, 1830.

tionably genuine assurances of his devotion to the causes of peace and civic order, never ceasing to repeat that the issue of war would be a republic, propaganda, a general upheaveal. Count Molé, his minister for foreign affairs, wrote to Werther: "We must save France, and I may add Europe, from a great convulsion. In this struggle the tricolor has been unfurled. But now that it has once more become the banner of France, this glorious flag can only be regarded as an emblem of moderation and defence, of a judicious conservatism, and of peace. Your government will recognise how much it has cost his majesty to make up his mind to ascend the throne of which, in the interests of public welfare, he was the only possible occupant."[1] In view of all these considerations, King Frederick William explained to Vienna that he felt it his duty to his subjects to make a painful sacrifice of his principles and sentiments. But he continued to hope for common action on the part of the quadruple alliance, and therefore recommended the three friendly powers to issue identically worded declarations recognising the new French government, but he also advised that they should simultaneously make a formal demand upon that government to maintain the treaties, the status quo, and peace.[2]

The Hofburg displayed a disposition hardly less pacific than that of the Prussian cabinet, its pliability being due to a consciousness of weakness. How painful were the disillusionments which this wild year had brought to the aging chancellor! On February 4th, at the London conference, the three protecting powers had resolved that mutinous Greece was to become an independent, tribute-free kingdom. Now came the news that the Bourbon government had fallen, the government whose "good and most powerfully manifested will" Metternich had cordially extolled but two days earlier. The casus belli foreseen in the Paris treaty of alliance and in the secret protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle[3] was now unquestionably furnished, if the treaties were to be strictly interpreted. Unless Metternich were to repudiate everything he had unceasingly been proclaiming to the world during the past fifteen years, he must now urge the legitimist powers to take up arms against the revolution,

[1] Molé to Werther, August 12, 1830.

[2] Brockhausen's Reports, August 11, 18 and 23; Ancillon, Instruction to the embassies, August 14, 1830.

[3] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 110.

which raised its head more threateningly in France than ever it had done in Naples, Piedmont, or Spain. Yet he never ventured to appeal to the treaties. History had marched over them. The arrogance that had ventured to call a halt to the eternal progress of mankind was now displayed in all its nudity. Austria was less prepared for war than any other of the great powers. Not even the shameful experiences of the war in the east had sufficed to shake this court out of its supineness. The condition of the army was no less pitiful than that of the finances. The number of men with the colours was far smaller than that prescribed for a peace footing; two months would be required to equip the artillery, for barely fifty of the guns were furnished with teams; the cavalry alone, a force forty thousand strong, was still worthy of its ancient reputation. Many of the generals and staff officers were far advanced in years; even captains of seventy were no rarity, for the thrifty Francis was almost as unwilling to allow officers to retire as was his brother-in-law of Bavaria. The officers suffered from the stupid and pedantic service regulations, and they suffered also from the lack of a proper position in society, for at court and among the high nobility they were considered persons of no account. The only commander in whom the army had confidence, the archduke Charles, was kept in the background by the jealousy of his imperial brother.[1]

With such forces a European crusade on behalf of legitimist rights was impossible. The limit of Austria's hope must be to restrain the revolutionary excitement which was now increasing day by day in Austria's immediate domain, in Italy. Gentz expressed himself unreservedly to the Badenese envoy, General Tettenborn, fire-eater and sometime leader of Cossacks, concerning the powerlessness of the old system. "We are absolutely compelled," he wrote as early as August 24th, "to desire that Louis Philippe should remain on the throne, car après lui le déluge. You must remember, too, that the state of affairs is very different from that which obtained in 1815, that none of the great powers is adequately prepared for war, and you need not be surprised if on all sides le maintien de la paix resounds as the word of deliverance. To-day your valiant sword must rest in its scabbard; I hope to God that you may not be compelled all too soon to stain it with the blood of

[1] General Tettenborn's Reports (communicated by Otterstedt to Bernstorff, March 1, 1830).

the world-destroyers." [1] What had happened to that pugnacious pen which in former days had composed the masterful despatches of the great congresses? Gentz was now sixty-seven years of age. His energies were waning; it was manifest that his vigour of will and his lust for battle were passing away; and yet the delicate artistic impulses of this abundantly equipped intelligence were reviving. He had moments of dithyrambic rapture as in the days when he had joined with Friedrich Schlegel in enthusiasm for Lucinde: "God preserve us from a world in which everything should be reasonable! All the blossoms of enjoyment would fall of a sudden from the tree of life. He who cannot become delirious about a book, he who cannot make a fool of himself about his beloved, he who is not a madman in fight nor crazy when he finds himself among pedants and philistines, is one who knows nothing of the art of life." A romantic love for the beautiful dancer Fanny Elsler, and a hardly less fantastic friendship for young Prokesch von Osten, occupied all his thoughts, except when he was musing over Heine's poems, now profoundly touched, now shuddering voluptuously, and now in a state of intense indignation. As the sober-minded Metternich was not slow to note, this unceasing sentimental stimulation, partly senile partly youthful, was wearing out Gentz's vital energies.

He continued to watch the changes in the political situation with his customary acuteness. A year earlier he had prophesied that the wild passion of the satanic stock of jacobin "Mützcujons" (cullions in caps), the doctrinaire obstinacy of the liberals, and the secret ambitions of the Bonapartists, would infallibly, and soon, lead to a fresh revolution in France. He knew that this latest revolution was "the most decisive and complete which France had yet experienced," because it had finally broken with historical rights. Alone among his contemporaries he already recognised that this renewed rising of the French was of far less significance than the inroad of democracy into English political life, traditionally aristocratic. In the transformation of English conditions he perceived the real novelty, the fateful meaning of the year 1830. Again and again his mind was occupied with anxious reflections as he asked himself, "What has happened and what is next going to happen to this nation?" But he was no longer willing to undertake a struggle against the victorious forces of the revolution; he did

[1] Gentz to Tettenborn, August 24, 1830.

not hesitate to admit frankly the defeat of the old authorities; "the lively sense that we are beaten robs us of our last strength to attempt a rescue." Peace!—this was now the watchword of all his letters. Indefatigably, and not always in correspondence with the true facts, he assured the trusty Samuel Rothschild for the information of friends in Paris that none of the three eastern powers had any thought of war, extolling the peaceable disposition of the French government in cordial and almost extravagant terms. It was not long before he even discovered that popular sovereignty, thanks to the moderation of the bourgeois king, was imperceptibly being transformed into a new legitimacy. Why could not these two great political principles flourish peacefully side by side, as Protestantism and Catholicism flourished in the society of nations? Why should Europe now endeavour, as she had endeavoured in the sixteenth century, to decide a difference of opinion by force of arms? There was no absolute incompatibility, he declared, between a system of judicious conservatism and a system of quiet progress. Thus by the force of events, and through the self-denying and conciliatory spirit of age, rather than through spontaneous conviction, he returned in the evening of his days to the moderate principles he had held at the opening of his political career.

Gentz's opinion was now of little account, since his part in public affairs had become trifling, and since, as Metternich phrased it, he now rendered "imaginative services" only. But the Austrian chancellor, too, was profoundly impressed with a sense of powerlessness, although he boasted to the Prussian envoy that Austria's army could be quickly and easily raised to a strength of 400,000 men.[1] However reluctantly, he declared himself in agreement with the Prussian proposals; but he would not entirely abandon the thought of joint intervention, and he therefore recommended that the four powers should meet in congress, or should at least form a "centre d'entente" in Berlin to keep watch on France. The Prussian court would not agree to any such useless challenge to the French, for memories of the disastrous Pilnitz congress were too recent. Should the worst come to the worst, a terrible weapon still remained in Metternich's hands—the duke of Reichstadt. The chancellor knew how the Orleans trembled at the great name of Bonaparte. More than once he assured the envoys of the friendly powers,

[1] Brockhausen's Reports, August 11 and 18; Blittersdorff's Report, September 4, 1830.

and ultimately the court of the Tuileries as well, that should France disregard the treaties the quadruple alliance would restore the heir of the Imperator.[1] In truth, the young Napoleon was quite ready to fill the suggested role. Idolised by women, precocious, talented, and extraordinarily handsome, he felt himself to be the son of the man who had curbed the revolution. It was not his idea to snatch his father's crown in the guise of a conspirator. He desired to make his entry into France as a prince of order, summoned by the old imperial army to crush the son of Philippe Egalité, to overthrow the despicable usurper who was supported neither by legitimist right nor by popular will. This hazardous idea was not cherished by Metternich in all seriousness. He toyed with it as a desperate man will regard a vial of poison with mingled longing and repulsion, since it was impossible for him to believe that a Napoleon could ever be a trustworthy guardian of the Viennese treaties. His main desire was an honest wish for peace, and he begged the king of Prussia to induce the czar to agree to a joint declaration by the powers, inasmuch as Emperor Francis did not possess the confidence of the Russian autocrat.[2]

In St. Petersburg, however, the pacific policy of the two German powers encountered serious obstacles. Nicholas was still intoxicated with the successes of the Turkish war and believed his army to be invincible. He imagined himself strong enough to take instant steps against the revolution. Did not his well-equipped Polish army stand ready on the frontier? The harassing doubt whether the Poles would fight against revolutionary France never entered his mind. Although he severely condemned Charles X for the latter's unconstitutional action, he would have no dealings with "the accursed usurper."[3] In the first flush of wrath he recalled all Russian subjects from France, excluded the French from Russia, and closed Russian ports to the tricolor. Nesselrode, who had recently conferred with Metternich in Carlsbad, and in a subsequent interview with Bernstorff in Berlin had approved the pacific aims of the German courts, met with an ungracious reception on his return. Even Pozzo di Borgo, being friendly to the Orleans, had forfeited the emperor's confidence. It is true that a few

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, September 5, 1830; February 11 and 16, 1831.

[2] Brockhausen's Report, August 23rd.

[3] Czar Nicholas to Grand Duke Constantine (communicated in the Report of Consul General Schmidt, Warsaw, August 25, 1830).

days later the incautious hostile measures against France were revoked.[1] But Nicholas was not satisfied with the Prussian proposals. To recognise popular sovereignty would undermine the entire system of the powers. Besides, what use was it to demand of Louis Philippe the maintenance of the treaties when he was a man on whose word no reliance could be placed? In the end, the czar decided to give his royal father-in-law "a striking proof of goodwill," sending Field Marshal Diebitsch to Berlin for further negotiations.[2]

Whilst the eastern powers were engaged in these fruitless negotiations, England had already made up her mind, and had once more shown unambiguously that the old quadruple alliance was dissolved. Wellington was still in power. The statesman who fifteen years earlier had most zealously demanded the reestablishment of the Bourbons, was now the first to withdraw from them his support. Shortly before, and no less unconcernedly, he had thrown over two other friends, the sultan, and the dey of Algiers. This was the customary faith of Albion. Not even the tories could oppose as illegitimate a government appealing to the principles of the English revolution of 1688. The cabinet, which had long been tottering, would have fallen at once had it withstood the unanimous demand of public opinion. On August 27th the government of the Orleans was unconditionally recognised by the English court, and Wellington despatched a circular to the eastern powers to the effect that the situation of his country had made it impossible for him to await the decisions of the allies.

Prussia's design that a joint reply from the great powers should simultaneously recognise the July monarchy, and indicate to that monarchy strict limits of conduct, thus came to nothing. It now seemed desirable to the court of Berlin that the other powers, too, should individually send despatches of recognition to Paris, so that the division between England and the eastern powers should not become unduly conspicuous. Now, as before, the king and Count Bernstorff held that this great crisis must be utilised for the reinvigoration of the grand alliance.[3] Louis Philippe had sent holograph letters to all the more powerful

[1] Lieven to Bourgoing, August 13/25; Czar Nicholas to Grand Duke Constantine, August 29, 1830.

[2] Galen's Reports, St. Petersburg, August 24 and 26, 1830.

[3] Bernstorff to Nesselrode, August 26; Bernstorff, Memorial Concerning the Recognition of Louis Philippe, September, 1830 (Natzmer, Unter den Hohenzollern, vol. 1, p. 293).

princes, the humble tenour of these missives comporting ill with the dignity of a ruler of France. In the deprecatory tone of one conscious of guilt he excused his usurpation. "I lament the disaster to the elder branch of my family," he wrote to Louis of Bavaria. "My solitary ambition would have been to bow myself before it, to remain in the situation to which providence had called me. But circumstances were too powerful, and I was compelled to sacrifice myself. The least hesitation on my part would have involved the monarchy in confusions whose end could not be foreseen, confusions which might well have endangered the continuance of that peace indispensable to the happiness of every realm."[1] General Lobau appeared in Berlin bearing a similar missive. On September 9th Frederick William replied in a friendly despatch, which however contained the pointed remark: "It is not my function (il ne m'appartient pas) to issue judgments concerning the past." Now that he had taken the difficult step, he desired his associations with the new prince to be free from rancour, and Louis Philippe hastened to respond with extravagant assurances of eternal gratitude. Alexander von Humboldt, an old friend of the house of Orleans, who at this time was setting out on his usual autumn visit to Paris, was given confidential instructions, and did his best to bring about a tolerable understanding between the two courts. Meanwhile, Emperor Francis had also despatched a formal recognition to Paris. The minor princes and the Bundestag followed the example. Czar Nicholas alone hesitated for a few weeks longer, and when at length he accepted the inevitable he was unable to curb his ill humour. For years thenceforward he delighted to show his contempt for the house of Orleans by various diplomatic slights.

In the existing posture of affairs, the question of the recognition of Louis Philippe did not involve any direct danger to the peace of the world, and the situation did not become threatening until the rising in Belgium followed the July revolution. To the bourgeois king the Belgian disturbances seemed nothing more than an unwelcome embarrassment. His subjects had other views. French volunteers and agitators flocked by thousands into Brabant. Like one man the radical press demanded the annexation of Belgium as an atonement for Leipzig and Belle Alliance. Even the moderate journals

[1] King Louis Philippe to King Louis, August 22, 1830.

contended, with that naive contempt for foreign rights which has ever distinguished the French, that by conquests alone could the new ruling house win the hearts of the people. It seemed to all appearance that in the event of the break up of the United Netherlands, Belgium must pass under French rule, or at least become subject to the predominant influence of France. Now this united kingdom had been the special creation of the quadruple alliance and was above all the creation of English statecraft. England's retention of half of the Dutch colonies had been rendered possible only by the way in which the allies had immoderately augmented the continental possessions of the house of Orange, and the fortresses on the southern frontier of Belgium which the quadruple alliance had had constructed under Wellington's supervision with the aid of the French contribution, had but recently been completed. The spirit of the treaties, if not the letter, and even more the nature of the political situation, imposed upon the English state as a duty that this pet child should not be promptly abandoned. Besides, how dangerous an example did this revolt of the priests set to the discontented in Ireland. O'Connell was already declaring with exultation that should the Catholic Belgians win freedom for themselves, Ireland, too, must shake off the yoke of her Protestant rulers. For these reasons Wellington received the news from Brussels with genuine concern. He desired that, at least, Belgium should be retained by the house of Orange as an independent land, and for some days he even entertained the design of occupying the aforesaid Belgian fortresses with British troops. But British commercial policy had failed to find profit in the United States of the Netherlands. That land had not fulfilled Castlereagh's hopes of becoming England's humble customer, but had quite unconcernedly opposed the island realm with customs dues and Rhenish navigation laws. The old friendship had long ceased to exist, and English public opinion, now greatly moved, would never have permitted the cabinet to initiate a war against the highly esteemed nation of the July revolution on behalf of the unloved Netherland neighbour. The iron duke was compelled to adapt himself to circumstances. By the middle of September it was difinitely known in Berlin that, whatever happened, England would not draw the sword in defence of her ancient "bulwark."[1]

[1] Bernstorff's Report to the king concerning the situation in the Netherlands, September 17, 1830.

The Court of Vienna was no less cautious. At the first serious sign of danger to our Rhineland it immediately became evident how completely, since the loss of her western provinces, the new Austria had grown apart from Germany. It is true that Metternich complained in the usual terms about the fresh crater of the ceaselessly working volcano of the revolution; and whereas he had formerly recommended the king of the Netherlands to grant the Belgians an independent constitution, he now found this measure extremely undesirable, since it was demanded at the point of the revolutionary sword.[1] But from the first he declared in plain terms that in this dispute Emperor Francis could not take a place in the front rank, having to utilise his chief forces in the south against the threatening revolt of the Italians. In his present mood of discouragement Metternich viewed Belgian affairs in the gloomiest light, and on October 11th informed his emperor that "the affair in the Netherlands is lost beyond recall."

All the more difficult, therefore, was the position of Prussia, no less intimately concerned than England in Belgian affairs. It was impossible that the king of the Netherlands should expect Germany to espouse his cause, for among the many bad neighbours of Prussia he was unquestionably the worst, and no other of the German princes had so shamelessly disregarded federal duties. How extensive had been the series of odious disputes, from the first contentions as to the frontier down to the interference with Rhenish nagivation and the impudent attempt to exclude German troops from the federal fortress of Luxemburg! How arrogantly too, after the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, had he declined the offer of his Prussian neighbour when the latter proposed, for the protection of Belgium, to establish a permanent observation corps on the lower Rhine![2] Despite all this, Frederick William retained a kindly feeling for the scions of the house of Orange, and in Berlin they were still treated almost as if they had been members of the Prussian kingly house. King William was brother-in-law and cousin of the king of Prussia; the two crown princes were on terms of affectionate friendship, although they had nothing in common in the matter of political principles; and in these very days the old kinship of blood was further strengthened by the betrothal of Prince Albert of Prussia to a princess of the Netherlands. The defeat which

[1] Maltzahn's Report, September 12, 1830.

[2] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 111.

Prince Frederick of the Netherlands suffered in the street fighting of Brussels came upon the court of Berlin like a thunderclap. It always remained a painful memory to the crown prince, and many years later, in the delirium of his last illness, he spoke sadly of the good friend who had lost half his children.

Prussian statesmen were still by no means unanimous regarding the instability of the artificial United States of the Netherlands. When it was too late, indeed, a year after the Vienna congress, Hardenberg had declared with vexation that Batavians and Belgians could never get on together, and that it would have been much better to give Belgium to the Guelphs, Prussia receiving Hanover in exchange. But these were isolated opinions. To the majority at court it seemed a point of honour to maintain for the friendly royal house the important position on the Meuse and the Scheldt. The old heroes of the wars of liberation considered that the long anticipated third punic war was now inexorably approaching. If war was inevitable, in what better cause could the sword be drawn than on behalf of the rights of an ancient ally? Such were the ideas of Clausewitz; and such were those of Gneisenau, although at times his views were more pacific. Even Stein, profoundly moved, considered that his life's work would have to be begun afresh. He knew that French vanity could not rest until vengeance had been wreaked upon the victors in the wars of liberation.

In this stormy sea of warlike passions, the king, though less far-sighted than some of those named, was for this very reason more competent to take a sober view of the situation. To him, likewise, it seemed that war was almost inevitable, but he would not assume responsibility for it. His people had hardly yet surmounted the distresses of the last war. Could he ask them to repress a foreign revolt which, though repressed for the moment, would infallibly break out again a few years later? The July revolution was already finding imitators on German soil. There had been disturbances in Brunswick, in Cassel, and in Dresden. Who could foresee whether Prussia would not soon be compelled to restore order by force of arms in these immediate spheres of influence? He had absolute confidence in the loyalty of his army, but, as was continually asserted in the memorials of the foreign office, the joyful enthusiasm of the wars of liberation could only recur if he were to lead his people in a just war of defence, one whose aims would be comprehensible to all; whereas an invasion of Belgium would, at least

to the convinced liberals of the petty states, have appeared censurable, as nothing but a return to the old Troppau policy of intervention. The fortresses upon whose aid the quadruple alliance had counted were, with few exceptions, already in the hands of the Belgian rebels. From England no help was to be anticipated; from Austria little, and that belated. France was resolved to occupy the western half of the country should Prussia invade eastern Belgium. On August 31st Count Molé confidentially communicated this intention to Werther, the Prussian envoy. The French statesman's tone was conciliatory. He excused himself in the usual manner by referring to the critical situation of the French government, and gave a solemn assurance that France did not cherish any hostile designs; but Belgium's two neighbours must, he declared, remain in identical positions until a European congress could furnish a peaceful solution of the problem.[1] There could be no question that these assurances were honestly meant. But what would happen if the ill-disciplined French army, greatly excited by the events of the revolution, were to find itself in close juxtaposition with the detested Prussian conquerors in the vicinity of the battle-field of Belle Alliance? Some trifling incident might give the signal for the world war which had just been happily averted through the recognition of the July monarchy.

Frederick William reserved for himself the decision of these serious questions. The only statesmen fully in his confidence were Witzleben and Bernstorff, the latter still clear headed and calm, notwithstanding a severe illness. It was absolutely necessary for the monarch to take the management of foreign policy into his own hands, for the war party at court had gained a powerful ally in Field Marshal Diebitsch. The king had just sent an instruction to St. Petersburg, "The despatch of this mission is to be prevented if at all possible."[2] It was, therefore, a painful surprise when the Russian, none the less, made his appearance on September 9th, for Frederick William knew that the field marshal and Chernysheff (who acted for Diebitsch during the latter's absence) were the only two men of note at the Russian court who shared the czar's desire for war. Brilliant festivals and reviews were held in honour of

[1] K. Hillebrand (Geschichte Frankreichs, vol. I, p. 144) makes certain observations in opposition to d'Haussonville concerning the time and substance of this conversation. As the sequel of my text will show, Hillebrand is perfectly right.

[2] The king's marginal note to Galen's Report of August 26, 1830.

the conqueror of the Turks. During the war in the east, Bernstorff and the more liberal-minded among Prussian statesmen had been upon Russia's side. Now there was a transposition of parties; all the strict legitimists extolled the czar as defender of the divine right of kings and were eager to pay court to the Russian envoy. This fat little red-haired man, who spoke modestly enough about his martial deeds, did not give the impression of being a person of exceptional intelligence, but he was not lacking in zeal. He had come to prevent the recognition of the bourgeois king. Disappointed in this hope, he endeavoured to turn the Belgian imbroglio to account on behalf of his warlike designs.

He remained two months in Berlin demonstrating again and again in public utterances and in memorials how easy it would be to make war upon the revolution, even without British cooperation. The king began to find his son-in-law's bellicose attitude extremely embarrassing. In matters of form the czar was courtesy itself. His letters to the king were so interlarded with assurances of gratitude and devotion that Witzleben once asked Bernstorff in what terms the king could possibly answer without failing to respond in kind or else lowering his own dignity.[1] During his last visit to Silesia, Nicholas had twice led his regiment of cuirassiers with lowered swords before General Zieten, so that even the Prussian officers were of opinion that he had gone too far. But while playing off these Gottorp stage-tricks he was perfectly able, in his political claims upon Prussia, to display the crude arrogance of the Muscovite. While he himself, like his grandmother in the year 1792, remained at a safe distance in the remote east, he wished to urge on his Prussian neighbour to an aimless war against the west. Although he was perfectly honest in his fierce hatred of the revolution, and did not like Catharine cherish cunningly hidden designs, he was no less barefaced in his demand that Prussia should sacrifice herself for the court of St. Petersburg. Diebitsch in one of his memorials reckoned as follows the fighting force available for the Rhenish campaign: 210,000 Prussians, 120,000 German federal troops, 30,000 Hollanders, 60,000 Austrians—and, finally, 180,000 Russians.[2] Thus in the most friendly manner the whole burden of the war was to be shunted on to Prussia. Berlin could do nothing but laugh at the proud

[1] Correspondence between Bernstorff and Witzleben during the year 1829.
[2] Diebitsch's Memorial, October 1/13, 1830.

figures of the little German contingents, while after the experiences of the year 1813 people knew how boldly the Russian imagination could overestimate Russian military power. Even General Schöler, the envoy in St. Petersburg, who had at one time been inclined to take far too sanguine a view of the strength of Russia, had now learned by experience. He wrote warningly that the czar was mistaken as to the force at his disposal; it was impossible that Russia could put more than 150,000 men into the field against France; and it would take three months for this army to reach the Meuse—by which time the matter would probably have been settled.[1]

While the czar was thus assailing the Prussian court with his war plans, Emperor Francis had the unfortunate heir apparent Ferdinand crowned in Pressburg as *Rex junior Hungariae*, in order that thereby the reports as to the prince's incapacity to reign (reports only too well founded) might be refuted by a positive demonstration. Nicholas took this opportunity to send Count Orloff to Pressburg. Metternich received the czar's confidant with open arms, extolling the envoy's purity of sentiments in the most lively terms, saying: "What the revolutionary government dreads, we must love; what that government rejects, we must accept." To ingratiate himself with the autocrat he breathed friendly and neighbourly calumniations of the Prussian court. It was the fault, he said, of Bernstorff's cowardice and of the revolutionary spirit of the Prussian officialdom that a war on behalf of legitimist right had not taken place. But he was extremely careful to avoid giving any positive assurance. The eastern powers must maintain the joint guarantees for the treaties of 1815, and must quietly prepare for eventualities—these vague counsels were all that the Russian was able to take home from Pressburg.

On August 28th, immediately after the first rising in Brussels, the king of the Netherlands despatched, through the adjutants "de notre Albert," an appeal for help to the king of Prussia. The consequences of the rising, he said, could not be foreseen, and he therefore begged that the governor of the Rhinelands, Prince William the elder, and his generals, should, "in accordance with the existing treaties" be instructed to render him assistance upon demand. This was all taken as a matter of course. Frederick William read the letter with surprise, for he knew nothing of any such treaty engagements.

[1] Schöler's Report, November 21, 1830.

Researches were at once made in the foreign office, and since it transpired that Prussia had never undertaken any special duties towards the Netherlands, but was merely bound by the treaties of 1815 in common with the other powers of the quadruple alliance, on September 9th he answered his royal brother-in-law to the following effect. He regarded the interests of the two crowns as "inseparable," and would therefore consult with his allies; further, he would send troops to the Rhine and would do his utmost to prevent France from supporting the revolt; but caution was essential, for the French court had declared that it too would send troops across the frontier should another foreign army occupy Belgium.[1] The fourth army corps was in fact immediately despatched from Saxony to the Rhine, and the Rhenish army corps was reinforced. These first trifling preparations sufficed to fill the statesmen of the Palais Royal with concern. Guizot, minister for the interior, held it certain that the sight of the Prussian observation corps could not fail to increase the desire of the French for war. "This unhappy Belgian affair is a terrible complication and places us all on a volcano. With the election of the new chamber of deputies and with the excitement that may be evoked by the possibility of war, we shall experience a new 1793. I am able to assure you that in this respect the king shares the opinions and anxieties of his cabinet." [2]

Meanwhile a second victorious rising had occurred in Brussels; all Belgium was in an uproar; and the prospect of reconciliation between the two estranged neighbouring stocks seemed hopeless. It was time for the great powers to intervene. On September 7th the Netherlands cabinet had begged the four powers to summon a conference of envoys at The Hague. On October 3rd Bernstorff sent an urgent enquiry to London, asking whether England at length considered that the right moment for joint intervention had arrived, and further, whether it would not be expedient that the court of the Palais Royal should cooperate directly or indirectly in the negotiations.[3] Although France had not shared in the founding of

[1] King William of the Netherlands to King Frederick William, August 28; Reply, September 9; Bernstorff, Protocol of the Deliberations concerning the Netherlands Despatch, September 1, 1830, with a Memorial "Concerning the Duties imposed upon Prussia by Treaty."

[2] Guizot's Despatch (September), communicated by Bernstorff to Bülow, October 3, 1830.

[3] Verstolk van Soelen to Perponcher, The Hague, September 7; Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, October 3, 1830.

the United Netherlands, at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle she had formally entered the grand alliance, and it was obvious, said Bernstorff, that the Belgian question could not be peacefully settled without her assent. In support of his view Bernstorff alluded to the warlike passions of the French, which were threatening to engulf the government. "We must give the French government the possibility of escaping, without humiliation and without danger, from a position of grave embarrassment." [1]

In the interim the English cabinet had formed a similar opinion. For some days Talleyrand had been in London as French envoy, and the old master of diplomacy to whom the Orleans owed their crown was now to secure for them a tolerable position in the society of states, was to close a variegated career with a successful coup. Neither Wellington nor the dull and timid Lord Aberdeen, minister for foreign affairs, could resist his inexhaustible eloquence, for Talleyrand was indefatigable in assurances that the king had no desire to annex Belgium and would on no account support the disorders there. The iron duke was enchanted, and extolled Talleyrand's candour as cordially as, the previous year, he had praised Polignac's wit. On October 2nd, before Bernstorff's enquiry arrived, the cabinet determined to invite the great powers, including France, to a European conference. Prussia and Austria agreed. The French court raised numerous difficulties, demanding assurances that in no case armed intervention should ensue, and recommending Paris as the seat of the conference. But when these proposals were unanimously rejected, France gave way, and by general consent the conference was to take place in London.

Such was the situation when the king of the Netherlands sent a fresh appeal for help, to all four powers this time, but manifestly too late. He demanded immediate armed intervention, and assured the czar that this might not prove irreconcilable with the peace of Europe. Prussia and England referred him to the proceedings of the conference; and when the Orange ruler subsequently made a third appeal to Prussia, begging at least for the occupation of a few fortresses, a similar answer was returned.[2] His envoy, Count Perponcher, was in a difficult

[1] Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, October 20, 1830.

[2] King William of the Netherlands to Czar Nicholas, October 2; Perponcher to Bernstorff, October 6; Reply, October 15; Cabinet Order to Bernstorff, November 1, 1830.

position. Paying a secret visit to Berlin, he had been received as an old friend by the king and the princes, but had subsequently had to endure continued rebuffs. He conducted himself with dignity and tact in the negotiations with Bernstorff and Diebitsch, with the liberal-minded official and the bellicose officer.

It now became apparent how important for the peace of the world had been the firm and frank attitude of Frederick William. With good reason did Lord Heytesbury in St. Petersburg declare to General Schöler, "Your government is the most reasonable of them all"; while the words of Nesselrode were, "The cautious policy of your king is the one upon which the hopes of Europe depend." It was by Prussia alone that the warlike designs of the czar were frustrated. To Nicholas it seemed intolerable that the king of the barricades should enter the high council of Europe. In Berlin, Diebitsch made the ingenuous proposal that France should be admitted to the conference only upon giving a pledge to maintain conditions in Belgium as they had existed before the revolution, to which Frederick William made the curt answer, "This could never be attained." But Russia could do nothing without Prussia. However reluctantly, on October 25th, Nicholas replied to the Orange ruler to the effect that Russia was personally prepared to furnish armed assistance, but that isolated intervention on his part would make matters worse, and that nothing could help but an understanding with the great powers. Nesselrode, whom the czar's passionate proposals had made extremely anxious, wrote to Berlin with obvious relief, saying that if all the great powers were to agree to Wellington's suggestion it was to be hoped that England would remain in the quadruple alliance, and would not make common cause with France."[1]

Thus the London conference was able to assemble on November 4th. The break up of the Netherlands had meanwhile become more plainly manifest as an accomplished fact. Even those most averse from the idea began to recognise that the existence of two independent middle-sized states, living in harmony side by side, upon the most important military area of Middle Europe, offered greater possibilities of permanence

[1] King Frederick William, Marginal Notes to Diebitsch's Memorial of October 1/13; Czar Nicholas to King William of the Netherlands, October 13/25; Nesselrode to Alopeus, October 19 (old style), 1830.

and was less dangerous to the peace of the world than would be the artificial reestablishment of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands torn by internal dissensions. On the day the conference opened Bernstorff wrote that in no case must Belgium pass under the influence of France; this was the most important point of all, and in comparison therewith it was a minor question whether a statthalter, a viceroy, or an independent duke should rule in Brussels.[1] Heinrich von Bülow, Prussian envoy in London, son-in-law of Wilhelm Humboldt, followed these congenial instructions with pleasure. At the conferences he showed himself to be a man of fine intelligence and a skilful negotiator; he was free from the liberal prejudices of the day, but had not been able to escape the temptation to which diplomats who spend many years abroad are prone to succumb; he was involuntarily inclined to look at matters through foreign spectacles, and was unduly accommodating to the views of the English statesmen. Metternich had already come to the conclusion that the only thing which now mattered was to prevent the French from gaining control of Belgium. As plenipotentiaries at the conference he appointed the envoy Esterhazy, and Baron von Wessenberg, the compiler of the German federal act, who in Austria had suffered under the suspicion of liberal views and had therefore for long had no voice in public affairs. In the diplomatic world the reinstatement of "this man of inconvenient abilities" was regarded as a proof of the perplexities of the court of Vienna.[2] Even the Russian plenipotentiaries, Lieven and Matuszewitz, were as conciliatory as their fears of the angry czar would permit.

The hopes of the eastern powers that the old quadruple alliance would be reconsolidated, were, however, unfulfilled. In November the tory cabinet was defeated, and as soon as Lord Palmerston took his seat in the conference the long prepared change in the system of alliances became immediately plain to all men's sight. The two naval powers (such was the contemporary diplomatic phrase) formed a cordial understanding in opposition to the three continental powers. At an earlier date, as member of Liverpool's tory cabinet, Palmerston had participated in the creation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands; but now, even more indifferently than Wellington, he dropped his old protégé to please the latter's enemies. He

[1] Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, November 4, 1830.
[2] Blittersdorff's Report, October 6, 1830.

immediately entered into confidential intercourse with young van de Weyer, a clever and cautious statesman, whom the Belgians had sent to London. Belgium was to become in relation to England that which the United Netherlands would never have become, a dependent and devoted ally. Palmerston therefore vied with Talleyrand in marks of favour towards the Belgian rebels. Although the French diplomatist at first played the part of unselfish virtue with his customary skill, the time necessarily came for the showing of his cards. When this happened, the friendly rivalry of the two kindred spirits ended perforce in the victory of the British statesman, for England was not in a position to demand Belgian territory for herself, and for this reason seemed to the eastern powers less dangerous than France.

The first resolution passed by the conference was a point scored for the Belgians. A truce was announced, and was gladly agreed to by both the contending parties. This really involved the recognition of the rebels as belligerents, although the recognition was ostensibly avoided. In a precisely similar manner, by enforcing a truce, England, France, and Russia had three years earlier diplomatically inaugurated the establishment of the Greek state.[1] On December 20th the independence of the southern Netherlands, as far as the old northern frontier of the year 1790, was adopted as a principle, but with the proviso that the king's rights were to be maintained. All the powers, not excepting France, disapproved the complete independence of the royal house that had been announced in Brussels, and still desired that the Orange rulers should retain possession of Belgium at least as a secundo geniture. On the demand of Prussia, the claims of the Germanic Federation upon Luxemburg were likewise expressly reserved, and the settlement of disputes upon this question was referred to the Bundestag. But in any case the foundations were laid for the future Belgian state, and in Berlin the question was already being debated, what was to happen to the fortresses on the southern frontier, since it was considered that the Belgians lacked both the power and the will to defend them against France. Field Marshal Diebitsch was of opinion that the only possible course was to dismantle some of the new fortresses, and the courts both of Prussia and of Russia accepted this

[1] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 587.

view.[1] To protect the Netherlands against a fresh breach of the peace on the part of the French, Bülow was the first to hit upon the idea that Belgium should, like Switzerland, be declared neutral, Belgian neutrality being placed under the joint guarantee of the powers. The makeshift was inevitable. The time was not yet ripe for the great decision, for the final settlement of the struggle which had lasted for a thousand years between the Gauls and the Teutons to secure the vestiges of the ancient intermediate realm of Lotharingia. After the latest proofs of British fidelity to treaties it remained, indeed, extremely dubious whether England would not some day as tranquilly abandon the new protégé as she was now abandoning the old. But the joint guarantee of the powers might well be expected to make matters safe for two or three decades.

Peaceful as was the course of the London conference, the danger of a general war was as yet by no means averted. The eastern powers were better acquainted than Wellington with the quality of Talleyrand's good faith, and the envoy's smooth words were too strikingly contradicted by the deeds of his government. France was arming herself without intermission. In September 128,000 men were called to the colours, and in December another 80,000, at a time when Prussia, though she had moved a few troops to the Rhine, had not placed a single regiment upon a war footing. The Parisian press became daily more outrageous in its clamours for war. French agitators were everywhere at work, in Belgium, in Germany, and in Italy. At the minor German courts, the bourgeois king's envoys were talking about the happy days of the confederation of the Rhine. When in November, almost simultaneously with the fall of the tories in England, the "ministry of movement" took office in France, the government assumed a bolder tone. Laffitte, the new premier, one of those liberal financiers who were honestly supporting the bourgeois throne, believed in the world-conquering might of the ideas of 1789 with all the naivety characteristic of a cheerful millionaire, while Sebastiani, the Corsican, minister for foreign affairs, had not, in becoming the confidant of the pacific Orleans ruler, laid aside the arrogant boastfulness of the Napoleonic general.

[1] Diebitsch, Memorial concerning the Belgian Fortresses, October 12/24; Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, November 4; Nesselrode, Instruction to Alopeus, November 12 (old style), 1830.

Among the catchwords wherewith this government endeavoured partly to win over and partly to appease the bellicose radicals, none was more effective than the vaunted principle of non-intervention. First of all in semi-official newspaper articles, next in Talleyrand's greeting to the king of England, next in various despatches to the great powers, and finally in a formal oration made by Laffitte in the Chamber, it was contended that every nation was competent to change its forms of government as it pleased, and that no foreign power was entitled to interfere in such matters. The strict legitimist doctrine justifying a policy of intervention had been a menace to the independence of every state. Now, by an inevitable reaction, this was opposed by a no less doctrinaire radical dogma which threatened to destroy the fellowship of the system of states. In Paris, the new gospel of the freedom of the nations was interpreted in so extreme a sense that France was held to be entitled to prevent by force of arms interference by the great powers in the internal dispute of any other country. Whereas in Troppau the eastern powers had arrogated the right to suppress every revolution in the world, the July monarchy now put forward the far more dangerous claim that it was entitled to support every revolt. This was the old principle of revolutionary propaganda, war to the palaces, peace to the cottages; but now it no longer appeared in its crude nudity; it was garbed in a mantle of bourgeois respectability, clad in fine words about the right of all free peoples to settle their own affairs. Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to turn the doctrine of non-intervention to account. Hardly had he assumed office when he announced this doctrine to the Russian court as an article of faith. He was too intelligent, and he rated Louis Philippe's courage too low, to be guided in good earnest by a doctrinaire formula; but since the Orleans policy lived solely from hand to mouth, that policy paraded under the banner of a great idea which tickled the national vanity, and to the British statesman everything was welcome which fomented disturbances on the continent. All that the new principle signified was that the western powers reserved the right to act according to circumstances, and that it was their purpose, should a favourable opportunity arise, to exploit revolutionary passions in their own interest. Talleyrand hit the nail on the head when, with his mischievous smile, he replied to an inquisitive English lady in the words: "Non-intervention is an esoteric

term used in diplomacy; it means almost exactly the same thing as intervention."

The eastern powers could not fail to regard this new dictum of international law as a piece of colossal impudence. It was in flat contradiction to all the views of the last decade, and it threatened to overthrow the guardianship that had long been administered by the great powers, to annihilate the old system of the European pentarchy. Metternich indignantly exclaimed: "The thieves are ordering the police to withdraw, the incendiaries are protecting themselves against the fire-brigade! Never shall we admit a claim which disturbs the whole order of society." Bernstorff took a soberer view, and sent instructions to Bülow that he should, if possible, avoid stimulating the doctrinaire dispute at the London conference. But Bernstorff, too, declared: "In the newly discovered system of non-intervention there is involved the principle of the most arrogant and inadmissible intervention." Commissioned by Bernstorff, Ancillon wrote to Vienna: "Unquestionably, the principle of non-intervention, and the claim under threat of war to forbid the powers in any circumstances to move troops beyond their own frontiers, would destroy the independence of every government." Czar Nicholas was infuriated, and his desire for war now became almost ungovernable. "From the first," he said, "I have desired to fight on behalf of legitimacy, and only because I am the younger did I yield to the king's riper experience." But he now imagined that his views must be shared not by the royal princes alone, but also by his father-in-law, and he believed that Bernstorff and the other ministers were responsible for Prussia's lukewarmness.[1] Metternich's communications to Orloff had probably roused this idea in the mind of Nicholas, and the czar clung to it for a considerable time.

Long ere this he had begun to prepare for war. He now commanded new levies. "Wishing to terrify the revolution," and in a manner totally discordant with Russian custom, he had his orders to this effect published in the newspapers. At length, however, moved by Schöler's urgent representations, he agreed that in a conciliatory despatch to the embassies Nesselrode should mitigate the seriousness of these threats. The preparations that had been decreed, it was explained, aimed only at maintaining the peace of Europe, at maintaining the

[1] Schöler's Report, November 21, 1830.

order provided for in the treaties; and it was to be hoped that the mere announcement of the preparations would suffice to fulfil "this conservative purpose."[1] In Berlin, meanwhile, Diebitsch was exhausting his eloquence to prove how necessary was the great war and how easy would be its conduct. But his diplomatic arts, which had been so successful the previous year in Adrianople, availed nothing on this occasion. Frederick William stood firm; and when, at the beginning of December, the field marshal at length returned to Russia, he carried with him a comprehensive and carefully prepared memorial, destined to explain once again to the czar the leading ideas of Prussia's peaceful policy.[2]

Nothing was more remote from the king's mind than the thought of a nearer approach to the liberal west. All his hopes were set upon the league of the eastern powers, and he had by no means discarded his old and immoderate preference for the Russians. "Russia," he said, "is and remains the most powerful support of the alliance, alike on account of the magnanimous character of her sovereign and on account of the excellence of her army." He did not desire peace at any price, for he demanded that the great powers should make a joint declaration to the court of the Palais Royal to the effect that they would not tolerate a policy of revolutionary propaganda. Should France prove openly hostile, he was prepared to begin the war even in default of English cooperation, whereas St. Petersburg still believed in the durability of the quadruple alliance. At the same time, he explained to the czar that public opinion in Germany was decisively opposed to this serious war, which would perhaps lead to risings in Germany and in Poland. It would only be possible to reckon upon the cheerful compliance of the Prussians if the people knew that all peaceful means had been tried unavailingly. He consequently asked for a precise and unambiguous agreement as to what was to be considered a casus belli.

This was the language of calm reason, but how could it convince blind wrath? On one side was the boastful arrogance of the autocrat, on the other the impudent greed of the revolu-

[1] Schöler, Verbal Note to Nesselrode, October 27/ November 8, 1830; Nesselrode, Circular Despatch, October 29 (old style), accompanied by a despatch to Schöler.

[2] Bernstorff, Mémoire sur la position de la grande alliance relativement à la France et à l'Europe, November 24, 1830. Draft for the same, dated November 9, together with "Questions and Instructions" by the king.

tion; on both sides preparations for war were proceeding with increasing fervour. Who could hope to curb these forces of destruction upon their downward career? Towards the end of November the air was surcharged with inflammatory material. With the solitary exception of the ever-sanguine Gentz, it was universally believed by perspicacious and well-informed statesmen that the peace of the world hung only by a thread.

§ 3. REVOLUTIONS IN POLAND AND IN ITALY.

There now occurred an event which incited party passion throughout Europe to new ardours, and nevertheless contributed to the maintenance of peace. All over the world there had prevailed an exaggerated conception of Russia's fighting strength. This idea was first shaken by the experiences of the Turkish war, and it was shaken yet further when information began to circulate in Europe concerning the devastation wrought by Asiatic cholera. This terrible pestilence, first studied by English physicians in its ancient East Indian home (1817), had, since the summer of 1829, been making its way steadily through the interior of Russia, for the most part following the watercourses. Since medical skill was as yet unavailing in the case of this mysterious disease, the state adopted the most rigorous methods of prevention; a cordon was drawn round entire provinces, all letters and travellers were fumigated, and a system of quarantine was established; but the ignorance of the populace and the untrustworthiness of the officials rendered the precautions nugatory. In September, 1830, the cholera reached Moscow. The mob raged against the Poles and other foreigners, who were believed to have imported the poison; and nothing but the personal intervention of the czar, to whom fear was unknown, served to restore quiet. In many parts of the gigantic empire, civic order was as completely dissolved as of old in western Europe upon the coming of the black death. To friend and foe alike it was growing manifest that a land thus afflicted could hardly be in a position to send a large army abroad. The suspicion became a certainty when on November 29th a revolt suddenly broke out in Warsaw.

Poland, too, had her great week. Within a few days the last Russian had been expelled from the land of the white eagle,

and the czar had been cut off from the west by a terrible enemy. Once more, as in the Netherlands, one of the artificial state structures established by the Vienna treaties suddenly collapsed, but on this occasion the responsibility for the failure attached rather to individuals than to the artificiality of the institutions. Emperor Alexander's well-meaning attempt to effect a partial restoration of Polish independence under Russian protection was frustrated by the hopeless unruliness of the Polish nobility. For fifteen years the kingdom had possessed an army of its own, well schooled by Napoleonic veterans, and had had a national administration which worked almost as beneficially as had the Prussian administration of former days. This administration established excellent order in the finances; it founded a university, a bank, a system of state pawnbroking, and a good postal system; and it constructed roads and canals. The worst trouble of the country, the condition of the ill-used peasants, devoid of all legal rights, was not regarded as an evil by the nobility, which here was supreme. There was a severe press censorship, but this had not been instituted until after the freedom of the press had been grossly abused. It had even proved necessary to abolish the publicity of the proceedings of the diet, for the clamour of radical youths in the galleries had made the deliberations wellnigh impossible. In other respects the constitution was almost intact. A few persons only had suffered from outbreaks of the grand duke Constantine's fierce temper, and most of these had been officers, for the viceroy's powers were purely military.

However unwilling the masterful Nicholas may have been to enter into the inheritance of his popularity-seeking brother, he swore to observe the constitution, and it was not his way to infringe the letter of the law. At the outset, it is true, he postponed the summoning of parliament beyond the legally specified date (a course which may well have been justified on account of the wars and the internal confusions of the initial years of his reign), but in the spring of 1830 he visited Warsaw to open the diet. "It rests with you," he declared to the assembly, "to confirm the work of the restorer of your fatherland by a wise and moderate use of the powers and privileges he has granted you." In Warsaw, with dramatic talent, he appeared only as King of Poland, and he missed no opportunity of displaying his veneration for Polish memories. He erected a monument to the national hero Sobieski, speaking of the Pole

as his own predecessor on the throne; he distributed munificent presents; he gave brilliant festivals which were attended by some of the young Prussian princes; and with the patience of a constitutional ruler he endured in silence the onslaughts made by the radical majority among the deputies. When, after a stormy session, the diet had succeeded in passing but a single insignificant law, Nicholas expressed his concern in cold and dignified language, and concluded by saying, "Though from a distance, I shall continue to think of your true happiness." He was careful to refrain from words of censure, for Nesselrode represented to him that any public expressions of this kind would make a very bad impression in Europe.[1]

Whatever grounds there may have been for complaint, the country did not suffer from intolerable arbitrariness on the part of its rulers. At a later date Mochnacki and other leaders among the radical émigrés frankly admitted that the Poles had not risen against Russian oppression, but had desired to regain their ancient independence and the frontiers of 1772. From the day on which this semi-independent kingdom had been established, the leading members of the nobility had been united in the hope for complete restoration, for a reunion with the lost brethren in Posen and West Prussia, in Lithuania and Podolia. Hardly anyone supported the new regime honestly and without arrière pensée.

During the long centuries when the country's neighbours had been accustomed to say, "Poland exists only by disorder," the members of this unhappy nation had utterly lost the straightforward virtues of civic life. The Polish noble understood only how to fight, to suffer, and to weave conspiracies on behalf of his country; he did not know how to serve his country with sobriety and diligence. Even Adam Czartoryski, Alexander's friend, continually assured the czar that this Polish kingdom, smaller by a third than the duchy of Warsaw, could not be considered as anything more than a payment on account, "une pierre d'attente." Acting up to his own words he misused his official position as director of the university of Vilna to Polandise his educational cure and to prepare it for its future incorporation, so that his indulgent patron was at length compelled to intervene. The entire history of this fifteen years had been a chain of conspiracies. The kingdom and the neighbouring domains were permeated by emissaries and secret

[1] Schmidt's Report, June 29, 1830.

societies, connected first of all with the national league of freemasons and subsequently with the patriotic league. Before long, all the educated youth of the country, the landed gentry, and most of the officers, had been won over to the conspiracy. It was only the peasants and the new bourgeoisie which held aloof, for the last-named order was just beginning to flourish under the protection of a well-regulated administration. The crown vainly attempted to protect itself by the busy activities of the secret police. When, in the year 1827, it at length proved possible to arrest some of the leaders of the conspiracy (confederates of the Russian decabrists), although their guilt was plainly proved, the senate, the supreme judicial authority, acquitted some, and inflicted preposterously light sentences on others. This judgment, which was a defiance of the law, a direct encouragement to treason, was actually drafted by Adam Czartoryski, the amiable and cultured leader of the moderate aristocratic party. The nobles exulted, for they had long been accustomed to glorify all state criminals as patriots. The Russian ruler swallowed the affront, and henceforward with increasing boldness the Poles conducted a petty warfare against the administration by devices as widely current here as among the enslaved peoples of southern Europe. For the younger men it was the fashionable thing to pick quarrels with the authorities and then to pose as martyrs.

When Lafayette, Kosciuszko's former comrade-in-arms, once more waved the beloved tricolor, enthusiasm flamed high. The dreams of the nineties again filled the thoughts of youth, while in the army Napoleonic memories revived. In these circles of the nobility no one doubted that the hour for Poland's liberation had at length struck. Emissaries of the French radicals urged prompt action, whilst a report came from St. Petersburg that Nicholas intended to declare war on France and would send the Polish army as advance guard. No definite plan for the rising had as yet been formulated, but so widespread was disaffection that a spark sufficed to start the conflagration. A handful of young officers, ensigns, and students entered into a conspiracy to assassinate the viceroy, treacherously struck down several generals, and called the Warsaw mob to arms. Grand Duke Constantine lost courage and self-command. After his manner he had an affection for the Poles, and he hesitated to interfere in Polish affairs. He excused his weakness by saying, "I and mine desire to emerge

from these confusions with clean hands."[1] Offering no resistance, he marched homewards with his Russian regiments, leaving the land to its fate. The entire kingdom together with the fortresses on the Vistula promptly espoused the victorious cause. No longer was it a mere revolt. An independent state with an organised administration, a full treasury, and a well-equipped army, confronted the czar's realm as one power confronts another, and could be constrained by nothing short of war.

In Warsaw, meanwhile, affairs ran the course traditional in Polish revolutions. Exuberant pugnacity and a spirit of self-sacrifice, fiery speeches and fraternal embraces, clamorous priests and high-spirited, beautiful women, as much dancing and drinking as heart could desire; but therewith rage of faction, complete lack of discipline, fierce mutual recriminations; whilst amid all this medley of brave and enthusiastic men there was not a single person of statesmanlike intelligence, not one of distinguished character. The orators of this nobles' conspiracy, men with the phrases of liberty on their lips, had no eye for the sorrows of the masses; the proposal to abolish the corvée and to give the peasants landed property was rejected by the diet. For a time the childish illusion was cherished that matters could be arranged with the czar by peaceful negotiation, and it was even believed that Nicholas might be persuaded to consent to the annexation of Lithuania and Podolia. But radicalism soon gained the upper hand, as it naturally does in times of revolt. Adam Czartoryski and his moderate adherents had to yield to the wishes of Lelewel, Mochnacki, and the jacobins. On January 25, 1831, the diet resolved upon the discrowning of the house of Romanoff.

The liberal world of Europe hailed the Polish great week with enthusiasm hardly less cordial than that with which the same world had hailed the July revolution. The traditional hatred of Russian autocracy, which had become active during the first years of peace but had diminished slightly during the Turkish war, flamed up anew. Everyone ignored that in Poland the Roman Catholic clergy was hardly less zealous on behalf of the revolution than in Belgium. To the heated intelligence of the day, the Sarmatian nobles seemed pioneers of liberty. The Polish revolutionaries, moreover, could be assured of the sympathy of all tender hearts, for, owing to the current fables of French

[1] Schmidt's Report, December 14, 1830.

historians, the Poles were still universally regarded as the innocent victims of unscrupulous and self-interested policies. No unprejudiced history of the partition of Poland had hitherto appeared. Although the old nobles' republic had fallen by its own sins, even Dahlmann regarded its destruction as nothing short of the coldly calculated murder of a nation. In common with the Roman see it was the destiny of the Poles that they were venerated in proportion to the remoteness of the observers. Their neighbours in the Prussian frontier lands knew well enough how far the Polish peasants lagged behind the Russians; but in the west, where no one had ever seen a Polish village, traditional views prevailed about Latin and Byzantine civilisation, and it was honestly believed that these masses, infirm of will, trodden down by junkers, priests, and Jews, constituted a strong bulwark against Asiatic barbarism. The general opinion was that the freedom of the nations and the civilisation of Europe were fighting beneath the banner of the white eagle.

The czar would not be diverted from his bold resolves. "The revolution in Warsaw," wrote Nesselrode proudly to London, "does not affect the position which his majesty has assumed from the first towards European affairs in general."[1] Like every true Muscovite, Nicholas despised the Poles. In a few weeks, while in transit, his invincible army would crush these disturbers to powder, and would then flow onwards towards rebellious western Europe. Diebitsch, too, persisted in his infatuation. His self-satisfied opinion was that if his counsels had been followed in Berlin the Polish army would by now have been at the Rhine and the Russian army at the Vistula. To an emissary of the Warsaw government he said mockingly, "You have chosen your time ill; the emperor's forces are already on their way to the west!" The field marshal was placed in supreme command and expected to settle with the Polish disturbers in February. When this revolution had been subdued, Prussia was to be drawn into the great crusade on behalf of legitimacy, and in May the army of the conqueror of the Turks would reach the Rhine. The guards, therefore, set out, though they could not possibly reach Poland before March—a month too late. The imperial train was already on its way. The Russians were delighted to take up arms against their ancient enemies, and the saying was everywhere current that Russia would

[1] Nesselrode to Lieven, December 4 (old style), 1830.

not allow herself to be robbed of the only reward she had secured from a victorious fight against the whole of Europe. They had long been incensed because this conquered land enjoyed wider rights than were known to the victors, and they now clamorously demanded complete annexation of the rebellious dependency.[1] No one anticipated vigorous resistance. Like the field marshal, most of the officers of the guard expected a quick and victorious campaign till the Seine was reached. Many, in taking leave, said they would write home as soon as they reached Paris. But the pride of the Muscovites was to be severely punished.

As General Schöler had warningly prophesied, the Polish campaign was compromised from the first by the czar's designs for a European crusade. Diebitsch began the war too early and with inadequate forces. Hoping to end matters quickly, he actually led the Lithuanian troops, whose loyalty had long been suspect, to fight against their Polish fellow countrymen.[2] He was preceded by a dictatorial manifesto which served only to increase the forces of resistance. On the battlefield the Poles forgot their dissensions and displayed everywhere the courage of former days. When Diebitsch, advancing directly upon Warsaw, had defeated the Poles on February 25th at Grochow, the old battlefield on the right bank of the Vistula, like Frederick William II in the year 1794 he did not feel strong enough to take advantage of his victory. He did not venture to follow the advice of Toll, his bold chief of general staff, to storm Praga, the bridgehead of the capital, and thus end the war at a single blow. Just as before, the current of events took another course as soon as the favourable opportunity had been missed. The Russian army was compelled to retreat across a country devoid of roads and in an unexpectedly early thaw, with cholera raging in the ranks. At the end of March the Poles, now led by the valiant Skrzynecki, sallying forth from Praga, defeated General Rosen's untrustworthy Lithuanian corps, compelling Diebitsch to withdraw still further eastward. The guards, upon their victorious march to Paris, arrived in time to arrest the course of disaster in Poland. A long and arduous war was in prospect. The newspapers of Europe announced with delight the proved weakness of the dreaded northern colossus. For many months to come

[1] Schöler's Report, January 29, 1831.
[2] Schöler's Reports, January 16, March 22, and May 2, 1831.

it would be impossible for Russia to intervene in the affairs of western Europe.

Both the other partitioning powers were likewise paralysed by the Polish revolution. As at the opening of the first revolutionary war, Prussia was in danger of being caught between two fires, and no Prussian statesman could fail to recognise what was dictated by the duty of self-preservation. Should the revolt in Warsaw prove victorious, Posen and West Prussia would be gravely imperilled, and it was evident that in France the party of revolutionary propaganda was becoming dominant. The smooth words of the Poles could not affect these obvious truths. Directly the revolution broke out, Count Titus Dzialynski, chief of the Posen conspirators, hastened to Warsaw to ask whether a rising in Posen was desirable. The provisional government, still under the cautious leadership of Czartoryski, gave him the cold shoulder, and in a letter predated by one day spontaneously assured Schmidt, the Prussian consul, that it was the government's firm intention "conscientiously to respect the boundaries of all states belonging to his majesty the king of Prussia." As a work of supererogation, the innocent count from Posen visited the consul to give the latter a friendly assurance that he had come to Warsaw solely in order to visit his mother.[1] Who was likely to be deceived by such artifices? Whilst day by day deserters from Prussia were joining the Polish army, among them General Uminski who had absconded from Glogau, and whilst a cavalry troop of Poseners was actually in process of formation, the revolutionary authorities in Warsaw continued to count on German goodwill, and, through the instrumentality of General Kniaziewicz, begged the king to act as mediator. Frederick William curtly refused, advising the rebels to submit to their king.[2] In his view they were nothing but enemies to his own state. Recalling the Prussian consul from Warsaw, he placed the money in the vaults of the Polish bank in Berlin at the disposal of the rightful sovereign.

When the posture of affairs became more serious he had the frontier line, a hundred and thirty miles [German] in length,

[1] Despatch from the Provisional Government to Schmidt, December 4; Schmidt's Reports, December 5 and 9, 1830.

[2] Schmidt's Report, December 27, 1830; Ancillon's Instruction to Schöler, January 19, 1831.

occupied by troops belonging to the four eastern army corps. Gneisenau was placed in supreme command of these reinforced corps, and he discharged the painful commission magnificently. Even the discontented Polish nobles bowed before the genial grandeur of the veteran hero. He encountered them with a certain contemptuous irony, being familiar with their ineradicable fondness for crooked paths. Though forbearing in respect of trifles, he insisted that desertions to join the revolt should absolutely cease. It was time to take active measures, for 12,000 men, disregarding the pacific exhortations of Archbishop Dunin, had already left the province to join the Poles. The field marshal's instructions were to assist the victualling of the Russian army, but not to intervene actively in the struggle unless absolutely necessary, for the Russians did not desire any such intervention, which would have been hurtful to their prestige. Gneisenau had a poor opinion of Diebitsch's competence as commander, and he regarded the entire Polish war as nothing more than a trifling episode. His gaze was directed westward, his thoughts being concentrated upon the approaching struggle with the Carthage on the Seine.

Thus nearly half the Prussian army had to be employed to protect the eastern frontier. Austria was less severely affected by the Polish disorders. There was little danger to Galicia, for the Ruthenian peasants detested their Sarmatian lords, and further the Polish nobles of this region displayed far less zeal for the revolution than did the Poles of Prussia. From of old Catholic Austria had been less hated by the Poles than the two other partitioning powers. Since the powerful Magyar nobility now greeted with passionate and almost minatory delight every defeat suffered by the detested Russians, since the viceroy of Galicia, Prince Lobkowitz, hardly concealed his Polish sentiments, and since even unexcitable Vienna was showing enthusiasm for the Sarmatian heroes, the Poles were too readily deceived. In the bitter school of conspiracy they had long learned to take hope for reality and empty words for deeds; their emissaries were at work at all the courts, and a casual utterance of human sympathy sounded to their ears like a pledge of armed assistance. Adam Czartoryski circulated an enquiry among his aristocratic friends as to whether the archduke Charles might not be elected king of the Poles, since this would gain help from Austria, and yet he must have known that the name of Charles was one to inspire

the suspicious emperor with alarm. Through the instrumentality of his brother Constantine, Czartoryski begged the Hofburg to mediate, and then wrote to Metternich to ask about the election of the archduke. Subsequently Count Clam, a confidant of the chancellor, was invited in profound secrecy to Moavia, where Polish negotiators were awaiting him. When the revolt was already undergoing extinction, Count Zamoiski, Czartoryski's nephew, came to Vienna, once again solicited Austrian succour, and offered the crown of the Jagellons to any one of the grand dukes, it did not matter which.[1]

All was labour lost, although the Polish newspapers continued to publish fables concerning the amicable sentiments of the court of Vienna. A year and a half earlier, at the time of the Turkish war, Metternich might have welcomed the Polish revolution, but now he regarded it merely as "a revolution like all the others," for he was endeavouring to re-cement the league of the eastern powers. It is true that he kept a back door open, retaining the Austrian consul Oechsner in Warsaw throughout the war, to the great annoyance of the czar; but he bluntly rejected the proposal to elect an archduke, speaking of it as "an absurd idea." To give vigorous public expression to his loathing, he went so far as to enrich his vocabulary of anxious phrases by a sixth metaphor, speaking of Poland as "a powder magazine" which threatened to blow all its neighbours into the air. Even Gentz, the old enemy of Russia, was constrained to admit that at this juncture Austria could not act very differently from Prussia. In fact, Emperor Francis' answer to the Poles was almost identical with that made by Frederick William; but to Prince Czartoryski, a persona grata at court, and to some of his noble colleagues, an asylum in Austria was secretly promised. The Galician frontier was occupied in force, and a neighbourly supply of provisions to the Russian army was permitted.

Since the eastern powers held firmly together, Czar Nicholas was from the first able to protest vigorously against French intervention. In insolent terms Nesselrode wrote to Paris: "Although the government of King Louis Philippe seems, ostensibly with impatience, to have been hitherto awaiting a favourable moment to give Europe a guarantee of security and to win the emperor's confidence, it must not fail to make a wise use of the present opportunity. This course is dictated

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, January 18 and 28, February 21, and September 4, 1831.

alike by dignity and by interest." [1] The dictatorial exhortation secured a willing audience. Louis Philippe knew that a fruitless attempt at intervention in Polish affairs could only redound to the advantage of the enemies of his house. For although all the French parties were enthusiasts on behalf of this Belgium of the east, the "liberal and Catholic nation, natural ally of the French," the republicans and the masked Bonapartists distinguished themselves in especial by suspicious zeal. The very journals which were trumpeting the principle of non-intervention as the saving truth of neofrench liberty, with the ingenuous logic of radicalism were demanding intervention in favour of the Poles. Lafayette entered a formal and bombastically worded protest against the proceedings of the Russians. Casimir Delavigne movingly described how the white eagle was looking hopefully towards the French rainbow. When this rainbow failed to help the eagle, Barthélemy wrathfully sang: "Cachons-nous, cachons-nous! Nous sommes des infâmes." The bourgeois king was unwilling to entrust the frail Orleans craft to the guidance of such friends. To appease public opinion, now intensely aroused, he addressed a cautious inquiry to the greater courts as to whether joint mediation by the powers was possible. Alike in Berlin and in Vienna the suggestion was bluntly rejected.[2]

It was rejected also in London. Canning had unhesitatingly supported the Greeks because English commerce in the Ægean Sea was being ruined by the Greek war. Palmerston, Canning's pupil, acted in the spirit of his master when he refused aid to the Poles, for a breach with Russia would have been disastrous to the lucrative English trade in the Baltic. A cool reception was therefore given to young Marquis Wielopolski, the envoy of the Warsaw government, the minister for foreign affairs speaking in dignified terms of the sanctity of the European treaties which in the Belgian dispute he had himself lightheartedly violated. The disorders in Poland actually led him into closer relations with the eastern powers, and he sent plainly worded admonitions to Paris. Ever suspicious of foreigners, he was afraid that the flatteries of the Polish agents or the inflammatory utterances of the radical propagandists might after all seduce Louis Philippe into a war harmful to British commercial interests. How imminent, too, was the danger that

[1] Nesselrode, Instruction to Pozzo di Borgo, November 28 (old style), 1830.
[2] Maltzhan's Report, March 23, 1831.

the unhappy Irish, who at the hands of their foreign despots experienced ill treatment incomparably worse than that meted out to the Poles, might then appeal for aid to France, generous donor of freedom! In private only, and without any practical effect, did he manifest at times to the German powers his concern regarding the unduly harsh treatment of the Poles.[1]

To complete the confusion of the European situation, in February, 1831, the long anticipated revolt broke out in Italy. More than ever unconscientious now appeared the Orleans policy, incalculable, and oscillating between timidity and greed. In Italy it conducted with evil demagogic weapons the traditional French campaign against Austrian rule, inciting the unhappy Italians to foolish risings in which France did not dare to lend serious support. Thus the malcontents of Piedmont who had sought refuge in France were favoured by the French authorities, and were spurred on to such an extent that the alarmed court of Turin formed a defensive alliance with Austria; and the new king, Charles Albert of Carignano, the man who at an earlier date had sought from the French Bourbons protection against the revenge of the Viennese court, turned away from France in deadly hatred. French propaganda then devoted itself to Central Italy. Emissaries of Parisian secret societies swarmed throughout the country; Louis Philippe paid money to the conspirators ('twas but a modest sum, for the Orleans' thrift was proverbial); while the principle of non-intervention boastfully announced in Paris exercised a still more disastrous influence. The conspirators firmly believed that Austria could not venture to intervene, because France would sustain the revolution by force of arms. Lafayette, the old mischief-maker, gave them a positive assurance to this effect, and they looked forward to a speedy victory over the pitiful troops of the minor princes and the priests.

Thus relying upon French protection, they hazarded the struggle. In the course of February the petty despots of Modena and Parma were expelled; Romagna, Umbria, the frontier provinces, fully four-fifths of the Papal States, shook off the intolerable yoke of the church. A revolutionary government was formed both in Bologna and in Modena, and amid the fluctuating medley of hopes and resolves wherewith the patriots were animated it became possible to recognise that

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, March 30, July 3, 1831.

in this noble stock the national idea was becoming cleared and better understood as it made its way from the emotional south into the calmer regions of the north. No longer was anything seen of the carbonari colours, which ten years earlier had been flaunted in Naples. The banner of the kingdom of Italy waved in all the liberated regions, which proudly styled themselves the United Provinces of Italy; and the name of the great founder of this kingdom was upon everyone's lips. Two of his nephews, the youthful sons of Louis Napoleon, were seen amid the insurgents, their chargers decked with red-white-and-green trappings. Many of the conspirators were already bold enough to appeal to the king of Rome to leave Vienna and join them.

Remarkable now the sudden oscillations of the Viennese court! During the disturbances of recent months, Austria had been little more than the chorus in the tragedy, but at this juncture she displayed herself as an Italian power. Emperor Francis regarded his dominance in the peninsula as the principal pillar of his realm, and the archdukes derived most of their revenues from Italian possessions. Metternich, who had never had any sympathy for the sorrows of Italy, considered that the evil doctrine of non-intervention was solely responsible for the movement. Whilst defeating the revolution, he desired simultaneously to furnish practical refutation of this new principle of international law, and when success had crowned his efforts he proudly exclaimed: "The first Austrian battalion in Italy sufficed to overthrow the doctrine of non-intervention."[1] The Austrian army, notwithstanding recent endeavours to improve its equipment, was still in sorry plight,[2] and financial resources were available only through the ready though by no means inexpensive assistance of the faithful house of Rothschild; but the ancient imperial power still felt strong enough for a campaign against the improvised levies of Italy. Directly the pope and the expelled princes appealed for help to Vienna, the Austrian troops crossed the border, and before the end of March the entire revolutionary area had been subjugated. Francis of Modena celebrated his return by the customary executions and imprisonments, while the pope thankfully greeted the chosen warriors of the whitecoats, who had expelled the desecrators of the temple from the domain of the Levites.

[1] Metternich to Fiequelmont, April 29, 1831.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, January 9, 1831.

Metternich held the court of the Palais Royal in check by a diplomatic masterstroke. On February 15th he despatched to Paris an account of the nature and aims of the Italian revolution—an artful tissue of truth and fiction. The movement, he declared, had been entirely instigated by the Parisian comité directeur, and its specific aim had been to make Napoleon's son constitutional king of Italy. He added certain documentary proofs of these assertions, which the widely ramified intrigues of the Bonapartists had put into his hands; but he was careful to refrain from recounting that the autocratically minded king of Rome was by no means disposed to become a tool of the Italian patriots, and that, in a generous glow of passion, the young Napoleon had offered to reconquer with his good sword the lost duchy of Parma for his mother Marie Louise. But between the lines indications were given that the grandfather of Napoleon II might perhaps be able to make some use of his grandson. At the close came a plain threat: "Our declarations must be understood by those who will befriend our cause under pain of their own annihiliation—for essentially our cause is their own." The device was successful. The Orleans ruler trembled before the spectre of Bonapartism, which had adherents even in Louis Philippe's immediate entourage; and to the jealous policy of the bourgeois kingdom the idea of a united Italy was quite as distasteful as it was to the Viennese court. France made no move. Not until the revolt had been suppressed did the Parisian cabinet enter a protest against the occupation of the Papal States. The minor duchies were not mentioned, for it was universally agreed that they were an inviolable family heritage of the house of Austria. Metternich built a golden bridge for the defeated enemy. Just as he had done ten years earlier, he gave a solemn assurance that Austria's action in intervening had been dictated by no selfish interest, but by a desire to maintain the peace of Europe. He consequently offered no opposition when, upon the request of France, the envoys of the five powers assembled in Rome to discuss the necessary reforms in the Papal States.

At the court of Berlin lively irritation was aroused by the Italian intrigues of the Palais Royal. Ancillon, in charge of the foreign office during Bernstorff's illness, gave the French envoy plainly to understand that the king thoroughly approved all that Austria was doing in Italy. In his verbose and

unctuous pulpit style he censured the ambiguous principle of non-intervention, saying: "We cannot too often or in too diversified a manner attack this revolutionary doctrine, which implies that insurrection is a sacred duty, and that no one has any right to interfere with the discharge of that duty. The independence of the sovereigns is thereby mined at its foundations, for the doctrine, if accepted, would make it impossible for rulers to appeal for help to their allies; and it would render dependent upon the approval of France the adoption of such measures as the governments may consider essential in the interest of their existence and of their self-preservation."[1] In accordance, however, with his long-established principles, the king would not commit himself for Italy's sake to any comprehensive responsibilities, and he refused a request addressed him by the Turin court that, jointly with Austria, he should guarantee the integrity of Piedmont. He was quite prepared for benevolent mediation, but would go no further.

Among the envoys to the conference in Rome, the Prussian was the most zealous. During his residence in Rome, Bunsen had completely overcome his prejudices against the Italian people. On May 21st he submitted to the envoys a memorial which was approved by all. For a generation to come the Roman see was to be incessantly reminded of the benevolent exhortation now uttered by its protectors. There was unanimous agreement regarding the sins of this priestly regime, which had become even worse since the death of the gentle cardinal Consalvi. Even Prokesch von Osten, the declared enemy of the revolution, who had been commissioned by Metternich to watch the progress of affairs in Romagna, considered that the condition of the people was deplorable. All the courts, the Viennese included, honestly desired successful reform, for everyone regarded the Papal States as a European necessity, considering that the loss of the temporal dominion would involve the destruction of the papacy. Bunsen's proposals were temperate and reasonable. He demanded that all offices should be open to laymen, that elected councils should be instituted in the communes and in the provinces, that an audit office, with laymen among its members, should put an end to the peculations of the priests, and that perhaps in addition a council of state should be appointed. But what hope was there that the papacy would accede even to these modest demands? The

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, March 20, 1831.

holy see gave half promises, and broke them because it was impossible that they should be kept. Every pure theocracy is a regime of caste. It was out of the question that the crowned priest should concede in serious earnest the indispensable preliminary to all reform, the equal rights of laymen.

France, meanwhile, in the name of the sacred doctrine of non-intervention, was demanding ever more loudly the evacuation of the Papal States, although the pope urgently desired that the army of occupation should remain for the present, and everyone anticipated a second revolt in the near future. The tedious and acrimonious negotiations were still in progress when the day approached upon which the Parisian chambers were to reassemble. Louis Philippe played his last trump, a card which from now onwards was always to win him his specious successes. He declared that if Austria did not promptly evacuate Romagna, he would find it impossible to control the passions of the representatives of the people, and war would become inevitable. Metternich having gained his principal end, now yielded in point of form. In July the imperial troops were withdrawn, but at the same time Count Lützow concluded a secret treaty with the grateful curia, Austria pledging herself to maintain papal sovereignty in all circumstances, and therefore agreeing to reoccupy the Papal States immediately upon the occurrence of another rising. In view of this possibility Metternich took the precaution of requesting the support of Prussia and Russia.[1] Rejoicing in their victory, and trading upon the profound ignorance of the deputies, the ministers of the bourgeois king regaled these with the fable that France had liberated the pope from the imperial yoke. In reality the imperial state had its feet more firmly planted than ever upon the neck of Italy. The coquetting of the Orleans ruler with secret revolutionary societies had driven all the princes of the peninsula, and even the fickle Charles Albert, into the arms of the court of Vienna, so that during the next few years Austria's supremacy in Italy was undisputed. But among the youth of the country a few farsighted men like Camillo Cavour were beginning to entertain the constitutional ideas of the new France; and it was of equal significance in relation to a future still remote that Louis Napoleon should here first form associations with the demagogues. During these disturbances in Romagna the prince lost his elder brother, and as the duke of

[1] Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, September 5, 1831.

Reichstadt's death occurred not long afterwards (July, 1832), the hereditary claims of the Napoleonic house devolved upon this enigmatic young man. Warrior Bonapartism was interred with the proud king of Rome; the new pretender pursued the quiet path of the conspirator.

In Switzerland also the July revolution found imitators Not fruitlessly had the Confederates during the weary years of the restoration pursued a peaceful life undisturbed by stresses from without. They were now far less dependent upon Parisian ideas than they had been in the days when they had constituted the Helvetian republic upon the model of the French unified state and had accepted the act of mediation from the hand of Bonaparte. Though the revolution in Switzerland was encouraged by French example, it retained a Swiss character, and possessed therefore enduring vitality. Its aim was to secure a purely popular government, for this was a necessary outcome of the recent history of the Confederacy. Not without disturbances and the use of force, but nevertheless without serious civil war, in several of the cantons, and above all in the largest and the wealthiest, the dominion of the capital cities was overthrown and the privileges of the patricians were abolished, these changes being succeeded by the introduction of democratic methods of government, of systems of popular representation centering in the great council. With these democratic ideas was associated a demand for reform of the loosely constructed federal constitution. But in the classic land of federalism the impulse towards unity could never become so powerful as in Germany or Italy. The old petty disputes between the cantons continued. In Schwyz an attempt was made to divide the canton into two parts, while the rural district of Basle, inspired with radical ideas, broke away as a sovereign half-canton from the conservative town of Basle. Since the national assembly was too weak to control all these party struggles, it adopted the fashionable principle of non-intervention. This resolve, the outcome of temporary embarrassment, could not be permanently maintained; sooner or later it was inevitable that the constitutional changes in the cantons should react upon the Confederacy. The sharp insight of hatred enabled Metternich to recognise this. He knew how eagerly the Parisian court, the only one to send an envoy to the national assembly, was again

endeavouring to secure a protectorship over Switzerland;[1] and he feared lest the movement of the Confederates towards unity might set the Germans an evil example. In his anxiety it seemed to him that Switzerland was once more tending to become the unified state of the Helvetian republic, and he begged the eastern powers to consider whether any such transformations could be tolerated, seeing that every canton had a well-established right to the maintenance of its ancient constitution, and seeing that it was only as a federation of states that Switzerland had been recognised by the great powers.[2]

§ 4. SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS. THE FALL OF WARSAW.

A certain guarantee for general peace was furnished by the very multiplicity of the contentions with which Europe was filled. Only to the self-conceit of Czar Nicholas could it seem possible to cut all these knots simultaneously with the sword. The eastern powers were hampered mainly by Poland and Italy, the western powers by domestic embarrassments. Consequently, the London conference was able to go ahead with its work of mediation, despite repeated and dangerous relapses, due for the most part to the double game played by France.

On January 20, 1831, the conference agreed concerning the principles of the separation of the Netherlands. In accordance with Bülow's proposal it was settled that the future Belgian state should be neutral, and that Belgium was to comprise all the territories south of the old Dutch frontier, with the exception of the German federal state of Luxemburg. But during these negotiations Talleyrand suddenly divulged his most cherished desire, demanding for France the frontier strip around Philippeville and Marienburg which had been ceded to the Netherlands in 1815. Even the Nestor of diplomacy was unable to escape from the wonderful dreamland in which the French had moved since the great week. On the Seine, people had become so much accustomed to see all the follies of Paris imitated by the entire liberal world of Europe, that it was seriously believed everyone with a liberal mind would approve the demand for the Rhine frontier. The more cautious among the French plumed themselves upon their moderation because they

[1] Otterstedt's Report, Berne, July 12, 1830.

[2] Metternich, Mémorandum sur les affaires de la Suisse, November 23, 1831.

did not as yet insist upon the "great frontier," but were content for the nonce to claim what Paris spoke of as the "little frontier," demanding the retrocession of the narrow strip of border territory which had been taken from France by the second and gentler treaty of Paris. Lord Palmerston, however, at once recognised that none of the eastern powers would accede to any such proposal; he therefore declared himself definitely opposed to it, and was supported in this by all the other plenipotentiaries. By secret despatches, Louis Philippe once more endeavoured to win over the English court to the acceptance of the "little frontier." He also demanded the neutrality of Luxemburg, but Prussia answered in definite terms that the Germanic Federation, to which Luxemburg belonged, was prepared for defence, and was not in any sense neutral.[1]

The king of the Netherlands agreed to the proposals of the conference. The Brussels congress, on the other hand, spoiled by the rare favour of fortune, entered a passionate protest, and appealed to the great principle of non-intervention. This turn of affairs sufficed to show that the Belgians were counting upon French support, and France did in fact suddenly make difficulties about approving the decisions of the conference. Meanwhile large bodies of troops were massed in Lorraine, close to the frontier; and on January 28th the officer in command of the Rhenish army corps, General Borstell, reported that a sudden invasion of the Moselle district and the region of the Saar appeared imminent. After Bernstorff had consulted with the principal military leaders, the king decided that the Rhenish, the Saxon, and part of the Westphalian army corps should be placed upon a war footing, so that fully two-thirds of the Prussian army were now devoted to guarding the eastern and the western frontier. These precautionary measures were communicated with perfect frankness to the Parisian court, in the desire to avoid even the semblance of a challenge.[2]

The danger of war became still more pressing when the Brussels congress proceeded to choose a king for the new state. Having in November decreed the dethronement of the house of Orange, it was nowise inclined now to reverse this decision.

[1] Report from the foreign office to King Frederick William, February 15; Instruction to Bülow, February 15, 1831.

[2] Protocol of the Conference between Bernstorff, Gneisenau, and others, February 7; Cabinet Order to Prince William the Elder, February 16, 1831.

The Belgians, safeguarded by the dissensions among the great powers, considered their position unassailable. Since the bombardment of Antwerp the name of King William had aroused dire hostility, and the ambitious prince of Orange had of late played so ambiguous a part that even his own father now hardly desired to see him ascend the throne of Belgium. The eastern powers, therefore, were already beginning to despair of the prospects of the house of Orange. Bernstorff recognised this as early as the middle of December. Barely four weeks later Metternich expressed the same opinion in despatches to St. Petersburg, adding sorrowfully: "It will be impossible to carry through anything without the cordial support of France and England." Even Czar Nicholas could not completely escape the dejected mood of his allies. He ordered his plenipotentiaries in London to demand the crown of Belgium for the prince of Orange. Should they be outvoted, the czar would consider whether any other candidate might be unobjectionable.[1]

All the more impudent were the proceedings of the Belgian congress. Although the majority did not desire the incorporation of Belgium with France, they considered that their country could expect help from the French. To secure this support, and to bind the timid bourgeois king permanently to the Belgian side by personal interest, it was proposed to offer the new throne to Louis Philippe's second son, the duke of Nemours. What arrogance of revolutionary conceit! How could anyone believe that the great powers would permit this Orleans ruler, who so recently had begged humbly for the recognition of his own kingship, to acquire now a second throne for his house? What a mockery, too, would this step be in relation to the neutrality of the new state, that neutrality which had just been joyfully acclaimed by the Belgians themselves, if the country were to become a subsidiary French kingdom! Louis Philippe at once recognised that his headstrong Belgian friends were steering direct for a general war, and he declared alike in Brussels and in London that there could be no thought of the proposed kingship. But meanwhile a new candidate had appeared, the young duke of Leuchtenberg, and the attitude of the French court underwent a temporary change. When it became a question of suppressing the terrible name of Napoleon, no means was too contemptible for the Orleans ruler. Bresson

[1] Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, December 17, 1830. Metternich to Ficquelmont, January 10; Instruction to Lieven, January 19 (old style), 1831.

and Lawoestine, Louis Philippe's plenipotentiaries in Brussels, now gave secret and solemn assurances that the king would agree to his son's acceptance of the crown, thus winning over van de Weyer, Nothomb, and several others of the most capable members of the house. On February 3rd, by a majority of two, the congress elected the duke of Nemours King of the Belgians. The tricks of the house of Orleans had gained their end, for the Napoleonid had been defeated; and since, in the interim, the London conference had come to the sensible decision that no member of any of the five great royal houses could wear the crown of the neutral state, the envoys from the Belgian congress encountered at the Palais Royal a flat refusal. The bourgeois king made them a speech stuffed with virtuous commonplaces, assuring his deeply moved hearers that he had no desire to follow the example set by Louis XIV and by Napoleon.

It will readily be understood that these indications of French probity served to strengthen the voice of the war party in Berlin. With the sanctimonious catchwords of Haller's political doctrines Duke Charles of Mecklenburg implored his royal brother-in-law to defend monarchy by God's grace against the disloyal attacks that were being made upon the institution, saying: "As a father rules and guides the children entrusted to him by God's grace, so should a king be the father of his people, a God upon earth, responsible to the All-highest, who has given him power and entrusted the nations to his care." Bernstorff's sobriety was proof against such rhetorical exercises. They annoyed even Prince Wittgenstein, who in this crisis was no longer the partisan, but faithfully supported the king's pacific policy.[1] Even less influence was exercised by the voice of old Hans von Gagern when in *Patriotic Letters* published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* he defended the inviolable rights of the house of Orange. This remarkable imperial patriot, having played so zealous a part in the foundation of the United State of the Netherlands, now regarded as a personal affront the decomposition of the artificial structure. Of more importance was it that the dwellers upon the left bank of the Rhine were concerned as to their safety. Thanks to the undeniable benefits conferred by the new administration, in Prussian Rhineland a definitely profrench party had long ceased to

[1] Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, Memorial concerning the Question of War, March, 1831; Wittgenstein to Bernstorff, March 27, 1831.

exist. But belief in the permanence of the German dominion was not yet established, and such confidence as existed was severely shaken when the French demanded the disguised or undisguised annexation of Belgium. It was universally asked whether the king's excessive patience was not stimulating Gallic arrogance. Influenced by these Rhenish apprehensions, in the beginning of the year Arndt composed his pamphlet *The Question of the Netherlands and the Rhinelands*, a booklet which should alone have sufficed to acquit this loyal spirit of all suspicion of demagogy. "Sixteen years ago we had the fox in a trap, fast caught by tail and paws"—such were the words with which he began his lurid account of the secret intrigues of French policy, boldly reproaching German liberals for their French sympathies. More royalist than his king, in the Belgian uprising he could see nothing beyond a devilish puppet show worked from France; and he insisted that the fools and idiots of Brussels ought to return to their allegiance to the house of Orange, as otherwise Belgium would inevitably pass under French dominion.

In Paris, however, affairs now took a peaceful turn, showing that matters were not yet desperate. The July monarchy began to consolidate its domestic position. Lafayette had already been relieved of his dangerous post as chief of the national guard. In March the "ministry of movement" fell, and the headship of the government accrued to the leader of the "juste milieu," Casimir Périer, a wealthy banker, who knew from experience that petty artifices are unfavourable to business progress. He was an advocate of strict law and order, proud and unbending, sufficiently masterful to control both the intrigues of the monarch and the passions of the radicals, fundamentally a lover of peace but at the same time resolute not to sacrifice the dignity of his country, so that, taking him all in all, he was the most distinguished among the statesmen of the July monarchy. He would have nothing to do with the fantastic dreams of revolutionary propaganda, considering that liberty must always be national in spirit and that French blood belonged to France alone. His language to the great powers was invariably definite and frank—in so far, at least, as frankness was possible to a minister of this mongrel monarchy. He soon won Werther's friendship, and the court of Berlin recognised that France was

"now beginning to deserve confidence owing to her attitude and her principles." Even in Vienna and St. Petersburg the peaceful character of the policy of this honest bourgeois secured recognition, although Metternich could not restrain manifestations of enmity for the system of the "juste milieu," speaking of it as a policy "which is always hostile to the good, and which, if it does not favour evil, at least endeavours to cajole it."[1] Tedious negotiations, initiated in Vienna and aiming at the simultaneous disarmament of all the powers, failed, indeed, to achieve any practical results, for such proposals must inevitably be frustrated by the natural egoism of sovereign states; nevertheless, they served to show that tension was diminishing.[2] Even under the leadership of Casimir Périer the behaviour of the French cabinet was not fully straightforward or trustworthy, for in London, Talleyrand, behind the minister's back but hardly unbeknown to Louis Philippe, pursued a policy of his own, hinting in mysterious terms at the desirability that Belgium should be partitioned.

As soon as the breaking up of the United State of the Netherlands was settled, it was Prussia's interest to recognise unreservedly the new order of affairs, to assist the Belgians to obtain a supreme ruler without delay, and thus to secure for Prussia the preponderant influence in Brussels. But the conscientious caution of King Frederick William made it impossible for him to follow Lord Palmerston in the latter's bold and light-hearted reversal of policy. The king was unwilling without demur to attack the legitimate rights of his Orange relatives; he was unwilling to treat with the Brussels congress, which had so openly manifested its profrench sentiments; and above all he was unwilling to dissolve the alliance of the eastern powers, which to Prussia was now more essential than ever. Czar Nicholas, notwithstanding all that had been done with his own approval, continued to hope for the restoration of the Orange dominion, and Metternich feared to oppose the Russian ruler openly. Thus the eastern powers were placed in a false position; they left to the western powers the leadership in the Netherland negotiations, reluctantly and sulkily accepting the inevitable. Whilst Palmerston was becoming more closely associated with van de Weyer, and whilst the

[1] Ancillon, Instructions to Schöler, May 5, to Maltzahn, May 30; Metternich to Trauttmansdörff, August 9, 1831.

[2] Alopeus to Ancillon, May 2; Reply, May 26, 1831; etc.

bourgeois king had agents at work in the Brussels congress, in Berlin Baron Behr, plenipotentiary of the Brussels government, was curtly refused audience by the permanent secretary of the foreign office, on the ground that there could be no relations between Prussia and Belgium beyond those which the London conference was seeking to establish.[1]

After the futile royal election of February, Louis Philippe furtively endeavoured to secure the crown of Belgium for his nephew, the youthful Prince Charles of Naples, but dropped the proposal as soon as he noted the hostility of the eastern powers.[2] Meanwhile Baron Surlet de Chokier became regent, an old clericalist who had for years been hostile to the Orange rulers, but was by no means an ardent supporter of the Belgian uprising. In youth he had had experience of the Brabant revolution, and he was afraid that this new revolt would end in the annexation of Belgium by France. His advisers, Lebeau, Devaux, and young Nothomb, took bolder views, conceiving the happy thought of offering the crown to Prince Leopold of Coburg, relict of the late Princess Charlotte. It need hardly be said that this candidature was approved by the English court. The German prince was not unacceptable to the eastern powers. Louis Philippe speedily gave his assent, and turned the incident to his own advantage, promising Leopold the hand of his daughter Louise. The prince, prudent and ambitious, was ready to accept the call, and at once showed himself a master in diplomacy. He recognised that Belgium could not maintain independence without coming to terms with the London conference. He succeeded in talking over Palmerston and subsequently the other plenipotentiaries, so that on June 27th the conference decided to make certain changes, modifying its earlier resolutions concerning the subdivision of the area and concerning the national debt, changes favourable to Belgium. The new proposals for the preliminaries of peace were comprised in eighteen articles and were accepted by the Belgian congress. Leopold could now count with tolerable certainty upon recognition by the great powers, and on July 21st he entered Brussels as king.

To King William this all seemed tantamount to a personal affront. The eighteen articles had been drawn up by Palmerston, Leopold, and the Belgians, without the participation of the

[1] Permanent Secretary Zahn to Baron Behr, April 23, 1831.
[2] Alopeus to Ancillon, March 8, 1831.

Dutch plenipotentiaries, and had been signed by the envoys of the eastern powers only because the latter, still building confidently upon England's friendship, did not desire to drive the British minister into the arms of France. To secure the subsequent assent of the Orange ruler, the conference despatched Baron von Wessenberg to the Hague. The Austrian accepted the arduous commission with reluctance. He knew that Emperor Francis and Metternich were most unfavourable to this new concession to the Belgian rebels, and wrote in exculpatory terms, saying: "Time, events, France, and even England, are against us." As Metternich had foreseen, the mission was fruitless.[1] King William not only rejected the eighteen articles, but decided upon a fresh appeal to arms, to restore, if the worst came to the worst, the honour of his flag. On August 1st he announced that the truce was at an end. In a ten days' campaign his valiant army, led by the prince of Orange and Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the pitiful Belgian militia, and after the skirmish at Hasselt the new king of Belgium narrowly escaped capture. But now help came from France. Leopold had immediately applied to London and to Paris, receiving from Louis Philippe an answer to the effect that the French would at once take action to protect the neutrality of Belgium and to safeguard "peace, so wickedly disturbed by the king of the Netherlands." The king of the French added: "My two eldest sons, including the one on whose behalf I refused the crown you now wear, will accompany the army." [2]

Thus the state which had formulated the principle of non-intervention set the example of one-sided interference. The current of events had reduced the phrase to a mockery, for if Louis Philippe were to tolerate a military subjugation of Belgium, a subjugation which could not possibly be permanent, the Orleans throne would unquestionably fall, radicalism would become supreme in Paris, and a general war would ensue. Whilst the English fleet assembled at Dover, Marshal Gérard invaded Belgium with 40,000 men. On August 12th the duke of Orleans appeared in Brussels. At the first challenge from the French, the Hollanders arrested their victorious campaign and evacuated Belgian territory. Simultaneously Périer made

[1] Wessenberg to Metternich, June 27; Metternich to Esterhazy, July 6; Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, July 8; Maltzahn's Reports, August 16 and 20, 1831.

[2] King Louis Philippe to King Leopold, August 4, 1831.

conciliatory declarations on all hands, saying that France had no hidden purpose, and was merely operating in the name of the five powers since there had been no time to consult their London conference. The measures taken might be distasteful "to the magnanimous spirit of the king of Prussia"; but Paris and Berlin really desired the same things, the neutrality of Belgium and universal peace. Moreover, the French army would not enter Dutch territory, nor would it approach the Prussian frontier.[1] The minister's assurances were made in good faith, but the French troops had other views. The soldiers thought only of a great war, and when General Lawoestine demanded a suspension of hostilities his tone towards the Dutch was provocative and scornful.[2] The French officers imagined that they could see Prussian battalions in the Dutch ranks, and were loudly demanding revenge for Waterloo.

The Prussian cabinet was painfully surprised by the Hollanders' breach of the truce. King William was manifestly in the wrong, for he had personally appealed to the London conference for mediation and had accepted the truce. Prussia, therefore, was unable to support an undertaking which threatened to frustrate all that had been laboriously achieved on behalf of peace by the conference. The Prussian military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel von Scharnhorst, who accompanied the headquarters staff of the prince of Orange and thus witnessed the brief campaign, was in a difficult position, for he was unable to hold out to the dissatisfied Dutch any prospect of help from Prussia. But still less was Prussia willing to undertake armed interference to restrain the disturber of the peace. This question was never even mooted in Berlin, for the entire court heartily favoured the Orange side. Thus French intervention was grudgingly endured, since it was effected with surprising suddenness, and could not be prevented in good time. Ancillon indignantly exclaimed: "Shamelessly and unreservedly France has manifested a disturbing partisanship for Belgium." As soon as the truce had been reestablished, at the London conference King Frederick William demanded, in set terms, the immediate withdrawal of the French, threatening that in case of need his Rhenish regiments would cross the frontier. Since all the powers supported Prussia's

[1] Sebastiani to Count Flahault, August 5; Bülow to Nagler, August 6, 1831.

[2] Report of Lieutenant-Colonel von Scharnhorst to the king, Tirlemont, August 14, 1831.

demands, France was on this occasion compelled to keep troth.[1] Thus the withdrawal of the French troops began a few days after the invasion, and Belgium had been evacuated by the end of September. The Parisians were infuriated at the shame that had been inflicted, being of the modest opinion that by a trifling coup de main Belgium could have been united with France. On his return, Marshal Gérard was received as a traitor. When, upon the battlefield of Belle Alliance, his valiant warriors had begun to hack off the tail of the Netherland lion-monument, Gérard had forbidden this praiseworthy enterprise. Now the journals of the nation which imagined itself the leader of civilisation complained as with one voice: "They have not even destroyed the lion of Waterloo!"

In reality Périer's quiet resoluteness had inflicted a humiliating reverse upon the eastern powers. Without the other powers venturing any resistance, France had intervened single-handed on behalf of peace, and for the moment at least the bourgeois king seemed to be the mighty protector of Belgium. Manifold were the intrigues pursued by the Orleans ruler behind his minister's back. At the very time when, for Belgium's advantage, the king was trampling upon the sacred doctrine of non-intervention, he was already meditating a mortal blow against his own protégé. More definitely and more urgently than before did Talleyrand now unfold to the Prussian envoy his covetous proposals, saying that the lamentable course of this campaign had sufficiently proved Belgium's incapacity to stand alone; that the simplest thing would be to partition the country between Prussia, Holland, and France; that England's consent could readily be secured if Antwerp and Ostend were made free ports. Palmerston, who always judged others by himself, was inclined at first to suspect that Bülow was lending a willing ear to these allurements. But the Prussian bluntly rejected all such incitations, for how could he have agreed to commit his king to the robbery of the house of Orange?

These intrigues made the danger of war again imminent. Czar Nicholas gnashed his teeth with rage when he learned of the French invasion of Belgium. He conveyed a solemn assurance to the German powers (his actual words are quoted), that for the moment his realm was hampered by domestic embarrassments, by the Polish war and the cholera; but, he continued, "Had I but a single regiment at my disposal

[1] Ancillon to Maltzahn, August 11; to Schöler, September 17, 1831.

I would send it to fight in the ranks of the Austrian and Prussian armies, to demonstrate before the eyes of Europe the inseparable union of the three continental powers."[1] When, shortly afterwards, Russia's hands were freed by the fall of Warsaw, Metternich proposed to the eastern powers to cement their ancient alliance more closely, to establish a permanent diplomatic committee, a "centre d'entente" for the conduct of a joint policy, since England was no longer to be counted on.[2] But the plan failed to mature. Everywhere the need for peace was too pressing, and all the powers desired to see the end of the vexatious Belgian dispute.

The London conference resumed its attempts at reconciliation, doing so now in a somewhat modified mood. The warlike deeds of the Dutch army had had some effect; Belgium, through her manifest weakness, had greatly fallen in the general esteem; the eastern powers insisted that the obstinate Orange ruler must not be treated with undue severity.[3] On October 14th, in twenty-four articles, the conference drew up new preliminaries of peace, more favourable to Holland than the eighteen articles had been. The dispute about the frontier was to be settled through Belgium ceding part of the province of Limburg, receiving in return the western half of Luxemburg, subject always to the rights of the Germanic Federation. The Belgians murmured, but their king, more far-sighted, recognised that his unarmed state could not venture resistance, and he accepted the twenty-four articles. King William, on the other hand, had derived fresh courage from his military successes, and through the instrumentality of Prince Albert of Prussia conveyed a blunt declaration to Berlin to the effect that nothing would ever induce him to approve "the shameful destruction of Holland." He held to this view even after the Prussian government had explained to him in a detailed memorial that by the terms of the twenty-four articles the Dutch domains would still be greater than they had been in the days of the republic.[4] Thus the prudent Coburger once more had the great powers upon his side. On November 15th he triumphed in that the plenipotentiaries of the London confer-

[1] Nesselrode to Tatischcheff, a despatch delivered in Berlin August 30, 1831.

[2] Ancillon to Maltzahn, September 23 and October 18; Nesselrode to Tatischcheff, October 7, 1831.

[3] Nesselrode to Lieven, November 17, 1831.

[4] Witzleben to Ancillon, October 22; Eichhorn's Memorial concerning the Netherland Question, October 25, 1831.

ence and his envoy van de Weyer signed a treaty wherein the kingdom of Belgium was formally recognised upon the basis of the twenty-four articles. Next month he came to an understanding with the powers of the old quadruple alliance concerning the long contemplated dismantling of five fortresses on the southern frontier. France was excluded from these negotiations, and her noisy complaints about the "infamous" fortress treaty remained fruitless.

Thus with the indirect recognition of the great powers did the Belgian constitution become actual. As was unavoidable, it was based upon the principle of popular sovereignty, for the new state owed its existence to a revolution, and, further, the ancient liberties of the "joyeuses entrées," which actually conceded to the men of Brabant the right of resistance, were still a recent memory. "All authority is vested in the nation," ran the most important article. Devoid of any kind of traditional right, the king ruled solely by force of treaty and by popular favour; all taxes and military dispositions were subject to the annual approval of the chambers, and he was able to endure such a condition of dependence because no far-reaching foreign policy and no serious military system were possible to this small neutral state. The republican doctrine of Rotteck and his disciples, in accordance with which the constitutional king had no independent authority whatever, was carried to its logical conclusion in Belgium even more thoroughly than in France under the new Charte. Although in the fertile soil of the ancient communal freedom of the Netherlands, constitutional life could strike deeper roots than in the stony ground of Napoleonic bureaucracy, the only real result of the revolution alike in Belgium and in France was to establish the class dominion of the wealthy bourgeoisie. The masses were excluded from the suffrage by a high property qualification, so that in the villages there was but one voter for every hundred and four inhabitants; the senate, the upper chamber, represented nothing but the interests of the larger capitalists; in the entire country there were but four hundred and three persons eligible for this oligarchic corporation.

The Catholic clergy, however, shared with the bourgeoisie the control of the state, and herein lay the European significance of the new community. In earlier days Richelieu had hoped to construct out of the Spanish Netherlands a Catholic

republic, which should be a counterpoise to the militant Calvinism of the Dutch. The cardinal's dream had now been gloriously fulfilled. Since the autumn of 1830 Lamennais, in conjunction with Père Lacordaire and Count Montalembert, had been publishing *L'Avenir*, a journal which with burning eloquence simultaneously defended Roman world dominion and an almost unrestricted political liberty. Nowhere did the leading articles of *L'Avenir* find more eager readers than among the members of the Brussels congress. Precisely in accordance with the instructions of this neofrench ecclesiastical radicalism, the church was assigned a power in Belgium such as had never before been conceded it in any European state. Nothomb and his liberal friends imagined that they were merely following the celebrated example of the American voluntary system. In reality the church in Belgium was by no means content, as in North America, with the modest position of a private corporation. It continued to possess all the honours and privileges assigned to it by the Spanish kings, and the stipends of its priests were paid by the state. But the state renounced supremacy over the church, and had no word even in the appointment of bishops. Temporal and spiritual authority faced one another in unmitigated dualism, like two sovereigns with equal rights; and since in Europe a completely non-religious state cannot maintain itself in existence, the clergy speedily began to interfere in political affairs. Under cover of the fashionable catchword of educational freedom, the church gained almost complete control of the elementary school system, and was so successful in this respect that in Belgium, an ancient home of civilisation, ability to read and write became rarer year by year. The clergy were little troubled by the debile state authority, for, as Capaccini, the able nuncio, had at once predicted, a Protestant king ruling a Catholic people must sedulously avoid any dispute with the curia. The Belgian state resembled one of those Spanish cathedrals wherein the clergy, separated from the laity by the lofty barrier of the "silleria," is in sole possession of the nave and the choir, whilst the congregation is permitted only to catch distant glimpses of the altar from the aisles.

As soon as the consequences of the new religious liberty became manifest, the union which had formed the Belgian state began to break up. Clericals and liberals separated into hostile camps, two parties of almost equal strength, one supported by

the believing rural populace and by a number of religious societies, the other predominating in the towns and sustained by freemasonry, which here assumed a still stronger political tint than in other Catholic lands. Henceforward the history of Belgium consisted of the alternating successes of these parties, and was summed up in the struggle between the lodges and the confessionals. Since the culture of the day was irreligious, was purely political in character, this morbid and irreconcilable party struggle aroused no disapprobation among neighbouring peoples. As the Belgians without exception remained faithful to the constitution, the conflict was considered of no importance, and the fact was overlooked that in moral outlook the two parties differed as widely each from the other as the nineteenth from the thirteenth century. This land of priestly rule was universally extolled as the exemplar of constitutional liberty, for its fundamental law embodied all the essential principles of the law of reason, while the alternation of the parties in the control of power involved "continuous and invigorating changes"—such was the favourite journalistic phrase. A sagacious commercial policy promoted vigorous industrial development. The bourgeoisie and the clergy, the two dominant castes, had temporarily attained their ends, while the grievously oppressed workers in the mines and factories were not yet fully conscious of the miseries of their situation. Thus for many years the youthful state enjoyed undisturbed tranquillity, and the whole world believed that it owed this good fortune solely to the miraculous virtues of its exemplary constitution. Above all, upon the ambitious clergy and the rising bourgeoisie of Prussian Rhineland did Belgian conditions exercise a seductive charm. So strong was the cosmopolitan tendency of the time, so lacking was the age in understanding of the historical peculiarities of states, that in Rhineland the naive question was at times mooted whether Prussia, the land of great military strength, the land where parity of belief prevailed, ought not to seek salvation in adopting the constitutional forms of neutral Catholic Belgium.

Upon the new king alone did it depend that the crown still maintained a certain prestige in Belgium's democratic constitution. Leopold was in his prime, and had experienced numerous and strange vicissitudes. The ancient cosmopolitan spirit of adventure characteristic of the German estate of petty princes had never shown itself more able, more restless, and more

astute, than in the life of this Ulysses of Saxe-Coburg. Four separate times did he elect to change his fatherland. From a German he became a Russian, then an Englishman, then a Greek, and finally a Belgian. It was solely through the favour of circumstances that he did not also become a Spaniard or a Brazilian. In course of time he almost forgot his mother tongue, so that in later years he could write German only by helping it out with fragments of English and French. As Russian general he played a distinguished part in the battles of the War of Liberation, and subsequently, at the Vienna congress, shrewdly ministered to the interests of the house of Coburg. He then married Princess Charlotte, hoping that some day as prince consort he would be able to guide British policy. After this fine dream had been shattered by his wife's death, he maintained a respected position at the English court, although looked upon with ill-favour by George IV. Next the Greeks asked him to be their king, and without hesitation he began to fit himself for the new role. But in the end he withdrew his assent, foreseeing that Greece could not develop vigorously within her narrow frontiers, and secretly hoping that in England the future would offer him yet greater successes as counsellor to his niece Victoria. But these uncertain hopes were likewise renounced when the summons came from Belgium, a summons which did in truth bring the right man to the right place. Even before Leopold ascended the throne, his cautious adaptability to the wishes of the London conference saved the Belgian state from inevitable destruction. Thenceforward for an entire generation he displayed the like diplomatic mastery in steering a course between the two great parties, succeeding not merely in earning the personal gratitude of the Belgians, but even in awakening in this land of yesterday a certain sentiment of dynastic loyalty. Welcome to the liberals as freemason and as an old friend of the whigs, he gained the confidence of the clericals and even secured the support of the zealot pope, Gregory XVI. Though he faithfully observed the constitution, and was ever ready to change his ministries in accordance with the fluctuating votes of the chambers, he remained aware of his own superiority, saying to his confidants, "For Belgium, in the present juncture of affairs, I am the state."

All the threads of the country's policy, foreign and domestic alike, were centred in the castle of Laeken, where this man

quietly wove his nets. He was tall and slender, pale of countenance, with finely chiselled features, and dark, gloomy eyes. His speech was gentle and slow; his movements were deliberate; in all things he was taciturn, in business just as much as in pleasure. In England he was nicknamed Monsieur Peu-à-peu and Marquis Tout-doucement; at the German courts, where he was unfavourably regarded, he was known as Leopold the Sly. He would spend hours brooding over his plans, while listening, a fine connoisseur, to music, or to readings from scientific treatises, memoirs, or romances. He had no higher conception of morality than that derivable from a prudent calculation of worldly chances. When one of his nephews was confirmed, he warned the youth against selfishness in the following terms: "Many people find it to their interest to foster in a young prince this extremely unamiable characteristic, which they are subsequently able to exploit as a lucrative mine." Valiant on the battlefield, but in daily life always timidly concerned about physical well-being, he possessed a thorough knowledge of mercantile arts. To gain political friends he would sometimes overcome his natural inclination to thrift, and would spend lavishly; through his associations on the stock exchange he would then recoup his finances, for thus did he secure the extensive wealth essential to a democratic throne in this industrial country. Thus it was that with the two bourgeois kings of the July revolution, with the houses of Orleans and of Coburg, the members of a new race made their way into the ranks of the high nobility of Europe—well-informed men of business with stock exchange lists in their pockets, retiring and inconspicuous, men who wooed fortune like the tyrants of the cinquecento, utterly devoid of chivalrous feeling and of sentiment for historical tradition, but at bottom no less proud than the aristocratic princely caste of earlier days. When Leopold set out for Brussels, he thought of William of Orange's bold expedition to England. Like that celebrated "great patriot of the world" he hoped as European statesman simultaneously to save parliamentarism and to maintain the balance of power. It is true that he was as inferior to his talented prototype as little Belgium was inferior to the allied naval powers of William's days. Like The Hague of old, Brussels became a diplomatic observatory, numerous official and private agents keeping the Coburg ruler advised concerning the stellar changes in the European firmament. But the king

of the Belgians was unable to pursue a genuinely independent policy like that of the great Orange ruler. He was compelled to depend upon the protection of the western powers, and thus became the clamp by which their alliance was held together, so that cautious and unobtrusive mediation enabled him to put an end to numerous minor misunderstandings between the two courts with which he had such close personal relationships. But since he had everything to fear from France and nothing to fear from England, and since he had a predilection for his first wife's native land, he commonly favoured British interests. It was through the work of Leopold that Belgium avoided passing predominantly under French influence. At a later date his relations with Germany became more friendly, for the Flemings, who had been weakened by the revolution, gathered strength once more, and their vigorous commercial intercourse with the east could not be ignored. With the exaggerated self-esteem characteristic of weak nations, the Belgians henceforward imagined that their land was the centre of the society of states. As had the Dutch at an earlier date, with laudable zeal they laid especial stress upon international law, treating it as if it had been a specifically Belgian science, but displaying the while a philanthropic partiality which showed very plainly that unarmed nations are incompetent to take unprejudiced views of international struggles for power. During the reign of its first king, the Belgian state was not genuinely neutral like Switzerland, but was, in defiance of its constitution, the biased ally of England, so that Palmerston could say with good reason, "Belgium is my daughter."

This little throne was by no means an adequate sphere for the exercise of Leopold's ambition, and he utilised it as a platform from which to pursue the world-wide design of his dynastic policy. A man of cool judgment, indifferent to the legitimate rights of other princes and never disturbed by religious or nationalist feelings, he was affected by but one prejudice, a superstitious belief in the historic mission of the house of Coburg, and this fatalistic confidence furnished a power which guaranteed great successes. He reckoned as blindly upon the peculiar care of Providence for his chosen race as had the Ferdinands and the Leopolds of Hapsburg. Although the dynasty possessed in addition to himself no more than one personality with considerable political endowments, young Prince Albert, he never doubted that every nation would necessarily

esteem itself happy to possess a Coburg ruler. Just as little as the Hapsburgs did he imagine that his house could err. Anyone unlucky enough to cross the Coburg path was to him simply a rascal—for instance, Hardenberg, because this "man of little faith" refused to cede the Prussian portion of Henneberg, which the princely house of Coburg had claimed without any legal right whatever.[1]

The first foundations for the new glories of the Ernestine house were laid during Leopold's childhood, when, at a nod from Catharine of Russia, his mother had brought her three charming daughters to market at St. Petersburg, and Grand Duke Constantine had thrown his handkerchief to the youngest. The marriage proved unhappy and was soon followed by a separation, but for brother Leopold it opened a way into the great world. When he successively paid his addresses to an English and a French princess, it was currently said at the European courts that the Hapsburgs' proverbial luck in marriage had now passed to the house of Coburg. Meanwhile his brother Ferdinand married the wealthy heiress of the house of Kohary, this son of the distinguished champions of Protestantism unconcernedly having his children baptised as Catholics, just as in Belgium the offspring of Leopold had to be brought up in the Romish faith. Therewith opened a hopeful prospect that in case of need even the bigoted nations of the Iberian peninsula might be provided with Coburgers. But the indefatigable matchmaker's most successful coup was in England. His sister Victoria, the good and amiable widowed princess of Leiningen, married the duke of Kent, and became mother of the heiress to the English crown, and thus the possibility still remained open that the position of English prince consort, which Leopold had once hoped to fill in person, might after all be held by a Coburger. This dynastic policy was untinctured by lofty ideals. Ever dominant was the excellent bourgeois aim to secure satisfactory positions in life, although there was naturally no lack of obsequious pens to suggest in newspapers and books that true constitutional freedom flourished best under Coburg rule. Fortunately for Europe, the great power of this Saxon house, which now waxed as suddenly as had long before that of the house of Hapsburg, was unable, like the Hapsburg power, to equip itself with a circumscribed area of dominion. Nevertheless, the subtle efficiency of the widely ramified intrigues and

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 121.

machinations of the Coburgs increased from year to year, at any rate at our minor courts, and was rarely advantageous to the German nation. Nor was the national sense of self-reliance, still inadequate, strengthened by the way in which the constitutionalist doctrinaires became accustomed to look up to the denationalised Leopold as paragon among princes.

At the side of the Coburger throughout all his metamorphoses stood his countryman, C. F. von Stockmar, first as confidential physician and subsequently as diplomatic adviser. Stockmar was a statesman of high attainments, clear-minded, resolute, far-seeing, a man bolder in expedients and more fertile in imagination than Leopold himself. During the London conference he conducted the decisive negotiations with the Belgians, always giving the casting vote when his more cautious royal friend was unable to come to a speedy determination. His political views had been formed during years of association with the English whigs and radicals. Wealthy and independent, he wooed no man's favour, and was not sparing of frank criticism on occasions. He loved to work in the background. This man of slender build, dark-eyed and intelligent-looking, delighted to stand in the wings and, with the superior smile of the initiate, to listen while others were pluming themselves upon his ideas. In sharp contrast with his cosmopolitan master, though living abroad he remained always a German patriot, inspired with cordial enthusiasm on behalf of national unity. Utterly despising our pitiful particularism, it seemed to him that no methods could be too severe to put an end to its disastrous consequences. He excelled all his German friends in comprehensive knowledge of diplomatic affairs (a knowledge unattainable by the German liberals in their narrower environment), and he excelled them also in sobriety of political judgment. In this thoroughly practical mind, there was but one doctrinaire weakness, a tendency to think too highly of parliamentary majority rule. But how tragical was the contradiction through which it came to pass that for such a man there was no place in the service of his fatherland, and that his abundant energies were squandered over the affairs of the great international matrimonial agency of Brussels, affairs that did little or nothing to promote the well-being of Germany.

Whilst the Belgian state was beginning to undergo consolidation, the revolution in the east came to a pitiable end. At

the outbreak of the Polish war, Nicholas had determined that after the anticipated speedy suppression of the rebellion he would abolish the Polish constitution; would inflict a terrible punishment upon "those chiefly responsible, Czartoryski, Lelewel, and similar scum ("faquins"); and would condemn the Warsaw students and "the rest of the canaille" to imprisonment with hard labour. When the Poles sought to negotiate, offering to restore the rule of the Romanoffs, he wrote mockingly, "I am profoundly touched and grateful!" But the course of events had differed greatly from his expectations. After the failure to take advantage of the victory of Grochow, Diebitsch's position was one of grave embarrassment. Cholera was raging in his ill-equipped army, while the confidence of the Poles was increased by Skrzynecki's unexpected successes and by the enthusiastic applause of Europe. The unfavourable weather rendered military movements extremely difficult in this roadless country; whilst the commander was scarcely less inconvenienced by the autocrat's pedantic and petty interference, Nicholas from his study overwhelming the general, now with arbitrary commands and now with friendly reproaches, recommending him to be sparing in the employment of the brilliant regiments of the guard, and indicating the proper utilisation of the newly organised dragoons—a comparatively useless force of "mounted infantry."[1] In May, Skrzynecki made a fresh sortie from Praga, crossing the Bug and moving northwards against the Russian guard. Diebitsch promptly pursued him, and on May 26th defeated him with heavy losses at Ostrolenka. Again, however, the victor did not dare to follow up his success; again he permitted the shattered Polish army to disappear behind the sheltering walls of Praga and to reinforce itself there anew. The czar, losing patience, resolved to recall the unlucky commander.

The tedious course of the campaign had everywhere greatly lowered the prestige of Russian arms, and since in this unsuccessful war nearly all the officers in high command were, like the commander-in-chief, Germans, there was a fresh and violent outburst of the Muscovite's ancient hatred of the Germans. The nation fiercely demanded the chastisement of the despised Poles, but this national war must be led by a Russian.[2] The

[1] Nicholas to Diebitsch, February 4 and 21, March 4 and 10 (old style), 1831, printed with other letters from the czar to the field marshal, Russkaya Starina, 1884 and 1885.

[2] Schöler's Report, June 3, 1831.

Polish revolution was a turning point in Russian policy. In the opening years of Nicholas' reign he had at times been inclined to favour the traditional Muscovitism, and henceforward this became the leading principle of his regime. In striking contrast with his brother Alexander, patron of Germans and Poles, he regarded with hostility all that came from the west. Thus was resumed the operation of the ancient rule, an inevitable outcome of the incomplete amalgamation of occidental and oriental civilisation, a rule whose working is manifest throughout Russian history with the constancy of a natural law, the rule that vis-à-vis European civilisation the attitude of every czar is the precise opposite of that judged expedient by his predecessor.

Before the news of his recall could reach the front, Diebitsch died of cholera. The laurels of his Turkish victories had withered. Meanwhile General Toll, the ablest and most intrepid member of the headquarters staff, was already preparing a decisive blow. The Russian army was to make a wide flanking movement to the north-west, withdrawing almost as far as the Prussian frontier. There the frequently planned crossing of the Vistula was to be effected, and on attaining the left bank of the river the army was to turn south-eastwards to attack Warsaw. Now for the first time became evident how important for Russia was Prussia's friendship, for success was impossible without the neighbourly cooperation of Prussia. The king agreed to the provision from the Prussian Vistula of the boats and other materials requisite for the construction of a bridge by the Russians; along the frontier he had markets instituted to furnish Russian buyers with all necessary supplies; and although Lord-lieutenant Schön, like the majority of the liberal officials who worked under him, abhorred the Russians, the orders were carried out with the customary Prussian precision. In July, General Valentini concluded an agreement with the Russian general Mansuroff in virtue of which Prussia agreed for a specified compensation to disarm and intern any Poles who should cross the German frontier. Thus needless bloodshed would be obviated, and the suppression of the revolt would be hastened.[1] The king, fully persuaded that he was pursuing the right course, acted quite openly. In reply to repeated representations from the western powers, he bluntly declared that nothing would ever induce him to recognise the Polish rebels

[1] Schöler's Report, October 20, 1831.

as belligerents, and that it was idle to talk of the duty of neutrality in face of a disturbance which threatened Prussia's own safety.

Paskiewitsch, the hero of the last campaign in Asia Minor, was appointed Diebitsch's successor. He was a typical Muscovite, terribly rough, harsh, and arrogant; dogged in the field, but extremely cautious. He was to reap where others had sown. With his right flank covered by the adjacent Prussian frontier, on July 17th he crossed the Vistula at Ossiek, a few miles above Thorn. Since the ravages of cholera were abating, and since his men, restored to health, were now well provisioned from Prussia, he was able to advance slowly upon the capital, whilst the Poles had lost the flower of their army in the defeats inflicted on them by Diebitsch and betrayed their increasing perplexities by continuous changes in the supreme command. Paskiewitsch hoped to effect the subjugation of Poland without any fighting, and, notwithstanding Toll's warnings, avoided a battle when he encountered the Poles in a quite untenable position at Bolimoff. As late as September 4th, when he at length arrived before Warsaw, he offered the rebels astonishingly favourable terms: almost complete amnesty; reestablishment of the constitution; withdrawal of the Russian garrisons; and even the retention by the Polish officers of the rank acquired in the fight against Russia! Thus greatly had the czar's pride been humbled by the prolonged struggle. In the unhappy city of Warsaw, however, savage radicalism had just regained control through a terrible uprising of the mob; Prince Czartoryski took to flight, the moderates were afraid to stir, and the victorious party determined to continue the hopeless struggle. On September 6th, Paskiewitsch began his assault across the wide champaign of Wola, where of old the Polish nobles used to assemble in their myriads to elect the king. Next day, under Toll's leadership, the gates of the capital were taken by storm after a fierce affray. Warsaw surrendered, the remnants of the Polish army fled, for the most part to Prussia, but a few of the refugees made their way to Galicia.

Nicholas promptly abandoned the conciliatory thoughts of recent months and resumed the revengeful designs with which he had begun the war. Prussia was to learn the truth of the assurances frequently given the king by General Schöler when he declared: "It is a national peculiarity of Russia to be extremely remiss in the fulfilment of international engagements,

and, in particular, to ask a great deal from Prussia without displaying in her turn the like accommodating spirit."[1] It is true that in a ukase the czar announced a general amnesty, but he forbade in perpetuity the return of all the officers who had taken refuge abroad after the fall of Warsaw, this applying to the great majority of the Polish officers' corps. Thus Prussia and Austria, in recompense for their neighbourly assistance, were to be burdened with the care of several thousand desperate exiles. Schöler wrote warningly that decisions of this character came from the czar in person, that they afforded an index to the peculiarities of his character, which was not being ameliorated by time and experience.[2] Both Prussia and Austria raised objections, asking by what right Russia decreed this wholesale banishment, by which would be "established throughout Europe a wandering focus of rebellion and incendiarism."[3]

Only as the result of prolonged negotiations did the czar agree to the gradual modification of his ukase, so that in the end none but common criminals and political ringleaders were excluded from the amnesty.[4] Whilst King Frederick William honourably carried out the extradition treaty with Russia, he was far from being inclined, from complaisance towards his son-in-law, to furnish the western powers with a casus belli. The republicans of Cracow had in various ways supported the rebellion of their fellow-countrymen, and the czar therefore desired that the three protective powers should jointly occupy the territories of the free city. The court of Berlin refused, being unwilling to take a single step beyond the specifications of the treaties, and left the military occupation to be undertaken by the Russians as the only aggrieved parties. Subsequently, under the supervision of commissaries from the protective powers, the civil order of the little state, which had been completely shattered, was partially reestablished.[5]

So blinded were the Poles by their obstinate spirit of defiance that the enlarged amnesty profited them little. Some put no credence in the pledges of the angry czar, others con-

[1] Schöler's Reports, May 7 and November 17, 1831.
[2] Schöler's Report, October 7, 1831.
[3] Ancillon to Maltzahn, October 25, 1831.
[4] Ancillon, Instruction to Schöler, November 10; Schöler's Reports, November 16 and 20, December 21, 1831.
[5] Metternich to Maltzahn, September 14; Protocol concerning the Negotiations between Metternich, Maltzahn, and Tatischcheff, October 6; Instructions to Maltzahn, September 27 and October 13, 1831.

tinued to derive hope from the empty promises of Lafayette, expecting that sooner or later, with the aid of the French radicals, they would successfully carry out a general revolution. The fanatics, and above all doughty General Bem, who had taken refuge in Dresden, made so successful a use of the methods of party terrorism universally practised by the Poles, that the majority of the refugees, comparatively inoffensive persons, were frightened into acquiescence, and the return of officers to Poland soon came to be looked upon as treason. Thousands of voluntary emigrants, falsely giving themselves out to be proscribed exiles, swarmed throughout western Europe. Though most of them could have returned home unpunished, to work peacefully on behalf of their fatherland, they scorned the prospect, preferring to practise the evil arts of the conspirator. Europe was continuously afflicted with further troubles consequent upon the crime of the partition of Poland. Polish emigration became a curse, a focus of disturbance, as the Prussian government had prophesied. For two decades, the Polish refugees constituted links between the radical parties of all lands, fomenting every revolt, and fighting upon every barricade.

Henceforward, next to Metternich, Czar Nicholas was the best hated man in Europe. His evil reputation was partly dependent upon the fabulous stories circulated by the Polish refugees, but still more was it due to the severe penalties inflicted upon the subjugated province. In his view, all the liberties of the Poles had been abrogated by the revolt, and upon his will alone rested the establishment of a new legal order. Some of the rebels were sent to the gallows, and many were banished to Siberia. The constitution was annulled; the army and the university were abolished; the magnificent palace of the Czartoryskis in Pulawy was despoiled of its art treasures. Polish orders were distributed among the annihilators of Polish independence, and in the principal square of Warsaw an obelisk was erected in honour of the generals who had been murdered in November, 1830. After the issue of the organic statue of February, 1832, the country was nothing more than a Russian province with a distinct administration and a distinct legal system. Even if the Poles had misused their constitutional rights, availing themselves of these only for the purposes of intrigue and conspiracy, the new order proved, if possible, more disastrous, for it could be maintained in no other way

than by a perpetual state of siege. In the capital, Paskiewitsch, now raised to the rank of Prince of Warsaw, ruled with iron severity. Openly despising the conquered, he flaunted his victories in gorgeous festivals, and when the czar presented to him the equestrian statue of the Polish national hero Poniatowski, a work just completed by Thorwaldsen, Paskiewitsch had the head of the figure removed and replaced by his own, erecting this incomparable monument of Muscovite barbarism in front of one of his own palaces.

In all these matters the western powers played a lamentable part. On several occasions they raised timid objections, appealing to the treaties of Vienna, which they themselves were incessantly violating. But attempts at intervention were disregarded by the three partitioning powers, for the Vienna congress act did no more than promise the Poles in general terms that they should have "national institutions," and the country still possessed a national administration.[1] Year after year the parliaments of England and of France continued to manifest sterile indignation. The timid bourgeois king gave hospitable welcome to the Polish refugees. Secretly, however, he was relieved at the quelling of a revolt which had brought him nothing but embarrassment. His confidant Sebastiani incautiously betrayed the secret when in the chamber he let fall the expression: "Order reigns in Warsaw"—a phrase greedily pounced upon by the liberals of all lands, and reiterated henceforward for years as proof of the ruthlessness of kings.

§ 5. ANTWERP AND ANCONA.

The fall of Warsaw restored freedom of movement to the policy of the eastern powers, but the Polish struggle had exhausted Russia to such an extent and had induced at the two German courts so strong a desire for peace that there now hardly seemed to be any serious danger of war. The Belgian problem was nearing solution, though very slowly and amid manifold complications. The treaty concluded with Belgium on November 15th aroused well-grounded annoyance both in Vienna and in St. Petersburg, for the envoys of the three powers had exceeded their authority in signing it, and they had done so without the cooperation of Holland, whereas the London

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, November 9, 1831; et seq.

conference had been summoned to mediate between the contending parties. None the less, King Frederick William was prepared to sanction the treaty, since he approved its content; but he desired to withhold ratification until all the great powers had agreed to it, and if possible Holland also, so that a definitive settlement might be assured. Prussia laboured throughout the winter to bring about this general understanding. Austria was won over without difficulty. But the obduracy of the king of the Netherlands would not yield to persuasion. Although he had long agreed to the dismemberment of his kingdom, and raised objections merely on points of detail to certain articles in the treaty, he had been profoundly affronted by the high-handed procedure of the conference. He could not forgive the Coburg usurper, and he secretly hoped for a general war which might still avert Holland's humiliation. "After all that has happened," he wrote to his brother-in-law, "it is impossible that I should not continue to regard Leopold as my enemy. The cause I advocate is not mine alone, but is that of all rightful governments." Vainly did Frederick William represent to him that Holland by her irreconcilable attitude was alienating the support of her allies.[1]

King William did not take this threat seriously. He counted upon Russian support, for Nicholas continued to withhold ratification. Thus things moved in a circle, the two legitimists, of St. Petersburg and of The Hague, hiding each behind the other. Since Ancillon's memorials made no impression upon the czar, Frederick William wrote in person. He said that he respected, in fact shared, his son-in-law's sentiments; "but," he continued, "I have constrained my feelings in obedience to the demands of political discretion." Belgium had formerly been united with Holland, not for the sake of the Orange dynasty, but for the sake of Europe. In like manner, in this affair of the separation, the only question to be considered was the general interest. In the event of a European war, Russia would constitute no more than the rear guard; the heat and burden of the day would be borne by Germany; consequently it was the duty of the three eastern powers to

[1] Colonel Scharnhorst's Report to the king, August 28; Witzleben to Ancillon, October 22; Eichhorn's Memorial for Prince Albert, October 25; King William of the Netherlands to King Frederick William, December 5; Reply, December 24, 1831.

make a joint declaration to The Hague that their patience had limits.[1]

After prolonged resistance and several relapses, the czar allowed himself to be convinced, sending his confidant Orloff to The Hague in February, 1832, for a final effort. Since Orloff, as was to be expected, could make no headway with the Orange ruler, on March 22nd he bluntly informed the king that his emperor could no longer refuse ratification and would wash his hands of all responsibility in the matter.[2] Throughout these negotiations, Nicholas continued to imagine that he would succeed in detaching England from France, and would induce England to adhere to the old quadruple alliance, whereas the inevitable effect of the Russian policy was the very reverse.[3] The longer the eastern powers procrastinated, the more firmly cemented became the understanding between the two protectors of Belgium. Lord Palmerston had lost patience long ere this, and in December, to show his gratitude for Frederick William's honest attempts at reconciliation, had sent an unmannerly despatch accusing the Prussian government of masking its hesitation " behind a phrase." In this document he had already adopted that domineering tone which before long became second nature to him and contributed greatly to bring the name of England into disrepute among all other nations. He manifestly hoped to frighten Prussia, but his coup miscarried. The only result was that Bülow, who had had the Prussian ratification in his pocket since the beginning of January, received instructions to withhold it until after an agreement had been secured between all the great powers.[4]

When the czar's opposition had at length been overcome, the formal ratifications were handed in, by Austria and Prussia on April 18th, and by Russia on May 4, 1832. The two German powers once again expressly reserved the rights of the Federation upon Luxemburg; the czar, still grumbling, referred, in an ambiguous proviso, to the future understanding between the two kings of the Netherlands. Late in the summer, Leopold's

[1] Ancillon, Circular Despatch to the Embassies, December 18, 1831; King Frederick William to Emperor Nicholas, with a Memorandum, January 12, 1832.

[2] Emperor Nicholas to King William, January 18 (old style); Russian Memorial, a Reply to the Prussian Memorandum, February; Nesselrode, Instruction to Lieven end of March, 1832.

[3] Nesselrode, Instruction to Lieven, January 19th (old style); Nesselrode, Instruction to Maltitz, February 17 (old style), 1832.

[4] Palmerston to Ancillon, December 30, 1831. Bernstorff, Report to the king, January 6; Ancillon to Chad, January 7; Ancillon to Bülow, January 8, 1832.

envoys were received in Berlin and Vienna. But Nicholas, King Louis of Bavaria (following the czar's example), and several other German princes holding strict legitimist views, still refused for the time being to open diplomatic intercourse with the new court of Brussels.

The prolonged hesitation had obviously widened the chasm between the west and the east. Palmerston's increasing discourtesy convinced even the czar that Europe had become separated into two hostile camps, whilst Metternich indignantly declared that the three allies were faced by the two accomplices. Unquestionably the accomplices had the upper hand in the game, for they knew what they wanted. They demanded that King William, who still held the citadel of Antwerp and two small fortresses on the Scheldt, should at least evacuate Belgian territory; and they were prepared in case of need to overcome his obstinacy by force of arms, whereas the eastern powers were at once unable to approve and unprepared to prevent the coercion of their ancient ally. When the summer had been spent in further fruitless negotiations with The Hague, at the London conference England and France demanded that forcible measures should jointly be undertaken against Holland. The struggle surged this way and that, until the conference could save itself from its perplexities in no other way than by discontinuing its meetings. The European areopagus dissolved, leaving it to the western powers to infringe grossly and for the second time their sacred doctrine of non-intervention. On October 22nd they decided that England should lay an embargo upon Dutch shipping, and that France should conquer the citadel of Antwerp for Belgium.

On this occasion the court of the Palais Royal operated without arrière pensée, for in the interim King Leopold, after a lengthy wooing, had married the daughter of Louis Philippe, and now that the Coburger belonged to the family the old plan for the partition of Belgium was no longer in harmony with the business principles of the house of Orleans. Casimir Périer had died in May, another victim to the cholera epidemic. In October the portfolio for foreign affairs was entrusted to the duc de Broglie, the leader of the doctrinaires, a man of culture, stiff, impeccable, impossibilist like all his party, but incontestably a man of peace. He immediately promised the great powers that the French troops should quit Belgium as soon as they had reduced the citadel of Antwerp, and he went so far as to

enquire whether Prussia would not simultaneously occupy eastern Belgium.[1] King Frederick William was unwilling to participate in the coercion of his brother-in-law. He contented himself with reinforcing the Rhenish troops with the Westphalian army corps, and moved his forces nearer to the frontier, concentrating them at Aix-la-Chapelle, ready for immediate action should France break her word. In Paris, as Ancillon unctuously phrased it, Werther was "to exercise the most powerful moral resistance."[2] Both Austria and Russia, too, displayed towards the French court the capricious ill-humour which, alike in private and in political life, never fails to react unfavourably upon those who give way to it. Nevertheless the eastern powers did not venture upon a public protest, for very early in the year they had jointly recognised that such a step would either lower their prestige or would revive the peril of a European war.[3] The bourgeois king knew this only too well, and confidently notified the lesser German courts to the following effect: "Although we have been unable to secure the assent of the northern powers to the measures we are adopting, we are none the less certain that we have no reason to expect any resistance from them."[4] It is not surprising that the Orange ruler was exasperated to the uttermost by this further attempt at intervention on the part of the non-interventionist pharisees. Despite all the warnings he had received, among them some even from St. Petersburg, he had considered it impossible that his old friends would leave him defencelessly exposed to the misusage of the western powers, and that they should do this because he was refusing to accept a treaty which, like the peace of Utrecht, had been concluded without Holland's participation, over her head, and in defiance of her wishes! But Lord Palmerston gloated over the predicament of the eastern powers. More cheerfully than ever did he commend to parliament the "expediency" of the Antwerp expedition, extolling also the straightforwardness of English policy in words which, even to many of his British hearers, had the ring of an impudent witticism.

Thus the extraordinary spectacle of a war without a breach of the peace could now be staged. On November 22nd, Marshal

[1] Witzleben to Maltzahn, October 16; Instructions to Maltzahn, October 20 and 30, November 6, 1832.

[2] Ancillon to Maltzahn, October 20, 1832.

[3] Prussian Memorandum for Count Orloff, February 13, 1832.

[4] Broglie, Circular Despatch concerning the Treaty of October 22, 1832.

Gérard with 60,000 French soldiers began the investment of the Antwerp citadel held by a force of 5,000 Dutch. He refused Belgian cooperation on the ground that his regiments were acting solely as the executive officials of Europe. The fortress surrendered at the end of four weeks, after a brave resistance, and thereupon the French army promptly returned home. On March 22, 1833, a new truce was agreed upon, the Dutch continuing to hold the Scheldt fortresses Lille and Liefkenshoek, while the Belgians occupied portions of Dutch Luxemburg and Limburg. This extraordinary situation persisted in the Netherlands for six years, until at length King William gave way. For six years the Dutch army was marshalled along the southern frontier, the loyal Dutchmen willingly making extensive sacrifices to their king's obstinacy, what time the canny Belgians were escaping the payment of interest upon their share in the old national debt.

Thus did this sequel to the July revolution end in a triumph for the bourgeois monarchy, a triumph which, though it failed to restore the traditional military glories of France or to bring to the country a permanent expansion of power, yet seemed so dazzling that even the sober-minded Guizot could boast "the brilliant French solution of the Belgian question." The eastern powers felt their defeat very keenly. Metternich could find but one consolation, that the day of requital was yet to come. Shortly after the fall of Antwerp he gave expression to the lament: "The practical truth, the only consideration applicable to the present situation, is that it is necessary to await the course of events."

It is true that in Austria's immediate sphere of influence Metternich did not admit that this truth was valid; his Italian policy remained firm, domineering, and grasping. In the Papal States everything happened as he had foreseen: the disturbances broke out afresh directly the Austrians had withdrawn in accordance with the wishes of France. The pope neither could nor would seriously carry into effect the promised reforms, although Metternich gave him several warnings, and thought of inviting the cooperation of the great powers, if for this reason alone.[1] Laymen were still excluded from the government, and the new provincial and communal councils were utterly powerless. In January, 1832, when papal troops

[1] Metternich, Mémoire sur l'affaire des légations romaines, November, 1831.

entered Romagna, militiamen and volunteer levies took up arms. The rebels were defeated, and fearful devastation was inflicted in the subjugated towns by the savage rout of papal soldiers. But the curia trembled before its own army, and appealed for help once more to the Austrian neighbour. On January 28th, Marshal Radetzky and the whitecoats appeared in Bologna. E ven the people of Romagna received him with acclamations, since he would at least protect them against the ravages of the "papalini."

By international law Austria's conduct was irreproachable, for assuredly her intervention had better justification than the French campaign in Belgium during the previous summer. Casimir Périer, however, had boasted to the chambers that he would not tolerate further Austrian interference; it would ruin him should he fail to keep his word. By the partisan rancour of the French, even this serious statesman was compelled to bow before the phrases of the doctrine of non-intervention, and to close his brief but glorious career with a preposterous farce. The premier instructed Marshal Maison to announce in Vienna that France, too, was now compelled to intervene—in the name of non-intervention! With superior scorn Metternich replied: "Do you desire us to remain in the Papal States? If so you are choosing the right means, for we shall certainly stay there until you leave!" Meanwhile, in profound secrecy, a small squadron was despatched from Toulon. On February 22nd, 1,500 French landed in Ancona and took possession of the town. In a pompous manifesto the Italians were informed that France would everywhere protect the liberty of nations against the encroachments of despotism.

The Parisian press and many liberal newspapers in Germany exulted over the new miracle performed by free France. Lucid as was Casimir Périer's intelligence, like all Frenchmen he was in political matters prone to self-deception. He persuaded himself into the belief that he had defended "the public law of Europe," and the attitude of the other powers strengthened him in his illusion. Whilst Austria and Russia gave noisy expression to their indignation at this "political crime," even Palmerston could scarce conceal his dissatisfaction, so that Louis Philippe thought it advisable to make all kinds of cowardly excuses to the foreign envoys. Ancillon touchingly complained: "The winds have been strangely favourable to a voyage which deserved no such favour.

History offers few examples of so flagrant an infringement of all principles. This momentous adventure would be a riddle were it not that we are already accustomed to find that alike in France and in England the ministry subordinates everything to the exigencies of the parliamentary situation and sacrifices everything to the national vanity." [1]

Speedily, however, the powers ceased to be anxious, for they foresaw that the occupation of Ancona would serve merely to gratify the arrogance of the French parties, and would in other respects remain utterly void of effect. Since the pope interposed his veto, the 1,500 men in the half-ruined citadel could neither receive reinforcements nor repair the fortifications; they had to hoist the papal flag; and they even expelled the liberals from the town, and rendered willing assistance to the Vatican police. For nearly seven years they remained in this ludicrous situation, to depart at length in December, 1838, simultaneously with the evacuation of the country by the Austrians. In the interim the priestly regime had been commodiously reinstalled under the protection of the imperial arms. So little talk was there of serious reforms that within a few months England recalled her plenipotentiaries from the useless conference of envoys at Rome. Metternich was by no means pleased with the obstinacy of the curia, and was not sparing in the issue of earnest exhortations. Yet he was aware that this priest-ridden state, which years before he had denominated "a decaying structure, rotten with age," [2] could hardly be expected to endure far-reaching innovations. Besides, were it only to avoid preparing a triumph for the bourgeois monarchy, he had no desire to press the pope too hardly. The occupation of Ancona advantaged in no respect the cause of Italian freedom. It served, indeed, as an obstacle in the way of the modest reforms which were perhaps still possible under the dominion of the crowned priest. The fine political instinct of the Italians was a safeguard against illusions. They dreaded the Austrians as harsh and valiant enemies; but they despised their noisy, pretentious, and timid French friends. The dominance of the imperial house in the peninsula seemed secure for a long while to come.

Such was the upshot of these confused struggles. England had entered the paths of liberalism; the revolution had been

[1] Ancillon to Maltzahn, March 5, 1832.
[2] Metternich to Bernstorff, August 17, 1820.

victorious in France and in Belgium; in Poland and in Italy the revolution had been overthrown. The old Europe and the new were balanced one against the other. Which of the two camps would Germany enter? Upon the answer to this question depended the immediate future of the society of states

CHAPTER II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN NORTH GERMANY.

§ 1. THE DISTURBANCES IN BRUNSWICK.

SMALL states are apt to appear ridiculous, for the state is power, and weakness stultifies itself immediately should it attempt to masquerade as power. But where the energy of a great nation finds its sole expression in the pitiful activities of petty communities, striking transformations in national life are frequently initiated by inconspicuous particularist movements which, though individually unimportant, in their totality become momentous. New political ideas cannot display their indispensability more convincingly than when they appear simultaneously in various regions among a disunited nation, forcing a channel for themselves despite manifold hindrances. The inner kinship between such isolated struggles betokens the creative elemental strength of the movement towards national unity. Whilst Europe was lavishing its praises upon the heroes of the Parisian barricades, the street fighting in the lesser North German capitals aroused abroad no more than a contemptuous smile, and many of the leaders of these trifling revolutionary movements regarded themselves simply as modest disciples of the unrivalled Frenchmen. Nevertheless the scattered German movement, despite its absurd parochialism, was better justified, and exercised in the end a far more notable influence, than its much admired prototype. Though favoured by the July revolution, it was by no means conditioned by that movement, for it was a natural emergence from an obsolete social order whose oppressive influence was far greater than that of the political blunders of the Bourbons. Amid the feudal communities of the north, it realised the ideas of citizenship

and of equality before the law which had long been established elsewhere in Germany, thus rendering possible for the first time the growth of a sense of civic community common to all Germans, favouring the establishment of political parties whose activities were no longer bounded by the frontiers of the individual states, and leading by degrees to a deliberate campaign on behalf of reform in a Germany conceived as a national unit.

Amid all these petty revolutionary movements, the revolt in Brunswick aroused the chief attention, for here alone was the inevitable transformation effected by revolutionary methods, by an obvious infringement of law; and a terribly plain demonstration was afforded that the ultimate ground of the instability of German legal relationships must be sought in the scandalous ineffectiveness of the Bundestag. The old imperial constitution had always offered a certain protection against the hole and corner tyranny of the weaker estates of the empire. On several occasions the imperial authority had deposed incorrigible petty despots; and even as late as the days of the French revolution an imperial commission would occasionally sit in some princedom overburdened with debt, to restore order to the finances. But after the federal act had accorded sovereignty to these minor princes there no longer existed any restrictions upon their arbitrary will, until at length, in the person of a degenerate scion of the German high nobility, there was to be a public testimony how profoundly demoralising can be the enjoyment of pretentious dignity unaccompanied by genuine power.

In the defiant exercise of his princely responsibility, Charles of Brunswick had declined from stage to stage. Knowing that the Germans detested him, he soon came to take a malicious delight in providing ever renewed justification for his ill fame. Four years previous to his fall he wrote to his friend and well-wisher Princess Amelia of Saxony, who had made a vain attempt to show him the error of his ways: "In the end one becomes willing to be in reality that which one has long been by reputation. How can you expect that my career could have been different, the career of a man who when young and handsome attained to a position of power and absolute independence?"[1] The lax supervision of the Bundestag, furnishing an almost farcical solution in the dispute between the two Guelph houses,

[1] Duke Charles of Brunswick to Princess Amelia of Saxony, November 21, 1826.

could serve only to increase the arrogance of this infatuated prince.[1] For a long time another complaint against Duke Charles had been lodged in Frankfort without securing redress—the petition of the committee of the estates for the maintenance of the incontestably legal constitution of 1820 (vol. IV, p. 383). Once again was Count Münch able to procrastinate, notwithstanding the fierce exhortations of the Prussian envoy, for it was inconceivable to the Hofburg that any subjects could possess rights as against their prince. Moreover, many of the other federal envoys doubted the validity of the new constitution, seeing that the arrangement had been secured while the government was in the hands of a regency, and a regent or guardian has no right to dispose of the property of his ward. These doubts were shared even by Wangenheim and some of the more punctilious among the liberals, so strong was still the influence upon the minds of our jurists of their training in civil law, of that ancient patrimonial doctrine of the state in accordance with which land and people are the private property of the ruling house. Thus the matter was slowly argued with considerations and counter-considerations, till at length, late in the summer of 1830, the committee of the Bundestag issued a report in favour of the plaintiff estates.

This news from Frankfort strengthened the Brunswickers' conviction of their rights, and involuntarily they began to think of taking the law into their own hands—for who could tell whether the Bundestag would follow up its report by the issue of an effective decree? For months the duke had been sauntering on the Parisian boulevards, and had been discussing financial transactions with the house of Rothschild. When taken unawares in Paris by the outbreak of the July revolution, the heir of the heroic race of Brunswick showed himself a sorry coward. Though the Parisians barely noticed his presence, he fled in a panic, experiencing singular adventures. In Brussels, on the way home, he attended the performance of *The Dumb Girl of Portici*, which heralded the Belgian revolution. Thus twice was he warned by destiny, but in this smooth forehead the seriousness of the time could carve no furrows. The Guelph ruler fancied that he could soon settle matters with his own subjects. On his return he was accompanied by a new favourite, the French adventurer Alloard, and he loudly boasted that no one should make a Charles X of him! A few

[1] Vide supra, vol. IV, pp. 391, 392.

subordinate officials and some of the workmen employed about the court welcomed him with a torchlight procession. But the bourgeoisie looked askance at this manufactured homage, sending representatives to the palace to request the summoning of the diet. Burgomaster Bode, a blunt and outspoken man thoroughly impregnated with the civic pride traditional to the Hansa towns, was spokesman of the deputation, and warned the duke that the popular mood was ominous of disaster. But Charles, through his arbitrary and boyishly wanton conduct during the past seven years, had brought matters to such a pass that even in this population naturally devoted to the Guelphs he had almost no adherents left among the educated classes. The very officers murmured, for he would sometimes capriciously insult them, would sometimes reduce their pay, and sometimes leave vacant positions unfilled.

The mass of the population was little concerned about the constitutionalist campaign of the estates. But enough was known of the life of the court to induce hatred of the duke; the internal customs dues were an oppressive burden; complaint was general that no strangers now came to visit the ill-famed court, and that the avaricious ruler had put a stop to all public works; these things were increasing the poverty which was general throughout Germany in consequence of a severe winter following upon a bad harvest. Charles felt that a storm was imminent, installed cannon in front of the palace, and stored powder in the church of St. Giles hard by. On the evening of September 6th, while he was attending a performance at the theatre, a number of people assembled round the two carriages waiting outside to drive him and his mistress (a well-known actress) home. On his emergence he was hailed by a torrent of invectives, and the departing carriage was pursued by a volley of stones, In front of the palace was a crowd of people gaping and vociferating. An officer asked them, "Children, what do you really want?" They contemplated one another in bewilderment, until at length a liberal lawyer voiced the new Parisian war cry, "Bread and work!"—a demand that was re-echoed by a few well-fed pupils of the Carolinum.[1] Two squads of hussars, without striking a blow, then cleared the Bohlweg, the street facing the palace.

Next morning the cannon and the powder were removed.

[1] This account is based upon the verbal report of one of the aforesaid pupils—in later years a deputy to the Reichstag.

Upon a petition from the burghers the duke promised to remit a few taxes, and agreed to disburse certain sums for making roads and for the provision of the necessaries of life; he even assented to the assembly of a civic militia, armed with pikes; but he would not hear a word of the summoning of the diet. In the evening a drunken and howling mob, certainly no more than a thousand strong, assembled once more in front of the palace, and the pikemen of the militia were promptly driven from the field. But the duke did not dare to give orders to fire to the soldiers stationed in the courtyard of the palace. Again taking to his heels, he was conducted to the frontier by his hussars, and made his way to England. The mob broke into the palace and began to set it on fire, and while the ruffianly elements proceeded to pillage, men transparently disguised were busily examining the duke's private papers. General von Herzberg, a gallant veteran who had seen service in Wellington's Spanish campaigns, failed to fulfil his military duties, keeping his men inactive for hours in the palace garden. A volley fired without his orders, passing harmlessly over the heads of the rioters, sufficed to clear the courtyard and even to frighten the plunderers out of the interior of the palace; but since the troops subsequently remained inert, the mob, plucking up courage, recommenced the work of destruction. The disorders continued throughout the night, but not a life was lost. The crowd would not permit the fire-engines to approach the palace, and when the grenadiers had made another half-hearted attack upon the rioters, there was no attempt to follow up the easy victory. By dawn the fine building had been almost completely destroyed by fire.

Unquestionably this strange and bloodless revolt was directed by certain nobles and officials; it was carried out by hired bravos and a disorderly mob; the bourgeois classes looked on with mixed feelings at the work of destruction, simultaneously alarmed and gleeful. Such legal proceedings as were subsequently instituted were conducted with the utmost laxity; important witnesses were left unsummoned; and hence, despite shrewd suspicions, the names of the leading conspirators remain unknown to this day. It was plain that the success of this coup de main effected by a few was rendered possible solely by the general detestation felt for Duke Charles. The accomplished fact was hailed by all as one of God's judgments, even by those who censured the rough methods employed.

Since the great week in Paris, the illusion had become universal that in street fighting the masses are invincible. The newspapers continued to reiterate the saying ascribed to Napoleon, and supposed to have been based by him upon the Spanish experiences of his marshals: "Woe to the general who engages in a skirmish in narrow streets." Yet it was not fear which paralysed the officers of the renowned black troop; their hands were tied by hatred and contempt. "Ought we to shed the blood of the people for the sake of a wretched creature who has run away in a panic, and has left us to guard his palace?" Such was the ever-recurrent thought which made them powerless in face of a mob that possessed neither courage nor the force of numbers. There is no proof that the officers' inactivity was the outcome of calculated treason, nor is it necessary to have recourse to such a suspicion in order to account for the conduct of the troops.

The feeling was universal that the regime of Charles had found its tomb in the ruins of the palace, and the publication of some of the stolen documents and of passages from the duke's black book rendered the return of the refugee utterly impossible. The lamentable admissions of this beautiful soul (as Metternich had once termed his Guelph protégé) passed from mouth to mouth; the parish gossips luxuriated in horrible revelations; and to his incensed subjects it soon seemed that this foolish and futile young fellow had been no better than a savage ruffian and a poisoner. After his flight, order was promptly restored. The militia swaggered about the streets, armed now with flintlocks after the Parisian model, and led by the popular idol, Löbbecke, the banker; and the more blameless these good bourgeois had been in the matter of burning the palace, the more loudly did they boast of their revolution. Paris, Brussels, and Brunswick, constituted the three-starred constellation of the new popular liberties; while Götte, the distiller, who had advised the duke to send away his store of powder, was acclaimed as a local rival of Lafayette. General Herzberg was consoled by the gift of a civic sword of honour, for the dubious glances with which he was regarded by his Prussian comrades—a Brunswick pamphleteer declaring that "the modern soldier" was no longer "the rascal of the old century, the man trained to blind obedience by the use of the cane." A militiaman published an open letter to the duke, proclaiming that two hundred thousand Brunswickers would rather find their graves

beneath the ruins of their houses than suffer the tyranny of a second Dom Miguel. Another, in an essay, extolled "voluntary obedience" as the peculiar excellence of the civil guard when contrasted with the army. Together with the playing at soldiers characteristic of the Parisian bourgeoisie there was introduced into the self-complacent civic society of these petty states an ungerman contempt for the serious pursuit of arms, and the genuine military equipment of the nation such as had long existed in Prussia was stigmatised as "an implement of despotism." The government was at the end of its resources. The counsellors of the duke were in ill repute; several of them had taken refuge abroad; those that remained lacked energy and prestige. The estates took prompt action, and it was plain that some of their leaders had anticipated the burning of the palace. The great committee met as early as September 9th, passing three decisive resolutions this very day. It determined to continue its sittings until the diet should be summoned; it empowered Counts Werner Veltheim and Oberg "to undertake confidential approaches in Berlin and Hanover respectively, and to seek advice should necessity arise;"[1] finally, it despatched to the duke's brother, last remaining scion of the princely house, an address signed by numerous burghers begging him "to assume the reins of government as speedily as possible."

Duke William of Brunswick-Oels was an officer of the guards in Berlin, regarded by his associates as a man of pleasure, as one thoroughly competent to turn his great wealth to account in the pursuit of enjoyment; but this prince, four and twenty years of age, had not hitherto been conspicuous for talent. On the evening of September 8th the mounted courier despatched by an official attached to the Brunswick court brought him tidings of the revolt, and he promptly begged the king's advice, through the instrumentality of Prince Wittgenstein, his father's old friend. Acting on Frederick William's urgent recommendation,[2] he hastened home to instal provisional order. Quite unexpectedly he appeared on September 10th at Richmond palace, outside the gates of Brunswick, whilst the address from the committee of the estates was still on its

[1] Veltheim to Bernstorff, September 17, 1830.

[2] This fact is recorded by the Hanoverian ministry in a report to King William IV, dated September 14th; also by Count Münster in a despatch to Stralenheim, dated November 21, 1830.

way to Berlin. Loudly did the pacific heroes of the revolution now rejoice, since they could hope to be ruled once more by a genuine Guelph. "William the Blessed" was triumphantly ushered into the town of his fathers by the militia and by shouting crowds. Nothing was further from his wishes than to make ambitious claims upon his brother's crown. He was exceedingly loath to exchange the cheerful carousals of the Berlin guard for the cares of government and the tedium of a minor capital. Throughout his life, moreover, he adhered firmly to the strictly legitimist principles of his house, and could never completely overcome his repressed wrath at the mutinous conduct of his Brunswickers. The irresistible force of circumstances was alone competent to drag the reluctant man forward; and it is not surprising that the prince, who, however well-meaning, was inexperienced, uncultured, and by no means far-sighted, should have his judgment clouded by the strange aspect of the excited city, and should overestimate the strength of this petty-bourgeois upheaval.

The young Guelph felt the need of support, and therefore continued to correspond with his well-wisher Wittgenstein. Upon the duke's request the king of Prussia sent two well-known landowners from the neighbourhood, von Wulffen and von Alvensleben, to visit the little principality. Both reported, as truth demanded, that the refugee prince had been universally abandoned and that everyone desired that Duke William should remain.[1] Count Veltheim meanwhile had reached Berlin. He displayed the black book wherein Duke Charles had sketched his monstrous principles of government, and begged the king to issue a formal invitation to the younger brother to assume the regency. Bernstorff gave audience to the count, but would not enter into negotiations with the envoy of the estates, who was known to be a personal enemy of the expelled duke. "Prussia," he reported to the king, "must avoid even the semblance of indulgence in judging a revolt." In these serious times, she must be careful to give her neighbours no occasion for mistrust, this applying particularly to the court of Hanover, most immediately concerned in the affairs of Brunswick. The decision was a matter for the Federation alone. Nagler was therefore commissioned to demand in Frankfort the immediate despatch of a federal commissary, while in the king's name

[1] Duke William of Brunswick to Wittgenstein, September, 11, 15, 19, and 21; Wulffen's Report, September 21, 1830.

Bernstorff directed the young duke to persist in his present "indefinite but extremely beneficial attitude" until the Federation had spoken.[1] In view of the state of feeling in North Germany, the king knew that the return of the exile was extremely undesirable, and indeed practically out of the question; but as long as there was still hope that the Bundestag might fulfil its duty, he was unwilling to overstep the bounds of federal law.

The Hanoverian ministers, cautious at all times, were almost more prudent than the king of Prussia. They refused to enter into official relationships with Count Oberg, the plenipotentiary from the Brunswick estates; they begged advice from the court of Berlin; and simultaneously they asked the king of Hanover whether, as head of the house of Brunswick, he could not induce the refugee duke to abdicate, thus bringing the present troubles to a peaceful conclusion.[2] King William IV expressed himself as profoundly incensed by the rising and by the shame done to the house of Guelph. The amiable ruler was far from sharing the detestation for Duke Charles which had been felt by his late brother, and gave the refugee a kindly reception when the latter visited him in the Brighton pavilion within a few days of landing in England. But King William was profoundly estranged when he became aware of his nephew's mischievous arrogance and brazen duplicity. Charles had still no conception of the seriousness of his situation. Appealing for help to the great powers, it was his definite hope that these would promptly reinstate him on the throne; and he laughingly informed his uncle that out of affection alone had the Brunswickers burned the palace, desiring to keep their duke in the country and to prevent his long-planned English journey.[3] However, he allowed himself to be persuaded by the English ministers to despatch to his brother, who was sending faithful reports of all that happened, a revocable authority. For the time being Duke William was to carry on affairs as governor general, but all appointments made by him were to be provisional, and he was to effect no changes in the organic laws.[4]

[1] Bernstorff, Report to the king, September 29; to Duke William, September 25; Instruction to Nagler, September 27, 1830.

[2] Minister von Ompteda to Bernstorff, September 14; Report of the Hanoverian ministry to King William IV, September 14, 1830.

[3] Bülow's Reports, London, September 16 and 20; Münster to the Hanoverian ministry, October 5, 1830.

[4] Authority granted by Duke Charles to Duke William, London, September 21, 1830.

How absurd, meanwhile, was the part played by the Bundestag. The votes upon the federal resolution which was to compel Duke Charles to recognise the new constitution had not all come to hand when the news arrived that the culprit had been expelled. The alarm was indescribable. It was universally felt that Charles had himself alone to blame for his fall, and that his restoration was impossible. Yet Austria would not lightly abandon her protégé. The lesser courts, and especially those related to the widely ramified house of Brunswick, trembled at the suggestion that they should recognise the revolution and deny the legitimate right of princes. So conflicting were the currents of opinion that a speedy decision was not to be thought of. The perplexed assembly could only summon up courage, as a preliminary measure, to demand a report from the Brunswick government.

In such circumstances how could it be expected that the Brunswickers should not lose patience? The first essential for the disturbed country was the reestablishment of definite order. The estates met, and on September 27th presented to Duke William an address wherein, after a highly coloured statement of grievances, the demand was boldly voiced that William should take over the government, since, "in accordance with the general principles of political law," it was impossible that the rule of Duke Charles should continue. The young Guelph was perfectly willing to accept a formal regency in his brother's name, for the authority had now arrived from London. But the ministers, the estates, the town councils, and numerous other unsolicited counsellors, made serious and almost threatening representations to the effect that the expelled duke's name must on no account be mentioned, since this could not fail to lead to a renewal of the revolt. In the evening a crowd collected in the Burgplatz; an orator climbed to the top of the old lion monument, demanding groans for Charles and cheers for William, the new duke.

Alarmed by these manifestations of the popular will, on September 28th the duke announced that he had "found it necessary to take over the government until further notice." Not a word was said in the patent about the authority received from his brother. The first illegal step was thus taken by the new duke from fear and youthful inexperience, by no means from ambition. To the king of Prussia, he did not venture to admit his error, declaring merely that he had temporarily

taken over the government by agreement with his brother. To his English uncle, he expressed himself more freely, writing that he had desired to publish his brother's authority, and had asked the advice of many trustworthy persons, who had, however, "unanimously declared that any such publication would utterly frustrate the purposes of my provisional acceptance of the government, would give rise to renewed general disturbances, and would entail the most dangerous consequences to the wellbeing of the country and to myself personally."[1] The excuse was as feeble as the rest of his conduct, for had he found courage to adhere to his first resolve he could, as unquestionably lawful regent, have counted with certainty upon the armed help of Prussia, Hanover, and even the Germanic Federation, whilst the military forces at the disposal of Militia-Major Löbbecke would hardly have maintained their "voluntary obedience" in the face of Prussian battalions. Duke William's answer to the estates was to the effect that he would endeavour to induce his brother to abdicate. Should the attempt fail, there could be no objection to the estates applying to the friendly king of England-Hanover. The estates were not slow to act on the hint, and on the very same day they appealed to William IV to mediate, saying that it was impossible until Charles had resigned the crown for his brother to become legitimate ruler.[2]

In Berlin, as in London, it was recognised that Duke William's arbitrary act was irrevocable. Upon him depended the tranquillisation of the principality. Moreover, the Brunswickers' defiant attitude was by no means solely due to the exaggerated self-esteem characteristic of revolutionary-minded civilians, for, in view of the character of Duke Charles, a revocable authority issued by the ex-ruler offered no guarantee of enduring peace. Both the courts, therefore, tacitly ignored the formal error that had been committed, and rivalled one another during the ensuing weeks in attempts to induce the refugee to abdicate. The king of Prussia wrote in person, and Prince Wittgenstein wrote also, in more forcible terms.[3] King William IV discussed matters with his nephew, at first through the

[1] Duke William to King Frederick William, September 28; to King William IV, September 29, 1830.

[2] Duke William, Despatch to the Estates, September 28; Petition from the Estates to King William IV, September 28, 1830.

[3] King Frederick William to Duke Charles, October 16; Wittgenstein to Duke Charles, October 20, 1830.

intermediation of Wellington and Aberdeen, then directly. Throughout, his conduct was considerate and strictly honourable; even Count Münster, the duke's old enemy, displayed unexpected moderation. Charles was given the option between complete abdication, and the unconditional and irrevocable grant of a lifelong regency to his brother. Both the kings were agreed that the right of succession should be secured to Charles' issue.[1]

At length the duke began to give way, and announced his conditions. He was prepared to appoint his brother governor general for life, but demanded for himself, in addition to the style and honours of a sovereign prince, a yearly allowance of 300,000 thalers, without deductions—and this from a territory whose total annual revenues amounted to little more than a million. In addition, the diet was to retain the right to recall the duke to the throne at any time. Since by English conventions of respectability there is nothing repulsive about such mercantile bargainings, Wellington and Aberdeen were at first inclined to give a general support to Charles' proposals, for what did these tories care about the financial difficulties of a petty German state? But Münster considered the allowance far too high, and held that the proviso regarding the possibility of reinstatement was quite unacceptable.[2] Yet greater were the concern and astonishment felt by the court of Berlin. Bernstorff, much incensed, wrote to Vienna saying that it was no matter for surprise that Duke Charles should be out of humour; "but that as a solatium he should demand so enormous a price in cash, a sum which it would be hardly possible for the country to provide, gives additional proof of the obduracy and of the boundless selfishness of his character."[3]

Long ere this King Frederick William had come to the conclusion that the hesitating English Guelphs needed a spur. He had urged the journey to Brunswick upon the young duke, and had subsequently remained in the background, not wishing to usurp the functions of the Germanic Federation or those of the house of Guelph. But the plan suggested by Prussia, that a federal commissary should be despatched to Brunswick, had

[1] Wellington to Münster, October 4; Münster to Duke William of Brunswick, October 5; King William IV to Duke William, October 8 and 13, 1830.

[2] Bülow's Reports, October 15 and 22; Esterhazy's Report, London, October 19; Münster to Stralenheim, November 2; King William IV to Duke William, November 4, 1830.

[3] Bernstorff to Maltzahn, November 9, 1830.

been quite outstripped by the progress of events. Duke William's arbitrary regency was universally acclaimed by the revolutionaries as a regime of popular sovereignty, and the uncertain posture of affairs was a danger to Brunswick's neighbours. It was time for the Germanic Federation to recognise the regency and thus to provide it with a firm legal foundation. The king consequently had the Prussian view formulated in a detailed memorial issued by the foreign office. This document declared that the disturbances in Brunswick had not been purely anarchic, but had in truth been directed solely against the duke. So intense was the hatred inspired by the personality of Charles that in the event of his return it was even possible that Germany would witness "the horrible example" of a regicide. If he could not be induced to abdicate, and since the imperial courts no longer existed, but one resource remained, namely that, with the approval of the Bundestag, the agnates of the house of Guelph should reestablish a legitimate government. A few weeks later, Bernstorff wrote to London in still plainer terms. If the negotiations with Duke Charles proved fruitless, they should not, he said, be resumed. The agnates must declare him incompetent to hold the reins of government, and must have this declaration approved by the Bundestag.[1] The memorial was despatched to London, Hanover, and Frankfort; and subsequently to Vienna. Carefully elaborated by Eichhorn, its calculated aim was to urge forward the Hanoverian government without arousing the ever-wakeful suspicions of Count Münster regarding the designs of Prussia to secure the hegemony of Germany. The coup was successful. Münster unreservedly accepted the Prussian views, recapitulating them in a memorial addressed to the Hanoverian federal envoys, intended to pave the way in Frankfort for joint action on the part of the two crowns.[2] Duke William, manifestly relieved, expressed his gratitude to the court of Berlin, demanding and receiving permission to refer to the Prussian memorial should it become necessary for him to justify to the German princes his action in remaining in Brunswick.[3]

[1] Memorial issued by the Foreign Office, Concerning the present situation in the Duchy of Brunswick, October 29; Bernstorff, Instruction to Bülow, November 17, 1830.

[2] Bülow's Report, November 20; Münster to Duke William, November 16, 1830.

[3] Duke William to Wittgenstein, November 16; Bernstorff to Wittgenstein, November 12, 1830.

The next essential was that the Bundestag should at length deal with the grievances of the estates against Duke Charles, a matter about which there had been such scandalous procrastination. To the last moment Count Münch, availing himself of all possible excuses, endeavoured to postpone the decision—so great was the consideration paid by the house of Austria to the most contemptible among the German princes. But Nagler stood firm, and on November 4th, two months after the flight of the Guelph ruler, the federal assembly resolved to declare to Duke Charles that he was not entitled to make any alteration in the constitution of 1820 except by constitutional methods. However ludicrous this decree might seem in view of the changed situation, its issue was nevertheless necessary, since it served at least to secure their new constitution for the unlucky Brunswickers. Prussia's triumph was complete, and in confidential circles Metternich angrily spoke of Nagler (whom he had at one time so greatly esteemed) as "a jacobin in disguise." Besides that of Austria, the only votes recorded against the resolution were those of the incorrigible elector of Hesse and of Leonhardi, Münch's devoted henchman, the representative of the sixteenth curia.[1] At length it was possible to turn to the question of the hour. No one really believed any longer in the possibility of reinstating Duke Charles, not even Czar Nicholas, strictest of legitimists. To the refugee's appeal for help, Nicholas made answer: "Whilst I deplore the occurrences to which you refer, I deplore no less the grave errors which led to these occurrences, and the illusions which your serene highness apparently continues to cherish regarding their inevitable consequences."[2] Metternich, too, had repeatedly assured the Prussian envoy that Charles was now impossible, while Emperor Francis had actually sent a friendly letter to Duke William. Yet Austria's attitude remained ambiguous throughout. When Hruby, the new Austrian envoy, made his appearance in Brunswick, his credentials were addressed to Duke Charles, and were to be presented to the duke's brother as Charles' deputy.[3] Münch meanwhile resumed his old intrigues against Nagler, and so timid and desultory was the assembly that he might well hope for a further postponement

[1] Nagler's Reports, October 26 and 31, November 6, 1830.
[2] Czar Nicholas to Duke Charles of Brunswick November 25 (old style), 1830.
[3] Maltzahn's Report, October 7; Emperor Francis to Duke William of Brunswick, October 17, 1830.

of the settlement. But a new folly perpetrated by the refugee duke compelled the Bundestag to action.

On November 8th Charles suddenly broke off negotiations with the English ministers and left England next day. A week later he turned up in the neighbourhood of Frankfort, attended by a Jew named Henrici, by Bender von Bienenthal, at one time a lieutenant in the Bavarian army, and recently emerged from a debtor's prison in London, and by several other adventurers of the same kidney. He came with well-filled pockets, and was determined to raise a volunteer army and to regain the throne by force. Since Duke William had made no public allusion to the delegated authority, Charles henceforward regarded his brother as an enemy. On November 16th the authority was formally revoked, and William was cited to appear to discuss matters with Charles at Fulda. But the Brunswickers refused to part with their regent. So intensely were their suspicions aroused that they seriously dreaded lest Charles should poison his brother. "I need hardly tell you that I do not myself share these anxieties," wrote Duke William to Wittgenstein; but he did not venture to accept the invitation, and, after all, the interview could have had no good result.[1] William once more felt his position to be insecure and full of embarrassment. The revocation of the authority had deprived him of legal status, so that in fact as well as in form his regency was now an illegitimate usurpation. Turning again to Berlin for help, he declared to Wittgenstein that unless he were enabled to state publicly that the kings of Prussia and Hanover desired him to remain, he would feel compelled to leave Brunswick. Prussia's answer was a foregone conclusion. It was impossible to allow the refugee Guelph to feel that his mischievous intervention had sufficed to overthrow the laboriously established provisional order. The young duke was requested to stay at his post, notwithstanding the revocation of the authority.[2]

The Brunswickers had taken spontaneous action before the reply came to hand from Berlin. Upon tidings of the approach of the detested petty tyrant the whole country was once more in a ferment. In an uproarious meeting the militia solemnly swore to obey Duke William alone; and the officers of the little army took a similar course—unprecedented in Germany.

[1] Duke William to Wittgenstein, November 21, 1830.

[2] Duke William to Wittgenstein, November 22; Bernstorff's Report to the king, November 30; Bernstorff's Reply to Duke William, November 30 1830.

Such was the curse visited upon the slothfulness of the Germanic Federation. For nearly three months the unhappy country had been left to its own devices, and so confused by now had become all conceptions of right, that even the military oath taken by this troop equally renowned for courage and loyalty was no longer regarded as binding. In an emotionally worded address the municipal authorities of the capital assured the young duke: "These sinners will continue in the error of their ways until the permanence of their new ruler's government is secured beyond the possibility of doubt." In a covering letter; Bode the burgomaster added: "If a return to the old conditions, indescribably oppressive and horrible, should appear imminent, I would rather cease to live than remain leader of burghers who will become gradually depraved or will be aroused to the wrath of despair." [1] Homage of this nature was distasteful to the duke. The officers' conduct was intensely distressing to him, and he wrote sadly to his fatherly friend Wittgenstein: "Circumstances compel me to approve all these things by silence." [2] On this occasion also he swam with the stream, announcing in a proclamation issued on November 26th that when he had taken over the government it had not been without his brother's approval; that although to his profound regret this approval had now been withdrawn, he intended to retain his position, since it had become impossible for Duke Charles to reign. Excusing himself yet further to the Prussian court, he declared that the step was forced upon him by the general ferment.[3]

Duke Charles had now made his way to the little Prussian town of Ellrich on the southern slopes of the Harz mountains. Collecting there a mob of idlers, he had his men's caps decorated with enormous French cockades, which he had brought from Metz, and on November 30th he led his troop across the adjacent Brunswick frontier. Assuming for the nonce the role of a cosmopolitan demagogue, in crazy manifestoes he pledged himself to the abolition of the army, to the annulment of tithes, to entire freedom from taxation for the lower classes, to trial by jury, and to the election of popular representatives and of

[1] Address from the Municipal Authorities of Brunswick, November 23; Bode, Covering Letter to one of the chamberlains (presumably von Hohnhorst), November 24, 1830.

[2] Duke William to Wittgenstein, November 24, 1830.

[3] Duke William to King Frederick William, November 26; to Bernstorff, November 26, 1830.

officials. He took with him numerous copies of a forged appeal, alleged to have been issued by his brother, wherein Duke William appealed to the Brunswickers to open their hearts "to the promises and to the goodwill of Our Brother."[1] At Zorge, on the frontier, were stationed the black yagers, still wearing Charles' monogram upon their shakoes; but neither the officers nor the men would follow their war lord when, weeping and half drunk, he endeavoured to talk them over. When the troops prepared to fire, the Guelph fled for the third time, before a single shot had been discharged; his followers dispersed; and the tricolor cockades, which were picked up by the Brunswickers, were subsequently attached to diplomatic despatches in order to give ocular proof of the jacobin designs of this legitimist prince. With a hero's pride, Berner, captain of the yagers, sent in his report of the bloodless battle, fought at "a place which will ever be memorable in history."[2] Charles hastened westwards, and when in Osterode a threatening mob assembled in front of the inn where he was staying, for the fourth time he sought safety in flight, to reach at length the French frontier. These contemptible follies put the finish to Charles' career. It was obvious to all that such a man could no longer belong to the German high nobility. Charles might appeal to his incontestable princely right, but he had stirred up the mob to disorder, had broken the peace of the Prussian state, and Berlin had made up its mind to have done with him. Now that Charles had himself broken off the friendly negotiations, the cautious king of England replied to the address sent him by the Brunswick committee of estates in the previous September, and promised the estates his protection. Even Emperor Francis gave Duke William an assurance of his full assent to the inevitable recent decisions.[3] Everything was now transformed at the Bundestag, and no one but the envoy of Electoral Hesse any longer denied that Charles was unfitted to reign. There was an end to Münch's intrigues, the views of Prussia and Hanover speedily secured acceptance, and as early as December 3rd the Bundestag unanimously adopted a resolution, to which a few only of the governments attached provisoes in accordance with regular federal custom. Duke

[1] Captain Berner, Report to Colonel von Wachholz, December 1, 1830.

[2] Proclamation of Duke William, dated November 28, 1830, composed by Duke Charles.

[3] King William IV's Reply to the Address of the Committee of the Estates November 21, 1830.

William was requested "to carry on the government until further notice," while the agnates were instructed "to take steps to secure definite order for the future," and to submit their arrangements to the Germanic Federation for approval. The young duke breathed more freely, and hastened to communicate to his subjects the first part of the resolution. Once more he stood upon firm ground; he ruled henceforward on commission for the Germanic Federation.

Yet only, it is true, "till further notice." Day by day his position became more untenable. Charles promptly entered a protest against the federal decree. He declared to the king of Prussia that he would gladly entrust the administration of the country to one of his fellow princes, but would never do so to his brother. Three weeks later he offered his brother the appointment as co-regent or as provisional regent, but always with the proviso: "Never can I consent to renounce my sovereignty in favour of any third person."[1] When Duke William refused to accede to these nebulous proposals, whose good faith was dubious, the refugee overwhelmed him with invectives. Yet how could William be expected to act as permanent regent on behalf of a prince who had just led an armed attack upon him, and who publicly stigmatised him as rebel and traitor? The new ministry, composed of able men and skilfully led by Baron von Schleinitz, had long been of opinion that the duke should definitively take over the government.[2] The transference of the ducal crown to the younger brother was demanded by the entire country as by one man. Now William plucked up courage, and fiercely declared to the Hanoverian minister Stralenheim that he could not reign in Charles' name, and that he would not accept the position of regent on behalf of an infant son of his brother, to experience, perhaps, such ingratitude as had been visited upon King George IV, and to pass his declining years in grief and poverty.[3] This speech was not altogether void of effect in London. Should the young Guelph resign the regency, the king of Hanover as nearest agnate, would be compelled to accept it, and to the king's advisers, after the painful experiences of earlier

[1] Duke Charles to King Frederick William, January 1; to Duke William, January 25 and 26, 1831.

[2] Despatch from the Brunswick Ministry to the Hanoverian Minister von Stralenheim, December 4 and 5, 1830.

[3] Stralenheim to Münster, Brunswick, December 5; Reden to Bernstorff, December 28 1830.

years, this prospect seemed extremely undesirable. Count Münster, consequently, expressed himself in favour of Duke William's view, saying that the young man had a will of his own, and could not be compelled to continue the regency.[1] King William IV alone was unwilling to relinquish his adhesion to legalist considerations. His Guelph pride was offended by the unruly activities of the Brunswickers, and he wrote to his nephew as follows: "It appears to me a matter of trifling importance whether you reign in your own name or in your brother's, and I venture frankly to assert that your subjects would take too much upon themselves should they presume to oppose the use of a formality which has been consecrated by national law and princely usage."[2]

Behind all these considerations, the most serious question was that of the succession, which would easily have been settled by the voluntary abdication of Duke Charles, but seemed quite insoluble in the present posture of affairs. If the ducal crown were to pass to the younger brother, and nevertheless the succession, in accordance with the original intention of the agnates, were to be reserved to the issue of the elder, it could be predicted with certainty that Charles, like Duke Antony Ulrich von Meiningen in former days, would promptly marry out of sheer perversity, and would procreate a terrible number of rightful heirs. He would have no difficulty in finding a consort of his own rank in one of the lesser mediatised houses. Was Duke William to be pledged in these circumstances to resign the crown in favour of a nephew? Yet it seemed almost more dangerous that the succession should be unreservedly secured to the male issue of the younger brother. In earlier times the unborn issue of persons placed under the ban of the empire had regularly been deprived of hereditary rights. But how could the agnates of a sovereign federal prince arrogate to themselves the powers of any such penal jurisdiction? Doubts and perplexities were universal. The federal law provided no solution; there was no legal solution in default of the majesty of emperor and empire. The Guelphs knew of no way out of the difficulty, and it had again become necessary for Prussia to urge them forwards.

In this affair King Frederick William showed himself

[1] Münster to Stralenheim, December 7; to Reden, December 17; to the embassies in Vienna, Berlin, and Frankfort, December 17, 1830.

[2] King William IV to Duke William, December 23 1830.

remarkably firm and assured. However profoundly impressed he might be with the sacredness of monarchical rights, his sense of rectitude nevertheless made him aware that upon every human right, limits are imposed. He regarded it as a moral duty to rid the German estate of princes of an unworthy member, and he considered it a dictate of prudence to show the nation in this time of ferment that Germany would not tolerate the ultimate excesses of princely arbitrariness. In response to a new letter from the refugee he wrote curtly and coldly that the agnates, and after them the Federation, had still to give opinions, and that the German princes "would give their most careful consideration to the whole matter, regarding it from the outlook of princely honour and dignity."[1] His views were equally unaffected by the legitimist doctrines of his brother-in-law Charles of Mecklenburg and by the request of the Brunswick relatives. When Charles' grandmother, Margravine Amelia of Baden (now advanced in years and almost blind), and her daughter the queen dowager Caroline of Bavaria, represented to him in feminine fashion the hope that Charles' "terrible misfortune" would lead the exile to mend his ways, the king made answer: "There is only one method of reestablishing order in the duchy and of insuring the repose of neighbouring territories. The incapacity for reigning of which Duke Charles has given overwhelming proof must be formally recognised, and authority must be legally transferred to the hands of his brother."[2]

This was the tenour of the new memorial issued by the foreign office on January 9, 1831, and sent to the Hanoverian envoy Reden for the perusal of the agnates. Inasmuch, said this document, as a regency had been rendered impossible by Charles' latest actions, the agnates, though not acting as judges, must declare the duke "absolutely incompetent to reign." He was shown to be unfitted to reign "by misconduct displayed in the actual exercise of his governmental authority, and the complete lack of a sense of responsibility therein displayed had aroused the passions of his subjects against him"; he was unfitted to reign "because the impressions produced by his actions could not be obliterated." In the case of a private individual such breaches of duty would not result in a simple

[1] King Frederick William to Duke Charles, January 19, 1831.

[2] Margravine Amelia to Queen Caroline, November 30; Queen Caroline to King Frederick William, December 3; Frederick William's Reply, December 16, 1830.

declaration of civil incompetence, but would have "very different consequences." Should the agnates formally recognise that Charles was incompetent to reign, Duke William, as next heir, would succeed by personal right, and without any need for a cession of the crown. The difficult problem of the right of succession had better be left open for the time, for both brothers were still unmarried, and a decision could be taken later should necessity arise.

Such was the advice of Prussia. In a supplementary memorial, Eichhorn explained that these propositions "must be regarded as an extreme measure, beyond which it is not possible to go without an infringement of the principle of legitimacy."[1] In reality the Prussian proposals already involved a manifest breach of legitimist rights, for they demanded that an absolute monarch should be deposed as a punishment for his misdeeds. The illegality was all the more notable inasmuch as Duke Charles secured no formal hearing, and the council of agnates consisted only of the two Guelph rulers, one of whom, Duke William, was beyond question an involuntary usurper. Yet after all that had happened a violation of the law was inevitable ; there could no longer be any question of the reinstatement of the exile ; and once people had made up their minds to recognise that necessity knows no law, it became evident that the best way out of the difficulty was that in virtue of hereditary right the younger brother should take the place of the dethroned ruler. It was a necessary result of the complications of the situation that a settlement of the problem of the succession should be postponed, seeing that it is absolutely impossible to deduce legal principles from a direct breach of law. There was a natural unwillingness to push the infringement of law further than was necessitated by the existing state of affairs, a natural reluctance to deprive Duke Charles' possible issue of their hereditary rights ; but it was desirable to avoid express recognition of these rights, lest Charles should be encouraged to contract a marriage which could not fail to increase the Brunswick confusions. Why go out to meet trouble ? Was it not possible that a formal decision of the problem would be altogether superfluous ? Was it not possible that Charles, a man of dissolute life, would die young and childless, so that the right of succession would incontestably

[1] Memorials issued by the Foreign Office ; to the Agnates, January 9 ; to the Court of Vienna, March 4, 1831.

accrue to the offspring of Duke William? These considerations were sufficiently obvious. During the negotiations of the last few months both of the Guelph courts, Brunswick first and subsequently Hanover, had expressed the opinion that it would perhaps be the wisest course to leave the question of the succession, "in any case an extremely delicate one," undiscussed for the moment.[1]

As soon as Prussia's proposals reached them, the agnates once again joyfully accepted the proffered hand. The duke of Cambridge had a personal interview with Duke William in January. The two courts, largely accepting the actual wording of the Prussian memorial, on March 10th had a declaration made to the Bundestag expressing their conviction that Duke Charles was absolutely incompetent to reign, that the ducal throne had been vacated, and that it had now definitively passed to Duke William, the nearest agnate.

Loud was the uproar at the Bundestag when this declaration was read! On the very first intimation that Duke William was demanding the crown for himself, Metternich, greatly incensed, had exclaimed to the Russian envoy: "I cannot and will not believe it. But if, contrary to my hopes, this should prove to be the young duke's desire, I shall be regretfully compelled to consider it a proof that he is unworthy to hold the position with which he has been entrusted."[2] His legitimist fervour involved the chancellor in the strangest contradictions. He frankly admitted that Duke Charles was incompetent to reign, and yet in a memorial addressed to the court of Hanover he demanded that Duke William should merely act as regent on behalf of his brother, that the Brunswickers should not pay homage to the regent, and that they should merely swear an oath of parition [obedience]. So delighted was he with these sophisms that he sent them also to Berlin, adding with customary modesty: "We flatter ourselves that we are entitled to regard this argument as strictly correct."[3] Yet a regency carried out in defiance of the express will of the legitimate prince was no whit more legal than the usurpation of the ducal dignity. There ensued an extremely animated interchange of opinions between the two German great powers. Metternich

[1] The first reference of the kind is that made by the Brunswick ministry in its memorial to Stralenheim dated December 4, 1830.

[2] Maltzahn's Report, January 7, 1831.

[3] Metternich, Promemoria to the Hanoverian Envoy von Bodenhausen, January 29; to Trauttmansdorff, February 4, 1831.

obstinately clung to his opinion that "correctness" could be secured only by the illegal regency. It was true that, to avoid annoying the Brunswickers, the imperial court would have to agree to whatever the agnates should decide; but he found it impossible to approve their declaration, in view of "the needless, sophistical, and disturbing manner in which it threw overboard all the principles of legitimacy."[1] This seemed so enigmatical that in Berlin it was at first believed that there must be a misunderstanding. But from Hruby, Austrian envoy in Hanover, came the information that Metternich had the personal support of Emperor Francis and also that of his consort, who was closely related to the Brunswick dukes. Matters seemed hopeless, and on March 24th Bernstorff wrote to Vienna expressing regret that it was impossible to come to an understanding with Austria.[2] If the great powers could not agree, still less likely was agreement among the other federal states. It was painful to see the little ants anxiously running to and fro over the ant-hill of the federal law after it had been stirred up by the walking-stick of the revolution. Count Münch resumed his old intrigues, and again the dispute seemed interminable.

The situation of the duchy became more intolerable day by day. In speeches and documents the Brunswickers referred to the young Guelph as "our rightful prince, chosen by the popular will," being fully satisfied with their revolutionary wisdom. K. F. von Strombeck, judge of the high court of appeal, a bureaucrat trained in the school of the kingdom of Westphalia, in a pamphlet issued shortly after the burning of the palace, had devoted himself to answering the question: "What is law when the supreme authority in the state acts counter to the purposes for which the state exists?" Drawing facile conclusions from the old doctrine of the social contract (a doctrine long ere this rendered obsolete by the criticisms of the historical school of law), he declared that if the ruler should infringe his contractual duties, his subjects were justified in renouncing their obedience. The new government felt very keenly that such doctrines were essentially subversive to monarchy, and would gladly have punished their inopportune defender, but no action was taken for fear of evoking

[1] Maltzahn's Report, Vienna, March 4, 1831.

[2] Count Maltzahn's Report, Hanover, March 6; Instruction to Baron von Maltzahn in Vienna, March 24, 1831.

disturbances.[1] The alarm of the Brunswick government increased when a report became current in March that the agnates' declaration was encountering opposition in the Bundestag. The country was unwilling to endure uncertainty any longer. People spoke of the situation with growing bitterness, and were already beginning to ask themselves whether Brunswick should not take matters into its own hands and anticipate the slow-moving federal assembly. April 25th was Duke William's birthday, and the entire duchy prepared to celebrate the occasion. How would it be if all the communes were simultaneously and spontaneously to take an oath of homage to the new sovereign? The plan was not unlikely to be successful, for it was in conformity with the general desire, and Duke William was not the man to prevent it with the strong hand. But in the event of its success Germany would be furnished with an example extremely ominous to a federation of princes, the example of the choice of a ruler by popular election, and how would it be possible to cancel this effective demonstration of popular sovereignty? [2]

The young Guelph was in despair. He had made up his mind that he could rule only as duke, and not as regent on behalf of his declared enemy; but he had already half resolved that if the federal assembly would not agree to his accession, he would lay down the reins of government and leave Brunswick without delay. He could not expect prompt action from Hanover, for there caution was the invariable rule, and the only advice he could secure from that quarter was that it was "desirable to act with the utmost prudence." [3] Again, therefore, Prussia was the only source of help. On April 7th the duke wrote to his friend Wittgenstein that Count Veltheim, who had meanwhile become a member of the Brunswick ministry, was once more to be despatched to Berlin upon a confidential mission.

Before Veltheim's arrival the Prussian court had come to a decision. As the protective power of North Germany, Prussia could not be responsible for the further continuance of the uncertain state of affairs in the duchy, and it was absolutely

[1] Despatch from the Brunswick ministry to von Marschall the federal envoy, November 21, 1830.

[2] Reports of Count Maltzahn, Hanover, March 29 and April 1; Count Veltheim to Bernstorff, April 11, 1831.

[3] Schleinitz to Stralenheim, March 8; Reply, March 14; Count Bremer, Ministerial Despatch to the Brunswick ministry, Hanover, April 2, 1831.

essential to prevent the spontaneous rendering of homage planned by the Brunswickers. Duke William, therefore, as lawful successor of the duke who had been declared incompetent by the agnates, must immediately assume the crown, and must demand an oath of allegiance from his subjects before the birthday celebration. It was not within the competence of the Bundestag to pass a judicial decision upon the agnates' resolve; the right of the federal assembly extended merely to a recognition of the new duke as member of the Germanic Federation, and this recognition could be accorded subsequently to the change of government. It was in this sense that Bernstorff replied to Veltheim's enquiry, What is now to be done? He regretted that the lack of unanimity in the Bundestag necessitated this course, but Prussia had made no secret of her views, and would not abandon the young duke at the present juncture.[1] Nor were matters finished with the giving of good advice. Eichhorn, who was just as zealous in this affair as in that of the customs union, examined the drafts submitted by Veltheim for the patent which the duke was to issue on taking over the government, and, since he considered them all inadequate, he composed a new patent.[2] Veltheim hastened back to Brunswick with a copy of this document. The certainty of Prussian support gave the young duke renewed courage. He adopted Eichhorn's suggestions word for word, and returned thanks in moving terms, writing: "Without the powerful support which the royal court has rendered on this occasion, so important to me and to the country, the desired issue could never have been secured." [3]

On April 20th he took the country by surprise with the publication of the patent. Eichhorn had worded it in such a way that the Bundestag would have to deal with an accomplished and inalterable fact. The duke announced his taking over the government, justified the step to the country, and concluded by saying that the acceptance of the new oath of allegiance would establish the definitive order recommended by the Federation to the agnates. The federal assembly was formally notified of the fact. The Brunswickers exulted. Like all the citizens of the constitutionalist petty states, proud of

[1] Eichhorn, Instruction to Count Maltzahn, April 8; Bernstorff to Veltheim, April 14, 1831.

[2] Eichhorn, Draft for Duke William's Patent, undated, returned by Count Veltheim on April 16, 1831.

[3] Duke William to Wittgenstein, April 16 and 19, 1831.

their liberties, they were accustomed from a superior altitude to look down upon Prussian slavery, and they had no idea that the patent of their popular William had been composed in the Berlin foreign office. Five days later they were able, in accordance with their desire, to celebrate the new sovereign's birthday by taking the oath of allegiance, but this was done by the duke's command and not by a popular resolve. In rhetorical phraseology, Burgomaster Bode voiced the praises of the prince "who had hastened, as if on the wings of the wind, to his terribly disturbed city." The young Guelph again thanked Count Bernstorff in a confidential despatch for his "enduring services" to Brunswick. To Wittgenstein he wrote as follows: "For me, too, this was a day of rejoicing, and my delight would have been unalloyed had I but been able to free my mind from the distressing thought of my brother." [1]

Thus was the question settled without consulting the Bundestag, and the discords in that unhappy assembly continued to increase. Apart from the incontestably serious considerations concerning the legality of the procedure, the assembly was now exercised by the affront to its dignity, and was animated by the ever-ready suspicion of Prussia. As soon as the agnates made their declaration, Frankfort gossip, active as ever, discovered the right scent, and Nagler reported: "It seems probable that Hanover has taken little pains to preserve the secret that the views and maxims advocated by that country were mainly supplied from Prussian sources." When Duke William had taken the final step, Bernstorff allowed it to be openly declared, even in Vienna, that he had acted on the advice of the Prussian court. But he disclosed nothing regarding the authorship of the patent, for this revelation would have been too great a shock for the nerves of the German sovereigns." [2]

The door was thus opened to Austria's machinations. Whilst Metternich gave candid assurances that his part was entirely passive,[3] his creatures in Frankfort were continually inflaming opinion against Prussia, and there ensued a complete metamorphosis in the customary position of parties. Münch and his shadow Leonhardi were now supported, not merely by the immutable electoral Hessian and by Pechlin of Holstein,

[1] Duke William to Bernstorff, April 26; to Wittgenstein, April 26, 1831.
[2] Nagler's Report, March 7; Instruction to Maltzahn in Vienna, May 12, 1831.
[3] Maltzahn's Report, April 25, 1831.

the most ardent reactionary in the assembly, but also by Both of Oldenburg, whose worthy grand duke could not make up his mind to recognise the upshot of a revolt. Some of the other sovereigns looked upon the matter simply as a family affair. In Darmstadt, du Thil inclined to the Prussian view, but Prince Emilius insisted that cousin Charles must not be left in the lurch. The court of Dresden took a similar view, going so far as to formulate the prospective demand that any children that might be born to Charles should be brought up by the king of Hanover, and not by their revolutionary uncle. The king of Würtemberg, in opposition to the advice of his ministers, allowed himself to be guided by dynastic considerations. The Brunswick government could not implicitly rely even upon its own envoy, Marschall of Nassau. This confidant of Metternich aroused universal suspicion by his almost superhuman impartiality. Continuing to hold powers from Duke Charles, he simultaneously received instructions from Duke William. Alternately revolutionary and legitimist, he communicated to the Bundestag the declarations, now of the younger, and now of the elder brother, solemnly pronouncing the most offensive condemnations upon his own conduct. On this occasion, however, Prussia's old enemy Blittersdorff joined forces with Nagler, and a similar course was taken by Mecklenburg, the Ernestines, and the Hansa towns. King Louis of Bavaria had resisted the urgent entreaties of his step-sisters and of the queen dowager, approving after some hesitation the declaration of the two Guelph courts. As to subsidiary votes, many of these were still uncertain: "Some accept the judgment of the high agnates, while others will base their decision upon considerations which have not yet become actual."[1]

On May 11th, fully two months after the agnates' proposal had come to hand, the close of the proceedings drew near. The votes were eight against eight. Everyone anxiously awaited the decision of Luxemburg, the only vote still to be recorded, and in the circumstances destined to be the casting vote. Instructions from The Hague were not yet forthcoming. But Count Grünne, the Luxemburg envoy, belonged to a generation which had grown up in the Austrian service. A confidant of Münch, he gladly lent a hand to one of those unexpected tricks which Austrian federal policy, aided by the elasticity of

[1] King Louis of Bavaria, Instruction to Lerchenfeld, May 2, 1831.

the presidential rights, could play with such masterly effect. As Metternich personally admitted to the Prussian envoy, Münch was instructed by the Hofburg "to associate subsequent federal resolutions with the latest actual occurrences," [1] and in conjunction with the Luxemburger he now played his cards in accordance with this command. Count Grünne, instead of simply announcing that he was still without instructions and that consequently the final decision must be postponed, good humouredly remarked that Duke William's taking over the government had modified the situation, and that it seemed essential to ascertain what view was taken by the respective federated governments of "this unanticipated step." Not merely was the declaration made by the envoy upon his own authority, but it manifestly had nothing to do with the subject under discussion, seeing that the vote referred solely to the agnates' proposal.

Nevertheless the presidential envoy had so high a sense of his duties that he promptly accepted the suggestion, and delivered a long address, obviously not extemporised, concerning the young Guelph's accession to the throne. He censured this "extremely regrettable occurrence" in severe and positively offensive terms, contending that the prestige of the Federation was injured by the duke's mode of procedure, which was premature and utterly devoid of justification. He concluded by proposing that the Bundestag should record the affair in its minutes, and should leave all further action to the governments, but should at the same time express the opinion that "this arrangement established without federal cooperation" could not affect the rights of Duke Charles's issue. Nagler immediately entered a protest against the proposal to express a censure upon the duke's conduct before the governments had even been consulted, contending that an impromptu resolution of this character was null and void.[2] But the Austrian party supported its leader, only two votes changing sides, Mecklenburg joining Austria, and Würtemberg Prussia. The Austrian surprise attack was completely successful. Since no one had received instructions concerning this unexpected proposal, Count Grünne cheerfully recorded his vote with the others, and, thanks to the Luxemburger, Münch's motion was adopted by a majority

[1] Maltzahn's Report, Vienna, May 2, 1831.
[2] Nagler's Reports, May 11, 21, and 26, 1831.

of one. What a result! Two months had passed; the Bundestag had still come to no decision concerning the agnates' declaration; but in a resolution open to objection on legal grounds, and practically ineffective, it had expressed its annoyance at the swearing of allegiance by the Brunswickers.

Emperor Francis did not hesitate to inform the young duke that the federal resolution received his personal approval, writing: "In accordance with the principles which have served me for guidance during nine-and-thirty years' rule over the states Providence has entrusted to my care, I feel it my duty to tell your highness frankly that I profoundly regret your having taken so serious a step."[1] Prussia, however, set all possible influences at work to secure a recognition of the agnates' decision. The first thing was to win over to the Prussian side the Luxemburg vote, the only one which had not yet been recorded. Count Truchsess, Prussian envoy at The Hague, was able to effect this without much difficulty, for the king of the Netherlands regarded all German affairs with utter indifference, and was compelled owing to the Belgian troubles to rely upon Prussia's friendship.[2] To the general surprise, Count Grünne declared on June 30th that he had now received instructions to support the agnates' proposals. By these means a majority was at length secured for Prussia, and if the presidential envoy should now, as in duty bound, arrange for the passing of a resolution, the federal recognition of Duke William's government would be secured. But Austria was unwilling to admit defeat, and upon worthless excuses Münch continued to procrastinate from week to week. In the interim the supporters of Prussia began to waver. King Louis of Bavaria wrote to his federal envoy to the effect that a final decision now seemed superfluous, and that it would suffice that all the governments should individually recognise the new duke. Even the Hanoverian court relapsed into its customary attitude of caution. In London, Minister von Ompteda admitted to the Prussian envoy that his government was unwilling to quarrel with Austria, and for the present therefore would take no further action.[3] It had thus once more become doubtful whether the laboriously acquired majority would hold together for the final decision. Lastly,

[1] Emperor Francis to Duke William, May 30, 1831.

[2] Waldburg-Truchsess' Report, June 9; Grünne to Nagler, May 29, 1831.

[3] King Louis of Bavaria, Instruction to Lerchenfeld, August 2; Bülow's Report, London, September 17; Verbal Note from the Hanoverian embassy to Bernstorff, October 31, 1831.

a grave legal point was involved, a matter which had hitherto been ignored, except for a passing reference to it by Prussia. The question manifestly concerned *jura singulorum*, and if the federal law were to be strictly interpreted it could be decided solely by a unanimous resolution of the Bundestag—an inconceivable eventuality.

In view of this impossibility, both the great powers gradually began to feel that the insoluble and purposeless dispute must be quietly laid to rest, seeing that they had need of one another alike in German and European policy. Prussia had carried her will into effect. Duke William's government was in actual existence; all the German courts held regular official intercourse with it; no one except the dethroned prince now ventured publicly to dispute its rights. If in some new way indirect recognition by the Bundestag could be secured, the legal foundation of the Brunswick government would be thoroughly established, and the utmost would be gained that was attainable after a breach of law. In April, 1832, after prolonged negotiations, Metternich made to the Prussian court a conciliatory proposal of this character. Austria suggested that the Brunswick envoy should present a new authority to the Bundestag, which should then be officially accepted by the federal assembly in a brief declaration, for which he appended two alternative formulas. Prussia adopted the suggestion, and chose the preferable formula. The Guelph courts also expressed their agreement.[1] In accordance with this plan, on July 12, 1832, Marschall regularised his position as continued holder of the Brunswick vote, presenting an authority from Duke William. The Bundestag thereupon unanimously agreed to accept this authority, "seeing that in view of the previous proceedings his serene highness is to be regarded as a voting member of the federal assembly."

This farce provided a worthy conclusion to the federal activities in the Brunswick affair. The position of Marschall, the ultra-conservative, as envoy of an unlawful prince was quite as remarkable as was the position of the entire serene assembly which had adopted a resolution tantamount to a censure upon itself. On December 2, 1830, it had requested Duke William to carry on the government "till further notice." On May 11, 1831, in extremely discourteous terms, it had expressed

[1] Metternich, Instruction to Trauttmansdorff, April 25; Instruction to Nagler, May 7; Münchhausen to Bernstorff, May 26, 1832.

its displeasure to the duke on account of his arbitrary accession to the throne; it had been unable to secure unanimity about other aspects of the affair, and yet it now declared that in view of the previous proceedings the duke must henceforth be regarded as a member of the Federation! Such were the contradictions issuing from legitimist obstinacy, which could not annul accomplished facts, greatly as it might dislike them. Is it surprising that the liberals should tend more and more to stray into the paths of particularism? Even when the need was urgent, the nation had nothing to expect from this central authority.

The continued hostility of the expelled duke compelled the Guelph courts to adopt new precautionary measures. On October 24, 1831, they agreed upon a domestic law in virtue of which henceforward the approval of the reigning sovereign of the line must be secured as a preliminary to any marriages entered into by the Guelphs. All the English princes subscribed to this law, although Ernest Augustus of Cumberland, heir to the throne of Hanover, held out against it for a long time. This fanatical legitimist would not hear a word about the Brunswick revolt and its consequences. Many years passed before he became reconciled to "the usurper William," and throughout life he remained of opinion that the right of succession to the throne belonged to the issue of the elder brother.[1] It need hardly be said that Charles did not sign the document, and since he looked upon himself as ruling sovereign of his line, the question of the Brunswick succession still remained unsettled. His manœuvres ultimately compelled the agnates to place his property in commission, a severe measure, which led to unpleasant legal proceedings, and was not recognised as valid by the French courts. Enquiry showed that he had withdrawn from the country a sum amounting to nearly 350,000 thalers, 118,000 thalers being English subsidies, and the balance derived from the illegal sale of crown estates, the total being considerably less than his embittered subjects had imagined. He had also taken abroad with him the magnificent Mantuan onyx vase and other treasures of the house of Bevern.

Since the agnates, in their perplexity, had left the question of the succession open, it resulted as a necessary though by no means as a directly designed consequence that neither of the two estranged brothers could marry. Duke William, a proud Guelph, desired to secure a consort from a great house,

[1] Canitz's Report, Hanover, January 10, 1838

but all his private efforts proved fruitless, for without exception the leading houses hesitated to sacrifice the potential issue of their daughters to an uncertain future.[1] The Brunswickers knew little about their duke's failures in these respects. Again and again they implored him not to allow the old line of heroes to become extinct; and on one occasion the towns of Brunswick and Wolfenbüttel went so far as to present a formal address begging him to provide the country with a mother.[2] All was in vain. By degrees the populace became suspicious. Strange rumours were current, and the ex-ruler cultivated them diligently in inflammatory writings. Ill-natured people naturally began to ask who would benefit by the extinction of the Brunswick line. Since the only possible answer was the house of Hanover, an artificial tissue of lies was soon manufactured, a web that seemed indestructible, so firmly interwoven were its threads. It was generally believed that the Hanoverian Guelphs were legacy-hunters, that they had helped Duke William to the throne on condition that he remained unmarried, and that Prussia had been Hanover's faithful squire. The truth was the very opposite. The motive forces in the affair had been, on the one hand the Brunswickers, who desired to be rid of their bad duke once for all, and on the other hand the crown of Prussia, eager to terminate speedily and effectively the anarchic situation just across the frontier. The Guelphs had been impelled solely by the might of circumstances, Duke William promptly, because in his case necessity was urgent, the king of England-Hanover slowly and reluctantly. From first to last the Hanoverians displayed a cumbrous but honourable conscientiousness, and only to the uninitiated did they erroneously appear to be the leaders because, in the Bundestag, Prussia invariably and deliberately left the first steps to them.

For two-and-forty years Duke Charles lived abroad, a disgrace to the German name. Alike in London and in Paris good society soon came to look upon him askance, none but a few fanatical radicals like honest Thomas Duncombe placing any credence in his democratic protestations. Half niggard, half spendthrift, he increased the rescued portion of his property, no inconsiderable amount, by lucky stock-exchange speculations,

[1] In a memorial, Concerning the Marriage of the Duke of Orleans (1837), this is adduced as an awful example by Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, who describes it as a fact well known to all the courts. The statement can be confirmed from other sources.

[2] Canitz' Report, Hanover, April 28, 1839.

and made the finest collection of precious stones in the world. He passed his time carousing with a rout of courtesans and adventurers. To the English, the great beard of the "diamond duke" was even more repulsive than his moral depravity. He worked indefatigably to secure reinstatement, although he no longer had any following in Brunswick, and but once only was an insignificant conspiracy discovered in the principality. He designed to land in Germany with a troop of French volunteers. Since Louis Philippe's government frustrated this plan, he again set his minions to work in the customary demagogic paper war, describing his experiences with shameless mendacity but with some literary talent in *The Memoirs of Charles d'Este.* In London he became acquainted with another pretender, Prince Louis Napoleon, whose mind was better furnished, but whose purse was lighter. The two put their heads together, and in a formal agreement exchanged pledges to help one another to their rights by money and arms, Charles promising in addition "as far as possible to make a single nation of Germany and to give the country a constitution suited to a progressive epoch."[1] But when his ally risked the coup d'état of December 2nd, the Guelph fled once more from the thunder of the cannon, and on returning to France he received a lukewarm welcome from the new emperor, to whom he had furnished but slender pecuniary help. When subsequently the armies of united Germany advanced upon Paris, again fleeing from his fellow countrymen he hastened to Geneva. He bequeathed all his property to this town, desiring to do nothing to advantage the fatherland, whilst with the aim of closing his abandoned career with a malicious act of mockery, the petty German despot imposed upon the Swiss republicans the obligation of erecting to his memory a magnificent monument which was to rival the tomb of the Scaligers.

The change of rulers was a blessing to the land of Brunswick. For two decades under the Schleinitz ministry the duchy was one of the best governed of the minor states. Its diet possessed a talented orator in the liberal jurist Carl Steinacker, and maintained a high repute among the lesser German parliaments. In the year 1832 a new constitution was promulgated, providing the burghers and the peasantry with fuller representation, and proving that the revolution had by no means been

[1] Reproduced by T. H. Duncombe Life and Correspondence of J. S. Duncombe, vol. II, p. 10.

effected (as was contended by the refugee duke) through the instrumentality of the nobility alone. Ably drafted agrarian laws contributed further to the liberation of the countryfolk. The German princes, however, were for long unable to tolerate the presence in their midst of a sovereign who, like the bourgeois king, could not be regarded as more than quasi-legitimate. Duke William commissioned Heinrich Zöpfl, the Heidelberg jurist, to write a defensive work concerning *The Inauguration of the Legitimate Succession to the Throne*; but the energetic young man who, like Carl Salomo Zachariä, was ready to provide legal opinions to suit every client, unfortunately lapsed into the obsolete doctrine of the social contract, and arrived at the ludicrous conclusion that if a prince was entitled to abdicate, his subjects were also entitled to refuse obedience. Still more unpleasant was it for the young Guelph when Walter Berg, a radical poet, put the following words into the duke's mouth in a drama entitled *Der Bürger*:

> We are but the first among the citizens,
> The citizen has outgrown the discipline of the state!

The fact, however, could not be glossed over; the history of the Germanic Federation had for the first time to record a little revolution. But how diverse were the manifestations of character among the two neighbouring nations. How readily did the French, without any cogent reason, disregard the restrictions of traditional law; and how difficult did the Germans find it to carry to its logical conclusion a breach of law that had been imposed by pitiless necessity!

§ 2. CONSTITUTION AND CO-REGENCY IN ELECTORAL HESSE.

The transformation in Electoral Hesse was somewhat less violent. "The elector is plundering his country and his subjects in such a way that ultimately there will no longer exist territorial treasuries and demesnes, but only private or princely treasuries"—such were the words used by the Prussian envoy Hänlein to describe the covetous regime of Countess Reichenbach, which at length aroused hostile comment even abroad, and was described in the Parisian *Figaro* as a German scandal.[1] Kopp, the new

[1] Hänlein's Report, February 20, 1830.

minister of finance, was definitely instructed when appointed that it was his especial province to watch over the interests of the elector, and the father of his country showed himself extraordinarily resourceful in the less commendable artifices of finance. Whilst conducting a prolonged dispute with the estates of County Schaumburg concerning an illegal increase in taxation, upon paltry pretexts he instituted fiscal prosecutions against the town of Cassel and other communes; whilst for the benefit of his peasants he issued a decree to the effect that the dung of the army horses which cavalrymen on furlough took with them into the country was to be sold by auction for the military treasury. Even the rising prices and the intense cold of the opening months of 1830 were to be utilised for the advantage of his court treasury: he seized a monopoly of the wood trade, prohibiting the customary import of timber across the Hanoverian border, and raised the price of wood to such a figure that on one occasion the bakers of Cassel had to stop work through lack of fuel.

Here as in Brunswick petty despotism relied upon the support of Austria. Hruby, the Austrian envoy, was in the Reichenbach's confidence. He had induced the elector to join the Mid-German commercial union, and could now contemplate with gratification how the unhappy little territory, wedged in between the customs lines of Bavaria and Prussia, was hastening towards economic ruin. Already, too, could it be foreseen that the disordered family life of this princely house, which had entailed so much misery upon the land of Hesse, was destined to continue during the next reign. To escape the encroachments of the Reichenbach, the electoral prince lived abroad with his mother for years. King Frederick William provided the electress with large sums of money, since the elector refused his wife and son an allowance for maintenance. When the electress, to the delight of the populace, at length returned to establish an independent court in Fulda, the son remained on the Rhine. In Bonn he had become enamoured of the wife of a cavalry captain named Lehmann, and led with her so outrageous a life, that even Hänlein, though himself a man of pleasure, felt it his duty to report to the young man's royal uncle in Berlin the general wish in Hesse that "your majesty will, for the advantage of the aforesaid country take forcible measures to check the electoral prince in his worthless excesses."[1]

[1] Hänlein's Report, August 10 1830.

In July, 1830, Elector William visited Vienna in order to secure an Austrian princely title for the Reichenbach. His Hessian subjects were alarmed lest he should subsequently follow the example of Philip the Magnanimous, and formally declare this terrible woman his accessory wife, and he had already had the documents relating to Philip's double marriage sent to him at Wilhelmshöhe. Metternich, however, considered this proposal open to objection, and left the capital suddenly before the guest's arrival. When, some days later, the elector reached Carlsbad, exhausted by the heat and raging about his fruitless journey, he was very badly received by his disappointed mistress and fell seriously ill. Sinister reports became current at home. It was believed that the elector was dead, for the Reichenbach's brother, Heyer von Rosenfeld, unexpectedly appeared in Cassel, hastily packed up jewels and state papers, and then, under cover of night, fled the country with his sister's children. The municipal authorities despatched three town councillors to Carlsbad to ascertain the actual condition of their sovereign, and the electoral prince also hastened to the spa to effect a reconciliation with his sick father. The embittered populace, meanwhile, had been greatly excited by the news from Paris and from Brussels. Murmurs against the tyranny and dissoluteness of the court could no longer be controlled. A popular song censuring the rapacity of the Reichenbach was in everyone's mouth. It described how the evil woman had enriched herself with the ransom of millions, and concluded with the refrain:

> To God in Heaven goes our call,
> "Alas, the whore has seized our all!"

The peasants were beginning to evade the corvée; poaching was on the increase, and smuggling still more so, for the customs system had fallen into utter disrepute owing to the elector's insane commercial policy. Hence the contemporary Hessian catchword, "Excise is a child of darkness." In Cassel the wardens of the guilds assembled to discuss grievances. A cooper named Herbold was the principal spokesman, and was honoured with the name of "The Hessian Masaniello," for these German civic heroes could not feel proud and glorious unless they were decked with foreign feathers. When the mob attempted to storm the bakers' shops, the burghers took up arms and restored order. The alarmed government gave them

a free hand, and opened the electoral granaries; but even now, in accordance with the ancient custom of the electoral house, the wheat was sold at enhanced prices, and it was not until envoys from the burghers had used threatening language to the minister of finance in his own house that he decided to sell at the market price.

Such was the disturbed state of the peaceful capital when the elector, dispirited and barely recovered, at length returned home on September 12th, having left his mistress on the other side of the frontier, for the ministers feared the worst should she set foot in Hesse. On September 15th, the burghers, in anxious suspense, assembled in large numbers in the Friedrichsplatz while the town councillors were in the palace presenting an address adjuring the elector to summon the estates and "to consult like a father with his children how to help us in our need." In the audience chamber, Carl Schomburg, the burgomaster, acted as spokesman. A true Hessian, serious, thoughtful, and candid, he described in a moving oration the miseries of the neglected land. In his heart the elector detested these "rebel burghers," but he could not fail to read the significance of the gloomy faces outside, and he gave a tremulous assent. Herbold, the cooper, at once hastened to the palace steps, and when he waved a white handkerchief the square was filled with cries of uproarious delight. How often subsequently in song and picture was the peaceful embassy of the Hessian Masaniello glorified, for all knew that had Herbold waved a black handkerchief, this would have been the signal for revolt. "The great day of Hessian history" ended with dancing, singing, and fiery speeches. Cheers were given in front of the Prussian envoy's house, for King Frederick William was honoured as brother and protector of the beloved electress. Not rarely was the menace heard on the lips of the dissatisfied: "Let us become Prussians."

The intoxication of joy was speedily dissipated. Despite the prohibition, the men of Cassel continued to hold their burgher assemblies, loudly voicing in these their suspicions of the elector, the Austrian envoy, and the ministers, all of whom were regarded as creatures of the Reichenbach. The return of this detested woman was a thing no one would tolerate. Upon the rumour of her approach, crowds swarmed out one day on the Arolsen road to bar the way, and her brother Heyer had to be promptly dismissed from his office. How lamentable was

the aspect of the elector in his dull-witted despair. Languishing for his mistress, he dolorously exclaimed, "I know now what a rising is!" The military moustachios of the civil guard of Cassel affronted his most sacred sentiments. From his own arsenal he was now compelled to arm these ruffians, and had actually to issue a manifesto expressing his "gratified recognition of the excellent spirit and approved loyalty of the Hessians," and permitting on that account the formation of civic battalions throughout the country. Armed burghers were soon proudly parading in every little town of Hesse, arrayed after the Parisian fashion, wearing a white "civilian armlet." Gloriously resounded the song extolling these civilian warriors:

> To every freeman aid they're lending,
> The sons of Catti well defending!

Fortunately the bold plan to present an embroidered civic armlet to the elector came to nothing, for persons about the court recalled with horror the Phrygian cap forced upon Louis XVI. The self-conceit of the members of the civil guard was however more conspicuous than their military efficiency, for it was the curse of the old system of substitution that those who played at war thought more of themselves than of genuine fighters. They invariably demanded precedence at reviews, and had frequent brawls with the regular troops. When Frau Roller-Schweizer, a favourite singer, had permitted herself certain observations, frank rather than flattering, upon the doings of the militia, she was ruthlessly driven from the boards, although she tendered from the stage an apology to the "greatly respected citizens of Cassel."

Despite this plethora of guardians of the peace, tranquillity was not restored to the country, for the government had lost both its wits and its courage. The countryfolk imagined that the promised new liberties involved also enfranchisement from the soil. Uproarious crowds stormed the mansions of the landlords, not as a rule to pillage, but to burn the tithe registers and the rent-rolls. These "paper-stormers" were most active in the impoverished Isenburg region near Frankfort, for this district had great difficulty in paying its double taxation to the elector and to the mediatised prince. The alarmed nobles of the house of Isenburg were already threatening to place themselves under Prussian supremacy in order to safeguard

their possessions. In Hanau the excise house was destroyed by a mob, all the papers and even the treasure chest being committed to the flames, for no one would soil his fingers with the excise money. A demagogue who styled himself General Paulsen issued from his "New-Brussels headquarters" commands couched in jacobin phraseology. To restore order, the electoral prince hastened to the scene, and the timid young man was so greatly terrified by the bold speeches of these harmless revolutionaries that he promised them freedom from customs dues until further notice. The levying of excise was actually suspended in the Hanau and Fulda districts. As the court of Cassel put it, these southern provinces behaved almost like an independent state. They had always refused to keep their accounts in thalers, and now the gulden territories of Hesse detached themselves in addition from the customs system of the electoral state.

It was time that some generally recognised order should be established to put an end to this cheerful anarchy. Bernstorff wrote to Hänlein: "We deplore the necessity to recognise that the present excesses of the populace are the inevitable outcome of the past excesses of the ruler." It was true that the pledges had been wrung from the elector by the masses; but "these concessions have been made, and it is inconceivable that they can be revoked without the gravest danger and without the disintegration of all remaining social relationships. The universal wish must be that the path now entered shall lead as speedily and quietly as possible to the goal of firm legal order."[1]

The elector would never listen to advice from Prussia, and the only thing that constrained him to keep his word was the alarm aroused by the repeated and noisy demonstrations of the Casselers. On October 16th the Old Hessian estates assembled, being immediately reinforced by delegates from the other districts. With prudence and consideration the estates first dealt with the difficulty which had hitherto rendered an understanding impossible, the old dispute about the princely possessions. The elector submitted a summary statement, showing the extent of the territorial property, the amount being at least six million thalers (doubters even declaring sixteen million thalers) below the general expectation. The committee of the estates, however, made no attempt to ascertain in detail

[1] Bernstorff, Instruction to Hänlein, October 12, 1830.

how much had vanished into the pockets of the Reichenbach and into those of Amschel Rothschild, and agreed to the division of the capital sum mentioned in the account. Half became national property, while the other half, yielding an annual revenue of at least four hundred thousand thalers, remained the inalienable property of the dynasty. In addition, for the upkeep of the court, the elector was assigned an annual revenue of three hundred and ninety-two thousand thalers derived from the income of the domains administered by the state; and since in addition he possessed private revenues whose amount was known only to himself and to the faithful house of Rothschild, he still remained one of the wealthiest of the German princes. He had however at length to disgorge a legacy to his wife which he had embezzled, and was also compelled to hand over the sum of 110,000 thalers which King Frederick William had advanced to the electress. He resisted these claims to the uttermost, but the crown of Prussia insisted upon its rights, and was effectively supported by the diet.[1]

As soon as the question of dividing the territorial property had been settled, the electoral negotiator, Councillor Eggena, an able and experienced jurist, suggested that the estates should express their thanks to the father of the country. The diet conceded the point, the peasant deputies frankly declaring that the capital sum was Hessian blood-money, and in its entirety properly belonged to the country; but still it was necessary for the elector's subjects to manifest devotion to their ruler. William received the delegation at Wilhelmshöhe; he was still in poor health, was in contrite mood, and wept copiously. The faithful estates mingled their tears with his, and when the ceremony was over they all drank their gracious ruler's health.[2] But, seeing that they had generously fulfilled the greater part of his wishes, they felt all the more justified in going their own way in constitutional concerns, in which the elector was less interested.

Eggena submitted a proposal which involved in essentials nothing more than a few trifling reforms of the old feudal constitution. Thereupon in the constituent committee a protest was immediately raised by Professor Sylvester Jordan, representative of the university of Marburg, a light-hearted Tyrolese

[1] Despatch from the Electoral Hessian Minister von Schminke to Hänlein, January 7; Wittgenstein to Bernstorff, March 10, 1831, and subsequent dates.

[2] Hänlein's Report, November 23, 1830.

Catholic. In youth, in his native land, he had struggled against the dominion of the clergy; in Munich, as an interested hearer, he had attended the proceedings of the first constitutional diet; and in Heidelberg he had accepted down to the last letter the saving doctrines of the Rotteck-Welcker political theory. To the brothers Grimm this fervent doctrinaire seemed to be "an inflated liberal who is hot on behalf of forms but is not even lukewarm on behalf of realities." Among all the spokesmen of North German liberalism, his views most closely resembled those of Rotteck, and nothing but the well-justified anger at the misdeeds of the electoral house could account for the way in which the amiable dullness of this Josephan enlightenment secured support in Protestant Electoral Hesse. Jordan appeared in the committee inspired with the consciousness of a great historical mission. "The example of Electoral Hesse will prove decisive for the victory of the constitutional system in Germany." He immediately raised the question, "What form should a constitution take in order to correspond to the needs of the time, to the demands justly based upon reason and history?" In a typical professorial utterance, he went on to enumerate, with 1 and with 2, with *a* and with *b*, all the essential "guarantees of a constitutional national life." In this discourse, like the impaled beetles in a collection of insects, there appeared in due order: popular education, moral and political; "true popular enlightenment, which is rightly regarded as a main pillar of the monarchical commonwealth, just as conversely the ignorance and stupidity of the populace are the foundations of despotism"; freedom of speech and freedom of the press, "i.e. publicity"; an independent communal constitution and a vigorous system of popular representation; finally, "the arming of the nation, a Landwehr," for "the spirit of a professional army is utterly different from the spirit of the people," and if it should be impossible to abolish the standing army altogether, that spirit must at least be mitigated by shortening the term of service and by frequent furloughs. Jordan desired that the governmental proposals should be judged in accordance with these principles, "for here, as always, the essential thing is to have correct principles."

This remarkable address made a profound impression on the audience, for it proclaimed with genuine enthusiasm, with a confidence which did not admit the possibility of doubt, all the articles of the rationalist political catechism sacred to the

German liberals, whilst behind the doctrinaire commonplaces was concealed a practical idea, and one for which ample justification was afforded by the gloomy experiences of Electoral Hessian history—the intention to be ever on the defensive against princely encroachments. It was Jordan's design to regulate his monarchical commonwealth in such a manner that the government could not possibly infringe the prescriptions of the constitution; and since the estates, despite their inviolable loyalty to the dynasty, were all suspicious of the elector, the proposals for a constitution were entirely transformed. The Marburg professor remained unchallenged leader throughout this affair. In his university note-books all the catchwords of popular liberty and happiness had long ago been neatly inscribed. He was able to produce upon instant demand the rationalist formula for every strongly felt popular desire, and this facility in expression, which is always over-esteemed in inexperienced parliaments, procured him a reputation for statesmanlike wisdom. The proceedings, therefore, drew speedily to a close. People knew what they wanted, and since the proceedings of the diet were still private, there was no scope for superfluous oratory. On January 5, 1831, the new constitution was signed by the elector, and proved to be one of the most notable of the German fundamental laws, of importance not alone for its stormy destiny, but also for its content. Nowhere else were so clearly displayed the national peculiarities of the earlier German representative system, the strange quickening of the still persistent feudalist legal traditions with the modern doctrines of natural rights. With exhaustive diligence Jordan and his friends withdrew from the well-filled arsenals of the feudal constitution and of modern constitutional law all the nets which were to ensnare the prince like a wild beast, rendering it impossible for him to move. Eggena, like the estates, regarded the new fundamental law as a treaty between prince and people. In this respect, feudalist views were in agreement with the doctrine of the social contract.

Consequently the successor to the throne did not receive allegiance until after he had taken an oath to observe the constitution, and great difficulties were imposed in the way of any attempt to reform the fundamental law which had been accepted by mutual agreement. Only when the estates were unanimous, or when in two successive diets a three-fourths

majority was secured, could the constitution be reinterpreted or modified. If any doubt should arise concerning the meaning of its prescriptions, a court of compromise was to be appointed, consisting of six members, three sent by the diet and three by the prince. The diet was composed of deputies from the three old estates, but these deputies were henceforward to be regarded as representatives of the entire people, and were to vote individually in a single chamber, for it was recognised that the Hessian gentry were too weak and too impoverished to uphold a respected position in an upper house. In addition to the right of supply and the right of vetoing or accepting all legislative proposals, the estates secured the unrestricted right of the initiative, which no German diet had hitherto possessed. When the deputies had sat for three years, a general election was to ensue without orders from the government. When the diet was not sitting, in accordance with feudal custom the rights of the estates were to be vested in an elected committee of from three to five members, with a syndic or president appointed for life; in case of need this committee could summon other deputies to take part in its councils.

Certain personal liberties were guaranteed to the citizens, and pledges to abolish the land taxes and to provide certain other economic alleviations were given. To safeguard these representative and civic rights, bulwarks were erected of a character hitherto unparalleled in Germany. Every male Hessian on attaining the age of eighteen had to swear allegiance to the fundamental law; the army and the civil guard likewise swore fealty to the constitution; officers and other officials in state service were placed upon a footing of general legal equality, although the elector preserved the style of "supreme military chief." The assent of the estates must be expressly given to the levying of every tax. In default of such assent no one was authorised to demand payment of a tax nor was it anyone's duty to pay it. Not until six months after the dissolution of the diet was the government entitled to arrange for the provisional continuance of taxation previously approved. In the event of any infringement of the constitution, the estatee were not merely enabled to impeach the ministers before ths supreme court of appeal, but it became their duty to adopt this course. This §100 of the fundamental law soon showed itself to be the most dangerous of all. It positively encouraged the quarrelsomeness characteristic of the minor diets, seeing

that differences of opinion regarding the still untried constitution were practically inevitable; and it favoured the sinister tendency of the Germans to consider questions of political power from the outlook of civil law. The diet could sue any official for infringement of the constitution, disloyalty, corruption, and misuse of official authority. State servants, being thus made responsible to the estates, acquired an independence vis-à-vis the elector which contrasted strangely with their previous position, devoid as it had been of all legal rights. They could be dismissed solely by legal proceedings and after a formal judgment, and could be placed upon the retired list only for senile debility or other deficiencies. Should an official be elected member of the diet, the government retained the right to refuse him leave of absence, but must furnish substantial grounds for such refusal, and these must be communicated to the diet.

Never before upon German soil had been realised with the like logical completeness that new doctrine which discovers in the spirit of mistrust the animating energy of the constitutionalist state; and after all that the country had experienced at the hands of its ruler it was natural that the Hessian diet should be ever on the defensive. By the doctrines of rationalist politics it was regarded as inconceivable that the estates could ever misuse their powers, and the constitution gave the elector no weapon to provide for any such possibility. In case of need, should existing laws prove inadequate, the sovereign could issue decrees, but only with the approval of the standing committee. It remained doubtful whether he could even make effective use of his right to dissolve the diet, for at the close of every session the estates had all to sign the act of adjournment and to furnish instructions for their committee, but how could these things be done if the government were able to dissolve the diet against the will of that body? It was impossible that a great state with a powerful army and an independent foreign policy could continue to exist under such a constitution. Existence thereunder might be possible to a small and dependent community—provided that the ruler displayed an unwonted capacity for self-denial.

Since the electoral house of Hesse had no such capabilities, the admirers of the rationalist system of politics were soon to learn from a great disillusionment how little are political forms competent per se to guarantee liberty. Among all the German constitutions, none was better protected than that of Electoral

Hesse by legal safeguards, and yet none was so frequently and scandalously infringed. Even Jordan was but half satisfied with his own work, complaining that: "Anti-constitutional elements permeate the entire constitution, sticking throughout to the constitutional elements like burs," for Schomburg and other deputies of wider experience had sometimes poured water into this fiery politician's wine. He was especially displeased with the ill-conceived "keystone" of the constitution, the prescription concerning the impeachment of ministers. How could the decision of such accusations be entrusted to the supreme court of appeal, nominated by the government, and "exposed in the capital city to all the arts and dangers of the court cabal?" Nevertheless he ventured to hope that from this "larval stage" the image of liberty would ultimately develop, if only the spirit of the constitution were to be observed rather than the letter. By this spirit he understood simply the neofrench parliamentary regime, saying: "The constitutional system can develop vigorously there only where no ministry can maintain itself in power in opposition to the majority in the chamber of deputies." Yet defective as the constitution seemed to him, the grateful populace rightly hailed him as its father. For Schomburg, and for Masaniello the cooper, the gift of goblets of honour sufficed, these being the customary rewards for fidelity to liberal principles. But Jordan was presented with a house by the town of Marburg. When the simple and unpretentious man returned home after the first sitting of the constitutional diet, he was received with royal honours, and Franz Dingelstedt, the young Hessian poet, sang:

> Was not I among the chorus of the people, who with naked blades,
> Who with banners and with trumpets, greeted thy returning footsteps?

Throughout the country the oath of fealty to the constitution was joyfully tendered, and a legal protest issued by the clericalists of Fulda on behalf of the Roman church was ignored. A few villagers of the Fulda region took exception to article 10, which declared of the elector, "His person is sacred and inviolable," for they imagined that this "person" signified the Reichenbach! However, matters were soon explained to them. In numerous pamphlets "the joyful future of Electoral Hesse" was extolled to the skies, and the constitution was hailed as

"this profoundly conceived testimony to the progress of humanity." A constitutional booklet for burghers and peasants dwelt with especial commendation upon the newly acquired right of free emigration, concluding with the consoling assurance: "The ultimate right is that every Hessian who may henceforward find himself dissatisfied at home may go where he will without let or hindrance." In Cassel, Bernhardi the philologian, founded a newspaper called *The Friend of the Constitution*, whose articles were chiefly distinguished by bold generalisations and by the sedulous avoidance of all practical topics. "The Eve of great Occurrences," or "What more remains for the Electoral Hessians to do?"—thus ran the titles of favourite articles. The liberal press of neighbouring German states could not find words enough to express praise. Now that the Spanish cortes constitution of 1812 was at length passing into oblivion, liberals were accustomed to speak of Electoral Hesse, Norway, and the pattern land of Belgium, as the states "which have made the necessary concessions to the spirit of the age." Börne alone continued to show himself an insatiable radical, and his *Paris Letters* made fun of the pinchbeck of Hessian liberty. The Bundestag, on the other hand, was fired with indignation at this most revolutionary of all the German fundamental laws, and there was general agreement with the angry Blittersdorff, who at the very outset of the Electoral Hessian movement had prophesied that the dreaded South German constitutions would soon prove to be the least liberal in Germany![1]

Yet the sorely tried land was to enjoy its new fundamental law for a few days barely. On January 8, 1831, the diet assembled before the throne. The elector, concealing his spleen with difficulty, handed the hereditary marshal the constitutional charter, and stammered out the words: "I wish Hesse joy of it." Thereupon the estates, brimming over with servility, begged permission to erect a statue to their prince as the second founder of the national happiness, the successor to Philip the Magnanimous. The next day the burghers flocked to the palace with torches, for the beloved electress had just returned. When the sovereign appeared on the balcony arm in arm with his consort, loud were the rejoicings, for it seemed as if with the new liberties the domestic peace of the electoral house had at length been guaranteed. Unfortunately, however, William had already taken steps to ensure that this worthy counterpart

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, October 20, 1830.

to the statue of the man-selling *pater patriae* should never be realised. The very same night one of Amschel Rothschild's carriages drove up to Wilhelmshöhe, and from it alighted Countess Reichenbach. Instantly there was a change in mood in Cassel, and once again began the *Krawall* (general tumult), to use the new expression which at this time first became current in these central German territories. The universal cry was that she must leave the country. The detested woman should never enjoy the protection of the new fundamental law, although she was a Hessian, and although the electress now declared herself willing to tolerate the presence of the countess as her husband's companion and nurse. In the disorders o, these January days there was unmistakable evidence, just as in Brunswick, that the nobles were taking a hand in the game, but here such incitation was hardly requisite. Even the soldiers, whose discipline in other respects remained excellent notwithstanding the dangerous twofold oath, shared the general loathing, and declared in plain words: "Kill the woman; we shan't interfere!" After three days of increasing excitement the countess felt compelled to leave Wilhelmshöhe. Masaniello Herbold paid a personal visit to the castle to make sure that she had gone. William was like a man possessed. He had fulfilled all the political wishes of his people, and now the ungrateful wretches refused to allow him to follow his personal inclinations. During the following days, partly constrained by the threatening despatches sent in by the burghers, he found it necessary to summon a constitutional ministry, which was led by Baron Schenk von Schweinsberg, while Meysenbug, the Reichenbach's confidant, was fobbed off with the non-political office of court chamberlain. How far the country still was from an assured legal position became evident when the diet began to recapitulate the endless series of organic laws that were still requisite to fulfil the copious promises of the state fundamental law.

The constitution was sent to Frankfort in February, in order that the Bundestag might assume a guarantee for its maintenance. But, as was the custom in difficult cases, the Bundestag took no action at all. Metternich bluntly demanded the rejection of the proposal, and when Prussia, supported by several of the middle-sized states, opposed this suggestion, he had a memorial issued recapitulating all those articles of the

constitution which, in his opinion, conflicted with "the monarchical principle." The referendary, Blittersdorff, composed an opinion which coincided with that of the Hofburg. But the grand duke of Baden, as constitutional ruler, found it impossible to approve such an abuse of power on the part of the Bundestag, and his government therefore expressed itself as directly opposed to the opinion of its own envoy. Ultimately, after further confidential disputes, and when three and a half years had elapsed, in October, 1833, information was privately conveyed to the court of Cassel that the Bundestag was unable to come to any decision in the matter. Through this ludicrous upshot Austria's proposals were temporarily frustrated; the Electoral Hessian constitution remained of recognised efficiency, the Bundestag had not expressed any opposition to it, and the consequence was that in accordance with the Vienna final act and the precedent in the Brunswick case, it could only be modified by mutual agreement between prince and people.

The Casselers, meanwhile, speedily perceived that their sovereign harboured some private design. Packing went on incessantly at Wilhelmshöhe. Silver and other valuables, even door-locks, stoves, and parquet flooring, disappeared into great wagons, consigned to the Reichenbach in Frankfort, while the court marshal's office arranged for the sale by auction of a number of the elector's horses.[1] The "Krawallers" flocked together once more to prevent the departure of the wagons. In the city the elector was not safe from insult, but his consort put in an appearance at civic dances, attired like other ladies in the white and blue colours of the town, to receive the respectful homage of the men, all wearing the "constitution rosette" in their buttonholes. On March 10th, as soon as the session of the diet was finished, the elector, accompanied by Meysenbug, left Wilhelmshöhe for his Hanau palaces, where he was met by his mistress. The Hanau radicals could hardly contain their joy when their sovereign appeared in person among them, nor had they any animus against the countess. They hoped that, as of old, their city would become a royal residence; and by their servile devotion they so completely won William's heart that he nominated himself chief of their civil guard. These southern provinces had already shaken off the Old Hessian excise system, and why should they not become an independent petty state under the rule of the elector? Such plans were

[1] Hänlein's Report, February 19, 1831.

already being discussed by inspired Hanau patriots over their beer.

Whilst in Cassel the ministers were loyally elaborating the new organic laws, in the beautiful castle of Philippsruhe on the Main the elector, aided by the countess and Meysenbug, was constructing a mysterious absolutist counter-government. The Casselers' civic festivals were disturbed by all kinds of rough horseplay, and it was generally believed that the practical jokers received their instructions from the Reichenbach. Whilst the ministers were preparing for accession to the Prussian customs union, the elector was in communication with the Austrian federal embassy close at hand in Frankfort, secretly endeavouring to counteract any attempt to draw closer to Prussia. By the letter of the constitution he was within his rights, for the constitution merely forbade him to remove the seat of government to another country; but in the long run a duplex regime of this character would necessarily prove unworkable. The Casselers murmured because they were deprived of the custom of the court, and because even the court theatre was closed. Fruitlessly did Hänlein confidentially explain to the town councillors that after the gross acts of disrespect that had been committed it was necessary for the town to beg the offended sovereign's pardon. Hotspurs were already expressing the opinion that since the elector was prevented from carrying on the government, his consort must assume the regency.

In April the new diet was elected, without any violent struggles, in accordance with the quiet methods of old days. The great majority of the deputies belonged to the liberal party, and they determined to send delegates to the elector demanding his return to Cassel, seeing that in Hanau he dispensed almost completely with "the advice of responsible ministers, specified as essential by the constitution." The elector rejoined by fierce reproaches of ingratitude, indicating to his Cassel subjects that the memory of evil deeds could not be expunged by words. The irritation of the diet now found expression. The estimates displayed a deficit of nearly 400,000 thalers in a total revenue of 2,888,000 thalers. The army, numbering 9,000 men, required a million, and a number of new and inevitable expenses were in prospect. For example, "the Americans," the unhappy soldiers hired by England many years before, were at length to receive a modest pension, but only

those now living in Hesse, the diet deciding that "in view of the financial stringency," the country could not display "superfluous generosity" towards foreigners. For the nonce the difficulty could be overcome by a loan, but a permanent balance between revenue and expenditure could not be secured unless the anarchy of the excise system were to be replaced by Prussian order, whilst many of the liberals were hardly less shy of the Prussian customs system than was the elector himself.

Amid such perplexities, the disastrous influence of §100 of the constitution was already becoming manifest. The elector had promoted certain officers by cabinet order. No exception could be taken to the persons or to the fact of their promotion, but the order had not been countersigned by Lossberg, the minister of war, and although the prescriptions of the constitution regarding this matter were by no means unambiguous, Burkard Pfeiffer, one of the ablest lawyers in the country, felt bound in conscience to propose that General Lossberg, whose fault at most was a pardonable error of form, should be impeached for an infringement of the constitution. Jordan made an impassioned speech, appealing, as was his wont, to the spirit of the constitution in order to help out its dubious wording. The country, meanwhile, was becoming more uneasy day by day. The civil guards of Cassel and Marburg were already taking council for "the complete suppression of the stealthy and rancorous rabble at work in the darkness," and were discussing how the elector (without his countess) could be brought back to the capital. An address signed by nearly a thousand Casselers advanced the incredible claim that if William wished to remain away from the capital he must resign the electoral hat. Despite their good-nature, the Hessians were on the verge of reproducing the Parisians' march to Versailles of October, 1789.

To put an end to this state of affairs, the diet determined to try its luck once more with the angry sovereign. At the end of August, delegates from the estates were again sent to Philippsruhe, and one of them was admitted to the presence —Wiederhold, the venerable judge who, as president of the supreme court, had for many years resisted the elector's arbitrary encroachments. Candidly and yet respectfully he now explained that in the existing posture of affairs the sovereign must regularly cooperate with the ministers. The countess's life, he said, would hardly be safe in Cassel. Finally the

choice was offered of separation from the Reichenbach or renunciation of the headship of government. William chose as his nature compelled him, giving the preference to his mistress, and sending Wiederhold to Fulda to negotiate with the electoral prince, to whom by the constitution the regency would accrue. On September 4th the estates were summoned to a secret sitting, and with the agreement of the diet a new law was promulgated by which the electoral prince, as co-regent, was entrusted with the entire conduct of the government until the elector should decide to resume permanent residence in Cassel.

No one had either anticipated or desired this issue from the imbroglio. Frederick William, the electoral prince, had long been popularly known as "the bad young man." The favourable reputation which he had acquired by his concessions to the excise-stormers of Hanau had been ephemeral. It was known how urgently had he counselled his father against the constitution, and how impudent and unamiable towards his mother had been his recent behaviour in Fulda with the support of his mistress, Frau Lehmann. Disastrously had everything cooperated to promote the shameful ruin of these last princes of a glorious house. He had grown up unhappy and friendless, continually quarrelling, first with his father and subsequently with both parents, ill-bred, encompassed by intrigue, his life threatened, uncultured, mean and vulgar in all his tastes, he thus became a malicious misanthrope. The strange look of his pale blue eyes, half timid, half vacant, sufficed to show that he dreaded everyone, and honoured no one, continually imputing the worst of motives. He was incapable of any higher moral ideal than that of formal legality. Diffident and awkward in social life, barely competent to enunciate a lengthy sentence to its close, he would at times give way to furious passion, and he would then think nothing of kicking a functionary, or of showering invectives upon a minister of state, and would even throw an inkstand at the offender's head. His political wisdom was summed up in the catchword: "Obey orders and don't think!" Being nothing but an absolutist he had an equal dislike of theological unction and of the romanticism characteristic of the feudalist reaction.

He could not infringe the constitution, for to it he owed his regency, and his father could return at any moment; but he hated it as a personal enemy, for it interfered with his domestic life, the only happiness he understood. Gertrud

Lehmann was now his legal wife, for he had privately married her shortly before, as soon as she had been divorced from her former husband, and now, by the first act of his government, he bestowed upon her the title of Countess of Schaumburg. How lavishly of old had his ancestors been able to provide for their mistresses and their bastards. Yet he could do but little for his wife and his lawful children, whom he loved after his own fashion. Despite the utmost frugality, and notwithstanding the assistance of Amschel Rothschild, his income barely sufficed to meet court expenses, for his father kept the family income for his own use, and the regent, as constitutional sovereign, was no longer able to misappropriate the national revenue. Unfortunately the prince regent's situation was rendered more difficult through his mother's fault. If the electress had magnanimously made up her mind to throw a veil of oblivion over the past, if she had accepted her son's wife as a rightful daughter-in-law, seeing that Gertrude was now leading a blameless life and did not attempt any interference in state affairs, a well-ordered domesticity, might have been reestablished at court. King Frederick William gave his sister express permission to come to an understanding with Countess Schaumburg.[1] But the unfortunate electress had suffered too severely under the courtesan regime in Hesse; she was unable to fight down her repugnance as a woman and her pride as a Hohenzollern; and since her son revenged himself by defiant ill-manners, it resulted that this ruling house possessed no generally recognised mistress.

The opening weeks of the new regime were tolerably successful. Wiederhold accepted the leadership of the ministry, and went such a long way to meet the views of the diet that he even agreed to the dismissal of the partially guilty minister of war. It is true that this pliability led to a great increase in the self-importance of the estates, and the way in which the chamber now became enabled to deduce anything it fancied out of the spirit of the constitution was positively astounding. When the electoral prince, during the session of the diet, invited some of the deputies to dinner, Jordan proposed that the responsible ministers should request the court marshal's office to abstain from issuing such invitations, seeing that the regent had no right to withdraw the representatives of the people from their duties. The discords in the electoral family soon led to fresh

[1] Hänlein's Reports, November 12, December 27 and 31, 1831.

disorders. Enraged at the contemptuous treatment of his wife, the electoral prince had his mother's box in the theatre closed, but revoked the command next day owing to general indignation. When, on December 7th, the electress next appeared in the theatre, she was greeted with cheers for "the rightful mother of the people." A crowd assembled outside, desiring to conduct the electress home by torchlight procession. Troops hastened to the spot, and the chief superintendent of police proclaimed martial law, although there had been no serious disorder on this occasion; the guard charged the crowd and wounded more than twenty persons. The electoral prince, meanwhile, was busy among the soldiers in the Friedrichsplatz, and when the affray was over he plumed himself upon having at length enforced respect.

A few days later he lost courage once more, for Hänlein had had a serious talk with him. He commanded an investigation, and issued a proclamation deploring that there had been "accidents during the darkness of the night." The burghers manifested their wrath by odious bickerings with the soldiers. Since the electoral prince invariably wore uniform, the *Verfassungsfreund* wrote that a sovereign who always went about in military dress showed thereby his desire to be chief, not of the state, but of the army. On new year's eve (*Silvesterabend*), Silvester Jordan's name day, that political leader was hailed with extravagant homage. A little later the deputies of the two Hesses met in a formal banquet at Giessen, drinking together to their common liberties, each participator receiving as a memento a printed copy of the two constitutional charters. The Electoral Hessians, however, were already bitterly recalling Hippel's story of *Careers in the Descending Line*, for it seemed to them that in the house of Brabant the son was ever worse than the father, and many were already longing for the return of the old elector. But never again did William set foot in his capital, living as a private individual in one of his castles on the Main, or else at Frankfort, or at the gaming house in Baden. His son promptly pardoned the chief superintendent of police, who had been sentenced on account of the affair of December 7th; and he mortally offended the Cassellers by commanding the officers of the militia, seeing that they were civilians, to shave off their mustachios. This gave Jordan a splendid opportunity for passionate speeches. Articles 31 and 32 in the constitution guaranteed liberty of person and property,

consequently every Hessian had an unrestricted right to the hair on his own face, and the perjured ministers must be impeached for an infringement of the constitution!

It was most unfortunate for the country that Wiederhold should have died in February, 1832, for he was the only man sure of a hearing both at court and in the country at large. Hans Daniel Hassenpflug, a typical son of his father, joined the ministry, and promptly announced his intention "to restore the current to the abandoned channel of obedience." Now began the long and invidious struggle against the constitution. Out of numerous vicissitudes Electoral Hesse secured only three political gains: the subdivision of the territorial property; a definite legal position for the officialdom; and, above all, the accession to the customs union, which was at length effected in the summer of 1831, and was approved by the estates as the only possible means of placing the finances of the country upon a sound footing. The Prussian customs system came into force on new year's day, 1832. Once more did the Hanauers assemble in mobs to storm the new custom house as they had stormed the old, to encounter, on this occasion, resolute resistance. In other parts of the country hostility was displayed only at the outset, the street arabs making fun of "the Prussian" in the custom house, and saying:

> Like a woman he's laced tight,
> Through his body shines the light!

Soon, however, the blessings of free access to the German market were generally recognised. It was owing to the customs union that even under a worthless government the economic energies of the country were steadily though slowly restored.

§ 3. THE SAXON CONSTITUTION.

Both in Hesse and in Brunswick the disturbances had been definitely directed against the arbitrary excesses of princes oblivious of their duty. In the kingdom of Saxony, a well-meaning government, but one affected with senile debility, and utterly devitalised, collapsed hopelessly at the first onslaught of a petty bourgeois popular movement which, altogether devoid of political aim, primarily vented its discontent on account

merely of certain detested authorities and local abuses. Here the disturbances began in the month of June, prior to the great week in Paris, during the three days' celebration of the jubilee festival of the Augsburg confession. A religious poem exhorted the Saxons to continue during the coming century loyally to protect the holy gifts of the church, "then, free like the church, your descendants will be able to rejoice." Many of the speeches made on this occasion sounded like a protest of the Lutheran populace against the Jesuitic machinations of which the aged king's foreign court chaplains were suspected. In Dresden and in Leipzig the authorities were hostile to the popular festival, the result being that in both these cities there were some minor disorders and street brawls, and at times excited mobs would raise a cry never heard before in Saxony: "Long live Frederick William, the Protestant king!" The investigation that ensued was conducted in profound secrecy, and to the disgrace of Electoral Saxony a fierce pamphlet which bluntly described the conduct of the alert but rough-handed Leipzig police as *Shadow without Light* had to be published beyond the borders, under the ægis of the strict Prussian censorship.

During the opening days of September, popular anger broke out afresh, and on two successive evenings the Leipzig mob rioted at large. The burghers looked on with malicious delight, and when on September 4th the alarmed town council appealed to them for assistance, they angrily recapitulated to that body the sins of its nepotistic regime, until at length a promise was given that an account should be rendered of the administration. The whole of the ensuing night the mob continued to rage in the streets. Here and there the tricolor was waved, and at times cries could be heard for "Liberty, Paris, and Lafayette!" The ill feeling was essentially directed towards the petty tyrants of the city, but in this time when work was scarce some of the craftsmen wished to void their spleen upon dangerous rivals. The dwellings of several councillors and police officials were "demolished"—such was the phrase employed. A like fate befell certain houses of ill-fame whose inmates enjoyed the secret patronage of the city authorities. The smiths were out of humour because the town council had placed abroad an order for iron hospital bedsteads; the printers wished to break the new machine presses which were taking the bread out of their mouths; the wrath of the hackney coachmen was directed against the diligence in the royal posting stables. Next

morning the burghers assembled to form a communal guard. Krug, the rector of the university, summoned the students to St. Paul's church, and in a fiery speech exhorted them to join forces with the burghers to restore order. Order was then promptly restored without difficulty. The communal guard and the academic legion combined to constitute the watch—for, in virtue of old privileges, apart from the palace guard of the Pleissenburg there was no garrison in Leipzig. The burghers wore white armlets; the students carried swords and sported the variegated uniforms of the different corps, these uniforms being now exhibited once more in defiance of the prohibition. Whilst some patrolled the streets, others sat in front of the guard rooms drinking beer and playing cards.

With what delight did the honest Krug warm himself in the sunshine of this new civic happiness. Years before, with customary prolixity, he had favoured the Germans with his *Memoirs*, describing the year 1813 as the climax of his existence. He now hastened to write a supplement concerning the "most memorable year" of his life, for who could venture to deny that the Leipzig revolution was even more important than had been the battle of Leipzig. None of his countless writings afforded a more brilliant justification for the nickname of "Wasserkrug" (water jar) which had been bestowed upon the philosopher by the malicious Hegelians. At the close he related in touching terms how the order of civil service had been granted him for the great deeds of the year of his rectorship, modestly adding: "The honour was more than I deserved. For, after all, what had I done? Merely my duty." The numerous other pamphlets called forth by the Saxon revolution rarely attained a higher level than this self-satisfied enthusiasm for liberty. One booklet may be excepted, *The Hopes of Saxony*, by Carl Haase the young theologian, well known to the persecutors of the demagogues, who wrote with political insight and with moderation.

The Leipzig disorders found an echo in Dresden. Here, too, at the outset the anger of the populace was directed solely against the all-powerful town council, although here and there amid the riot the strains of the Marseillaise were to be heard. A mob completely wrecked the police station and burned the archives from the neighbouring Rathaus without interference from the civic authorities (September 9th). The black musketeers, one of the best regiments of the little army, were

forbidden by the alarmed government to fire on the mob, and when a civic militia wearing white armlets had been sharked up, the regular soldiers, without fife or drum, had to withdraw from the town escorted by a double file of the communal guard, whilst the crowd volleyed abuse at the "black bloodhounds." Now the quiet city of Dresden was in its turn gladdened by a reflection of the neofrench civic glories. When, in response to the drum summons "Kamarad komm," the communal guardsmen were hastening to the rendezvous, they proudly exchanged greetings with the words: "Good-morning, Parisian!" On festal occasions they sang the Saxon Marseillaise composed by the gentle old Tiedge, the refrain "aux armes citoyens" here taking a less bloodthirsty form:

Forward, good friends, strew flowers sweet
Where discord once prevailed.

The mood of the country was in truth less childlike than this civic ballad would suggest. In Chemnitz and several smaller towns rioting was rife. Even the Freiberg miners, in general so loyal to the chaplet of rue, assembled threateningly in front of the gate of the free mountain city, and were only to be appeased by the promise of higher wages. In one place the house of a Catholic merchant was plundered, in another a councillor was threatened on account of his severities, a manufacturer on account of his machines, the patron of a church on account of the excessive height of the pew rents. All the most intimate desires of the civic population came to light now that the reins of government were trailing on the ground.

By degrees voice was given to political aspirations also, for the detested urban administration was closely connected with the feudalist constitution. C. G. Eisentuck, an able official greatly liked by the middle classes, whose knowledge of English conditions had given him liberal views, composed an address to the crown on behalf of the burghers of Dresden-Neustadt, venturing here for the first time to demand, in addition to a suppression of the malpractices of the city administration, "representation in accordance with the spirit of the age, especially for the estate of peasants."

In all innocence the communal guardsman of the capital were already debating the question whether, seeing that so many changes were requisite, good old King Antony should not be

given a friendly hint to abdicate. His nephew, the youthful prince Frederick Augustus, could then ascend the throne, and perhaps his affection for the people would lead him to adopt the Lutheran faith. In this period of general disturbance such plans seemed quite unexceptionable, for had not Louis Philippe been recognised by the powers? The influence of the recent French revolution upon the easy-going German burghers was all the more seductive because its course had been so smooth, and because it seemed so far more innocent than the first and cruel revolution. But the German prince had other views than the Orleans ruler. Directly the suggestion came to his ears he rejected it with indignation, saying: "Nothing would induce me to become a king of rebels!"

The vague movement did not acquire a definite aim until the high officialdom assumed the leadership. The younger members of the privy council had long been uneasy at the excessive power of the privy cabinet, by which they were quite cut off from the monarch, and at the obstinacy and arrogance of Einsiedel the cabinet minister. Nor could they fail to see that in view of the imminent collapse of the old system the king required at least some assistance from youthful energies. To the aging ruler the disturbances seemed quite incomprehensible. "I have left everything as it was," he mournfully exclaimed, "and I have harmed no one!" At length, however, he began to recognise that Count Einsiedel had been completely deceived as to the popular mood. On September 13th the minister had to resign at the king's request, laying down with reluctance the office he had so long held, and writing to the Prussian envoy: "His majesty has thought it necessary that I should send in my resignation."[1] The same day Privy Councillor von Lindenau and three of his colleagues came to Pilnitz and induced the king to nominate Prince Frederick Augustus as co-regent. The young man's father, Prince Max, offered no objection, and even made the unsolicited declaration that he renounced the succession in favour of his son, declaring good humouredly: "I don't care about reigning. Fritz is a good lad and will reign as I should like."

Frederick Augustus thus took over the reins of government, being seldom interfered with by any suggestion from the old king. It was long since there had been so excellent and amiable a ruler in the Albertine house, for he possessed a

[1] Einsiedel to Jordan, September 13, 1830.

many-sided culture, was kindly and courteous, and was characterised by a straightforwardness which occasionally alarmed his courtiers. He spoke of himself as a man of feeling, and was in fact both by talent and temperament better suited for learned leisure than for the world of action. Quick decision was difficult to him; he was readily fatigued by the dull routine of affairs; and he spoke little in society. "Not a word about politics," he was wont to say when, accompanied by but a single adjutant, he went for a day's pleasuring among the rocks of the Meissen highlands. He had wandered over most of the mountain regions of Europe, visiting the remotest valleys, and among his intimates he would describe his travels with poetic vividness. He was most at ease in his modest vineyard at Wachwitz, where he laid aside courtly state, and would not have his quiet disturbed even by a military guard. He was a connoisseur of the arts, and was skilful in the recognition of youthful talent. Among the sciences his favourite was botany, and any peasant who saw the unpretentious-looking man, with a green collecting box slung over his shoulders, searching the banks between the fields, might well take him for the ratcatcher. He had conscientiously prepared himself for his princely career. It was well known that he had long been convinced of the untenability of the traditional nobles' regime, and that he was in good odour neither with his uncle's confessors nor with Count Einsiedel. The co-regent promptly won all hearts by issuing a friendly address to the Dresden burghers. His phrase "confidence inspires confidence" was henceforward continually recalled by his devoted subjects in rhymed and unrhymed toasts, and they forgave him because he could not constrain himself to the suggested change of creed. His brother John proved a loyal and industrious assistant, being a man of wide learning, less amiable in character than Frederick Augustus, but of stronger metal, and exceedingly well-informed upon matters of Saxon law and administration. Prince John assumed the supreme command of the communal guards, this force being now established in all the larger towns, its members first acquiring an adequate sense of their own greatness at sight of the prince wearing the white civic armlet. The co-regent and his brrothe John were extolled with dithyrambic extravagance, and when these "Saxon dioscuri appeared in the zenith of Leipzig" Krug could hardly find words for the adequate display of his liberal enthusiasm.

The leading intelligence in the work of reform was that of Privy Councillor von Lindenau. In the days when, during an interregnum, the government of his native territory of Gotha-Altenburg had been entrusted solely to his hands, he had been known to the grateful Thuringian populace by the pet-name of "Duke Bernard." He inspired the like affection in Electoral Saxony, especially among the peasants, although the simple-minded aristocrat scorned to exercise the arts of popular flattery. His disposition was tinged with melancholy. His betrothed having died, he remained unmarried, devoting the income from his considerable property and four-fifths of his official salary to purposes of general utility, and shunning social life to such an extent that even some members of the diplomatic corps were personally unknown to him. All his leisure was given to science. Astronomers regarded him as a successful investigator, and the observatory on the Seeberg near Gotha owed to him a considerable part of its reputation. This high-minded idealist would at times lose himself amid impossible plans, but in the end he invariably returned to the solid ground of reality. Now, for example, he abandoned the policy of the Mid-German commercial union, which at one time he had furthered with so much patriotic zeal, frankly explaining to Jordan, the Prussian envoy: "The court of Vienna has made attractive proposals for a commercial union; we do not intend to accept them, but shall join the Prussian customs union.[1] In regard to the abolition of the burdens on the peasantry, and in regard to the reorganisation of the administration and of the municipal system, he took the Prussian laws as his model. The constitution he designed to introduce was, in accordance with the opinion of his day, to take the form of a charter, but it was not to diverge too greatly from feudalist traditions. For the present no more could be expected from the old diet, and the cooperation of that body was essential seeing that it was a point of pride with the prince regent and his councillors that the new order should be legally unassailable.[2]

For many years Saxony had been the most tranquil of all the middle-sized states, and it is therefore easy to understand that the court of Vienna was greatly exercised about the utterly unexpected recent events. Ominous tidings came to hand likewise from the neighbouring petty states. The widowed

[1] Jordan's Report, September 25, 1830. Vide supra vol. IV, p. 499.
[2] Jordan's Report, February 1, 1831.

duchess Julia, a convert to Catholicism, had been forced to flee from Coethen because the Protestant populace was threatening her clerical entourage. In Altenburg a very lively rising of the mob had been controlled with considerable difficulty, and with Prussian help. Emperor Francis addressed an enquiry to Berlin whether it was not desirable for the two great powers to undertake joint intervention, first of all in Saxony; and although Frederick Augustus, the prince regent, wrote to his father-in-law to justify his own course, the emperor instructed the chancellor to favour Dresden with a few "pungent despatches." In polite phraseology, Metternich enquired how it was possible that a state which had hitherto been a pattern of German morality, and which owed its present existecne solely to Emperor Francis, could have given so dangerous an example, threateningly adding that the emperor was firmly resolved not to content himself beyond a certain limit with the role of benevolent spectator of these disorders. Count Schulenburg, Saxon envoy in Vienna, a man of the old school, who had hitherto from the Austrian capital conducted Saxony's German policy entirely in accordance with the views of Metternich, hastened home to reecho his master's warnings, only to be told by the prince regent to return to his post, and to be recalled shortly afterwards. Czar Nicholas proved equally antagonistic. The envoy of France, protector of liberty, actually came to Lindenau in profound concern to enquire whether there was really any prospect of foreign invasion.

Bernstorff coldly rejected the Hofburg's proposals. A severe view was taken in the foreign office of the disorders of Saxony, seeing that the overthrown government could not be accused of any breach of law. "The rising in the duchy of Brunswick was the outcome of oppression, and that in Hesse finds its explanation in the accumulated errors and the gross injustice committed by the government, but for the Saxon troubles there is hardly any excuse, and still less a reason.[1] When General Watzdorf, Saxon envoy in Berlin, submitted the draft of the new constitution, and asked for friendly criticism, Ancillon reiterated praises of the feudalist estates of Germany, expressing regret that the "purely Germanic form" had not been retained "with a few improvements." But the Prussian statesmen willingly recognised how sedulously the proposal "safeguarded the monarchical principle"; and they were all

[1] Instruction to Jordan, April 22, 1831.

the less inclined to interfere with Saxon reforms since it was plain that their neighbour could not accede to the Prussian customs union until Saxon administration had been reorganised.[1] Thus assured of Prussian friendship, Lindenau answered the Hofburg in plain terms, saying that the new government would maintain its monarchical prestige by its own unaided energies.

As soon as the little kingdom had undertaken the healing of its internal troubles, its German policy began spontaneously to flow in the natural channels. Rancour concerning the partition of the country seemed almost forgotten, and relations with the Prussian court were soon on a friendly footing. During a recent visit to Berlin, Prince Frederick Augustus had made an extremely favourable impression on the king. Prince John was on terms of intimate friendship with his brother-in-law the crown prince of Prussia, and the two most learned princes of the age delighted in the exchange of serious ideas, although the sober-minded Albertine did not share the romanticist outlook of the Hohenzollern.

A full year elapsed before the effervescence in Saxony had subsided. Inflammatory language was frequently used by the *Sachsenzeitung*, the *Vaterlandsfreund*, and the *Biene* (issued by Richter the "Bienenvater" of Zwickau); whilst matter suppressed by the alarmed Saxon censorship was often surreptitiously printed in Saxony, or published in Altenburg or Ilmenau under the nerveless regime of the Thuringian petty princes. Subsequently some of the Polish refugees, to whom the Dresdeners, mindful of old times, gave a hospitable reception, took a hand in the game. Almost everywhere the authorities lacked firmness; accusations lodged by the communes against officials or pastors were practically sure of a hearing; in the innumerable minor street brawls the police had acquired a reputation so unsavoury that it was hardly possible to find decent men willing to join the force. The old national guard of Dresden was disbanded since there was no reason for its existence beside the new communal guard. Some of its members objected to the disbandment, entered a protest against the abuse to which the entire national guard was subject, "not in Europe alone, but throughout the world," and, in their ill-temper, founded a burghers' club. It was among these circles that a writing was circulated by a lawyer named Mosdorf, entitled *The Constitution the Saxons Desire*. It bore the inscrip-

[1] Watzdorf to Bernstorff March 2; Jordan's Report, March 1, 1831.

tion, "and if it be not granted us we shall knock at the door with the butt ends of our guns." It demanded popular sovereignty, and the abolition of the nobility and the standing army, thus giving crude expression to all the confused radical ideas which the unyielding nobles' regime had aroused among the petty bourgeois.

When at length, in April, 1831, the government ordered some arrests, rioting recommenced in the capital. The mob liberated the captives; the communal guard displayed cowardice; Prince John, their leader, was publicly insulted; and not until the second day were the rioters dispersed by the regulars, armed with rifles; Mosdorf was sent to the Königstein fortress, and many other persons were imprisoned. In Leipzig these tidings awakened the old jealousy of the capital; the town council promptly sent an assurance of devotion to the court, offering its communal guard for use in case of need against the mutineers of Dresden. Unfortunately, however, the civilian army on the Pleisse was no less untrustworthy than that of the capital, for the incense of the liberal press had notably increased the arrogance of the armed populace. In August some of the Leipzig communal guards mutinied through dissatisfaction with their new guard-room. Even the students took sides against the offenders, and to the black musketeers (quartered in Leipzig now that the privileges of the city had been annulled) fell the ungrateful task of suppressing the disturbance by force of arms. Thenceforward the crown felt its position more secure.

The old diet, meanwhile, had completed its discursive deliberations concerning the fundamental law. How strange was the contrast between Saxony and Electoral Hesse! Whereas in Hesse the diet had completely transformed in the liberal direction the ministers' proposal for a constitution, in Saxony all the reforms were initiated by the government, which was far more perspicacious and far less prejudiced than were the estates. Alike the Ritterschaft and the towns had an eye only for selfish interests, and Lindenau had to listen to much abuse from men of his own order who accused him of sacrificing the rights of the nobility. The new constitution, like the old, was founded upon the principle of caste. The upper house was no more than a reduced replica of the old diet, and was as independent of the crown as that body had been, for the crown could merely appoint ten life members. It consisted of the prelates, the high nobility, the representatives of the

great landowners, and the burgomasters of eight large towns. The landed interest was preponderant in the second chamber as well, for the diet had coolly maintained that in this manufacturing country, thanks to the existing commercial embarrassments, the economic centre of gravity was to be found in agriculture alone. The Ritterschaft was represented in the lower house by twenty deputies; the peasantry had twenty-five members, the towns a like number, whilst manufacturing industry had five representatives. The consequence was that the chambers, although they had abandoned the practice of the curiate or collective vote, had a closer resemblance to the institutions of feudalism than to those of the neofrench representative system. They offered little scope for the promotion of metropolitan culture, since every deputy must reside in his constituency. But they did not multiply officials in the unfortunate manner characteristic of the South German diets. The crown gave the diet free disposal of the crown lands, contenting itself in future with a civil list. The estates were granted the right of impeaching ministers before a specially constituted court; they voted the budget every three years, and could accept or reject legislative proposals, which could be initiated by the government alone. A law, and even a budget, were only to be regarded as vetoed when a two-thirds majority against it had been secured in both chambers; and as regards the budget the crown could in case of need continue expired taxes for a year. No less cautious was the article relating to the rights of man, although this had to be included as a concession to the age of enlightenment.

King Antony indulgently accepted all that happened. Two articles only of the constitution wounded him deeply, the one which subordinated the churches to the supervision of the state, and the one which prohibited for all future time the admission of the Jesuits and other religious orders, for their wording displayed an offensive mistrust of the Catholic court. Only after his nephew John had discussed the matter with him would he agree to accept these provisions. The young man was a strict Catholic, and loyally adhered to views of German history in conformity with the Hapsburg and Albertine traditions; but he knew that the dynasty owed much to the rigidly Lutheran people, and he dealt with questions of ecclesiastical policy in a broad spirit. On September 4, 1831, the king handed the constitutional charter to the old estates, and after the model

of the July festival of the Parisians the anniversary of the promulgation of the constitution was henceforth celebrated by civic processions, banquets, and congratulatory speeches.

However ludicrous the inflated language used on these occasions might sometimes sound, the first ten years of the new regime were indubitably the happiest experienced by the kingdom under the Germanic Federation. The specialised ministry of state which now assumed conduct of the entire administration could boast more men of talent than perhaps any other of the German middle-sized states, while von Zeschau, minister of finance, was a man of statesmanlike intelligence, trained in the wider school of the Prussian service, and able to mitigate Lindenau's idealistic leanings by businesslike sobriety. Some of the other leading offices were occupied by persons of exceptional ability, such as Wietersheim, Merbach, and Günther, for the land had ever been conspicuous for men of talent, and talent could now find freer scope. A keen observer could indeed discover that the traditional Electoral Saxon noble oligarchy continued to exist in modified form. The ministers belonged without exception to the narrow circle of old noble families which for three hundred years had wielded the powers of government. Müller, minister of education, was the only bourgeois among them. His appointment was an almost unprecedented concession, but henceforward it remained the rule that as a sop to the officials and the liberals a bourgeois minister should from time to time be appointed, the most important positions however being always reserved for the nobility. A firm foundation was given to the new system of popular representation by a towns' ordinance modelled on that of Prussia. In the same year (1832) was promulgated the excellent law concerning emancipation and the partition of the communes, which effected a much more thorough abolition of feudal burdens than had hitherto been possible in Prussia. In accordance with Lindenau's plans a land-rent bank was established which indemnified duly entitled persons with interest-bearing bonds and thus facilitated the work of emancipation. After negotiations lasting several years the margravate of Upper Lusatia at length entered the administrative order of the patrimonial dominions.

At the outset the new diet displayed an almost childlike modesty, although Tiedge voiced a challenge with the words, "We have such men as Eisentuck"; since for the moment the abstract liberalism of the school of Rotteck and Welcker

was unrepresented in Saxony. But there was no lack of sound practical reason. Individual orators, such as the honest aristocrat Albert von Carlowitz, and Deutrich, the Leipzig burgomaster, were already venturing to look beyond the green and white boundary posts. Great commotion was aroused at the other courts by the parliamentary activities of Prince John, who alone among the princes of the German ruling houses regularly occupied his seat in the upper chamber, worthily filling this difficult position, and, while displaying a somewhat dry legal knowledge, continuing to work in a well-informed and intelligent manner. Who could take it amiss of the irrepressible Carl Böttiger that in well-turned Greek distiches he should extol the learned prince as the πύργος Σαξονίας? After the breaking down of the rigid system of antiquity, and after the customs union had given the industrious country access to its natural market, a more vigorous life was universally awakened. There was a flourishing economic development, the educational system was wisely reformed, the Leipzig city companies opened their great commercial academy; in almost every town some active man, like good Pastor Böhmert in Rosswein, worked on behalf of Sunday schools, savings banks, or workingmen's clubs. Art was not neglected now that the new art union was holding its exhibitions. Young Ludwig Richter, entering the Dresden academy which was hidebound with tradition, ventured to take his pupils to draw landscapes under the free air of heaven. Frederick Augustus performed an important service for German architecture when he summoned to Dresden Gottfried Semper, and commissioned the young Holsteiner to build the new theatre, which was to stand between the scintillating beauties of the Zwinger and of the Hofkirche. In such an environment it was inevitable that the architect should produce an ornate Italian renaissance building which, less overloaded with detail than edifices in the baroque style, nevertheless to the artistically inclined modern eye appeared more cordial and more congenial than Schinkel's Hellenic temples.

Nevertheless, during this time of prosperity much discontent was accumulating beneath the surface. The lax control of the year of the revolution, long persistent, had accustomed the lower classes, especially in the capital, to a rough radical tone. No one would admit that the government stood high above the people, that Lindenau and his friends had been the first to give a political content to an utterly aimless movement.

With the heroic courage of the "fighters of the Saxon July," men boasted how the reluctant crown had been forced to concede liberty. "All the inhabitants of Europe, in every town and in every village, share the same political sentiments," contended Richter the Bienenvater," and for this reason the example of the great week of Paris was promptly followed throughout Europe." The new cosmopolitan radicalism, everywhere in the air, affected a silent entry into Saxony, and the foreign writers who occasionally visited Leipzig nourished its spirit no less zealously than did the Polish refugees in Dresden. There was extreme poverty in the Erzgebirge, and the first germs of socialist discontent were already manifest. The government did little to protect the workers from exploitation, for it was still helpless in face of the suddenly increasing power of large-scale manufacture. The arrogance of the middle classes was fostered by the ungerman playing at soldiers of the national guard. Occasional friction was inevitable, for the regulars often gave plain expression to their opinion of this civilian army, which had played so paltry a part against the disturbers of the peace. On the parade ground the severest of all censures was "You are doing it like the communal guard!" Malicious fables circulated when the unhappy Mosdorf hanged himself in his fortress prison, and when Richter, the Bienenvater, had to abandon his disorderly periodical and emigrated to America. The black musketeers were spoken of as the "Saxon pretorians"; while the mistrust felt by this Lutheran nation centred with incredible venom on Prince John, whose popularity speedily became a thing of the past. He was considered a thorough Jesuit, although it was thanks to him that the Jesuits had been expelled; he was said to be engaged in secret intrigues at court; and so on, and so on. This civilian gossip had free scope, for a cultured liberal press was as yet unknown in Saxony; and when the demagogues found voice, petty ill-feeling was prone to degenerate into savage radicalism.

§4. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HANOVER.

In Hanover the struggle against the dominion of the nobility broke out later than in Electoral Saxony. "All is quiet here, for here there is no reason for complaint"—such were the

words proudly uttered in professorial circles at Göttingen when news first came to hand of the disturbances in Cassel. The peasants, who had suffered severely from failure of the last harvest, held other views. They often foregathered to complain of the rudeness of the officials and the arrogance of the landowners, of the tithes, the corvée, and the game laws. In some of the smaller towns the townsfolk had formed vigilance committees in the previous autumn, dreading attack by the excited countrymen. The spirit of vague discontent had need of a name upon which could be visited all the sins of the nobles' regime, and this name was supplied when, towards Christmas, 1830, a pamphlet entitled *Impeachment of the Münster Ministry at the Bar of Public Opinion* was secretly circulated in manuscript, and subsequently printed. It was a bombastic effusion from the pen of König, a young lawyer of Osterode, and the substance of the accusation was: "Münster, Münster, Münster, is a mountainous nightmare of oppression." The all-powerful minister was compared with Attila, Nero, Pizarro, and Pepin, the mayor of the palace, on the ground that he had abrogated the liberally conceived legislation of the kingdom of Westphalia, had "scandalously thrust the people back into serfdom," and "with sacrilegious hand had in an instant destroyed the political edifice so magnificently erected during the years 1808 to 1813." So intense already was the resentment inspired by the ultra-conservative policy of the Guelph restoration, that this laudation of the foreign dominion which in its day had aroused such intense loathing made a profound impression upon the common people, all the more since the pamphleteer vented his wrath solely upon the abuses of ministerial authority, loyally declaring: "William, our burgher king, knows nothing of this."

On January 5, 1831, König's fellow Osterodians proceeded to form a revolutionary communal council and a communal guard. They proposed "to give the burgher king express information of the distresses with which all his subjects, except those belonging to the official classes, were afflicted. In a manifesto couched in the neofrench style they expressed the hope: "May the fifth of January be celebrated by our grandchildren and great grandchildren as a sacred heritage from their glorious ancestors!" The trifling disturbance was promptly suppressed. Then of a sudden it became apparent that even the learned and retired life of the Georgia Augusta university

had not remained totally unaffected by the storms of the time. Baron von dem Knesebeck, resident in Göttingen, a hotspur of the feudalist party, had recently, in a pamphlet dedicated "To the Illustrious Sovereigns of Germany," poured forth all the most intimate wishes of Guelph junkerdom. The work bore the Napoleonic motto: "When the canaille gains the upper hand, it is no longer spoken of as the 'canaille,' but is known as the 'nation.'" The writer declared the nobility to be the main prop of the throne, which must be safeguarded by the institution of a herald's college. He demanded that a special order of distinction should be established for the friends of legitimacy, and that a political catechism should be introduced into the schools and subscribed by all persons in state service. It was no matter for surprise that the students should one evening demonstrate their ill-will by breaking the windows of the legitimist baron's house and compelling the tenant to seek refuge elsewhere. Further excitement was aroused in the minds of the junior professors when the dean of the legal faculty, Hugo, who had long been an object of suspicion to the newspaper writers on account of his profound learning, refused the *imprimatur* to a dissertation by Dr. Ahrens upon the Germanic Federation, a work more notable for a liberal spirit than for brilliancy.

Among the younger professors and lawyers there now originated the insane design of undertaking a revolution in this most unfavourable of all conceivable places. It was universally known that with few exceptions the senior members of the academic body eschewed politics on principle. Even among the students the radical party found but scant support, for the Georgia Augusta was considered the most select of the German universities, and in the lecture theatres the princes and the counts continued as in Pütter's day to sit upon a separate bench of honour. Among the townsmen, however, now that the decayed city was dependent for its life solely upon the students, there had ensued an exceptionally powerful development of the characteristics which usually distinguish the inhabitants of minor spas and university towns—mingled greed and servility. Nevertheless a coup de main offered considerable prospect of success. Owing to the easy-going system of furloughs which prevailed in all the lesser armies of the Germanic Federation, the force of yagers in the barracks was but eighty strong, whilst in accordance with the custom of

the country the commanding officer had injunctions to avoid anything that might arouse umbrage. Although his men would have been amply sufficient had they been promptly utilized, he could not intervene unless upon demand of the civil authorities.

On January 8th the lawyers Seidensticker and Eggeling, with a small group of fellow-conspirators, made a descent upon the ancient Rathaus. The commissary of police, a man greatly detested, fled; the other authorities obediently relinquished their trust; power was taken over by a new communal council composed of burghers, graduates, and students. Whilst a students' tailor was threateningly whetting his clasp-knife upon the stone balustrade of the steps leading up to the Rathaus, the leader of the movement, an unattached lecturer named von Rauschenplatt, a resolute and vigorous little man with cunning eyes set aslant, thick hair, and bristling blond beard and moustachios, stalked about the market place, wearing a slouch hat and jack boots, and carrying four pistols, a cavalry sabre, and a dagger, in his belt. When the cry was raised, "There's a revolution on!" the students flocked to the spot with their swords, delighting in the tremendous spree. Academic and civic legions were formed, every man-at-arms wearing the white brassard, and a number likewise displaying the lilac-green-and-red cockade of the united nation of Calenberg and Grubenhagen. Everyone deferred to the new authorities. The garrison withdrew unmolested after Rauschenplatt had fruitlessly attempted to persuade the commandant to hand over his superfluous firelocks. In the senatus academicus Dahlmann proposed that the students should be severely reprimanded, but no one except Gauss, a strict conservative, found courage to support him.

For an entire week the town was in the hands of "Puss-in-Boots," as the little Rauschenplatt was nicknamed. The gates were barricaded, and the fine avenues along the wall were strictly watched, for it was desired to keep the officials and professors as hostages. In the market place the heroes of the two legions camped round great fires, the miserable beer of the town brewery (a monopoly institution) flowed in streams, whilst everyone smoked proudly in the streets—for in all the petty North German revolutions the freedom to smoke in public thus wrung from the authorities was hailed as the emblem of the new springtime of the nations. There

was no word of definite political plans. Revolutionary songs were sung; cheers were given for liberty, equality, and fraternity; some went so far as to talk of a republic of Göttingen under the ægis of the Germanic Federation. But the embassy which the new communal council despatched to Hanover was so little capable of achieving unanimity regarding the wishes of the sovereign people that in the end it was compelled to present simultaneously to the government two memorials of very different tenour. To the great courts this long-enduring and utterly unchecked revolutionary movement seemed hardly conceivable, Metternich observing with horror that the plans of its originators were "utterly dangerous and abandoned." The Hanoverian government promptly notified the Bundestag that it would be unable to use troops to guard the western frontier of Germany, since the Hanoverian forces were required for domestic use.[1] The alarmed bailiffs of the various districts promised the "trusty inhabitants" of these that all grievances should be "most expeditiously" redressed. The duke of Cambridge, the governor general, issued one exhortation after another to the men of Göttingen, addressing to them the paternal enquiry: "Is it right to have recourse to disorder and illegality?" He did not pluck up courage until Dahlmann, who had come to Hanover accompanied by a few delegates from the senatus academicus, confidently assured him that the rebels were weary of their folly, and that a moderate military force would be competent without bloodshed to reestablish order.

And this is what actually took place. On the eighth morning after the rising had begun, when the troops (over 7,000 soldiers, more than half the Hanoverian army) at length arrived, the barricades had already been removed from the gates, and the academic and civic legions had likewise disappeared. Rauschenplatt and some of his colleagues fled to Strasburg, securing a great reception from the students in that city. But the ringleader's stay there was brief, for Metternich lodged a complaint with the French government.[2] Those among the principals who failed to escape were arrested, cited before a judicial commission at Celle, and then, with the cruelty characteristic of the old judicial methods, imprisoned for years pending a final decision. Frankenberg,

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, January 28 and 29, 1831.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, May 9, 1831.

a lawyer, whose sole crime had been the summoning of a vigilance committee in the neighbouring district of Bovenden, had to await sentence for six years. At length he was offered a choice between the decision of the court and acceptance of the king's clemency. To escape the miseries of further imprisonment the poor man petitioned for pardon, though unconscious of having committed any offence. Many of the students regarded the coming of the troops with much complacency, saying that they must certainly have done something worth doing to set so many soldiers in motion; but none the less they were all severely punished through the temporary closing of the university. The great days of the Georgia Augusta had passed away for ever; its ancient aristocratic renown was irrecoverable.

With good reason could Jacob Grimm speak of this "pitiful and odious rising," but the childish affair brought blessings to the country, for it opened the eyes of the governor general, and it unsealed the lips of the burghers. All at once it became plain to the good-natured duke how little he had understood the situation. Travelling through the kingdom, he listened in Münden to the bitter complaints of the rent-paying peasantry and heard the miners of Clausthal describe in touching verses how difficult life now was in the Harz mountains, where

> All with tears of bitter sorrow
> Dry and tasteless bread must eat.

From Lüneburg, "the hereditary appanage of Hanover," and from many another town, came petitions demanding with one voice "free popular representation." Gans, the radical lawyer of Celle, wrote: "As sure as there is a God in Heaven, so sure is it that to every state in Europe will come this glory of glories, this crown of all good things." In Hanover as in Saxony there was associated with the popular movement a party struggle within the government. The minister Count Bremer, Cabinet Councillor Rose, and the other active bourgeois councillors, had long wearied of being kept in leading strings by the German chancellery in London, and determined to make a direct appeal to the monarch; but even before their emissaries reached the English court, King William, influenced by the representations of the duke of

Cambridge, had decided upon the dismissal of Count Münster (February 12th). So long, indeed, as the foreign dominion persisted, it was impossible that the disastrous duplex regime should be entirely done away with. Münster was replaced by Ludwig von Ompteda, the man who during Napoleonic days had laboured faithfully and indefatigably for the liberation of Germany, an honest aristocrat of moderate views. Henceforward, however, the centre of gravity of the government was transferred to Hanover; the duke was given the status of viceroy, and was furnished with more extensive powers.

The creator of the Guelph throne was profoundly incensed at his overthrow, and made no attempt to conceal his indignation; the honours which the friendly monarch lavished on the minister to soften the bitterness of dismissal did not suffice to compensate Münster for Guelph ingratitude, however inevitable. He responded to Dr. König's invectives by the issue of a *Declaration* which served merely to furnish additional proof of his unbounded self-complacency. Absolutely no fault could be found with the system that had hitherto prevailed; and he could not even see that there had been any undue favouring of the nobility, "although it is true that at present our ministers happen to be men of noble birth." At the close of his writing he printed an ode dating from the time of the Vienna congress, wherein "a distinguished and admirable German poet" had acclaimed his merits, declaring:

> You have broken the might of Sultanism,
> Your words have been the talisman of liberty.

In profound dudgeon he withdrew to his beautiful estate of Derneburg, where a marble tablet over the gateway of the old monastery church announced to all comers that this domain had been bestowed upon Count Münster in recompense for his services to the fatherland. Gneisenau and his other old associates of the Napoleonic epoch remained on friendly terms with the proud man, who stood after all head and shoulders above the crowd of mediocrities acting as ministers in the minor German states. For the rest of his days Münster lived chiefly upon memories of former greatness, and (to the alarm of the Rhenish Confederate courts) permitted

Hormayr, the Bavarian, to glean from the Derneburg archives materials for the latter's *Memorials of the War of Liberation.*

After Münster's fall, the old rules were still faithfully observed; it still "happened" that the ministers were invariably nobles, whilst all the hard work was done by privy councillors of bourgeois origin. Two bourgeois officials whom the viceroy desired to nominate to ministerial posts declined the honour, considering so rash an innovation impracticable. During the next few years Cabinet Councillor Rose, an able and well-meaning man, held the real leadership, with tepid support from his noble superiors. In March the old diet was summoned once more, and for the first time in its history this assembly, hitherto held of little account, aroused some popular interest, for many of the towns dismissed their fainéant representatives and elected new deputies of liberal views. None the less, the conservative sentiment of the lower Saxons was still predominant. Stüve proposed and the diet agreed to the formulation of a new constitution, based upon existing rights, but aiming at certain new developments.

In accordance with this decision a draft constitution was elaborated by Rose, with the assistance of Dahlmann. This having been approved by the king, in November it was laid before a committee composed of representatives of the government and of the diet. The deliberations lasted three months, for among the commissaries appointed by the upper house was, in addition to General von der Decken, a man of ultra-conservative views, Baron Georg von Schele, Münster's nephew, who had for years been leader of the junker party, and who in his *Landesblätter* was still waging a fierce paper war against everything savouring of constitutionalism. Baron von Wallmoden, the indefatigable mediator, required to exercise all his winning and persuasive arts to induce these feudalists to come into line, to some extent at least, with Stüve and the other bourgeois representatives of the lower house. Not until May, 1882, did the diet reassemble, now rejuvenated, for in the interim the rent-paying peasantry had secured representation, while the townsmen had been granted a wider suffrage. Nearly two months later the drafting of the new constitution was brought to a successful conclusion. The proceedings showed, as in the case of the Göttingen rising, that a few small trickles from the floods of neofrench liberalism had found their way even into this tenaciously

particularist Low German area. How splendidly did the catchwords of Rotteck's and Welcker's law of reason resound from the mouth of the Lüneburg lawyer Christiani, a warm-hearted but pedantic fellow, who now displayed for the Norwegian constitution an enthusiasm no less ardent than that which he had previously shown for Goethe, introducing into parliamentary oratory the lyrical imagery characteristic of the ladies' almanacs of the day. His friend Heinrich Heine spoke of Christiani as "the Mirabeau of the Lüneburg heath," celebrating in song his hero's release from the chill and arid atmosphere of former days—an atmosphere emanating from the artificial environment of Weimar. As a matter of fact, the Lüneburg Mirabeau secured very few adherents, with the exception of Saalfeld, a loquacious Göttingen professor. The feudalist nobles were alone in benefiting by the formation of a closely-knit party. To the bourgeois representatives it still appeared to be a heretical doctrine when Rehberg, in the wisdom of his age and experience, wrote in *Constitutionalist Imaginings of an elderly Helmsman*, "We should not take fright at the detested word 'party'!" Christiani, despite the boldness of his theories, remained perfectly loyal to the house of Guelph, writing on one occasion of William, the burgher king: "His spirit, serene and gentle as a May day, but strong as the rocks of the mountains and free as the ocean that surrounds his fatherland (the ocean on which he sailed in boyhood), can endure all things—except the oppression of his subjects." Notwithstanding its docility, to the conservative majority this liberal opposition appeared extremely dangerous; and when, in an ebullition of sentiment, the liberals went so far as to demand clemency for the Göttingen rebels, "the martyrs of freedom," Dahlmann angrily interposed with the words: "Insurrection against everything that men esteem, disregard for all oaths of loyalty—these are no deeds worthy of admiration. There is no such thing as liberalism of unconditional value, liberalism utterly unscrupulous as to means. Everyone proclaims the goodness of his intentions, and it is therefore necessary to judge men by the means they employ." He used the whole strength of his vigorous oratory, an oratory which sprang from the depths of the soul, to proclaim his adhesion to the old-fashioned belief that politics could not be divorced from ethics. "Did I find myself deceived in this I would no longer concern myself about politics for a single

hour." He had not a doubt that the maintenance of the existing order must be given the preference over reform, seeing that order is an indispensable precondition of reform.

Stüve acted as pointer on the scales, Stüve, whose knowledge of affairs and practical understanding, in conjunction with a disposition which, though masterful, could be conciliatory in case of need, enabled him again and again to direct the proceedings towards proximate and attainable goals. Rehberg spoke of him as "the soul of the reform movement and, now that I am myself past work, the hope of my old age." Wallmoden became his trusty henchman, smoothing matters over whenever the stiff little Osnabrücker had given umbrage by the sharpness of his tongue. In a writing *On the Present Situation in Hanover*, Stüve had recently afforded additional proof of the accuracy with which he estimated the power of Hanoverian inertia. To him it seemed that a constitution was of value only "when its principles are vivified by the administration." He spoke contemptuously of the South German liberals as "pothouse politicians," persons whose only ideas were abuse of Russia, glorification of the Poles, and clamours for the freedom of the press.[1] He often declared that the new fundamental law must not be drafted in accordance with theoretical or doctrinaire principles, but must do away with the grievances of everyday life; and among the chief of such grievances he reckoned those that ensued from the old system of separate treasuries. The government was acting in response to a widespread desire when it recommended to the diet that the royal domain treasury should be amalgamated with the general tax treasury of the estates, but that the king should retain the revenues from a certain number of the domains, to be chosen by himself, in order to meet court expenses.

Thus was unity restored to the finances. The budgetary committee of the estates, which had hitherto controlled taxation, and, amid unending disputes, had always endeavoured to burden the royal treasury with at least half the state expenditure, was now abolished. The amalgamation of the treasuries brought nothing but good to the crown, for the king was relieved from unworthy disputes with the financial councillors, while the income at his free disposal was more

[1] I avail myself here, among other sources, of an unpublished biography of Stüve by that statesman's nephew, Stüve, Governor in Osnabrück.

than doubled. Nevertheless, William was loath to approve this essential reform, for he had little knowledge of German conditions, and judged them by English standards. In England, although this was the country where the idea and the name of the civil list first came into existence, the crown had always defrayed from the civil list part of the administrative expenses of the state. Only after arduous struggles, and very recently (1831), had the Grey cabinet been able to establish a sharp distinction between court expenditure and state expenditure. The tories were still grumbling at the innovation, complaining that a monarch whose court expenses were prescribed in definite figures was a "stipendiary," an "insulated king," and no longer possessed the right of granting favours. The consequence was that the good-natured king was disagreeably surprised when he found that his unpretentious German subjects were following the same course as the whig reformers. In the end he gave way, and approved the amalgamation of the treasuries. All at once the curtain was drawn aside, the curtain that had hitherto concealed the mysteries of this financial system. The diet could now supervise the entire state expenditure, and could gain a clear idea about all the "pensioned ensigns with first-lieutenant characteristics," concerning all the privy councillors' orphans and state beneficiaries, who had been fed at the hospitable manger of the old feudal oligarchy.

After this decisive success the estates were extremely moderate in their demands. The government was well aware that in every well-ordered state most items of expenditure are prescribed by law as far as principle is concerned, and in many cases in respect of the amount as well, so that these items cannot, properly speaking, be approved by the chambers, which are merely competent to audit the accounts. The government therefore proposed that salaries and other regular expenditure in the respective branches of the administration should be prescribed once for all in a uniform code of regulations, so that one and a half million thalers only, or, if the matter were more strictly considered, no more than two hundred thousand thalers, were left annually for the free approval of the diet. In the simple conditions prevailing in a petty state the suggestion was practical enough. It did not deprive the estates of their privileges, but merely gave formal expression to what was already legally done. It was, however, absolutely incompatible with the dominant constitutionalist doctrine, which

bluntly assigned to the diets the competence, whenever the budget was voted, to refuse the payment of interest to the creditors of the state, and to refuse the payment of salaries to its officials. The dispute, therefore, became extremely acrimonious, and Rumann, president of the chamber, was bitterly reproached by the liberal press because, in the end, by his presidential casting-vote, he decided the issue in favour of the government. Precise limits were likewise imposed upon the legislative rights of the estates. They were empowered, it is true, to decide concerning the essential contents of new laws, and were also entitled to initiate new legislative proposals at will; but the government reserved the right "to elaborate" the fruit of their decisions—for Stüve and his friends, men of wide practical experience, knew how readily legislative details are confused and distorted by the incalculable play of parliamentary votes. Publicity of debate was left to the discretion of the diet, and was not ordered by law. The upper house made no use of this privilege, and in the published protocols the speakers' names were omitted. By the doctrines of German liberalism, salaries were regarded as a natural privilege of popular representatives. The king, however, cherished in this matter the good old English view, and the deputies in the lower house were in the end satisfied to accept the salaries allotted to them by a provisional regulation but not specified in the constitution.

Agreement regarding the composition of the two chambers was less easy to secure. It was the wish of the crown that only the most highly placed landowners, the holders of entailed estates, should be summoned to the upper house, the rest of the Ritterschaft being, as in Saxony, assigned to the lower house. If, in addition, as Dahlmann proposed, the crown were to be empowered to nominate one-third of the members of the upper chamber at its absolute discretion, it might be hoped that the two houses would work together in tolerable harmony. Wallmoden hailed the suggestion with delight, for he desired promotion to the upper house, to resist there as a leader of the peasantry the imperiousness of his own order. But to Schele and to the great majority of the nobles it seemed humiliating that members of the Ritterschaft should be asked to sit in the same house with burghers and peasants. Unfortunately Stüve played into the hands of the arrogant junkers when, hoping to weaken the power of

the nobles, he hit upon the sapient design of making them all sit in a single chamber. The upshot of this preposterous arrangement was that the irreconcilable antagonism between the two chambers, which had so long paralysed the diet, now persisted under the new regime. As before, the upper house represented the nobles exclusively, for whenever a solitary bourgeois landowner made his way into that body, he was speedily forced to withdraw; and its attitude towards the lower house, which consisted henceforward of ten prelates, thirty-seven representatives from the towns, and thirty-eight from the peasantry, became increasingly disdainful.

The privileges of the Ritterschaft were touched with a very cautious hand. Only for some future date did the fundamental law promise to restrict privileged jurisdiction and to amalgamate private landed estates with the rural communes. But Stüve now purposed to carry out his long cherished and carefully prepared design, the abolition of the burdens, tithes, and other exactions, pressing upon the peasantry, in order to secure the practical exemplification of the ancient Lower Saxon principle "free man, free land." The nobility resisted to the uttermost, and for years Stüve was engaged in a personal struggle with the leader of the junkers to secure the enforcement of the new ordinance of emancipation. Since his small landed property near Osnabrück was close to Schelenburg, the peasants on Schele's estate were continually coming over to take counsel with the peasants' friend, so that the conservative reformer acquired a reputation as demagogic conspirator. When the first excitement had passed the landowners were compelled to admit that the emancipation had brought them nothing but advantage, while the peasants were at length enabled to make an independent use of the newly acquired suffrage. Stüve was the only man to value such practical freedom, for the majority of the diet, obsessed by the dogmas of the constitutionalist law of reason, looked coldly upon this reform. The estates frankly admitted that nothing must be done to facilitate the frequent recurrence of great state trials; they therefore demanded the right of impeaching ministers only in case of the deliberate infringement of the constitution, and were satisfied, where minor disputes were concerned, with the right of making a statement of grievances to the king.

Thus was established the fundamental law, unquestionably the most modest among the constitutions of North Germany,

but despite all its defects the respectable product of experienced insight and cautious moderation. Dahlmann contentedly opined that herewith a path was entered which would lead to the general advantage of Germany. It seemed for a time as if among these cautious Low German reformers there was about to arise a new school of moderate liberalism of precisely the character that the nation required, honestly constitutionalist, without being hostile to traditional rights, a school which, following Stein's example, would endeavour to develop the future out of the past. With the support of Rose, Stüve, Dahlmann, and the excellent pedagogue Kohlrausch, Pertz, learned editor of the *Monumenta Germaniæ*, issued the *Hannoversche Zeitung*, the first notable political journal of the little kingdom. Rigidly nationalist in its views, this paper was equally hostile to the abstract theories of the liberalism then in fashion and to the enthusiasm for Poland and for France which was the most characteristic of liberal manifestations, and consequently it was stigmatised by the South German press as an organ of clericalist reaction. Its motto ran as follows: "Loyalty is the fundamental trait of German character, and loyalty is liberty." After a brief and promising career, the newspaper unfortunately succumbed to the exhaustion which visited the entire country. It had never secured many collaborators from among persons engaged in practical life, while the professors who took up politics, men whose effort on these lines is rarely persistent, gradually withdrew their aid.

No fortunate star shone upon the new constitution. After an agreement had been laboriously secured, another six months were spent in distressing uncertainty, during which rumours continued to pass current to the affect that Schele and the Austrian envoy in London were doing everything they could to strand the vessel just outside port. At length, on September 26, 1833, the king signed the fundamental law, after modifying in a biassed direction about fourteen unimportant paragraphs of the concerted draft. True, upon Stüve's proposal the new diet hastened to endorse the alterations, but it remained a momentous error that this state, which since the war had plunged from one position of dubious legality to another, should now for a third time secure a constitution whose validity was at least contestable upon specious grounds. Not here as in neighbouring territories was the conclusion of the work of constitution-building hailed with noisy acclamation. Zealous

liberals were by no means satisfied by this moderate reform, whilst the mass of the nation, after the excitement of the year of revolution, had long since relapsed into the old indifference. Electoral Hesse and Saxony joined the customs union shortly after their political reconstitution, and in an easily understood self-deception, people imagined that for the vigorous expansion of economic life that ensued they were indebted to the constitution rather than to free access to the German market. In Hanover, on the other hand, the commercial inferences which were irrefutably deducible from the amalgamation of the treasuries and from the reform of taxation, were not drawn. The country persisted in its adhesion to the suicidal English commercial policy, and there was no change in the sleepy course of affairs. The consequence was that the populace noted little of the blessings of the new order. It was only the burghers of Hildesheim who gave a triumphal reception to their popular deputy Lüntzel; while Stüve, just like his detested opposite Rotteck, had in his native town to accept with gratitude a silver goblet as a reward for liberal virtue. The rest of the country remained cold. Able men like Privy Councillor Hoppenstedt and many others among the officials displayed from the first no enthusiasm for the fundamental law, since they lacked confidence in the future. They knew that the nobles were far from abandoning their refractory attitude, and that hostility was still dominant in the seven provincial diets, which were to continue to sit with reduced powers. During the discussions upon the constitution, several of these diets had claimed the right to cooperate, and when the constitution had come into existence the committee of the Calenberg-Grubenhagen estates quietly maintained its traditional rights. What would happen when the crown passed into new hands (an event presumably not far distant), should this nobles' opposition secure the monarch's personal support? Alarming rumours were rife regarding the heir presumptive, the duke of Cumberland. It was reported that he had entered into an alliance with Schele, and that he disapproved of the new order. None, however, but a few initiates were aware of the unworthy intrigues that were being secretly carried on within the house of Guelph.

Ernest Augustus of Cumberland regarded German affairs with the superciliousness of the obstinate high tory. He did not think it worth while to acquaint himself with the

constitutional law of the country he was one day to rule, and was content with the vague idea that the agnates in Hanover possessed some sort of co-regency right, at least as far as extraordinary emergencies were concerned. On several occasions he made use of this arrogated right, but never openly, never without the subterfuges characteristic of his temperament, a strange mingling of bluntness and furtiveness. From Lord Eldon and his other tory friends he had learned to consider it the climax of political wisdom to resist all changes in the existing order of affairs, and he therefore desired to maintain the old provincial diets. In the year 1814, when the general assembly of the estates had been summoned, he addressed a memorial to the prince regent in opposition to this step, but kept the matter quite secret, so that even his brother Clarence, subsequently King William IV, heard no word of it. He also remonstrated with the prince regent on the question of the second constitutional alteration in the year 1819, on this occasion by word of mouth only, and again secretly.[1] Both protests passed unnoticed. Moreover, the fact was tacitly ignored that the duke avoided all official intercourse with the general diet, and that in the year 1822, when the assembly of the estates wished to pay its respects to him, he roundly answered that he could only receive individual members of the body as private persons.

When the draft of the fundamental law was under discussion, the conscientious king considered it necessary to ask the opinion of the heir presumptive, although he had little confidence in the duke, and had therefore, when appointing a viceroy, given the preference to his younger brother Cambridge. As early as October, 1831, the design for the constitution was communicated to Cumberland through the instrumentality of Ompteda and Privy Councillor Falcke. The draft already contained the proposal to amalgamate the treasuries, and the king was agreeably surprised when the duke expressed his gratitude in an extremely affable letter. Writing on October 31st, Ernest Augustus said: "I cannot sufficiently declare my perfect satisfaction in all and every point." He extolled the king for his nobility and disinterestedness, saying that his brother had proved to him "that your sole object is to place the finances of the country of Hanover on such a footing that your successor may not have difficulties." He raised only three

[1] See Appendix XXIII.

objections. In the first place, he protested against the publicity of the proceedings of the diet, saying that even King Louis of Bavaria considered the practice dangerous. Next he raised an objection against the daily allowances to the deputies, but went on in his rough phraseology to say that in this respect it might be expedient to give way: "then at least the expense must fall upon the country and not on the sovereign"; and the concession must be made "with such restrictions that the states cannot protract the business in order to be paid longer." His third criticism related to the arrangement in accordance with which soldiers on furlough were to be subject to civil, not military, authority—a matter to which the draft made no direct allusion. The previous day he had written in precisely the same sense to the duke of Cambridge, declaring in the most cordial terms: "I must say that it does both the king and the government the highest honour, the manner in which they have drawn up their proposals"; and referring once more to the king, in the concluding sentence he wrote: "Both his head and his heart have shone on this occasion." [1]

The good king was delighted. He, too, was by no means liberal in sentiment, but merely allowed himself to be driven along by the current of the day. In a friendly letter to Cumberland he declared that in this matter he had especially had in mind the interests of his successors, "of yourself and your promising son. It appeared to me of the utmost importance to the welfare and prosperity of the country . . . . and to your own comfort and tranquillity that you should be fully informed of what has been proposed to me." The king considered that the duke's objections to publicity of debate and to the daily allowances were well grounded. He promised that they should be taken into consideration by the government to such an extent as circumstances might render possible.[2] He fulfilled his pledge. Solely in order to meet the wishes of the heir presumptive, the provisions regarding publicity of debate (which had so often been promised to the diet) were modified so that publicity became permissive instead of obligatory. For the like reason the concession of daily allowancce was eliminated from the constitution and was incorporated in a provisional regulation. It was really impossible that consideration for objections quite devoid of foundation in law should be pushed

[1] Cumberland to Cambridge, October 30; to King William, October 31, 1831.
[2] King William to Cumberland, November 3, 1831.

any further It seemed all the less improbable that the government need expect any further difficulties to be raised by Ernest Augustus, seeing that the only article of the fundamental law to which the assent of the agnates was perhaps requisite, the one concerning the amalgamation of the treasuries, was extremely advantageous to the royal house, and had been accepted by the heir presumptive with the warmest gratitude.

Meanwhile, however, Schele began his subterranean labours. To the duke he described the fundamental law as the work of reckless demagogues, and he knew how to play adroitly upon the tory prince's prejudices against the civil list, contending that in Hanover the amalgamation of the treasuries (which had long before been effected in nearly all the larger federal states) would destroy "the monarchical principle"! From the reports of Münchhausen, envoy in Berlin, the king speedily learned that his brother was expressing opinions extremely unfavourable to the new constitution. When, in October, 1833, the ministers communicated the newly promulgated fundamental law to the heir presumptive, and asked him whether he would take his seat in the upper house, the duke's answer was curt and uncivil (October 29th). He declared that to his brother George IV of blessed memory he had protested against the introduction of the states general, on the ground that the assent of the agnates to that measure had not been secured. He concluded by saying bluntly: "I have not been duly informed regarding all the other and subsequent preliminaries, and therefore I cannot consider myself bound by the new law." [1] The aim of this underhand letter was manifest enough. The Guelph lacked courage to enter a straightforward protest, but he desired to keep his hands free in the event of his accession to the throne. Unless the government were willing to endanger the whole future of the fundamental law, it was essential, after such a proof of Guelph duplicity, to demand from the heir presumptive an unambiguous declaration, to insist that he should make an open protest or give an open assent. But how could such men as Stralenheim, Alten, Schulte, and von der Wisch, make up their minds to a course that would have given so much umbrage, to a course that would have conflicted so utterly with the respectable precedents of Old Hanoverian political life? In the first instance the ministers reported to the king,

[1] Cumberland to the Hanoverian Ministry, October 29, 1833.

and the good-natured ruler desired them to write to his brother in a spirit of compromise. He hardly expected a favourable result, but after all, he said, the duke's dissent would harm himself alone, not the country—an obvious allusion to Cumberland's debts.[1]

The ministers now resolved to reply to the heir presumptive, for although they did not regard his letter to them in respect either of form or content as a real protest against the fundamental law, still "we are unable," they declared, "to free ourselves from concern lest, sooner or later, this document may not be interpreted as having had a different intention." They therefore wrote to the duke, under date December 11th, saying that they had found no trace of his earlier protests; that the assent of the agnates, though desirable, was not essential, and that such assent had not been asked or given in the year 1801 when the territorial union of Calenberg and Grubenhagen had been effected. They indicated to him that the fundamental law aimed at strengthening the royal authority, and reminded him of the sedulous consideration that had been paid to his objections to daily allowances and to publicity.[2] This dull-witted rejoinder appeased their own consciences, and yet the ministers must have known that in the interim (November 29th) Cumberland had written to his brother Cambridge in still plainer terms, saying that he would never give his sanction to certain articles of the fundamental law, and specifying in particular the amalgamation of the treasuries.

When the duke visited London early next year, Privy Councillor Lichtenberg had three official interviews with him concerning the fundamental law, and in these the falsity of the Guelph was plainly displayed. He now attached but little importance to his two earlier objections. If at the outset he had demurred to two points only, "it must not be inferred from this that I gave my approval to all the rest." The duke ventured to speak in this way, although two years earlier, both to his brother Cambridge and to the king, he had expressly declared his perfect satisfaction in all and every point. The amalgamation of the treasuries, which he had formerly approved, now seemed the most undesirable of all, and he vowed that he never would and never could agree to any such innovation.

[1] Report of the Hanoverian Ministry to Ompteda in London, November 13; Report of Privy Councillor Lichtenberg to the Ministry, London, December 3, 1833.

[2] Despatch from the Ministry to Cumberland, December 11; the Ministry's reply to Lichtenberg, December 13, 1833.

All these subterfuges were punctuated by honest-seeming assurances to the effect that he was one who never failed to speak his mind freely, one who thought always of the public welfare, never of himself! Even the respectful Lichtenberg, in closing his first report, could say no more than that the impression made upon his royal highness by this interview "seemed not entirely unfavourable.[1] After all that had happened it was impossible that the ministers should doubt that the heir presumptive desired to subvert the constitution, and that in his arrogance he imagined it was merely necessary for him to refuse his recognition to existing rights in order to destroy these rights. Yet they did nothing to avert the imminent danger. They were well aware that the principles of constitutional law were quite without influence upon the hard egoism of the Guelph. Nevertheless they flattered themselves with the hope that the duke, persecuted as he was by his creditors, would never dare to risk a coup d'état. Should the worst come to the worst, they counted on the protection of the Bundestag for the new constitution, which was now indubitably one of "recognized efficiency."

The duke displayed no less subterfuge during the deliberations on the domestic law which was to form a supplement to the constitution. In this case also he had to all appearance given a preliminary but non-committal assent, really deferring the definite expression of his views. In April, 1834, Dahlmann, who was elaborating the draft of the domestic law, received from Minister Stralenheim an official communication to the effect that the assent of the royal princes of full age had been secured, and it is hardly possible that this ministerial assurance can have been devoid of all foundation. But in December, 1835, Ernest Augustus wrote to Privy Councillor Falcke saying that as a man of honour he could not at present attach his signature to the domestic law, seeing that it was so closely connected with the fundamental law. Yet even now he did not venture to make a candid legal protest, but, trusting to the future, merely said: "I must have much more aid and advice before I can allow myself to take so serious a step as you propose me doing." Nevertheless, on November 19, 1836, with the assent of the diet, the domestic law was promulgated as binding on everyone, including the royal princes. Cumberland, however, showed with increasing

[1] Lichtenberg's Reports to the Ministry, February 28, March 27, 1834.

arrogance that the new constitution was not made for him. In the *Berliner Politische Wochenblatt*, run by his henchmen, the fundamental law was opposed as a piece of jacobin folly. The duke never took his seat in the upper house; and, being in Hanover on one occasion at the opening of the diet, he left the town at the very moment when the estates were assembling, going to Derneburg to visit the discontented Münster.

The more plainly the dishonourable arrières pensées of the heir presumptive were disclosed, the more desirable did it seem to request the Bundestag to guarantee the fundamental law, and unquestionably this guarantee would have been more readily accorded to the conservative constitution of Hanover than to the radical constitution of Electoral Hesse. But the government did not even venture to make the attempt. Rose felt that his activities were hampered in every direction by the tacit opposition of his untrustworthy rival Privy Councillor Falcke. Although the new ordering of the finances proved most successful, and although notable surpluses were soon secured, the laws that had been promised for the carrying out of the constitution were forthcoming here far less rapidly than in Saxony. In particular, the government did not venture to attack the exemptions of the nobility. Moreover, the diet lacked energy and go. Eight-ninths of the upper house and five-eighths of the lower house were composed of salaried officials. Just as of old, noble officials sat in the former and bourgeois officials in the latter. The only difference was, now that the country paid daily allowances, that the privy councillors of the capital were somewhat more sparingly represented, whereas provincial officials were more strongly represented than ever. The liberal press had good ground for its complaints that in Hanover the pressure of the mass of officials was as heavy as was in Spain the pressure of the army of monks. Not until 1837 did the crown submit to the diet a number of important legislative proposals, but hardly had their discussion been begun when King William died and a new period of struggle ensued for the Guelph land.

§ 5. LORNSEN AND THE PROVINCIAL DIETS OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

In Hanover the constitutionalist movement indirectly shattered the foreign dominion, for henceforward the seat of government was transferred to the country itself. Still

more plainly did it appear in Schleswig-Holstein how closely linked were the liberal and nationalist ideas of the day. After their unfortunate campaign at the Bundestag, the Ritterschaft of the duchies had remained quiescent; Dahlmann, their pugnacious leader, had left Kiel; and it was long since a word had been heard about the proceedings of the Copenhagen committee which was to prepare a new constitution for Holstein. In the upper circles of society, however, Dahlmann's influence had reawakened affection for the ancient rights of Transalbingia, whilst among the narrower circle of his intimates it had aroused a clear consciousness of German nationality; for in his struggle for territorial rights he had ever been guided by the aim of restricting the disastrous effects of foreign rule upon German soil, contending that "the German subjects of Denmark" must remain German, and must fight only against Germany's enemies, saying, "that is their character, their inevitable destiny." After Dahlmann's departure, his loyal associate Nikolaus Falck had become the acknowledged leader of the country. It was from Falck's historical lectures, from his writings on constitutional law, and from the numerous essays he published in his *Staatsbürgerliches Magazin*, that the members of the younger generation of officials acquired a knowledge of the glorious but half-forgotten territorial history. When the July revolution occurred, there was manifested a widespread desire for a constitution which should reinvigorate and develop historical privileges. The government in Copenhagen was extremely timorous, for it had a tender conscience. It knew how grossly the rights of the northern mark of Germany had been infringed, and why the Danes extolled their sixth Frederick as the first Danish king; it was seriously afraid lest a counterpart of de Potter should appear in Schleswig-Holstein, and lest the Belgian rising should be paralleled on the Eider. The situation was by no means so threatening. No one in the duchies had as yet any thought of secession. Even the desire for legislative reform was held in check by profound veneration for "the noblest, best, kindliest of kings, the ardently loved father of his country," who had been so good as to go on living all these years. The modest wishes of the cultured classes would hardly have borne fruit had not a man of spirit taken advantage of the fears of the crown to put forward demands at the right moment and in a loud voice.

Uwe Jens Lornsen, after an eventful career as a student, had spent his recent years at the Schleswig-Holstein chancellery in Copenhagen, and in his employment there (so utterly enstranged was this authority from its home) had learned nothing either of the history or of the ancient constitutional rights of Schleswig-Holstein. But the old Burschenschafter had not forgotten his ardent enthusiasm for the German fatherland. He was revolted to the depths of his being when Danish officials uttered in his hearing the old jibe that the Schleswig-Holsteiners ought to be thoroughly pleased to be something, namely, Danes, rather than to be nothing, namely, Germans. In his official activities he became intimately acquainted with the red-tape methods and the stupid injustices of a government working from far aloof. Moreover, he was powerfully influenced by the constitutionalist ideas of the day, considering that in Europe the time was ripe for the dominion of the bourgeoisie. Alluringly near to the Copenhagen official was the plain example of the union of Sweden and Norway; and Christian, the Crown prince of Denmark, had bestowed upon the Norwegians their renowned peasant constitution. Lornsen often expounded his sentiments to his German colleagues. All listened admiringly as he delivered himself, a tall Norse warrior with a bush of fair hair and deep blue eyes, developing his ideas with irresistible eloquence, in phrases at once ardent and dignified. Unfortunately in this man of high attainments there already lurked the germs of disease. He believed himself to be affected by an incurable malady, which was half real and half fancied, and this illusion paralysed his courage at the decisive hour. He was proud to feel that he excelled most men in qualities which his fellow Frisians prize as the highest of masculine virtues, *rum Hart, klar Kimming*—broad sympathies and comprehensive outlook. It was his hope that one day he would work in the political field on behalf of Germany.

When he returned to the duchies in the autumn of 1830, to fill the office of bailiff in his native island of Sylt, he immediately recognised that the moment had now arrived for petitions and meetings which should induce the alarmed king-duke to grant a constitution. In Kiel and Flensburg he came to an understanding with men of note among the bourgeoisie, what time Georg Hanssen, the talented young political economist, was winning adherents among the peasantry

in eastern Holstein. To give the movement a definite aim, Lornsen then wrote a pamphlet of eleven pages *Concerning the Establishment of a Constitution in Schleswig-Holstein.* In this writing he referred to the faults of the administration and to the secret management of the finances, and bluntly demanded a joint diet for the two duchies, seeing that the federal act promised estates to the Holsteiners and that a separation of the duchies was "simply unthinkable" to every Schleswig-Holsteiner. To the nobility he would concede no more than one-fourth of the representation, saying that "henceforward the opinion of the great middle class, in which is vested physical and intellectual power, will alone rule the world, and everything that comes into conflict with the opinion of this class will prove to be fruitless opposition." He further demanded that all branches of the administration should be transferred to the German territories, that there should be a supreme court of jurisdiction for Schleswig-Holstein, that there should be a governmental assembly in each of the duchies, and supreme over both a council of state constructed after the Norwegian model. These changes would involve independence from Denmark as far as internal affairs were concerned. "All that we shall have in common will be the king and our enemies." In conclusion, Lornsen exhorted his fellow countrymen to think upon the uncertainties of the future and not to trust blindly in the person of the present king, "whom we should like to live for ever. Our king has not been made, but was born, a bourgeois king."

The bold undertaking collapsed almost as soon as it had been begun. The Ritterschaft opposed it, for the members of that order dreaded the bourgeois and liberal tendencies of the movement, assuring the king in an emergency address that while the needs of the time must certainly be given due weight, haste must be carefully avoided. In still more vigorous terms did the ultra-conservative duke of Augustenburg and his brother Prince Frederick von Noer fulminate against the dangerous demagogue. Even the bourgeois and the peasants took fright as soon as the Kiel town council had passed a pusillanimous resolution to the effect that the time was not ripe for a petition to the king. Not a single petition was despatched to Copenhagen. Lornsen, a commander without an army, was arrested in November, and being in bad health was lacking in energy. He did not venture to

demand a public trial or the subsequent publication of the report of his trial. Without protest he accepted the sentence of confinement to a fortress, seeing that incontestably he had infringed his official duty.

Nevertheless, Lornsen's pamphlet had a potent influence, As the Danish officials complained, it was like a firebrand thrown into the duchies, diffusing the idea of an independent and inseparable Schleswig-Holstein through wide circles of the middle class, which had hitherto looked on indifferently at the struggle of the nobility on behalf of the ancient territorial rights. Within a few months thirty pamphlets, pro and con, had been published. Many of them did no more than voice philistine complaints regarding the Bacchanalian confusion of innovating days, concerning the tactless insult to the beloved king, giving a comfortable assurance that if everyone would mind his own business all would be well. Wit von Dörring, the betrayer of the Burschenschaft, actually had the impudence to warn his fellow Holsteiners against that "Germany, which never has existed, exists nowhere to-day, and never will exist." Binzer, however, Lornsen's tuneful friend of Jena days, and Michelsen, the young historian, fiercely attacked Schmidt-Phiseldeck the Dane, and bluntly declared that Schleswig-Holstein demanded, not absolute independence like Belgium, but an independent position under the Danish royal house, like that of Hanover vis-à-vis England or Finland vis-à-vis Russia. The aging king, who in his alarm had already conferred upon the viceroy of the duchies extraordinary powers for the suppression of disorder, at length recognized that it was necessary to give way. In a law promulgated on May 28, 1831, he announced his intention of introducing into each of the two duchies, and also into Jutland and into Zealand, a deliberative provincial diet after the Prussian model. This was as far as he would go. Already he had, through the instrumentality of the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg, earnestly warned his neighbour of Oldenburg against the dangers of a purely representative system.[1]

The first breach had, however, been made in the unlimited autocratic hereditary power of the Danish kingship, and the unhappy Lornsen, who now looked down from the ramparts of the isolated fortress of Friedrichsort upon the waters of the Kiel inlet, could console himself by saying that for Danes

[1] Schöler's Report, St. Petersburg, March 30, 1831.

and Holsteiners alike he had been a pioneer in the introduction of a freer form of political life. Since the new law seemed to threaten the inseparability of Schleswig-Holstein, on July 7th the Ritterschaft entered a formal protest, declaring to the king that ancient territorial rights could not be affected by these purely administrative measures. The crown was not chary of conciliatory assurances, and in the following year the government summoned men of experience from the duchies to Copenhagen, in order to deliberate with them concerning the essentials of the provincial constitutions. Supported by Niebuhr's friend, Count Adam Moltke, the ardent romanticist, Falck again attempted on this occasion to secure a common diet for Schleswig-Holstein. The endeavour was unsuccessful, and at length on May 15, 1834, the establishment of the two provincial diets for the duchies was decreed.

In both these diets the Ritterschaft and the great landed proprietors were assigned only about one-third of the votes, for a third of the deputies were to be directly elected by the urban landowners and another third by the rural landowners. This bold innovation aroused general surprise, for in almost all other German states a system of indirect election prevailed, and even the liberals still universally cherished the prejudice that thus alone could public tranquillity be ensured. Still greater was the amazement when the king did not merely recognise in express terms the old *nexus socialis* of the Schleswig-Holstein Ritterschaft, and in addition all the other relationships connecting the two duchies, but actually introduced new joint institutions of first-class importance, namely, a supreme court of appeal which was to sit in Kiel, and a joint provincial government which was to be established at the castle of Gottorp and was to adopt the Schleswig-Holstein coat-of-arms. At the very moment when the diets of the duchies were being separated, their unity in point of law and administration was established more firmly than ever, consolidated more intimately than even Lornsen had ventured to demand. Manifestly King Frederick did not fully understand what he was doing. He had an obscure feeling that he owed some amenities to his German territories, and completely overlooked the inevitable upshot of the concession.

In Schleswig-Holstein, even Falck and the Ritterschaft promptly decided to disregard their legal objections and to accept the royal gift. The establishment of the provincial

diets would not really affect the inseparability of the territories, seeing that Jutland and the islands were also to have diets of their own. Since the diets of the two duchies were based upon identical principles, and since the same laws were as a rule to be laid before both bodies, they seemed almost like two curiæ of a single assembly of estates, and it would perhaps ultimately prove possible to effect their formal amalgamation. This was the spirit of a writing entitled *For Holstein, not against Denmark*, composed by Franz Hegewisch, an able medical man of Kiel, greatly respected both by the nobility and by the bourgeoisie. Like all patriots of the northern mark he still regarded the union with Denmark as a good thing, and naively imagined that this valuable union would best be secured if the duchies were to remain in mutual association, and Schleswig were thus to constitute a link between the German federal territory of Holstein and the Danish provinces. In reality nothing but a straightforward policy, one which should faithfully respect the ancient rights of the German territory, so faithful to the royal house, could perhaps still have sufficed to avert the decomposition of the united state of Denmark.

The Danes, however, had already begun to adopt other courses. Their sense of national egoism had been greatly increased by the king's concessions, although they owed these solely to the German, Lornsen, and they celebrated the birthday of their new constitution as a national festival. Nor was this altogether unreasonable. A new epoch of Danish history had opened, and Gustavus IV, the ex-king of Sweden, knew well what he was about when, as possible heir to the Danish crown, he entered a formal protest against the limitation that had been effected in the absolute authority of the monarch. The capital resounded with political struggles, and among the youth of Copenhagen, ever impressionable, there was already being founded a new party which placed the national idea superior to all other considerations. These "Eider Danes," as they were subsequently named, condemned the establishment of the new Schleswig-Holstein provincial government as a grievous error, and demanded the complete separation of the two duchies. In case of need they were willing to renounce German Holstein, which could never become truly Danish, but Schleswig must be unconditionally incorporated into the unified state of Denmark, and even upon the southern half of this

duchy, a purely German area, the Scandinavian civilisation must be forcibly imposed. The new catchword "Denmark as far as the Eider" was as yet voiced solely by a few youthful enthusiasts; but the number of their adherents was steadily growing, and should the Eider Danes ever become supreme it was inevitable that the three political energies which continued at work half unconsciously among the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein would be simultaneously aroused and would be forced into an attitude of irreconcilable opposition—the three energies inspired by the sentiment of traditional rights, by the ardour for liberty, and by Germanic national pride.

Once again it was Lornsen who was the first in the northern mark to recognise the signs of the new time. During his captivity he had incessantly been delving into the history of the duchies, and to his atonishment and delight had ascertained that almost everything which on political grounds he had been led to demand for his homeland had of old been incorporated in the territorial charters. "The Schleswig-Holsteiners," he now declared, "wish for nothing which they have not likewise a right to demand." Full of his new discovery he was at work upon a book dealing with *The United Constitution of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein*, in which he aimed at demonstrating to his fellow countrymen how they might construct the new state of Schleswig-Holstein upon the foundation of the old law. He censured Falck's rigidly conservative outlook with much severity, and with some injustice, such as is characteristic of the advocates of new ideas, those destined to bear rich fruit in the future. His aim had now developed, since he wished for a purely personal union with Denmark, on the part of a transalbingian state independent also in military and financial matters. He warned the Holsteiners against the easy-going illusion which led them to imagine that fraternisation with the Schleswigers would strengthen united Denmark and prove serviceable to the crown. Unsparingly he exposed to them the hidden thoughts of the Danes, who plainly intended to swallow Schleswig, to break the link between the duchies. No less keenly did he deal with the question of the succession, showing that as far as Schleswig-Holstein was concerned the right to the throne was vested solely in the male line, whereas in Denmark, since the promulgation of the King's Law, it was vested also in the female line, and consequently, since there were but two direct

male heirs, a separation of the two states might readily ensue. The writing was somewhat shapeless, and displayed manifold defects due to overhasty investigation, but showed throughout the fine fervour of a born publicist, of one who could firmly grasp essentials amid a mass of details, and one who could irresistibly compel the reader to draw a conclusion. It was not published in the author's lifetime, but Georg Beseler gave it to the world in 1841, and as a precious heritage it exercised a powerful influence upon the national struggles of the forties. Lornsen wrote it in a period of intolerable suffering, under the fiery sun of Brazil, where, at the close of his imprisonment, he vainly sought a cure for his malady, and where the poor fellow could no longer find help in the self-sacrificing devotion of his faithful friend Hegewisch. After his return to Europe he sought a voluntary death by drowning in the lake of Geneva (1838), and thus passed away the noblest among the long series of those who fought and suffered in the days antecedent to the achievement of German unity.

Considerable time elapsed before the Schleswig-Holsteiners recognised as clearly as did Lornsen the hostile designs of the Danes. How was it possible that in this nonchalant particularist life they could quickly acquire an understanding of questions of national power? Even Hegewisch, though much more far-sighted than his fellow Holsteiners, was still of the comfortable opinion that the duchies had no need of a navy, saying, "The ships of Hamburg sail on all seas although Hamburg has no armed forces under sail." When the establishment of the new diets was first announced Falck arranged for the publication of a translation of the writings by two Copenhagen liberals, Professor David and the ambitious young Captain Tscherning, entitled *The Prussian Provincial Diets*, and in the preface to this work he spoke of the two Danes altogether as fellow countrymen. Four years later, when David passed through Kiel just after a press prosecution which he had successfully withstood, he was hailed by the students as a hero of liberty, although his newspaper *Faedrelandet* openly attacked the German elements in Schleswig. The initial proceedings of the two diets were comparatively tranquil. It is true that the estates manifested on several occasions that desire for the enlargement of their privileges which is an inevitable characteristic of purely deliberative parliaments, unless they are in a profound slumber. The

diets demanded restricted publicity of debate, and more precise statements concerning the finances, since they estimated the deficit at a figure five times as great as that announced by the government. Between the duke of Augustenburg, a rigid aristocrat, and the peasant deputies of Schleswig there had already ensued some lively verbal skirmishes, which served to display the energy of suppressed partisan feeling.

The first serious struggles occurred during the second session, in the year 1838, when the excesses of the Copenhagen democracy had aroused the national egoism of the Germans. Upon the proposal of the young advocate Orla Lehmann, a hotheaded and reckless demagogue, in 1836 the Danish Society for Freedom of the Press had determined to extend its activities into northern Schleswig, and had formed branches throughout the region north of the Schlei. Shortly after this the Schleswig Society for the Diffusion of Danish Books was founded. In the German town of Hadersleben there was issued a Danish newspaper, *Dannevirke*, whose very name served to signal the struggle for the Eider frontier. These things were the heralds of a period of restless conflict in the plains of northern Schleswig. For centuries this frontier folk had spoken a Danish dialect barely comprehensible to the island Danes, and had honoured German as the tongue of culture and of intercourse with the great world. There seemed nothing amiss in a state of affairs which had arisen without coercion and as a natural historical development. But now hatred for the German oppressors was continually preached to the peaceful peasantry of northern Schleswig by the newspapers and emissaries of the men of Copenhagen, and here as elsewhere it soon became plain how all-powerful in this epoch was the dominance of the idea of nationality whose characteristics had been moulded in the struggle against the Napoleonic world-empire. A nationalist propaganda imposed from without sufficed in this Schleswig which hitherto, even in its struggles against Denmark, had always remained a loyally united whole, to engender a dangerous antagonism between north and south. Especially in Sundewitt, just without the gates of the German town of Flensburg, the peasants made a parade of their enthusiasm for "dear old Denmark."

These Danish intrigues at length compelled the Germans to arm in self-defence. At both the diets, alike in Schleswig and in Itzehoe, a resolution was now passed to petition for

the union of the Schleswig-Holstein estates, a measure which three years earlier had still been regarded as unduly rash. But the good-natured Germans were as yet far from realising the extent of the danger. When a deputy named Lorentzen, an eloquent peasant of liberal views from northern Schleswig, advocated the introduction of Danish legal terminology into the Danish-speaking regions of Schleswig, even Falck saw no reason to object to the proposal, for the unsuspicious man of learning had no conception of the sinister changes that had lately affected the quiet life of his old home in northern Schleswig. Fruitless were the warnings of the duke of Augustenburg, who saw further than others on this occasion. The proposal was passed by a narrow majority, and the eyes of the Germans were not opened until the Danes had hastened to make a gross misuse of the powers thus granted. The king succumbed more and more to the influence of the Danish faction, and he did not hesitate, when the duchies put forward a claim for five million thalers against the National Bank, to make a simple present of the sum in question to this purely Danish institution. In the face of such coups de main, the old careless self-complacency gradually disappeared, and the Holsteiners came to feel that they were men of the German march. Those of the younger generation had different sentiments from old Rist, who, to the day of his death, unheeding the transformations of the time, remained a faithful royal official in the Gottorp government. In Kiel, Dr. Balemann maintained active intercourse with the leaders of the South German opposition, while in the *Korrespondenzblatt*, the only notable Holstein newspaper, Theodor Olshausen gave expression to democratic liberal ideas far in advance of the feudalist views held by Falck. The inveracity of the existing state of affairs received a striking demonstration when the time came for the young lawyer Georg Beseler to take the traditional oath of homage, and discovered to his horror that to swear respect for the *absolutum dominium* of the Danish King's Law was utterly incompatible with the territorial rights of Schleswig-Holstein. Following the dictates of his conscience he abandoned his home.. On both sides of The Belt people began to recognise that the persistence of such contradictions was impossible.

Meanwhile the continuance of the royal house became more and more questionable, for Prince Frederick, son of the heir presumptive, remained childless. The Danish press displayed

almost hysterical zeal in discussing the problem of the succession. In leading articles and pamphlets there was incessant reiteration of the ancient fable that Schleswig equally with the kingdom of Denmark was subject to the regulations for the succession embodied in the King's Law. To confute this idea there was published in Halle in the year 1837 an anonymous writing entitled *The Succession in Schleswig-Holstein*, defending in sober and unadorned language, but in most definite terms, the claim of the house of Augustenburg to the ducal crown of Schleswig-Holstein. The pamphlet confined itself strictly to the limits implied in the title, for not a word was said concerning political liberty or concerning the German populace of Schleswig-Holstein. It soon transpired that the author was Duke Christian of Augustenburg. Thus the younger line of the house of Oldenburg gave frank expression to the expectation that the German duchies would before long become detached from Denmark. The question of the future of Transalbingia had been mooted.

No more than trifling bubbles from the rapids of the European revolution found their way into the adjoining minor domains of Low Germany. On one occasion the mob of the Hamburger Berg got out of hand, and attacked the Jews and the excise officers. More serious was a constitutionalist movement in Jeverland, which soon spread to other parts of the variegated state of Oldenburg. But the movement lacked the necessary foundation. Almost alone among German territories Oldenburg had never possessed a genuine diet. The prelates and the nobles had disappeared at an early date, the towns were of little importance, the peasants lived a free life upon their fine farms, and the sovereigns needed no additional funds for their thrifty housekeeping. After a little noise had been made, the agitation subsided when the well-meaning grand duke, influenced by the warnings of his Danish cousin, granted the country, instead of the desired constitution, no more than a new communes' ordinance. Oldenburg remained the only one among the larger German states which did absolutely nothing to carry out article 13 of the federal act. The official bureaucracy continued undisturbed its strict but careful regime.

CHAPTER III.

INTERMEDIATE POSITION OF PRUSSIA.

§ 1. INTERNAL PEACE. POLISH FRONTIER TROUBLES.

THE simple formulas of the philosophy of history can never do justice to the multiplex richness of historical life. Throughout the educated world the belief generally prevailed that the essential characteristics of the new epoch had long ere this been understood. The decisive stage in the struggle between kingship by God's grace and the constitutionalist law of reason seemed now to have been reached, and it was held that no throne in western Europe could have a secure future without the assistance of parliamentary forms. Yet among all the German territories Prussia had best surmounted the storms of the day. This state, whose unlimited monarchy had been subjected to so much abuse, exhibited energy and health that were offensive to all persons of liberal sympathies. Amid the uproar round its frontiers, it stood firm like a rock amid raging seas. Whilst protecting with its military forces the marches of the Fatherland on the Rhine and on the Prosna, by the invincible strength of its legal system it preserved for the Germans a fruitful treasure of traditional prestige, monarchical loyalty, legalist sentiment, and national pride. The old order of society, which it was necessary to sweep away in Saxony, Hesse, and Hanover, had long ago been destroyed in Prussia, and the neofrench catchwords of South German liberalism could make no headway among the people of the War of Liberation.

Prussia remained so perfectly immune from political troubles that the central authority hardly needed to avail itself of exceptional measures. An outbreak of the mob at Aix-la-Chapelle in August, 1830, was plainly dependent upon labour disturbances in the neighbouring town of Verviers. The

rioters wreaked their wrath only upon the labour-saving machines of Cockerill and upon the houses of a few unpopular manufacturers, and they were speedily subdued by the armed burghers. Of even less importance were the disorderly clamours which broke out one evening in September in the streets of Berlin, and beneath the king's very windows. The noisy crowd was led by journeymen tailors, who were discontented on account of the parsimony of their masters and owing to the unrestricted competition of the sempstresses. Here also the workmen cried: "Down with the machines!" The king administered a severe reprimand to the town councillors of his capital, and in his first alarm Bernstorff complained of "this new symptom of the spirit of intoxication and illusion which may readily transform Europe into a great madhouse." [1] But the spirit was laid as soon as the troops, without firing, had made a few onslaughts with naked swords, and the riot of the Berlin tailors would speedily have passed into oblivion had not Chamisso given it a permanent monument in his song *Courage, Courage!* Not even in Posen was there any breach of public order, notwithstanding the febrile excitement of the nobility, and notwithstanding the reinforcements that secretly crossed the Polish frontier.

It was only in a remote outpost, in Neuchâtel, that King Frederick William had to struggle for the possessions of his house. The beautiful little territory in the Jura had absolutely nothing in common with the Prussian state beyond the ruling house and that house's ordinance of succession. So conscientiously had the Hohenzollerns always observed the legal conditions of this purely personal union, that after the battle of Rossbach the Neuchâtelois officers who had fought in the French army against Prussia went unpunished, and received honourable treatment as prisoners of war. After the unlucky treaty of Schönbrunn the principality passed into the hands of Marshal Berthier, but on Napoleon's fall the century-old association with the house of Hohenzollern was immediately resumed, the restoration being effected in due legal form, Berthier abdicating in set terms, and receiving from the crown of Prussia a compensatory income. The Neuchâtelois welcomed their ancient king upon his entry with vociferous delight.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, September 30; Bernstorff, Instruction to Maltzahn, September 20, 1830.

As long as the lord marshal and the other royal governors of Frederician days had continued their mild and careful rule, the harmony between prince and people had remained undisturbed. The communes enjoyed their traditional liberties; the administrative offices were unsalaried, and (with the solitary exception of the royal governorship) were exclusively filled by natives of Neuchâtel. The members of the proud patrician families, to whom these posts were commonly allotted, could not here, as elsewhere throughout Switzerland, misuse their powers in oligarchical oppression, for the king's justice held them in check. During these days of royal rule, taxes were quite unknown. The yield of the domains and regalia, supplemented by a few ground rents, was entirely adequate. The king received an income of 27,000 thalers, which he regularly disbursed in the country for purposes of general utility. How remarkable was the general wellbeing in the inhospitable Jura mountains. In the rude upland valley of La Chaux de Fonds, where wheat would hardly ripen, there was now a great industrial town sending timepieces to all the world, so that many a princely house could not vie with the wealth of the Pourtalès or the Purys.

All these blessings of the good old time seemed now to return with the renewal of Hohenzollern sovereignty. The king reconfirmed the ancient territorial rights, and actually enlarged them by reviving the diet of the Trois Etats which had been in abeyance for centuries. Industry received a fresh impetus, for Prussia and her allies in the customs union gave special privileges to Neuchâtelois products. The youth of the educated classes began to attend German universities, and even the new academy of the little capital, although instruction was given in French, began to follow the paths of German science. The sons of the leading families, of the Pourtalès, the Sandozs, the Rougemonts, and the Crousazs, frequently took service in the king's army or at his court. Provision was also made for the common people, among whom the ancient Swiss fondness for mercenary service still prevailed, in a special battalion of the guards, the delight of the street arabs of Berlin, for in virtue of an express agreement this battalion was recruited in Neuchâtel, and, like the Swiss regiments of the pope or of the king of Naples, was treated as a troop of foreign mercenary volunteers.

Nevertheless the germs of internal dissatisfaction soon

displayed themselves, for the relationship between the principality and the confederacy had been completely disordered. This trifling family estate, which rendered no services to Prussia, merely receiving unrequited benefits from the Hohenzollerns, was a continuous source of embarrassment to Prussian statecraft, so that it was not long before, in the Berlin foreign office, where Neuchâtelois affairs were managed, one might hear people exclaim in moments of irritation, "I wish the canton were at the bottom of its own lake!" In the eighteenth century Neuchâtel was merely an associated district of Switzerland, without vote in the national assembly, while the king ranked as a Swiss burgher, and, like all his Neuchâtelois subjects, was personally beholden to the Swiss confederation as a "dear and faithful confederate." But since then the revolution had made an end of all the other associated districts, so that the new Switzerland was exclusively composed of cantons possessing equal rights; and when, in May, 1815, the principality was reaccepted into the confederacy, the new canton was the sole monarchy in a league of petty republics. Hardenberg felt that a royal envoy to the national assembly would occupy a disagreeable situation amid republican colleagues. To avoid friction he consequently arranged that the duties of the principalities towards Switzerland should be fulfilled by the Neuchâtelois government alone, by the council of state, without the cooperation of the king. But this wellmeaning expedient proved a serious mistake. Henceforward the king had by law no part in the confederacy, and yet did actually participate in the decisions of the national assembly, for the Neuchâtel council consisted entirely of employees of the sovereign. The inevitable result of these confused relationships was the birth of a party struggle that would have been impossible in the previous century. Among the radicals of the younger generation there came into existence a Swiss republican party aiming at separation from the princely house, whereas all the patricians and the great majority of the common people continued to plume themselves upon loyalty to the crown.

The opposition remained masked so long as in the neighbouring cantons the quiet rule of the old dominant families still continued. But after the July revolution, as soon as the radical party gained the upper hand in Switzerland, its shafts were directed against the princely coronet of the Hohenzollerns. The aims of the movement were to secure popular government

in the cantons and to strengthen the federal authority. These two aims were inseparably associated, for it was not possible that the loose federation of states should undergo transformation into a compact federal state unless the cantonal constitutions were all established upon an identical democratic foundation. The Swiss press, with characteristic roughness, began a newspaper campaign against Neuchâtel, describing the state of affairs in the best governed of all the cantons as an abominable tyranny, for from the Swiss point of view liberty consisted solely in the non-existence of monarchical authority. Moreover, extraordinary fables were rife concerning all the treasures which flowed away from wealthy Switzerland into the sands of Brandenburg. Even the Badenese journals were deluded by republican catchwords, and were not ashamed to incite the Neuchâtelois against their German princes.

The king promised the principality a reform of the constitution, in the sense that the majority of the members of the diet were henceforth to be elected by universal suffrage. General Pfuel, the redoutable Teutonist, who many years before as commandant of Paris had known so well how to deal with the French, was in May, 1831, sent to Neuchâtel with extraordinary powers. The new diet assembled, and all the trouble seemed to be over. But hardly had the general taken his departure when a mob strengthened by confederate reinforcements made a surprise attack upon the castle of Neuchâtel, and the national assembly was compelled to send troops to restore order. Pfuel returned, called out the loyal militia, arrested the ringleaders, and when a fresh rising took place in September, after a few skirmishes in Val de Travers the revolutionaries were completely routed. Loud were the rejoicings. Everyone knew that the disorders had been artificially fostered solely by the young hothead Lieutenant Bourquin and certain radical emissaries from the vicinity. The old royalist song was heard on all sides :

Vive le Roi, vive sa loi,
La liberté chérie !
Vive le Roi, vive sa loi,
Vive notre patrie !

The king instituted a special token of honour for those who had taken part in the fight, and expressed his gratitude in the warmest terms to the populace of the little principality,

writing: "This small area has given Europe a lesson and has set an example which will not be lost. It will gain thereby an honourable place in history." [1] He also thanked the national assembly for the help furnished by the confederacy.[2] His enthusiastic supporters among the ruling families took a less tranquil view. There arose a chorus of indignation in response to the attacks of the Swiss press, and on account of the demagogic intrigues in the neighbouring cantons. Count Louis Pourtalès, commanding officer of the militia, wrote to Otterstedt, envoy to the confederacy, as follows: "The molestations of the Swiss are positively nauseating. The Swiss desire that we should separate ourselves either from our king or from them. The choice is not difficult. We choose the king, for the offence has estranged us from these hostile confederates. . . . . We desire to avoid jacobin infection. Even should our separation from the confederacy become a European question, this will be all the better, for I believe that intervention is the only salvation for Switzerland." [3] A pamphlet emanating from these royalist circles used similar terms: "Les Suisses délibèrent sur le sort de Neuchâtel; ne saurons-nous pas en décider nous-mêmes?" The Prussian foreign office was absolutely opposed to any such designs. It was well known that since the awakening of Swiss radicalism the value of the association between the principality and the confederacy had notably declined. But the king was unwilling to abandon the legal standing ground of the European treaties, and he was loath to sacrifice to an uncertain fate this unarmed territory close to the French border. Moreover, he wanted to keep one foot in the stirrup of the confederacy, for the bourgeois king's diplomatists were busily endeavouring to bring Switzerland, as in Bourbon days, under French tutelage. Frederick William therefore commanded an attitude of strict reserve in both directions.[4] Upon his orders the hotspurs among the royalists held their peace. The canton fulfilled its duties towards the confederacy so conscientiously that for the ensuing ten years, notwithstanding the challenging attitude of the radicals, it was still possible to avoid open war with the national assembly.

[1] Cabinet Order to Pfuel, December 31, 1831.
[2] Ancillon, Instructions to Otterstedt, October 4 and November 25, 1831.
[3] Pourtalès to Otterstedt, January 8 and 25, 1832.
[4] Otterstedt's Report, January 14; Ancillon, Instruction to Otterstedt, February 7; Ancillon, Report to the king, March 17, 1832.

Nevertheless Prussia's Swiss policy tended more and more towards involvement in a tragical contradiction. With goodwill on both sides, the little principality could have continued to exist under the supremacy of a strongly republican federal state, just as to-day the Hanseatic urban republics thrive under the monarchical German empire. But the very party that demanded essential federal reforms likewise advocated radical ideas, insisting with increasing arrogance that the Hohenzollerns must be expelled from the confederacy. The Swiss newspapers unceasingly reiterated the old saying that the Swiss must "never submit to a master." Thus Prussia was positively compelled to intervene in federal policy as protagonist of particularism and as champion of the Swiss conservatives. Associated with the Swiss conservatives were the old councillor of state Sandoz-Rollin and all the other excellent patricians who ruled the territory of Neuchâtel, while the conservative leaders in Bern, Basle, and Zurich were in continuous communication with Otterstedt. But however much the radicals might err in point of arrogance and violence, to them belonged the future; and should the day arrive wherein federal unity would triumph over particularism, the Hohenzollern canton would stand in the ranks of the defeated party. No one recognised these dangers more plainly than General Pfuel. He had now become governor of the principality, winning the affections of youth by his swimming schools in the lake, and gaining the respect of all parties by his straightforward benevolence. The unbridled chatter of the radicals was no more agreeable to the liberal officer than were the Calvinistic bigotry and the nepotism of the royalists; his solitary consolation was that in the society of Agassiz he could enjoy intellectual companionship resembling that which had been known to him in the literary circle of Berlin. As early as 1832 he told the king in plain terms that the collapse of the old federal constitution was imminent, and that when that event ensued it would be difficult to retain the princely coronet of Neuchâtel.

None the less, wherever the black-and-white colours waved, the kingdom maintained its old prestige. Both friend and foe noted with amazement the loyalty of Catholic Rhineland to its ruler. The most difficult of all the difficult tasks imposed by the congress of Vienna upon the Prussian state seemed to

have been happily solved. Numberless emissaries from France and Belgium were engaged in intrigues on the Rhine: but everywhere they found deaf ears; everywhere the troops of the fatherland, despatched to protect the western frontier, were received with open arms; while Prince William the elder, who came to the Rhine as governor, soon won for himself universal esteem in Cologne. Nothing but the arrogant language of the clergy still served at times to indicate that the proximity of the Belgian priestly regime might one day disturb the peace of Prussian Rhineland. It is therefore readily comprehensible that the ingenuous Prussian journals should luxuriate in self praise, and that Aldefeld, the Rhenish pedagogue, should prophesy in indifferent verse that strong Prussia would henceforward be known as the land of tranquillity. But more perspicacious observers likewise recognised the superiority of this disciplined and loyal people amid its emotional neighbours. Even Rist, the Holsteiner, who previously, following the custom of his country, had profoundly despised Prussia, having paid a visit to the western provinces, now extolled the happy ordering of the well-ruled state. With still more confident tone did young Captain Helmuth von Moltke speak in his brilliant work on Poland, writing: "The Prussian state is distinguished by its quiet but unceasing progress, by its continuous internal development, which has placed Prussia in the forefront in respect of reform, enlightenment, liberal institutions, and reasonable freedom—at least as far as Germany is concerned."

Once more as in the days of the first revolution the Prussians felt proud of themselves as servants of their king, and wherever the old ruler showed himself he was greeted with loud acclamations. And just as in those days the *Marseillaise* had been answered by the strains of *Heil dir im Siegerkranz*, so now the new *Preussenlied*, written by Bernhard Thiersch (brother of Friedrich Wilhelm Thiersch, the Munich philologist), and set to music by Neithardt, went the round of all the strongholds in the fatherland. The court poets of the minor states were in the habit of inditing twaddling and polychrome lays concerning "the white of innocence" and "the green of hope," extolling cockades arbitrarily adopted and devoid of historical meaning. The liberals of the south might rail against Prussian arrogance as much as they pleased, yet, with suppressed envy, they could not but feel that the

proud strains of the *Preussenlied* were very different in their significance, that there was a ring of truth in the lines: "That my fathers died for freedom, 'tis this my colours mean." The commemorative festivals of the old Landwehrmen and comrades-in-arms were for the most part unpretentious and free from bombastic eloquence, although in Berlin it was Fouqué's custom to deliver vociferous and extravagant orations; but these reunions served to keep the sense of national unity alive. When in the year 1831, on the auspicious anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, a son was born to Prince William, a son who would presumably one day occupy the throne, there rose from all the provinces a chorus of delight which manifestly came from the heart. Now that the people felt so proud and so secure, among certain circles of the Prussian youth the dream of German unity began to assume a firmer configuration. The Burschenschafters of Bonn were enthusiasts on behalf of a Prussian emperorship, and it was a child of the left bank of the Rhine who first gave this idea expression in song. Carl Simrock had just had experience in his own person of the timidities of the government, for the old dread of the demagogues was not yet completely overcome, and the ministry of justice thought it necessary to forbid its officials to give public expression to any positive political judgments. Simrock had been compelled to quit the state service because, during the first excitement of the July week, he had published a poem upon the "three days and the three colours" of France. But the good fellow was unruffled by this injustice. Shortly afterwards, in an impassioned ode, he described how the chariot of victory drove from the Brandenburg Gate across the country and among the people. He saw "the sceptre of Charlemagne in the hand of Frederick William." He heard old Blucher say:

> Let those perish
> Who know not how to live.
> Do you ask who is the heir?
> Young Prussia shall it be!

Since such sentiments were general, it was hardly possible that the constitutionalist struggles of the minor states should arouse much emulation in Prussia, and the South Germans complained bitterly of their northern neighbours' political immaturity. Nevertheless, though prosperity was slowly returning to the impoverished land, economic anxieties continued

to claim men's best energies, and to this hard-working generation practical matters of taxation and local administration seemed far more pressing than questions relating to the promised parliament. But the real reason of the country's invincible tranquillity was to be found in the vigorous sense of the state by which the Prussian people was distinguished above other Germans. For two entire years the Prussians lived under the shadow of a world-wide war. They knew that to them almost alone would it be left to play the decisive part in such a war, since they regarded the military power of their lesser German allies with well-grounded contempt. Without a murmur, they accepted the severe system of billeting and all the other oppressive burdens of an armed peace. How could a nation educated in a warlike spirit ever think, during a time of such urgent stresses, and in actual view of the enemy, of besieging the throne with petitions concerning affairs of far less pressing importance?

In the Westphalian diet this loyalty to the crown was almost childlike in its innocence. Here, under Stein's leadership, the life of the estates had always remained active, and in December, 1830, the diet resolved to beg the king to summon a parliament which would "unite the various provinces by a new spiritual bond," and would everywhere infuse fresh energy into the representative system. But Stein, marshal of the diet, was now dubious whether the proposal was not untactful or untimely in this period of general ferment and when war seemed imminent. In the end he turned to the governor, begging the latter to mediate, and when Prince William, acting on a hint from Berlin, spoke of the project with some dubiety the estates promptly abandoned it. Stein alluded to the scheme in the report of the diet, reminding the king of "the fine tribute to your ancestor, Adolphus of Cleves, 'his word was his bond'"; but at the suggestion of Lord-Lieutenant Vincke he erased the allusion, and the whole affair, which had aroused lively anxiety at court, received no further official notice. Nothing was said in the other provincial diets regarding the promised national parliament. Even the Old Prussians maintained silence, although their committee of the estates had declared in the previous year that Prussia needed a parliamentary constitution, seeing that her neighbours were gradually forging ahead in their political life;[1] the diet merely

[1] Protocol of the Committee of the Estates (von Kuhnheim, von Hake, Count Dohna-Reichertswalde), Königsberg, January 23, 1829.

ventured to beg with all due respect that the proceedings of the provincial diets should be public.

In the numerous pamphlets published in Prussia no expression was given to the demand for a constitution, though once in a way some sedate professor, like Thilo, the Silesian, in his writing entitled *What is a Constitution?* might deal with the matter on theoretical grounds, Thilo contending that the prince represented the state in respect of foreign relationships alone, and that as far as home affairs were concerned the people must have their own system of representation. During all these years there was but one man who ventured in plain terms to remind the king of his former pledge. This was David Hansemann, a Rhenish merchant, born at Finkenwerder near Hamburg, son of an Evangelical pastor. In youth he had become intimately acquainted with the French system of administration and had unfortunately acquired an extravagantly favourable opinion of its merits. Subsequently, in Aix-la-Chapelle, he had founded a great fire assurance society, and by his brilliant business attainments had acquired a position of undisputed importance in this strictly Catholic city. In December, 1830, he sent to the king a *Memorial Concerning Prussia's Situation and Political Life.* Writing throughout as a loyal Prussian patriot, he gratefully recognised the strong position occupied by the Prussian state amid the dispersed activities of the petty German territories, and he looked forward to the day when the nongerman lands would quit the federation, and when Prussia would become leader in a federal council and in a German Reichstag. But with the inconsiderateness that is ever characteristic of new social energies, he simultaneously urged the interests of the young Rhenish bourgeoisie. It seemed to him indubitable that "the principles dominating the most lively and most stimulating nation in Europe "would undergo diffusion throughout the world, that every reasonable government would have to base its authority upon the predominance of property and culture (whencever derived), and that Prussia was now on the point of passing from the feudal age, by way of bureaucracy, to adopt this method of majority rule. He was absolutely opposed to the class divisions of the provincial diets, on the ground that every deputy from Cologne or Aix-la-Chapelle represented a hundred and twenty times as many heads and four and thirty times as much taxable capacity as any member of the

Rhenish Ritterschaft. He considered that in respect of knowledge and of political culture the towns were enormously more significant than the rural districts; and he believed that in the great merchants and manufacturers, men who had everything to lose by war or civil disturbance, the throne would secure a support at least as efficient as that which it could obtain from the landed gentry. He therefore demanded that while the upper house should consist of the owners of entailed estates and of nominees of the crown, the members of the lower house should be elected by the taxpayers.

Thus did the new views which had made their way into the great cities of Rhineland under the regime of the Code Napoléon and owing to the continued influence of French ideas, first find candid expression before the throne. In its youthful egotism the new middle class imagined itself to be the state; in bourgeois society it recognised but one difference, the difference that is dominant throughout the middle class, that which concerns money and culture. The king accepted the memorial in no unfriendly spirit, but neither he nor his advisers recognised that behind the proposals of the Rhenish merchant stood a mighty power, one predestined to exert enormous social influence in the future. The reconciliation between the west and the east which Berlin believed to be already complete, had in truth hardly begun. Between the abstract citizenship of the Rhenish towns and the feudalist sentiments of the Brandenburg landowners lay a chasm which could not be bridged without many years of labour.

In the east, too, satisfaction was by no means so unalloyed as might have been inferred from the general tranquillity. It was impossible that professors and officials should fail to derive new ideas from the foreign newspapers which they read with so much zest; and even though the number of constitutionalists was still very small, the Old Prussian spirit of contradiction frequently found vent in severe criticism, so that the diplomats of Austria and those of the minor German principalities were unable to find words sufficiently strong for the astonishment with which they contemplated the liberal sentiments of this bureaucracy.[1] Among the populace it was inevitable that this official regime, however excellent, should often arouse mistrust because it ruled unchecked. Even Reaube's *Jahrbücher der preussischen Provinzialstände* (the only

[1] Frankenberg's Reports, Berlin, August 20, 1830, and subsequent dates.

periodical which concerned itself about the inconspicuous activities of the provincial diets), would occasionally enliven a chaos of self-complacent philistine observations by a fierce attack upon the colossal army of officialdom, an army that continued to breed in and in. In England or France a merchant might become a minister, whereas in Prussia forty-nine men had to work in order to nourish one official!

In bourgeois circles, hatred of the nobility found yet fiercer manifestations. The only one of the Old German hereditary castes which had succeeded in maintaining its existence amid the occupational castes of the new society, could not fail to appear repulsive to the exponents of modern culture, prone to vanity. Since, moreover, the nobility exercised an altogether inequitable preponderance in the provincial and circle diets, all the world complained of the power of junkerdom, enumerating with offensive pettiness how many men of noble birth there were in the higher offices of state. The antepenultimate ministers for justice and finance, Kircheisen and Klewitz, had been of bourgeois origin, but were succeeded by two noblemen, Danckelmann and Motz. When the two last-named died, and the vacant posts were once more allotted to bourgeois statesmen, Mühler and Maassen, the entire press rejoiced at the liberal development of Prussia. Yet of the three ministers of finance, the nobleman had unquestionably been the best liberal; whilst in none of these appointments had the king paid any attention to the question of birth. Even when Ancillon subsequently became a member of the ministry, the newspapers raised a cry of exultation because he was a bourgeois, although his sentiments were known to be reactionary. Especially in the army, the accusation ran, unjust preference was given to the nobility; but even the complaints on this score, though not altogether unfounded, were characterised by deplorable exaggeration and ignorance. Among the generals and colonels of the standing army, men of bourgeois birth were few and far between, for not until Scharnhorst's day had the old privileges of the nobles been abolished, while the War of Liberation had been the first means for the introduction of a considerable number of bourgeois officers into the infantry and cavalry regiments. Among the intermediate grades of the commissioned officers, on the other hand, the nobility was less strongly represented than among the lower grades. Nearly one-fifth of the staff officers, and little short of half the infantry

and cavalry captains, were bourgeois. But among the second-lieutenants no more than one in twenty were men of bourgeois birth, for during these piping times of peace, military service was unalluring, so that the junior commissioned posts were almost exclusively filled from the warrior families in which a military career was traditional.

For the nonce all these petty grievances remained half concealed, but no one intimately acquainted with the profound if unobtrusive passion of the North German stock could fail to see that the time was approaching in which it would be necessary to provide a free tilting ground for the rivalries of the provincial areas, the classes, and the political parties. A deliberative parliament such as had been promised, one issuing from the provincial diets, was now clamoured for by no one, but could not fail to be gratefully accepted by the loyal populace. Such a parliament could not possibly shake the power of the royal house, of late regarded with such profound affection, and could only serve to strengthen the national unity, and to accustom the Prussians to understand one another and to get on with one another in joint political labours.

The state of the national finances gave express indications of the need for fulfilling the old pledge. Whilst the other federal states did nothing, during one and a half years Prussia expended upon the protection of the frontiers nearly forty million thalers, four-fifths of her ordinary annual revenue. Since formal loans could not be effected without the sanction of a national representative body, and since the kindly king could not make up his mind to decree an increase of taxation, this expenditure was temporarily covered by payments from the state treasury, by short loans from the Oversea Trading Company, by withdrawing all the capital that could be spared by the civil administration including even cautionary deposits made by the officials, these sums being gradually refunded out of the increasing yield of the new taxes.[1] Everything was done with Old Prussian precision, but what would be the upshot of these hidden ingenuities if the state of armed peace were prolonged or should war actually break out? Was it worthy of a great state that, when this was going on, the published annual budget should continue to speak falsely of the perfect equilibrium

[1] Survey of the National Finances during the years 1830-1840, Rother Alvensleben, and Voss, February 11, 1841.

between ordinary revenue and expenditure? These heavy disbursements for the safety of Germany were as sedulously concealed as if they had been the debts of a spendthrift youngster. Yet they were greatly to the credit of Prussian statecraft, and had they been openly acknowledged they could not have failed to convince the inhabitants of the petty states (in so far as these had remained uncorrupted by the fancies of the Polish enthusiasts) that Prussia alone was making sacrifices on behalf of the great fatherland.

But the momentary difficulties passed away, and the king was now more firmly convinced than ever that he had taken the right step in introducing the provincial diets. In earlier days, when the ordinance of May, 1815, had been submitted to him, he had personally erased the article giving the proposed Reichstag the right of supply, and had been prepared to concede to this body deliberative powers merely. Five years later, agreeing that the suggested estates of the realm should cooperate in the matter of national loans, he had done so only because he definitely hoped that the monarchy would no longer require to contract any debts, or that the Oversea Trading Company would furnish sufficient help in temporary embarrassments. At that date he expressly declared: "Representatives of the nation, representation of the people, representatives of the country, I deprecate the use of such phrases; estates of the realm do not commend themselves to me, but I am not strongly adverse to them."[1] He saw that his subjects were satisfied, far better satisfied than the inhabitants of the neighbouring constitutionalist states. There were no urgent indications of the need for a decisive change, and anyone familiar with the king's somewhat narrow and inert personality must recognise that during his lifetime the estates of the realm would never come into existence. How difficult, too, how impossible in fact, in view of the general situation in Europe, did the initiation of any such change now seem! As a result of the crude and coarse methods of Lord Palmerston and Czar Nicholas the world had ranged itself into two great armed camps comprising respectively the constitutional states and the absolute monarchies. In the existing posture of affairs Prussia had but one immediate enemy, revolutionary France, who displayed with unteachable

[1] Reported by Rother in his Memorial of May 18, 1847, My Share in the Ordinances of May 22, 1815, and January 17, 1820.

infatuation her impudent designs upon the Rhine frontier. Who could suggest to Prussia the exchange of the secure alliance of the eastern powers for the fickle friendship of the west, that of the hypocritical advocates of freedom.

For the rest, the gentler and more liberal spirit which had begun to dominate the government during the close of the twenties was not affected by the July revolution. Whilst Bernstorff frustrated the warlike designs of the czar, whilst with an attitude of benevolent detachment he left free play to the constitutionalist movements in the neighbouring North German states, actually going so far as to assist the Brunswick movement to a successful conclusion, Maassen continued the negotiations on behalf of the customs union that had been initiated by Motz, and the council of state proceeded with its work of legislative reform. It is true that the rural communes' ordinance, which had years before been promised in conjunction with the provincial diets, still failed to come into existence, for the incredible tangle of local interests was an insuperable obstacle to innovation. The revised towns' ordinance, however, was promulgated on March 17, 1831. Stein hailed with delight this transformation of his work, seeing that the new law made no change in respect of the tried principles of self-government, and merely arranged for the cautious abolition of certain defects disclosed by experience. In a brilliant treatise, Savigny proved that the emendations were for the most part genuine reforms. The towns acquired henceforward increased independence, being empowered to supplement and in certain respects even to overrule general legislation by the issue of by-laws. The powers of the municipal authorities, which had been hitherto entirely controlled by the town councillors, were somewhat enlarged. The provincial governments were to adjudicate in disputes between the local authorities and the town councillors, and in general were to exercise strict supervision (urgently requisite, for in some of the decayed minor towns serious abuses had become established). In addition, there were certain new provisions regarding civil rights, inevitable corollaries of the new freedom of occupation. The only matter open to objection was that the landowners of the mediate towns retained their ancient communal rights.

In putting the law into operation the crown acted with a consideration in notable contrast with the rigid centralisation

of the majority of the constitutionalist states. All the towns in which Stein's laws were already in force remained under the old ordinance unless they expressly arranged for the new legislation to be applied to their respective areas. In default of such initiative, the introduction of the new law was to be gradually effected by the provincial administration, the lord-lieutenant being commissioned to hold preliminary consultations with the urban deputies to the provincial diet. Well-intentioned as the reform was, inertia (ever invincible in local affairs) cooperated so powerfully with the tacit suspicion of officialdom, that of all the places in which the old towns' ordinance was in force, no more than three, Königsberg-in-Neumark and two country towns in Brandenburg, applied for the introduction of the reformed legislation.

In the new provinces the obstinate resistance of particularism again displayed itself. The diet of the province of Saxony, indeed, promptly and gratefully accepted the new law, delighting to be freed from the old-established nepotist regime of Electoral Saxony. The Westphalians, centering round Vincke, wished for the maintenance of the old law of the marshal of their diet;[1] but since they found little to object to in the new law, tedious negotiations ensued with the individual communes, until in the year 1841 the revised towns' ordinance was at length introduced into all the larger towns of the province. At about the same date the reform was completed also in Posen. But the Hither Pomeranians would have neither the old law nor the new, clinging obstinately to the urban constitutions guaranteed them by the Swedish charters. Securing a warm advocate in the romanticist crown prince,[2] they ultimately obtained their own way, except as regards a few inevitable reforms which were to be arranged by agreement with the civic assemblies of Stralsund, Greifswald, and Barth. No less obstinately did the Rhenish estates adhere to their Napoleonic communes' ordinance, not only because in this region of advanced economic development a separation between town and country was difficult to effect, but also because the inhabitants, habituated to a bureaucratic regime, were unable to understand the advantages of German self-government. They, too, carried their point, securing the provisional continuance of the French

[1] Vincke's Report, Münster, April 17, 1831.

[2] Crown Prince's opinion considering the Hither Pomeranian Towns, April 11, 1831.

laws; and no more than three towns in the province voluntarily adopted the new towns' ordinance. The yielding disposition thus displayed by the crown awakened profound concern among the reactionaries at courts. Duke Charles of Mecklenburg implored the king to withdraw the concession, pointing out that even in constitutionalist states subjects were never allowed to choose for themselves between different laws. As often before, he threatened to resign the presidency of the council of state. Frederick William, however, rejoined that the revised towns' ordinance was not a new law but a reform, and that the towns must therefore be left freedom of choice, in order that the people might remain contented and that due regard might be paid to the multiplicity of local conditions.[1]

The duke's letters of protest constituted but one of the pillars of smoke which rose from time to time above the concealed fires of the party struggle at court. Prussia's prudent and independent attitude towards the revolution filled the ultra-conservatives with ill humour. Bernstorff, however, remained firmly established in the king's confidence; in General Witzleben he had a faithful ally, and even Prince Wittgenstein, being a man of peace, had now become one of his supporters. In the spring of 1831, worn out by prolonged illness, he renewed the request he had so often before made that he might be allowed to resign, but Frederick William made answer that he was indispensable, and that a second minister might be appointed to help him in his work. Werther was therefore summoned from Paris. But this brilliant diplomatist felt that he was not made to play the part of leader, and declined. Bernstorff remained in office, and at his suggestion Eichhorn, who had once before conducted Prussia's German policy, was formally established as head of the second department of the ministry. Ancillon, with the style of secretary of state, conducted the regular European correspondence—not always to the satisfaction of the minister, who had long ceased to share his old mentor's Austrian leanings.[2] All the more, therefore, did Bernstorff depend upon Eichhorn, giving his subordinate almost a free hand in German affairs, and extolling everywhere as the soul of the Prussian customs policy this

[1] Duke Charles of Mecklenburg to the king, March 1, to Wittgenstein, March 8; Cabinet Order to Duke Charles, March 7, 1831.

[2] Bernstorff's Reports to the king, April 18 and 27, June 27; Werther to Bernstorff, June 26; Cabinet Orders to Bernstorff, April 26, June 4, and July 6, 1831.

man whom the Hofburg detested as a demagogue. A statesman regarded with almost equal ill-favour in Vienna was Privy Councillor Kühne of the ministry of finance, who acquired enhanced influence under Motz's successor, Maassen. Since in these moving times Schuckmann's bureaucratic rigidity had become inappropriate, the old gentleman was induced, much against his will, to agree to a subdivision of his department, and the new branch, known as the ministry of home affairs and police, was entrusted to Baron von Brenn. The vacant office of president of the supreme court was allotted to Grolman, brother of the general, and son of the celebrated old Heinrich Dietrich Grolman, sometime president of the privy supreme court. The new president was a distinguished jurist of independent temperament who came to be regarded with disfavour as leader of the more liberal minded among the minor nobility. Krauseneck, a definite opponent of Austrian pretensions,[1] became chief of the general staff. Even the much abused General Boyen gradually acquired the monarch's confidence and was invited to join in the deliberations upon the military laws.

At the universities, all schools of science could develop in perfect freedom. Whilst Altenstein and Johannes Schulze did everything they could to favour the pupils of Hegel, and even assisted Eduard Gans, the liberal rhetorician, to a professorial chair in Berlin, Schleiermacher, the deadly enemy of the Hegelians, after prolonged disfavour, received fresh distinction from the king. He showed himself to be profoundly grateful, for in the liturgical dispute he had, as a literary opponent entered into personal conflict with the monarch. Now, when the Parisian *Messager*, in February, 1831, spoke of him as "a leader of the Prussian left," he considered it his duty to bear public witness to the royalist sentiments of Prussia. "Your expressions, 'right and left side, left and right centre,'" he wrote, "have absolutely no bearing upon our conditions. Since the peace of Tilsit we have made rapid progress, without revolution, without parliamentary chambers, and even without freedom of the press. Invariably the people has marched with the king, and the king with the people. Could anyone in his right senses now imagine that a revolution would enable us to advance more effectively in the future? Consequently, for my part, I am well assured that I shall

[1] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 94.

always be on the side of the king when I am on the side of the most enlightened men among the people." The liberal Paris newspaper suppressed this rejoinder, and when it was subsequently published in one of the Berlin journals, the South German liberal press railed against the subserviency of the Prussian "court chaplain"—the man who had so worthily rebuked the ignorant pretentiousness of the French.

To Metternich's alarm, Wilhelm Humboldt was now recalled to the council of state. Returning from Paris in the very days of the first terrifying news from that city, he had completed the installation of the new museum and had opened it to the public. The king was delighted at the judicious choice of paintings and at the fine classical sculptures which had been restored with masterly skill by Rauch, and in accordance with Humboldt's suggestion he determined that the increase of the collections should be entrusted, not to any one man, but to a committee of artists. His grateful spirit further induced him to atone for the old injustice of Carlsbad days, doing this all the more willingly since the crown prince and Witzleben zealously advocated Humboldt's cause. This recall to the council had little political significance. Humboldt now lived aloof. His thoughts were fixed upon the obscurely known other world, which, however, as in the case of all great intelligences, was in his mind closely associated with this world. Since in the mighty web of history he regarded individualities and events as warp and woof, but considered that individualities exercise a decisive influence, it ultimately seemed to him that the question of primary importance is what spiritual energies the individual takes with him as his equipment out of this world. "I can never," he wrote, "regard it as indifferent whether a man before his exit from this life attains or fails to attain to a genuine clarity of mind concerning that towards which he has been striving in the realm of ideas." His spirit was wholly immersed in this aspiration towards an eternity of contemplation and cognition. He desired to employ such energies as yet remained to him in bringing to a conclusion the intellectual work of so many years, in explaining the origin of mankind by the laws of linguistic structure. Inspired with these scientific designs, he was no longer interested in political struggles. But his name sufficed to render the adherents of Austria uneasy. What mischief might he not do with the

aid of "the encyclopædic cat," his brother Alexander, a man with whom the king loved to associate?

"The Mecklenburg clique," to use the apt phrase of Prince William the younger, was filled with hatred for all these liberal intelligences at the court. Chief of the reactionaries was Duke Charles, who never flagged in the composition of emotional and insubstantial memorials on behalf of legitimism. His chief supporters were his beautiful sister Frederica and her husband Ernest Augustus of Cumberland, together with Kamptz, "the nose-pincher," as the young bloods called him. In his new home Kamptz had not forgotten the old one, and when he had become Prussian minister he continued to write comprehensive works concerning the mysteries of the civil law, the nobles' monasteries, and the privileges of Mecklenburg. From a distance, Grand Duke George of Strelitz, with his ministers Oertzen and Dewitz, supplied brother Charles with counsel. General Müffling, too, who recently (and by no means to his satisfaction) had been appointed commander of the forces in Westphalia, remained faithful to his old friendships. Cousin to Count Münster, and brother-in-law of Schele, the leader of the Hanoverian nobility, he was the natural connecting link in this Guelph-Mecklenburg junker party, which was hostile to all the fine Old Prussian traditions.

After Bernstorff, in the spring of 1831, had begged leave to resign, the Mecklenburg party set all possible influences to work in order to expel from the government the new and vigorous energies. Duke Charles lamented that the position was desperate, that Humboldt controlled the majority in the council of state and desired to establish his power upon the ruins of the old order. Grand Duke George dolorously opined: "This affection of the crown prince for Humboldt (a leaning which conflicts with his otherwise excellent understanding and with the views of the men to whose advice he is generally inclined to listen) is, in my view, one of the great storm-clouds that hang on the political horizon, ominous of disaster to the entire world." Four times within eight months did Duke Charles assure the king that, running the risk of giving a victory to "the liberal party," he would be compelled to resign unless the unity of the ministry were restored, and unless fresh appointments were to establish a truthworthy majority in the council of state. His idea was that Müffling should be made minister for foreign affairs or

for war, and that Nagler should take charge of home affairs or foreign affairs. The faithful Kamptz was the man for the ministry of justice, "but the crown prince and some of the liberal jurists are so bitterly opposed to him that I hardly dare to venture the suggestion of his name." Eichhorn was to be transferred to some embassy in which he could do no harm: "I am of opinion that his control of German affairs is undesirable, and that it is extremely likely to lead to friction with Austria." [1] The duke asked Kamptz's advice concerning this matter of strengthening the council of state. Kamptz answered bitterly: "It is as regrettable as it is true that among the present higher personnel in the state service there are very few, indeed I might say there are no more than two, persons who can in this connection be regarded as thoroughly trustworthy"; in the provinces, moreover, only isolated officials could be regarded as "shellproof." Friese, the elderly bank director, on the other hand, was ready to supply a whole series of notable names, suggesting such men as Boyen, Schleiermacher, President Grolman, and General Rühle, until the duke exclaimed in exasperation: "What company do you want us to keep!" [2] The king looked on unconcernedly at his brother-in-law's restless machinations. Once only did Frederick William become mistrustful of Eichhorn, for the Hofburg lent support to the duke of Mecklenburg's calumnies. The king, on this occasion, privately offered Eichhorn a post as lord-lieutenant, a post which he had coveted. But Eichhorn responded simply: "My office is at his majesty's disposal, but I will not resign it without direct command." Matters were left there, for Frederick William could not bring himself to act unjustly.

After prolonged and odious intrigues, Duke Charles began to fear lest his royal brother-in-law should take him at his word, and accept one of his repeated resignations.[3] In the end, therefore, he allowed himself to be appeased, and after all their proposals the members of the Mecklenburg party had to content themselves with a single partial success in the matter of the reappointment to the ministry of justice. On the death of Danckelmann, Kamptz, as chief permanent official

[1] Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, Memorials to the king, April 23, June 23 and 28, and November 6; to Lottum, October 27; to Wittgenstein, July 8; Grand Duke George to Duke Charles, June 26 and July 3, 1831.

[2] Kamptz to Duke Charles, July 19; Friese to Duke Charles, October 23, 1831.

[3] Lottum to Duke Charles, October 20, 1831.

in the department of justice, had provisionally, with his customary and colossal industry, supervised for a year the work of this department. The king was unwilling positively to degrade a deserving official, and therefore decided upon yet another subdivision. In February, 1832, Kamptz took charge of the department for the revision of legislation, a task which seemed specially created for this expert in the local laws of Prussia, and he was simultaneously made supervisor of the Rhenish legal system since legislative revision was first to be carried out in the Rhinelands. Mühler, a jurist of far more liberal views, was entrusted with the administration of justice in the remaining provinces.

In this party struggle, the royal princes occupied a peculiar and intermediate position. They all desired war with France, for they lived amid memories of Belle Alliance, detested the revolution, and chivalrously desired to come to the support of their harassed Orange cousin. General Witzleben had frequently to listen to fierce reproaches from the bellicose young princes on account of his peace policy. On one occasion, on St. Hubert's day, 1830, the princes actually aroused the indignation of the enlightened capital when, at a hunting feast in Grunewald palace, they drank an uproarious toast to "the victory of the good cause," and then, following the Russian custom, broke their glasses against the wall. But there was always a difference between the simple legitimist zeal of the young princes Charles and Albert and the ideas of the eldest brother, which were ever peculiar to himself. The crown prince, like the others, desired the victory of legitimist right. To him the revolution seemed above all to be a denial of the faith, and he could hardly take the name of Orleans into his mouth without a savage jest against "Louis Philippeste damné." During these years his old contempt for the liberals' law of reason increased yet further, for Lancizolle, an honest but thoroughly fanatical supporter of Haller's doctrines, was giving him frequent addresses concerning German legal history. When Gans became a member of the Berlin faculty, the crown prince demanded that as a preliminary his friend Savigny should receive a public apology from the bold blasphemer: "The name 'historical school' (which so aptly serves to HONOUR *those aspirations of which, in matters of church, state,* and jurisprudence, OUR COUNTRY *and our time* STAND SO PRE-EMINENTLY IN NEED) has been exposed by Gans to contempt

in so far as this is possible—and much is possible when a man only needs to bawl loudly in order to find companions." [1] But the Mecklenburg party seemed to him hopelessly dull-witted. He detested Kamptz, the persecutor of the demagogues. He was on friendly terms with Humboldt, Altenstein, and all the more cultured members of the government. Moreover, notwithstanding his passionate disposition, he was too much impressed with a sense of his duties as heir to the throne to manifest by reckless opposition his displeasure at the king's pacific attitude.

Prince William was even less inclined to become the adherent of a party. Calm and steady, never ceasing to grow, he was ripening for his great future. The death of the mother whom he had loved so tenderly and the terrible experiences of Napoleonic days had early given him a serious bent, accustoming him to keep under control his natural exuberance of spirits. In these years he had no thought that he would himself ever wear the crown. It was his hope that some day, as military commander on behalf of father or of brother, he would lead the Prussian flag to new victories. So rapidly had he become master in the profession of arms that he was already regarded as the exemplar of Prussian soldiers. His whole nature recalled the Frederician motto which was still inscribed upon the sword blades of the officers in the grenadiers: Ne me tirez sans raison, ne me remettez sans honneur. A happy admixture of warlike energy and clear reflection manifested by the aspect of this tall figure were displayed in the open countenance, the serious but friendly eyes. When on service he took note of every error, of the most trifling thing that was overlooked, frequently declaring that this nation in arms must unremittingly and arduously see to the full development of every individual, so that the reservist, when recalled to the colours after the lapse of years, should still have all his military knowledge at command, and should at once become a soldier of full value. While yet a boy, his military talent was recognised by his father, and he therefore received a more thorough instruction than the crown prince concerning all the reforms of the military system. He was profoundly convinced of the grandeur of Scharnhorst's ideas of organisation and of the moral superiority of the Prussian national army. He gave vigorous expression to his displeasure

[1] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, January 8, 1829.

when, during these years, Johannes Voigt and other East Prussian writers under Schön's influence endeavoured to depreciate the renown of the father of the Landwehr. He paid grateful respect to old Boyen as the heir of Scharnhorst, at the time when Boyen was in royal disfavour. With a keen knowledge of men he chose his friends from among the most capable of the officers, of the elders, General Brause (his beloved tutor) and General Natzmer, and of the younger men, General Röder and Colonel Reyher, for many years chief of general staff. It was his ideal to wage war in the grand style, and, in accordance with Scharnhorst's principles, "to march in separate detachments, combining for attack." He spoke of infantry as the principal arm of modern warfare, considering it also the most instructive for the commander, for infantry can make full use of every detail in the configuration of the ground, thus providing ever new tasks for the reflective intelligence.

The liberals in other parts of Germany knew little of the prince, and were inclined to regard him as no more than a brilliant soldier of the parade ground. His friends knew that his conscientious thoroughness in military work was inseparably associated with his view of Prussia's mission. More ardently and more definitely than any contemporary statesman, with the possible exception of Motz, he had during the last peaceful years unceasingly advanced the opinion that the first need of this state was power, that power was far more essential than liberty. Again and again his hopes centred on war, not indeed for the sake of the rough and tumble of battle, but because he felt that Prussia must develop, must activate her slumbering energies. Six years after the war, when the people had as yet barely recovered from the wounds then inflicted, he uttered bitter complaints concerning the enervating influence of the prolonged peace: "Consider the political outlook. Our physical weakness is terrible when we compare our strength with that of neighbouring states. We must therefore come to the aid of this weakness by the utilisation of intellectual power, and in the army above all must such power be awakened and sustained." He dealt contemptuously with the weaklings who already ventured to maintain that it was absurd with a population of eleven millions to aspire to a role among nations of forty millions, and said: "What enthusiasm effected when we were but three millions, an aroused

and encouraged intelligence must now do among eleven millions." Consequently, even after the July revolution, he considered the war to be necessary. He had little love for his Mecklenburg uncle, and the latter's legitimist sermons could not exercise much influence upon this serenely heroic mind. But he knew that revolutionary France would never peacefully tolerate an increase in the strength of Prussia. When the weather cleared he sadly declared that the struggle had merely been postponed, and "not to the general advantage of mankind," for the enemy was given time to consolidate his forces.

Yet however much these leading men of Prussia might differ among themselves, as convinced monarchists they constituted a united whole in opposition to the forces of the revolution. Similar sentiments had been cherished by all the great men of whom Prussia was now deprived by death. Terrible was death's harvest in Germany. Motz; next Niebuhr and Stein; next Hegel, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz (these three victims to cholera); finally Goethe—all succumbed within a year and a half. In a nation whose unity had been long established and firmly cemented, such severe losses, however much they might have been mourned, would have aroused also a feeling of pride, for where in the whole world was another nation with so much human greatness to lose? But in this generation all rejoicing in the irresistible fertility of the Germanic genius was turned to gall by the eternal complaints concerning the miseries of Germany. Over the new-made graves of Goethe and Hegel, deplorable literary quarrels broke out; but the great Prussians who passed away did so almost unnoticed by the liberal newspapers of the petty states. In these regions absolutely nothing was known of Motz, whilst among the party fanatics hardly anything but scorn was aroused by the tragical end of Niebuhr.

A year before the July revolution Niebuhr had delivered in Bonn his lectures upon recent history. So enthusiastically had he always participated in the events of the day that it seemed to him as if he were relating his own life. All the brilliancy and all the suffering of his great heart were incorporated in these addresses. It ever remained his chief demand of the historian that a vigorous and lively ego should find expression in historical writings, and never could he take a friendly view of the artificial objectivity of Johannes Müller,

of whom Niebuhr wrote: "The pure vital breath of fresh truth is lacking in all his writings. He has an extraordinary talent for masquerade." This was the first occasion on which a German master had given a comprehensive picture of the recent past. As will readily be understood, the relation was inevitably affected with numerous errors in point of fact and with numerous injustices, but it went to the root of the matter, expounding with pitiless honesty the tainted character of the movement of '89. Doubtless the Germans had previously been aware of this character, but they had begun to forget it under the influence of the liberals' mythopœic faculty. Thus did Niebuhr bequeath to posterity a last and splendid heritage of restoration views. Despite the severity of his criticism, the historian was by no means hopeless as to the future of France, believing rather that the Bourbon *charte* was already as firmly established as if it had been a constitution a hundred years old.

But now the sensitive man was afflicted by the burning of his house and by other domestic troubles. The morbid mood of these melancholy days was manifest when the crown prince endeavoured to secure for him a new home in Berlin. The heir to the throne begged the king to do something for this dear friend, this great man of learning, whose sentiments were "so genuinely royalist, so thoroughly based upon the principle of conservatism and of reasonable advance, not reposing, as did those of most men of his profession, upon the revolutionary principle." The prince recommended that Niebuhr should be offered an entirely free position in the capital with a high salary, so that, like Alexander Humboldt, he could engage as his preferences dictated in either literary or academic activities, and could in addition participate in the labours of the council of state. The king was quite ready to grant the request, provided that the historian was himself willing to leave his valuable sphere of influence on the Rhine. There now began one of those interludes played by go-betweens that are customary in the case of professorial appointments, and the crown prince once again displayed his sinister talent for spoiling everything he touched. Niebuhr imagined (with very little reason) that "the pietists" of the heir apparent's environment were opposing his appointment. Manifestly incensed, he gave vacillating answers, and when at length a definite reply was demanded he rejoined that he believed himself

able to do more useful work in Bonn. The net result was to produce in his mind a feeling of injury.[1]

He had long dreaded the decay of German literature. "Heine, Börne, Saphir, these three gods of Israel are the idols of the German Israel. Even Goethe has already been deposed." Still more alarmed was he at the contemplation of the democratic manners of the new time. "I find," he wrote sadly, "that the excellent qualities which were at one time the ornament of our nation have disappeared, that insipidity and impudence are now dominant in place of profundity, sincerity, originality, cordiality, and love." When the Bourbon throne fell, it seemed to him as to Goethe that general anarchy was imminent, and, more far-seeing than Goethe, he already sensed the coming storm of 1848. These experiences affected him so keenly that he became estranged from two of his best friends, Stein and Dahlmann. The trouble with Stein arose because Niebuhr considered that there was more political excuse for the election of the bourgeois king than the stern baron of the empire would admit. The quarrel with Dahlmann broke out because the younger man optimistically declared: "I am delighted at an occurrence which I would rather have seen happen ten years earlier." In the preface to the new volume of his *Roman History* Niebuhr gave open expression to his gloomy view of the future, while to a friend he wrote: "In a book which must one day come into its own, even though through several generations of the barbarism that seems imminent it should be forgotten, I have been able, I believe, to deposit a record, just as our ancestors used to deposit a record of their times beneath a foundation stone or in a church tower." [2] Still more definite was his last utterance, the preface to the first Philippic oration, which many years before, in the dark days before Austerlitz, he had translated for Emperor Alexander, and now republished as a warning to the Germans against the old sins of dissension and Prussophobia. "Everywhere," he wrote, "the envious laughed because Athens was

[1] Such is the utterly unanticipated impression derived from a comparison of the printed materials with the documents in the privy archives (the crown prince to the king, February 13, to Albrecht, February 14; Lottum to Niebuhr, March 22; Albrecht to Lottum, April 10; Niebuhr to Lottum, March 30 and April 20; to the king, May 13; Cabinet Orders to Niebuhr, May 3 and 30, 1830). The despatches to Niebuhr are all so kindly and respectful that his indefinite and evasive rejoinders seem to me explicable solely as the outcome of a condition of morbid nervous irritability.

[2] Niebuhr to Bunsen, December, 1830.

suffering shame and misfortune. Should the worst come to the worst, they hoped that they would be the last to be eaten by the cyclops. Would they not be able to elude him? Might he not become kind-hearted? Might he not die before their turn came? Many, in the end, awakened with horror from their dream. History laments those also who fell beside the Athenians at Chæronea. But their end does not redeem them from censure: through their fault perished Greece, the Germany of antiquity."

Oppressed by these unhappy visions, Niebuhr died at the new year of 1831. As Dahlmann put it, "His sole existence sufficed to prove that mankind has not been abandoned by the gods." How quickly had this rich life fled. He was but fifty-four, and had acquired such a treasure of knowledge and ideas as no man advanced in years could easily rival. Now, with a shrill discord, the strings had suddenly snapped. Privy Councillor Ferber, the diligent statistician, promptly attempted a pathological explanation of Niebuhr's last utterances, giving a consoling assurance to the philistines that in the year '89 demoralisation had indeed been dominant, but that in the year '30 morality was supreme. Those with more insight, however, recognised a serious sign of the times in the pain that filled Niebuhr's last days with gloom. What struggles were foreshadowed for Germany when the very men who had trained the spirit of 1813, the very men who had most faithfully cherished that spirit, were one and all turning away in loathing from the ideals of the newest time!

Stein, too, regarded the future with grave anxiety in the days before he departed this life on June 29, 1831. Since their last revolution, the French had seemed to him more contemptible than ever. He utterly denied that "this nation without either love or truth" possessed the creative energy of the spirit, seeing that all the pioneer activities of recent civilisation had originated either among the Germanic peoples or else among the Italians and the Spaniards. On his very deathbed he exhorted those around him, as good Prussians, to fight for king and country against the ancient enemy. Thus he went to his rest, still filled with the fire of that noble passion which had warmed his greatest days. Throughout Westphalia, and in his native Lahn valley where the last of the old baronial race was laid in the tomb of his ancestors, the funeral train was received with all possible honour; and

even the towns of Old Prussia cherished grateful memories of the man who had created their civic freedom. So completely had the other Germans forgotten him, that Dahlmann wrathfully exclaimed: "The day will come when people will forgive him his virtues."

Stein had aged prematurely, but when Gneisenau, in the seventy-first year of his age, fell a victim to the Asiatic epidemic (August, 1831), he still felt full of the energy of his most virile years. Just as hopefully as, when a young man on the Main, he had once dreamed of founding colonies and towns in the New World, did he now in Posen let his fancies run upon a third victorious campaign to Paris and upon a fine death on the battlefield. Napoleon II, accompanying the Prussian advance guard, was the predestined assistant for the destruction of the bourgeois monarchy. Like Stein, Gneisenau had long ere this overcome everything that had made a breach between him and Frederick William, espousing the king's cause with straightforward gratitude. Shortly before death he wrote to his old friend Siegling with his customary and marvellous modesty: "You are a child of industry, but I am a child of luck." Yet more urgently than Gneisenau did Clausewitz, who within a few weeks followed his friend to the grave, demand the inevitable war against the revolution, insisting that all dissensions with Austria must be shelved for the present, so that the league of the eastern powers might stand fast in the decisive struggle.

Such was the mood of the heroes of the War of Liberation. Just as Arndt obstinately demanded a campaign in Brabant, so, in his *Footnotes to German Folkdom*, did Jahn fulminate against the reinvasion of the country by French manners. "At no time," he fiercely exclaimed, "has the German less understood than now after the great dogweek in Paris the one thing that is needful. His heart, filled with love for his foreign brethren, overflows with pure sentimentalism; he whistles, he sings, he plays, in the discords of all the neighbour peoples; he gossips, talks, and writes like the lawyers of his born foes; he believes the green of heaven and the blue of earth to be what the most lying of the French, Wends, and other madmen tell him they are." The old man went on to give a vivid description of the evils of an anonymous press, speaking of "the pen-equipped rout of dwarfs who chatter at every turn, offering dirty clouts for sale in

the rubbish market. With loud clamour these nameless scribblers plead for publicity and for freedom of the press, giving currency, secretly and unnoticed, to one false word after another. . . ." To conclude, he proudly held up his Prussia as an example to the cosmopolitans of the petty neighbour states, Prussia whose crown "has crowned, not the ruler alone, but the ruled likewise, making of them a people."

Since the power of anti-revolutionary sentiment was so great, it was inevitable that the feudalist party, the only compact party in Prussia, should at length create a literary organ to voice its aims. The struggle had become imperative, declared Heinrich Leo, "now that the year 1830 had given matters the touch of grim earnest." The design to found the *Berliner Politische Wochenblatt* originated in the circle of the brothers Gerlach, where, in the Wilhelmstrasse, Major Radowitz, refugee from Hesse, and on terms of intimate friendship with the crown prince, now shone by his invincible and didactic eloquence. The editorship was undertaken by Carl Ernst Jarcke, the young lawyer who in Bonn not long before had gone over to the Catholic church,[1] and who quite recently had displayed an exceptional talent for politics in an ultra-legitimist writing entitled *The French Revolution of* 1830. Like Leo and Hengstenberg, he was a Burschenschafter, and none of the three would ever acknowledge the abandonment of the romantic ideals of their youth. The paper took as its motto that iridescent sentence from de Maistre which applied so aptly to the crown prince, "Nous ne voulons pas la contre-révolution, mais le contraire de la révolution." It was intended to serve as meeting ground for all the anti-revolutionary parties. In reality it represented nothing but the doctrines of Haller's school in their most rigid interpretation. The restorer of political science could at length watch the sprouting of the seed he had sown; and the new journal, to which he was a frequent contributor, gave him much influence in the court society of Berlin. At this time he was engaged upon a further volume of his great work on priestly government, in which he displayed profound knowledge, but also partisan prejudice, demonstrating that the stupidest and most illiberal of all methods of rule, namely, theocracy, is in reality "the gentlest and least coercive of states," and that the one lawful church of Christendom, the Roman, though monarchical in form, is

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 548.

in spirit thoroughly republican. In a pamphlet entitled *Satan and the Revolution* he bluntly described the zeitgeist and its prophets as the empire of the devil, the spirit of falsehood.

His Berlin disciples might well delight him, seeing that they did not merely attack the follies of the liberal law of reason, but opposed also the very idea of the state. It was, they said, a philosophical abstraction. They looked upon Mecklenburg as the exemplary German land, speaking of it as "a fresh green oasis in the dead and sandy desert of contemporary constitutionalism." The doctrinaire advocates of "feudalist monarchy" now ignored that this gloriously liberal regime of the nobles, characteristic of Mecklenburg, had at one time prevailed, too, in almost all the territories of Prussia, and that only after the impositions of restraints upon the system had Prussia been enabled to become a great power. The *Wochenblatt* was brilliantly written; it was more cultured and courteous than the great majority of liberal journals; and its thousand subscribers (in those days the number was considerable) were exclusively persons of power and repute. Jarcke often received valuable information from Ribeaupierre, the Russian envoy. He cautiously eschewed religious questions, for he knew that he must not venture to disclose his ultramontane designs openly in Berlin. The king had little confidence in him, and notwithstanding the repeated requests of the crown prince, Altenstein, and Schmedding, would never consent to give the convert a professorial chair.[1] When, in November, 1832, after Gentz's death, Jarcke was invited to Vienna to fill the vacant post, he gladly accepted the call. In the Catholic atmosphere of the southern capital his talents could find freer scope, while now that he received his instructions from Metternich his connection with the *Wochenblatt*, which continued, became all the more important.

Desiring to provide the moderate conservatives with a platform for discussion, Bernstorff, Eichhorn, Savigny, and the generals Witzleben, Krauseneck, and Rühle, took counsel in the summer of 1831 with Perthes the bookseller. Shortly afterwards there was issued under Ranke's editorship the *Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift*, a review in the grand style, well

[1] Schmedding to Altenstein, August 1, 1829. The Crown Prince to Altenstein, February 3; Altenstein's Reply, February 10; Cabinet Order to Altenstein, October 18, 1832.

supplied with scientific work of high quality, its most notable publications in this vein being the editor's historical essays. For the everyday politicians, too, Ranke provided valuable enlightenment. To the amazement of the liberals he gave from official sources the first true description of Prussia's recent commercial policy, concerning which total ignorance had hitherto prevailed, whilst regarding the characteristics of the July revolution his judgments possessed the secure touch of genius, by which they were distinguished from those of his contemporaries. It is true that his mind, occupied solely with contemplation and cognition, could influence his readers' intelligence alone; it was beyond him to exercise the publicist's chief function, to move the will. Unknown to him was the lust of battle so indispensable to the politician. Like Leibnitz, he shunned "the unpleasing name of Eris," and so peace-loving was his disposition that he could never bring himself to lay a finger upon the wounds of his country. What must be the feelings of the enthusiastic young men who were dreaming of a mighty fatherland when the great historian could extol the blessings of the pitiable federal constitution. The Federation, he said, provided for defence by its military organisation, but the inadequacy of that organisation was so plain to every eye that Prussia utterly disregarded the Federation in her plans for the next war. The working classes, explained Ranke, were provided for by means of the customs union, and yet this union had not been originated by the Federation, but by sonderbunds in conflict with the Federation. As regards education, the teaching profession, in the view of the great historician, was provided for by the Carlsbad press law! Thus conducted, the periodical could never acquire such political power as was wielded by the *Wochenblatt.* Neither the aristocrats (as the feudalists were then termed) nor the liberals were in full agreement with its views, and since men of light and leading are always the first to feel what work is really suitable to them, after four years Ranke returned to his learned leisure. But how strange was the spectacle. Here in Prussia, which did not as yet possess one noteworthy liberal newspaper, were two highly cultured conservative periodicals, both continually discoursing, across the black-and-white boundary posts, to the South Germans and to the French.

Nevertheless Prussia's scattered liberals were gradually drawing together, moved thereto in the first instance by the

troubles in Poland. Nothing could have been franker than Prussian policy during these complications. From the outset Bernstorff declared to the Russian envoy that the interests of the two courts were here perfectly coincident. The king gave his son-in-law the most definite assurance that if the Poles should attempt to make their way through Prussian territory they would "find a befitting reception."[1] As a matter of principle, all communications addressed to the king by the rebel leaders were ignored. Ignored, likewise, were suggestions at mediation, even when these were made by intimates of the king, such as Count Maltzan, hereditary marshal of Silesia, or Gräfe, the distinguished oculist.[2] None the less, from humane motives, Prussian surgeons were despatched to Warsaw as well as to the Russian headquarters staff. Berlin was animated by a perfectly sincere desire for a speedy end to the troubles. Gneisenau merely expressed the universal opinion in governmental circles when he said that, while the Prussian state must for the sake of self-preservation safeguard its Polish possessions, yet Prussia could not desire a new partition of Poland, for "the relationships between Poles and Germans have become greatly embittered during these six-and-thirty years; the Poles are quite unfitted for the rule of a mild and just government such as ours."[3] Towards advances from the western powers the attitude both of Prussia and of Austria was one of dignified aloofness. When Sebastiani made the danger from cholera an excuse for demanding that the war should be brought to an immediate conclusion, when Palmerston had the audacity to remind the German powers of Vattel's *Law of Nations* and of the rights of neutrals, Metternich mockingly rejoined that the one thing still lacking to the general disintegration had been that the English ministers should give themselves out to be professors of international law; whilst Ancillon, with the king's express approval, bluntly assured Count Flahault that the Poles must first submit, for not till then could there be any talk of concessions.[4]

[1] Bernstorff to Alopeus, December 24, 1830; King Frederick William to Emperor Nicholas, April, 1831.

[2] Bernstorff's Report to the King, June 28; Bernstorff to Count Maltzan, March 12; Cabinet Order to Staff-Surgeon-in-Chief von Gräfe, March 24, 1831.

[3] Gneisenau to Bernstorff, July 21, 1831.

[4] Sebastiani, Instruction to Mortemart, May 15; Palmerston, Instruction to Cowley, June 19; Metternich, Instruction to Esterhazy, July 6; Ancillon, Report to the king, with marginal notes by the latter, July 26, 1831.

The loyal Germans on the frontier were honestly grateful to the king for his resolute demeanour. They were sufficiently near to the centre of disturbance to realize the incredible mendacity of the war news emanating from Warsaw. They knew that the struggle in Poland was by no means unequal, for though the Russians had slightly the advantage of numbers, this was fully compensated by the strength of the Polish position along the Vistula. They could not but smile at the picture hanging in every shop showing "the last ten men of the fourth regiment," who were supposed to have escaped the Russians after a sustained bayonet fight; and Julius Mosen's bombastic verses beneath the print could hardly fail to amuse them, for they had seen with their own eyes these heroic "last ten," still eighteen hundred strong, fleeing across the frontier at Strasburg-on-the-Drewenz, and they had seen the entire fourth regiment unresistingly pile arms at the order of a handful of Prussians. In Berlin, however, and in the more distant provinces, the "love of the Germans for their foreign brethren" (stigmatised by Jahn) soon flamed brightly. It was not by chance that immediately before the first partition Rousseau had glorified the incomparable freedom of the Poles. A sense of elective affinity united modern radicalism with the anarchistic regime of the Sarmatian nobles, whilst additional assimilating influences were Russophobia and the magical influence of Parisian journalistic phraseology. A sarmatiophil literature sprang into luxuriant life, a literature whose pretentiousness was exceeded only by its ignorance, and it was through the influence of the Sarmatiophils that Prussia, which in the autumn of 1830 had been regarded by the liberals with some respect, fell again into disrepute. The most notable leader of this group was Spazier, the illuminate, and of old the vilifier of Goethe; associated with him in these activities were the two Bavarians, Grosse and Widemann, also Dr. Butte, and a crowd of anonymous writers, not one of whom had ever visited the erstwhile Ordensland. In the seclusion of his Italian home, Platen penned his wild Polish songs, writing with unaccustomed ardour, but with absolutely no knowledge of the facts. It was his serious belief that "Rome and her Jesuits" (who, it need hardly be said, were in truth upon the side of the orthodox Poles) exchanged fraternal kisses with the flat-nosed Muscovites—for to the liberals the Roman mitre and the Russian knout were the joint symbols of political

corruption. And when the poet hailed the czar in the following terms,

> Son of a bastard, grandson of a whore!
> Art not aware that all are saying:
> "What of thy oath, Rehoboam?"

he merely overlooked one trifle, to wit, that it was not Nicholas who had broken faith, but the Poles.

The sarmatiophils in Berlin constituted the first slight nucleus of a liberal opposition party. They met daily at Steheli's the pastry cook's, behind the theatre, reading there the *Courrier polonais* and the *Warschauerblatt*, railing against the Russophil diplomats and officers who met at the Nobles' Club in the Pariserplatz, and above all against the faithful Stägemann—for Stägemann, as a good East Prussian, gave frank expression in his *Anti-Messenian Odes* to the old hatred of the marchmen for the Sarmatians, apostrophising Poland thus:

> Faint gleam of radiance, once known as Poland;
> Flung forth to the night, thy light is quenched.

Besides Eduard Gans, it was Varnhagen and Rahel von Ense, above all, who fanned the flames of enthusiasm for Poland. Throughout these years, Varnhagen had persistently endeavoured to regain Bernstorff's confidence by voluntary diplomatic labours, and among them by a memorial recommending that the Prussian constitution should be secretly elaborated, that the country should provisionally be ruled by it, and that after a year's trial the constitution should be promulgated.[1] Recently the good-natured minister had given him temporary employment in the foreign office, but this had soon terminated in consequence of his incurable political dilettantism, so that he was now once more playing the part of the heroic champion of liberty. Beneath the surface, these sarmatiophil sentiments of the cultured world exercised powerful influence. Friedrich von Raumer's writing, *The Fall of Poland*, read almost like an attack upon Frederick the Great, and the ministers of state actually thought of prosecuting the pamphleteer. But Frederick William, having read the booklet, atoned royally to the historian, commissioning him, as a manifestly unbiased and honourable author, to compile from official sources a

[1] Varnhagen, Observations upon the Circumstances of the Day, June 29, 1820.

work on Prussia's relationships with Poland during the years 1830-32. Raumer accepted the commission, loyally fulfilling the task, but his work was so lifeless that the government left it unprinted.[1] Moreover, the Berlin stock exchange (which was now enjoying favourable days, the national bonds having sunk to 82-83, and which was beginning to exercise a perceptible influence upon public opinion) was in the habit of hailing any tidings of a Polish victory with a rise in the price of securities. Even in the army, views were by no means unanimous, for to the Prussian officers Russian rudeness had been no less displeasing than Austrian rudeness. The *Militärwochenblatt* published some articles by Major Willisen, which not only censured in strong terms the Russian conduct of the military operations, but in addition gave the Poles such benevolent advice that Ancillon, in great alarm, complained to the minister for war, and compelled him to intervene.[2]

Excitement spread when the fortune of war turned against the Poles, and when in July, 1831, Gielgud's corps, numbering 7,000 men, and in October General Rybinski's corps numbering 17,000 men, laid down their arms on Prussian soil, and when, to celebrate the occasion, Gielgud was promptly shot as a traitor by one of his officers. What a task was involved in sheltering these semi-savage warriors, verminous and much afflicted with loathsome diseases, until the czar would permit their amnestied return. General Krafft and the Prussian provincial authorities discharged their laborious duties with exemplary patience. The Poles were cared for just as if they had been Prussians, were provided with clothing, and were even given pocket money. The behaviour of the rank and file was seemly; but in Marienburg and at the Golden Stag in Elbing, the officers caroused after such a fashion that even the German sarmatiophils could not refrain from asking themselves whether this was the way to mourn for a lost fatherland. Little by little the majority returned home, having been assured of pardon, most of them on their departure giving loud cheers for the good king who had extended so humane a welcome to soldiers in misfortune, even though they were his enemies.

In the interim, however, the Parisian national committee had despatched secret instructions to the effect that the nucleus

[1] It was printed at a later date in Raumer's Collected Works, vol. II. p. 501.

[2] Ancillon to Hake, March 26; Reply, April 7; Krauseneck to Bernstorff, April 12; Reply, May 7, 1831.

of the Polish army must remain intact, in order to participate from France in the approaching war of vengeance. The remaining refugees were spurred on by emissaries from General Bem (a German, whose real name was Böhm). The consequence was that even those officers whose punishment had been altogether remitted refused to return home, inventing worthless excuses. Worst of all was the behaviour of "the last ten of the fourth regiment." Many of these had been repatriated, but over eight hundred yet remained in Germany, continually at odds with their billet-hosts. In the year 1832, when they were assembled at Fischau near Elbing to be shown to new cantonments, armed with cudgels and staves they advanced threateningly upon the small Prussian guard, until, after repeated warnings, the commanding officer made his men fire upon the mutinous crowd. Instantly these valiant warriors threw themselves flat upon the ground, and a compassionate peasant who was looking on had already exclaimed, "Good God, the poor fellows have all been killed!" when suddenly the majority sprang to their feet and took refuge in flight. Nine lay dead on the ground, and about twelve others were left behind seriously wounded; the refugees were rounded up by the incensed peasantry, and now allowed themselves to be conducted to their quarters patiently enough. Thus closed the career of the last ten of the fourth regiment. In the spring the land was at length freed from its unbidden guests. To the last the king insisted that no one should be handed over unless he had been promised clemency, saying: "We can never consent to send back to an uncertain fate these men who have entered Prussian territory trusting in our protection." Czar Nicholas fruitlessly endeavoured on more than one occasion to secure that the ringleaders at least should be extradited. About seven hundred men, excluded from the amnesty or disdaining clemency, were ultimately put on board ship to be sent to America, but, having mutinied once more upon the high seas, were perforce landed at Havre.

Prussia's behaviour towards her own Polish subjects was no less conciliatory. The temper of the Polish gentry and of the Catholic priests in Posen was very difficult for a while. The hotheads among them saw in imagination the eagles upon the Rathaus tower, which time had long since blackened, turning white once more. Inevitable was the king's decree that participation in the revolt would be regarded as treason.

But after the war Frederick William promised amnesty to all who should return home within a specified period. Nevertheless judicial proceedings had to be taken against more than sixteen hundred persons. Fourteen hundred of these were found guilty and sentenced, twelve hundred subsequently receiving a free pardon. In the case of one hundred and eighty of the condemned, the fines were entirely remitted, while their imprisonment was reduced by one half. Twenty-two only of the wealthier landowners, the whole of whose property was legally forfeit, had to pay fines amounting to one-fifth of their respective possessions, the sums thus accruing being assigned by the king to educational institutions.

What was the reward for this unprecedented and manifestly imprudent lenity? A howl of rage arose from the entire liberal press of Europe. The Polish national committee in Paris impeached the king before the world at large on account of the horrible massacre at Fischau, saying: "Never shall we forget that this crime was committed upon a soil which was at one time Polish, and that the ancestors of those who murder our fellow citizens were once tributary to Poland!" In further illustration of the claim that Prussia was tributary, the president of the committee, Lelewel (also a German, and really called Löllhöfel), designed a map of the reconstituted kingdom of Poland, including not merely the Ordensland, but claiming in addition for the white eagle monstrous cantles of Brandenburg and Pomerania. No less coarse and no less lying were the utterances of Czynski in a writing describing the treatment of his fellow countrymen, and entitled *Prussia in the Year* 1831. Mickiewicz, the distinguished poet, in his *Books of the Polish Nation*, divided universal history into two periods, "from the creation of the world down to the agonising death of the Polish nation," and the subsequent epoch. He described the German character in the following terms: "It is fathered by the workman's bench and mothered by the pot-house." He concluded with the prayer: "By the blood of the soldiers slaughtered at Fischau by the Prussians, good Lord deliver us!" These savage attacks on the part of the deadly enemies of Germany were eagerly retailed by the parliamentary orators and the newspaper writers of South Germany, although two Prussian officers, Dankbahr and Brandt, both eye-witnesses, had published reasonably worded and truthful descriptions of what had occurred. These friends of every country but their

own, what weight with them had the plain words of fellow Germans as compared with the vainglorious utterances of "the noble Poles"? For the liberal journals, "noble" was the inevitable adjective in this connection; ignoble Poles were non-existent.

In Old Prussia the Polish dissensions left, in the end, much bad blood behind. For a long period it had been necessary to guard the frontier, this interfering with the natural channels of intercourse. It was inevitable, too, that the establishment of a sanitary cordon against the Asiatic cholera should involve serious misunderstandings, for little was as yet known about this enigmatic disease. Schön, who as usual was better informed than everyone else, considered it demonstrated that cholera was not communicable, and made confusion worse confounded by his well-meaning but arbitrary regulations. After the German manner, all the blame was laid upon the government. In July, 1831, the municipal authorities of Königsberg despatched an extremely disrespectful address to the king, demanding that intercourse with Russia, whether by land or by sea, should be absolutely prohibited, the rejoinder being a cabinet order couched in very ungracious terms. When the war clouds had at length cleared away, Russia displayed her gratitude for Prussia's neighbourly help by an intensification of the embargo on the frontier which practically annihilated all legal traffic between the neighbour states. The province suffered severely, discontent increased, and by the middle of the thirties the royalist city of Königsberg had become hardly recognisable. There were now in the town two fiercely hostile parties, opposing one another with all the acerbity characteristic of the Old Prussians. The *Königsberger Zeitung*, at one time so docile, now judged everything done by the government in a spirit of carping criticism which showed very plainly that the vigorous will animating this province might readily become centred in a dangerous anti-governmental party. Plainly there was urgent need to provide free vent for all these suppressed oppositions. Dahlmann hit the nail on the head when, writing in the *Hannoversche Zeitung* under the caption "Addresses by an Apprehensive Man," he maintained: "There is a state in Germany which possesses the magic spear that simultaneously heals and wounds. On the day when the king of Prussia establishes for his realm the right to representation in the estates of the realm, the legal-minded

German will breathe freely once again. He will then be assured that during the development of freedom, law will continue to prevail; that our dynasties will continue to be honoured; but in addition that henceforward the federal assembly will take into its calculations and will gradually incorporate into the fundamental law those leading ideas which will safeguard our good native rights against all noxious influences, whether from the east or from the west.

§ 2. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FEDERAL MILITARY SYSTEM.

All the necessary antecedents were still lacking for the carrying out of any such design to rejuvenate the Bundestag. It was inevitable that the primary aim of Prussia's federal policy during these threatening days should merely be to establish Germany's safety at home and abroad. Towards the court of the Palais Royal the attitude of the minor German cabinets was above criticism, and was far more patriotic than that of their liberal subjects. In some of these cabinets dread of the revolution, and in others recent memories of the fate of Frederick Augustus of Saxony, might exercise an unfavourable influence, but the majority in every case was inspired by genuinely national feelings. When General Sebastiani privately asked the Bavarian and Würtemberg envoys and the court of Carlsruhe whether a new confederation of the Rhine might not be established, or whether, at least, arrangements might not be made to secure the neutrality of South Germany, he was answered by strongly worded refusals, and the courts concerned faithfully reported the occurrence to the German great powers.[1] At this period, when the negotiations regarding the customs union had had such a happy issue, King Louis of Bavaria was filled with ardent enthusiasm on behalf of Prussia. When sending his son to the Berlin university he repeatedly assured King Frederick William that he did so in order that the heir apparent might become inspired with sentiments towards Prussia "like those by which I am permeated on behalf of a country that more than once saved Bavaria for my house, and indeed I consider that Germany's

[1] King Louis of Bavaria to King Frederick William, March 17, 1831; Otterstedt's Report, December 12, 1830; Arnim's Report, Carlsruhe, January 8, 1831.

salvation can only be found in a close union with Prussia." [1] The king of Würtemberg had likewise broken completely with the trias dreams of earlier years, and his sober mind made him more and more unsympathetic to the empty rhetoric of the liberals. Meeting Louis Philippe at Strasburg in June, 1831, his attitude was one of strict reserve, and in the end he told the French ruler in plain terms that a new confederation of the Rhine was absolutely out of the question.[2]

However excellent the sentiments of the minor courts, at Frankfort, in accordance with established custom, every thoroughgoing federal resolution continued to encounter selfish opposition. On September 18, 1830, Münch, in understanding with Nagler, summoned the federal envoys to a secret session. He explained to them that, in these days of ferment, extraordinary measures of precaution were requisite, seeing that "the Federation is essentially based upon the principle of mutual intervention in all those cases which would otherwise be decided by international law." [3] It was first suggested that federal troops to the number of several thousand should be stationed in the neighbourhood of Frankfort, and that in case of need flying columns should be despatched through the disturbed regions of Central Germany. But Bavaria raised objections. King Louis was unwilling to tolerate anything that might diminish his sovereignty. Bavaria, whose frontiers marched with those of thirteen neighbours, could never obey foreign instructions, nor could she even agree, as was suggested in Frankfort, to place some of her battalions under the command of a Nassauan general. Only as a sovereign power, and not as a federal state, was Bavaria willing to render help to her neighbours. Louis imagined himself to be perfectly safe, for his country had hitherto remained tranquil, and the Munichers celebrated their October festival with the usual libations of beer. He wrote irritably to his federal envoy: "We are prepared, with German-patriotic sentiments, to furnish assistance to the Federation in accordance with the provisions of the federal law, but we ourselves have no occasion to demand extraneous aid for the protection of the frontiers of our realm." Zentner appended the following note: "Billeting

[1] King Louis of Bavaria to King Frederick William, September 30 and November 2, 1830.

[2] Salviati's Report, June 27; Otterstedt's Reports, June 21 and 26, 1831.

[3] Blittersdorff's Report, September 18, 1830.

is detested in peace time, and will be detested still more if our good citizens are compelled to house the subjects of other states." [1]

Metternich was already afraid that Bavaria's old-time separatist policy was about to be resumed, and in his anxiety he grasped at an extremely unusual method of negotiation. He despatched to Munich King Louis' own envoy, Count Bray, bearing an autograph writing from Emperor Francis and two voluminous memorials which were to open the Wittelsbach ruler's eyes to the dangers of the situation. "To-day, the concern of princes and peoples must be to live, and not to fall a prey to that class of proletarians who pursue aims they neither will nor can avow, persons who desire always to destroy and never to create." [2] At first King Louis received with comprehensible disfavour the envoy thus sent to preach Austrian policy to his master. But the king's mood soon became more gracious, and in an affable despatch he thanked the emperor for the latter's "sublime views," disclaiming the suggestion that he desired to bring about any cleavage in the Federation.[3]

Metternich's anxieties proved, however, to be without foundation. The Wittelsbach sovereign's dynastic vanity had been affronted, but in essentials his views were perfectly accordant with those of the great powers. At this very time the court of Munich was responsible for a new and deplorable sample of that false and oblique policy which Bavaria had continually displayed in the matter of the Carlsbad decrees. In the year 1824 the laws of exception had been put in force for a further period, this being done chiefly upon Bavarian initiative, although when the vote was taken the Bavarian envoy had interjected the casual remark that they would be enforced "in the same manner as before." [4] A proviso of this character was devoid of legal efficacy in the case of a unanimous decision of the Bundestag; but with some stretching it might be interpreted to mean that in Bavaria, as heretofore, books and scientific periodicals were to remain uncensored. In actual fact, during the subsequent years of

[1] King Louis, Instructions to Lerchenfeld, October 4, 6, and 9; "Comments" by the Bavarian ministry, October 9, 1830.

[2] Emperor Francis to King Louis, Pressburg, October 9, 1830, with two Enclosures; Points pour le Comte Orlow; Points pour le Comte Bray.

[3] King Louis to Emperor Francis, October 24, 1830.

[4] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 104.

tranquillity the Bavarian censorship was comparatively mild, and the smaller journals, which dealt exclusively with local affairs, were left quite unmolested. But after the July revolution several of these local sheets adopted so inflammatory a tone that King Louis became greatly incensed. In profound secrecy, and without consulting Minister Armansperg, he wrote on September 27th to Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian federal envoy, saying that he desired to bring the printed discussion of home affairs under the control of the censorship, but could not venture to do this without the assistance of the Bundestag. In inviolable confidence, therefore, Lerchenfeld was to urge the Prussian federal envoy to make a proposal in this sense. He timorously added: "It must not transpire that Prussia takes action at my incitation, and no one in Bavaria must get wind of the matter at any time." Again and again he recurred to the need for profound secrecy concerning Bavaria's readiness that such a measure should be adopted.

His request was hardly needed, for the two great powers had already determined to draw the reins of the censorship somewhat tighter. Thus it came to pass that on October 21, 1830, the new federal resolutions concerning Germany's safety could be adopted with tolerable harmony.[1] The resolutions went no further than was indispensable. In their drafting there was plainly manifest the restraining hand of Bernstorff, who during all these months was at feud with Metternich, so that the Hofburg, infuriated by his moderation, had been obstinately but unsuccessfully endeavouring to excite suspicion of the foreign minister in the mind of Frederick William.[2] The Federation merely demanded that the federated states should hold their respective troops in readiness for mutual support, that they should provide their federal envoys with extended powers, that they should keep their censors on the watch, and that even those periodicals which confined attention to home affairs should be subjected to strict supervision. The last clause was introduced by Prussia, desirous to extend a friendly hand and to help the anxious king of Bavaria out of his difficulties. For the rest, the resolution was drafted in far gentler and more conciliatory terms than had been the earlier Frankfort resolutions dealing with the same subject. The Bundestag expressed the expectation that the governments

[1] Instruction to Lerchenfeld, October 13, 1831.
[2] Bernstorff, Justificatory Despatch to the King, September 27, 1830.

would not confine themselves to avoiding dangerous lenity, but that they would further afford paternal redress to their subjects' legitimate grievances. Such a recognition of popular rights was unprecedented in the history of the federal assembly. In his accompanying address, Nagler, acting upon express injunctions from Eichhorn, and in opposition to his personal inclination, was compelled to declare in plain terms that many of the states had given occasion for complaint through neglect of their federal duties, and above all through their failure to establish representative assemblies.

This reasonable decision had, unfortunately, an epilogue which aroused well-grounded displeasure among the liberals. For the first time Czar Nicholas ventured to intervene in federal policy, expressing to the Frankfort assembly his approval of their wise decision; and the Bundestag responded by a despatch of thanks, heedless of the consideration that one who is entitled to commend is entitled also to censure. Shortly afterwards Prussia at length secured that the contingents of the smallest states should be amalgamated to constitute a reserve infantry division, available in the event of war to garrison the federal fortresses. It was very probable that such resolutions would come to nothing, for even in these dangerous days the proceedings of the federal military committee were as futile as ever. The committee was discussing the oath to be taken by the commanding officer of the still unfinished federal fortress of Landau. Würtemberg delivered to this body a lengthy lecture concerning the question who ought to pay for a horse killed during the building of the Luxemburg fortress, the upshot of the debates being that no provision had been made for so difficult a case, which could be settled only by a new federal law.[1]

When the danger of war became more pressing, King Frederick William asked the foreign office (November 10th) how tranquillity was to be maintained in Germany should war break out. Bernstorff thereupon made Eichhorn expound in a detailed memorial the leading principles of the former's federal policy (January 29, 1831). He unhesitatingly admitted that the discontent in the smaller states had not originated solely in consequence of the July revolution, but had been conditioned by serious errors on the part of the governments, and especially by the dissatisfaction of the Germans on account

[1] Nagler's Reports, November 10 and 22, December 10, 1830.

of the country's disintegration. Consequently the war against France must not be waged on grounds of principle as a struggle on behalf of legitimist right, but as a war for the defence of the national frontiers, for then the nation would respond to a cordial appeal from the king no less joyfully than it had done in the year 1813, especially if people were enlightened regarding the situation by patriotic writings. He did not consider that the time had yet come for federal reform. "When the German governments, taught by experience, cease to see, in arrangements aiming only at establishing and increasing the common good of Germany, nothing but attempts to limit their sovereignty and to be dreaded on that account; when in their own interests rightly understood they find a stimulus to put their hands voluntarily to the work of bringing such arrangements into being; then and then only will the time be ripe for an improvement of the German federal constitution in accordance with the principles of Prussia." For the nonce, the only course open was that Prussia, by a strictly legal attitude and one thoroughly loyal to the Federation, should secure the confidence of all the other members, simultaneously continuing by separate agreements with the individual states to further aims of general utility, and, above all, to advance step by step towards free trade throughout Germany.

The king agreed to these principles (March 22nd). The imminence of war compelled prompt advance along the recommended course of entering into separate agreements. Now that the need for men was really pressing, the courts were unanimous concerning the irremediable ineffectiveness of the federal military organisation—not excepting those middle-sized states which, animated by envy of Prussia, had created this masterpiece. The feeling was universal that for the next war, at least, agreement must be secured for the establishment of a different and firmer organisation, seeing that Austria's best energies would be monopolised in the protection of Italy. Upon reiterated representations from Prussia, the Hofburg declared itself ready to negotiate with the South German courts, but Austrian energy was paralysed by the old indifference towards Germany and by the inertia that now possessed the aging court. Count Schönburg, envoy in Stuttgart, who was to lead the negotiations, remained for months inactive in Vienna, so that Prussia was ultimately compelled to do everything upon her own initiative. In December, 1830, General

Röder was despatched to Vienna, and in January astonished the Hofburg by definitely declaring that the formation of a federal army under a federal commander was manifestly impossible. Prussia designed to enter the war with all her forces, and demanded the constitution of three armies: a Prussian army on the Moselle, reinforced by the little North German contingents; a South German army on the Upper and Middle Rhine, stiffened by Prussian troops; an Austrian army in Swabia. This disregarded the federal military organisation, though but temporarily, for the duration of the next war, which Prussia had good grounds for wishing to avoid. The ludicrous artifice by which six of the nine Prussian army corps were excluded from the federal army was to be ignored, Prussia, as was fitting, assuming leadership of the federal war, and Austria contenting herself with the modest role of auxiliary power.

In view of the uncertain state of affairs in Italy, there prevailed in Vienna so keen a sentiment of Austria's weakness that the Hofburg did not venture a flat refusal of these bold demands. No binding answer, indeed, was forthcoming; and in February, 1831, the king therefore determined to send General Rühle von Lilienstern to treat directly with the South German courts. The Prussian negotiator was received everywhere with open arms. King Louis made no secret of the fact that he had no more confidence in Austria's honesty than in her military strength. At this juncture, to the great indignation of the French envoy, he had the Bavarian war march which he had written in January, 1814, produced once more in the theatre. He was quite ready to take action, but only in close association with Prussia, and on the condition that in case of need his troops could withdraw towards the Main, towards Prussia.[1] The courts of Stuttgart, Carlsruhe, and Darmstadt likewise readily acceded to Prussia's proposals, agreeing even to the appointment of a joint commander for the South German forces. King William of Würtemberg had secretly hoped for this position, but in the opinion of the Prussian generals, though he was an able and steady leader, he was no commander, and was not a man to win the affection of his troops.[2] Since the other South German courts shared

[1] Rühle's and Küster's Report, March 7; Küster's Reports, March 7 and 25, April 10, 1831.

[2] General Wolzogen to Bernstorff, October 14, 1830.

this view, the king magnanimously surrendered his ambition and recommended that Wrede, who had the prior claim as field marshal, should be appointed joint commander of the Bavarian and of the eighth federal army corps.

It was a brilliant success that the ancient German quarrelsomeness should be thus completely overcome. The highland courts now engaged in eager negotiations concerning the details of the campaign.[1] Witzleben wrote delightedly to the foreign office: "The South German courts have shown their confidence in us, and it is essential that we should respond *largement.* Prussian policy is characterised by directness and openness, and we must therefore speak plainly to our South German brethren. The true interests of Germany will ever be Prussia's interests. Consequently we cannot fail to support all desires that do not conflict with Prussia's interests, nor is there any doubt that in this matter we shall readily come to an understanding with Austria." [2] General Krauseneck, a man whose views inclined more towards liberalism, was already cherishing the bold hope that these negotiations might eventuate in a military league of the lesser states under Prussia's hegemony, a league analogous with the customs union. The view became more and more widely diffused among the Prussian generals that in German military affairs Austria could be neither the creator nor the leader. Even Duke Charles of Mecklenburg did not hesitate to express this heretical thought. Unfortunately, however, the excellent sentiments of the South German courts secured immediate realisation in words alone. Something was done to bring about an approximation to uniformity in grades and armament of the Badenese, Würtemberger, and Hessian contingents, and on one occasion the eighth federal army corps actually assembled at Heilbronn for joint manœuvres. But the condition of the troops still left much to be desired, partly because of the foolish niggardliness of the diets and partly because of King Louis' extravagant expenditure upon works of art. Each Bavarian battalion had but sixty men with the colours, and when the king, for the first time since his accession, held a review of the Munich regiments, the entire garrison comprised only twelve hundred foot, four hundred horse, and five batteries.[3]

[1] Wrede to Margrave William of Baden, February 20; Reply, February 27, 1832.

[2] Witzleben to Eichhorn, July 1, 1831.

[3] Küster's Report, June 26, 1831.

The court of Vienna had awakened meanwhile from its lethargy. Lieutenant-General Langenau, Prussia's old enemy in Frankfort, uttered urgent warnings against the proposals from Berlin. Metternich dreaded, too, though quite without reason, that the South Germans would combine to form a league of neutrality. Moreover, General Bangold, a Würtemberger in ill repute at the Hofburg as a liberal, cooperated in the negotiations; and at all the minor courts the envoys of Louis Philippe were suspiciously busy.[1] It was jealousy aroused by Prussia's successes that ultimately induced the Austrian negotiators to counter General Röder with certain proposals of their own. They could hardly hope any longer that their own nominee would be chosen leader of the federal army, for Archduke Charles was by no means inclined to fill this thorny office under the suspicious eyes of his brother. They therefore demanded the constitution of two armies, all the South German troops being under Austrian leadership and all the North German under Prussian. What a shifting of power did this suggestion indicate! Of late years Prussia had worked for this bipartition of the federal army as perhaps the best arrangement attainable, while Austria had unflaggingly opposed. Now the Hofburg was upholding against its rival this identical military dualism. But the ideas of Berlin had advanced a stage. It was known how small a part Austria could play in a federal war, and the effective leadership of all the minor contingents was consequently demanded for Prussia.

Thus the negotiations in Vienna were at a standstill. The South German courts were unanimous in their approval of Prussia's suggestion. They were absolutely unwilling to entrust their troops to Austrian leadership, and when Langenau went so far as to suggest that the Austrian and South German army should have its line of retreat open towards the Lech, the unhappy memories of the days of the revolutionary wars were reawakened. Emperor Francis had his own inertia to thank for the fact that Prussia had now come to an understanding with the minor courts, and that he, the powerful ally of former days, had been thrust almost to one side. But he was none the less affronted by the king's line of action. Writing to Frederick William on April 2nd in the customary tone of friendship, he expressed his thanks for Röder's mission, but concluded in the following terms, plainly intended for a

[1] Maltzahn's Report, May 6, 1831.

warning: "The greater the dangers of the time, the more powerful becomes my conviction that the only safe issue can be found in the most intimate, most open, and most complete union between us two." [1] At the same time, Metternich took occasion to give the Berlin court more and more urgent reminders that the old confidence between the two leading powers made it essential that where matters of federal policy were concerned they should always come to a preliminary understanding. When the king was at Teplitz spa in August, Metternich's confidant, Councillor von Werner, made a formal request that he should permit an Austrian military plenipotentiary to visit Berlin, in order to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory issue.

Frederick William was disagreeably surprised. He gave way, however, for at the moment the peril of war was not urgent; and since the struggle, should it come, must be waged jointly with Austria, it seemed inadvisable to offend his old ally. There could be no question of a permanent reform of the federal military organisation. The South German courts would never have agreed to it, and least of all the jealous king of Würtemberg. Bernstorff was far too sober-minded to look for the possibility of any alteration in the laws of the Federation.[2] Clausewitz, too, advised a clear understanding with the court of Vienna. In September the Austrian general Count Clam came to Berlin, a dashing and wealthy magnate, of whose abilities Metternich took far too exalted a view, so that he was frequently employed on confidential missions. He was a persona grata to the court ladies, but had less success with men, for in the mouth of this handsome man of the world the wheedling Viennese tone had a hypocritical ring. Whenever Clam had occasion to put forward some arrogant Austrian demand, he would add with friendly emphasis that the proposal proved "how Prussia's honour, prestige, and eminent position in the Federation, are no less important and dear to Austria than her own." [3] During long months neither Bernstorff nor Generals Krusemark and Rühle could come to terms with their loquacious friend. Ultimately Bernstorff, ailing and irritable, begged the king that he might be excused this duty.[4]

[1] Emperor Francis to King Frederick William, April 2, 1831.
[2] Bernstorff Memorial concerning the Federal Constitution, November 1, 1831.
[3] Clam to Knesebeck, March 15, 1833, etc.
[4] Cabinet Order to Bernstorff, March 12; Bernstorff to Clam, March 14, 1832.

General Knesebeck was commissioned to continue the conversations. Of old a loyal and devoted friend to the Hofburg he did his best to meet Clam's wishes. But Prussia's demands were in such perfect harmony with the existing relationships of power that even Knesebeck could abate them but little. At length, in May, 1832, when the military plenipotentiaries of the South German courts (which had been kept faithfully informed by Prussia of all that was going on) were invited to Berlin, and when similar invitations were extended to representatives from Saxony and Hanover, Prussian policy was completely triumphant. The officers of the middle-sized states unanimously favoured Prussia's proposals. The military conference decided that in the event of war three armies should be formed, two, each consisting of Prussian and federal troops, being stationed on the Lower and on the Middle Rhine, while on the Upper Rhine there was to be an Austrian army. Prussia pledged herself to provide 231,000 men, in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses; the lesser states were to furnish 116,000 men, a somewhat bold calculation; whilst Austria's contribution was to amount to 172,000 men. The last figure was accepted from politeness merely, for no one believed that the war in Italy would leave so many Austrian soldiers available for use elsewhere. Should these proposals ever materialise, it was obvious that the leadership of the federal war would fall to Prussia. The plan was then communicated to General Neidhardt, who had been sent from St. Petersburg, and Czar Nicholas repeated his fantastic proposal that in the event of war he should cover Poland with 100,000 men, and should despatch 200,000 men after the German army as an "awe-inspiring reserve." Thus it was hoped to secure protection against any possible onslaught. The negotiations were kept profoundly secret, and for the time being remained inoperative seeing that war was averted. But they afforded striking proof that when need was pressing even the jealous petty courts could receive no help except from Prussia. Those whose outlook towards the future was unprejudiced might well deem that the time for which Eichhorn hoped was approaching, when German affairs would be ripe for a Prussian federal reform. The system of peaceful dualism had led the Germanic Federation into a blind alley. The larger courts perceived clearly that the only possible way of carrying on war against France was under Prussia's leadership, and yet no one ventured

even to propose the legislative reconstruction of the federal military system.'[1]

Prussia's federal policy was meanwhile undergoing gradual alteration. The immediate cause of the change was the resignation of Bernstorff, who in May, 1832, found that the sufferings due to his illness made further work impossible.[2] He was succeeded by Ancillon, for Werther had declined the proffered post, Eichhorn's reputed enmity to the eastern powers made him undesirable, and no other suitable diplomatist could be found. In secret, Ancillon had long coveted this dignity. The vain man was now radiant with delight, and in his free-handed distribution of pearls of political wisdom he resembled Louis Philippe of Orleans, to whom he had also a remarkable physical likeness. In the opinion of the foreign diplomats he desired to become the Cardinal Fleury of Prussia. But Ancillon's ambition did not soar so high. It would suffice him if things should continue to move quietly along in the old groove, and if the peace of the world should be maintained. There was no real change of system, for the king kept the conduct of foreign policy under his personal control, but the new minister's pusillanimity soon made itself felt. Whilst Bernstorff's attitude towards the Hofburg had become continually stiffer as the years went by, Ancillon's Austrian leanings had been all too faithfully cherished. Immediately after assuming office he expressed his humble admiration "for the great statesman to whom Europe owes so much," assuring him of "the complete equivalence of the system of the two powers."[3] His reiterated flattery of Metternich and the unctuous pulpit style of his interminable didactic despatches made his policy seem even feebler than it actually was. A far more disastrous influence was exercised by the increasing unrest in High Germany. The stubborn resistance of the South German liberals to the federal law, the immoderate language of their press, their unpatriotic intrigues with France and Poland, their savage attacks on Prussia, their threats and conspiracies—all combined to compel the Berlin court, whose view of the movements of the new age had at the outset been so indulgent, to resume closer ties with Austria.

[1] See Appendix XXIV.
[2] Cabinet Order to the Ministry of State, May 10, 1832.
[3] Ancillon to Maltzahn, May 7 and 28, 1832.

CHAPTER IV.

DIETS AND FESTIVITIES IN HIGH GERMANY.

§ 1. DISTURBANCES IN UPPER HESSE. THE BADENESE DIET OF 1831.

In South Germany the after-effects of the occurrences in Paris were manifest somewhat later than in the petty states of the north, but the influence on the south was far more considerable. Here modern constitutions had been in existence for a considerable time, and there was consequently no place for popular movements against the feudalist ordering of society. In the close of the year 1830 everything was still tolerably tranquil, but Darmstadt became involved in the Central German disturbances through its proximity to Electoral Hesse. Grand Duke Louis, advanced in years, died in April, 1830. He was succeeded by his son, Louis II, an honourable and well-meaning ruler, not entirely devoid of talent, but inactive and lacking independence of mind. He was already well over fifty at the time of his accession. With the aid of his Badenese wife (a princess of exceptional ability, well fitted to play a larger part), he had acquired a notable amount of debt, which, under the fostering care of Amschel Rothschild, had become swollen to the sum of two million gulden—a notable amount for a territory containing seven hundred thousand inhabitants. Minister du Thil, a capable financier, now stipulated that the disagreeable monetary position of the princely house should be disclosed to the diet, and he asked the chambers for an increase in the civil list, or, as an alternative, that the debt should be taken over by the nation.

The demand was drastic, and met with a very unfriendly reception in the diet. Throughout the minor states the fable that republican institutions are cheap had found general

acceptance. Every newspaper envied the United States because of the modest salary with which the president of that country had to content himself, and no one remembered that the cost of a single presidential election, of which no account was taken in the official budget of the North American state, was far greater than that of all the German civil lists taken together. Cheap government on the republican model was the universal war-cry. Ernst Emil Hoffmann, now the most prominent man in the chamber, washed the dirty linen of the princely house with demagogic glee, and, after prolonged and extremely disrespectful discussions, the grand duke's demands were all rejected. Necessity was thus imposed upon the court to effect a notable restriction of expenditure, and even to close the Hoftheater, which the Darmstadters, like all the inhabitants of the lesser German capitals, regarded as the only spice in the dulness of their existence. The anger of court society was now concentrated upon du Thil, whose revelations were deemed solely responsible for the defeat, and for the offensive utterances made in the diet. Ambitious Prince Emilius, who had unfortunately refused a commission in the Austrian army, and could find no scope for his military abilities in his little native state, took sides openly against the minister.

Meanwhile the ferment was beginning to work in Upper Hesse. Riotous bands from the grand duchy made common cause with the Electoral Hessian customs stormers, for in the fragmentary territories of Wetterau the burdens alone of the Prussian customs union made themselves felt and none of its advantages so long as the neighbouring states still held aloof from the union. Even Professor Hundeshagen of Giessen, the distinguished forester, published an impassioned writing in which he declared that the Prussian dues were the curse of the country. The mob destroyed the custom houses, and here and there fired the residence of some detested official. As in Electoral Hesse, the loudest complaints came from the heavily taxed subjects of the mediatised princes. In September the situation became really serious. The court was in despair, and Hoffmann, arrogating the style of a dictator, issued a pacifying manifesto to his people. "We have all that our neighbours long for," he said with the characteristic pride of the Darmstadter; "it is essential to keep the name of Hesse unsullied." On his own initiative Thil recommended that soldiers on furlough should be recalled to the colours, and at

the same time asked help from Frankfort, but the elector of Hesse scornfully rejected federal assistance. Prince Emilius made his peace with the minister, and was appointed commander-in-chief. In a few days the prince dispersed the rioters. At Södel there was a trifling skirmish, and some of the good peasants who had attacked the disturbers of the peace were wounded in the affray by the sabres of the angry cavalrymen. Order was restored, the courageous minister regained the grand duke's confidence, and even Otterstedt did his best to maintain the prestige of the only South German statesman who was a trustworthy supporter of Prussia.[1]

For many years henceforward du Thil's regime continued. It was conscientious and far sighted, but characterised by a strictness which in time amounted to severity. The genuineness of his German sentiments had been proved in the War of Liberation, when he promoted the accession of his country to the grand alliance, and had been displayed still more boldly in the customs negotiations with Prussia. The petty bourgeois self-conceit of the South German liberals seemed to him ludicrous. Knowing the modest powers of the grand duchy, it was his frankly expressed opinion that a German middle-sized state should maintain envoys in Berlin and Vienna only, that diplomatic representation was superfluous at the petty German courts, and that it was positively injurious in most cases at the foreign courts. He said: "If the Paris embassy ever becomes important, German affairs are in a bad pass." Notwithstanding his strongly conservative leanings, which led him to give a decisive preference to a feudalist constitution, he recognised that in the democratised society of the German south a representative system was the only possible one. Animated, however, by a sense of personal superiority, he treated his adversaries contemptuously, for the obstacles they imposed in his path were so often petty and foolish. Before long he came to regard every liberal as a fool or a knave.[2]

The diet of 1830 departed in peace, but the ferment in the country continued. Some of the younger officials had in earlier days belonged to the revolutionary Burschenschaft of Giessen, to the circles of the Blacks and the Unconditionals; others had been suspended, dismissed, or pensioned after the

[1] Du Thil to Otterstedt, October 13; Otterstedt's Reports, October 15 and 27, 1830.

[2] Du Thil's Sketches.

disturbances on account of their inhumanity and high-handedness. Thus a nucleus of discontented persons was formed, and the men of the younger generation were no more peaceful in their views, for Arens, chancellor of the university of Giessen, had aroused the defiance of the students by odious persecutions.[1] The Offenbach "league of sections" and other secret societies nursed the ill feeling. "The blood bath of Södel" was described to the populace as an abominable crime, although the government had conducted an inquiry and had punished some of the guilty soldiers. Even stronger in its influence was the seductive example of the neighbouring Baden, for Itzstein and Welcker, the most popular politicians in Carlsruhe, were both Hessians, and kept up communications with their former compatriots.

It was in Baden that the parliamentary liberalism of the petty states now attained full bloom. Grand Duke Louis of Baden died in March, 1830, a few days before the grand duke of Hesse, and when Leopold, the Hochberg margrave, ascended the throne without opposition, the country felt for the first time that its independence was secure. It was believed that the accomplished fact and recognition by the great powers would afford adequate protection against the Wittelsbach ruler's avaricious designs—a hope not destined to be immediately fulfilled. Grand Duke Leopold was a prince of rare amiability of disposition, one who honestly desired the happiness of his country, and his affability and good nature were a refreshing contrast to the forbidding demeanour of his predecessor. But he knew nothing of affairs of state, found independent thought difficult, and had still less inclination for vigorous resolves. He felt most at ease in the training stable or the shooting gallery, and never showed much comprehension of the arts and sciences. His consort Sophia, a proud Vasa of keen intelligence, strong will, active disposition, and regal bearing, was much more farsighted than her good-humoured spouse. The grand duke's brother, Margrave William, who had been a valiant general in the Napoleonic army, was not devoid of ambition. The margrave married a sister of the king of Würtemberg, so that the Swabian brother-in-law also felt entitled to put in a word at the court of Carlsruhe.

Fortunately the grand duke enjoyed the powerful support

[1] Arnim's Report, Darmstadt, September 25, 1831.

of a man who had been his tried confidant in the days of his margravate. Councillor Winter had for years supervised the business affairs of the younger line, and in his writings had victoriously defended its claim to the succession. For some time he had been the leading intelligence in Badenese home affairs, in so far, at least, as Grand Duke Louis gave him a free hand. The sins of the previous government were not laid to his reckoning, for everyone knew that much that had been done had been done against his will. A homely man, with a countenance simultaneously suggesting diplomatic prudence and genial honesty, he was eminently adapted to win the confidence of this bourgeois land. An excellent man of business, he at once recognised that the rigid system of police supervision had become untenable, and that the new dynasty must endeavour to win the affections of the people. Acting upon Winter's advice the grand duke undertook a circular tour through the country, and the unfeigned delight of the masses served to show wherever he went what hopes had been aroused by the death of the unloved former ruler. The Heidelbergers greeted their Leopold with the lines :

> Thy heart of gold the poet sings !
> Nought else to us salvation brings !

and arranged in his honour an artificial castle-burning. In the ruins of the old Castle Palatine quantities of brushwood and firewood were suddenly ignited, presenting the beholders with a vivid picture of the terrors of Mélac's day. It was much as if the Prussians had given a theatrical representation of the battle of Jena. In this generation, devoid of all sense of the state, no one saw anything amiss in such a reminder of the fatherland's shame.

When Winter assumed control, the hour of retirement had knelled for the two ultra-conservative ministers of the late grand duke, for Berstett the henchman of Metternich, and for Berckheim the Rhenish confederate bureaucrat. But Leopold hesitated. In the end, his Swabian neighbour helped him to make up his mind by administering one of those friendly kicks which William of Würtemberg found so much pleasure in delivering. He had hated Berstett since Verona days, regarding him as a personal enemy and calumniator. When Margrave William married the Würtemberg princess, the king presented

the Badenese minister with the customary snuffbox, but instead of adorning it, as was usually done, with his own portrait, he had inscribed on it, in obvious derision, the words "Loyauté et vérité!" Berstett was infuriated at the fresh insult inflicted upon him by "the irreconcilable neighbour king." He returned the Greek gift to the envoy General Bismarck, with a stiff letter, and poured out his grievances to the diplomatic corps. The poor man had to take a soothing powder to help him to control his temper, and all the high officialdom shared his indignation. But the grand duke lacked courage to take the offended minister's part, so that Berstett at length recognised that his time had come. Both his resignation and Berckheim's were decided on by the end of the year.[1] Not long afterwards Major Hennenhofer likewise disappeared from the scene, that dubious favourite of the former grand duke, who, by his busy activities, had made himself indispensable to the new ruler as well. The *Hochwächter*, a liberal newspaper issued in Stuttgart, published such startling revelations concerning his moral life that it became impossible to retain him about the court.[2]

The old system had fallen, but the new was not yet firmly established. At this juncture Winter formally took over the leadership of the ministry of the interior. He honestly designed to rule strictly in accordance with the constitution, cherishing numerous and well-considered plans for reform. But his vision did not extend beyond the boundaries of the little territory. It sufficed him if the Bundestag, whose pitiful laws the experienced man of business could treat like so much putty, were prevented by means of a cautious policy from interfering in Badenese affairs. Since he was content with the ideal of an ably-governed state of moderate size, he had an utterly false conception of the strength of the new radicalism, whose threatening aspect was solely due to the obscure recognition of the paltriness of particularism, and to the growing desire for a wider political life. A revolution in Germany seemed to him quite inconceivable—a disastrous error which he shared with nearly all the moderate ministers of the constitutionalist minor states. To him the cause of the general unrest was to be found solely in the inflammatory speeches

[1] Berstett to Bismarck, December 9, to Otterstedt, December 16; Otterstedt's Reports, December 6, 16, and 25, 1831.

[2] Salviati's Report, June 19; Otterstedt's Report, June 14, 1831.

of "the vaccinators," as, in his rough, popular phraseology he termed the liberal babblers, whose reiterated talk about popular distresses made people believe in the end that they really were unhappy. Winter could find but few trustworthy helpers in the carrying out of his policy of cautious and benevolent particularism. Owing to the lack of other men endowed with conspicuous diplomatic talent, it was essential that Blittersdorff should remain at his important post in Frankfort, and the hotspur of reaction did not hesitate to support the Austrian federal envoy, often doing this in defiance of instructions, so that the court of Carlsruhe soon acquired a reputation for duplicity. Baron von Türckheim was called to the foreign office. Twelve years earlier he had vigorously defended the privileges of the nobles against the assaults of Winter.[1] He was a statesman of high culture and moderate principles, but an aristocrat, and therefore at times out of sympathy with the bourgeois outlook of the principal minister.

Moreover, this government, divided against itself, was subject to a continuous cross-fire from the powerful neighbour courts. Grand Duke Leopold, like his predecessor, desiring protection against Bavarian assaults, wished to become a faithful adherent of Prussia, and earnestly begged the king to preserve "the favourable sentiments upon which my house and country have ever depended for support."[2] But whilst Otterstedt laboured on behalf of the customs union and the reconstitution of the federal army, Count Buol, the Austrian envoy, who must on no account be offended, was secretly working with the opposite aim. In addition, there was pressure from the Bundestag; the court of Munich gave notice of its hereditary claims; whilst the French envoy persistently recommended the formation of a new and neutral confederation of the Rhine.

A further trouble was the unceasing introduction of revolutionary ideas from abroad. The frontier was so widely extended and so defenceless that even the Carlsbad censorship proved unavailing. Revolutionary Swiss newspapers flooded the highlands, all preaching hatred of princes, and preaching above all a campaign against the Prussian customs union. Still more mischievous was the proximity of France. Now that the French lust of war had reawakened, people began to feel

[1] Grand Duke Leopold to King Frederick William, June 22, 1830.
[2] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 166.

for the first time how sharp a thorn in German flesh was a French Strasburg. This threatening sally-port so close to the unprotected German highlands robbed the South German courts of all their peaceful security, while the ancient imperial town became a focus of unscrupulous propaganda which was now far more successful than it had been in the days of the first republic. It was only since the passing of the agrarian laws of the revolution and since the military exploits of the French empire that the Alsatians had begun to consider themselves Frenchmen. They consequently had but little regard for the old reigning house, and after the July days they promptly erased the royal lilies from the arms of Strasburg, and flocked round the reinstated tricolor in the joyful expectation of new glories in the field. Immediate opportunity was taken to extol to the Badenese neighbours the glories of French civic freedom. A Strasburger, "Plaindealer, the National Guardsman," depicted for his cousin Michael, the peasant, the wonders of the new age, making use of that hail-fellow-well-met tone which had become current in Baden since the issue of Hebel's popular calendars. Next appeared *Echoes of German Voices greeting the German Fatherland*, a booklet stuffed with savage attacks upon the princes, and upon "the slavish corps of Potsdam-drilled pipeclay soldiers" who stood along the Polish frontier instead of "kneeling in the dust to honour Kosciuszko, the greatest of martial heroes." This was but one of a whole series of wild and incendiary writings, emanating for the most part from the printing house of Silbermann in Strasburg. The king of Würtemberg was soon informed by his alert police of the existence in Strasburg of a secret revolutionary committee, which weekly despatched two emissaries to Carlsruhe and Stuttgart respectively, but his instructions were "say nothing to Winter," for he trusted the Badenese minister no further than he could see him.[1]

The *Strasburger Niederdeutsche Kurier* issued a supplement entitled "Constitutional Germany." Young Cornelius of Stralsund acted as editor, and Badenese and Palatine radicals penned contributions. Its manifest aim was to incite the South Germans to rebellion. The old song of the confederation of the Rhine, set in a different key, could again be heard, extolling Germany's pomp and power: "Give Germany a

[1] King William, Instruction to Bismarck, reproduced in Arnim's Report, Carlsruhe, January 25, 1831.

constitution, that she may attain to the rank of sixth great power. Let Prussia and Austria, whose interests are alien to ours, go their own ways; but do you, glorious and mighty people, unite to form a single entity"—under a president elected for a fixed term and governing through parliament. French newspapers, and, above all, the Bonapartist organ *Révolution*, cunningly exploited these German endeavours at unity, denouncing the petty tyrants as responsible for the ignominious disintegration of the great German fatherland, and going on to demand for France the reinstatement of her natural frontiers. "Then will France, if need be by force of arms, bring about a salutary and splendid reconciliation of the two great theories of the state, and thus advantage the peoples."

The sails of Badenese liberalism could not fail to swell as the wind freshened from the west. Under the able leadership of Rotteck and Itzstein the defeated party quietly gathered strength. Winter had stipulated that the elections were to be entirely free from governmental interference, and the liberals won a brilliant victory. The newly elected lower house, which met in March, 1831, was almost entirely composed of liberals. Those deputies who were more in sympathy with the ministry did not venture to swim against the stream. The position was difficult, for the liberals, in their triumph, exercised an ungerman, characteristically French, party terrorism; they demanded vengeance for the long years of disdainful treatment; they abused as courtiers and aristocrats all who should deviate by a hair's breadth from the orthodox doctrine of the law of reason, and were intoxicated with a boundless vanity which bordered on megalomania. In a book entitled *Primer for the German Nation*, Rotteck described the proceedings of this diet as "a European event"; six hundred and seventy-four pages hardly sufficed him to exhaust the immeasurable deluge of liberal parliamentary wisdom. Pictures of the great men adorned the work; as frontispiece there naturally appeared a portrait of the author, who was greeted in the Badenese press as "Germany's greatest historian"; Grand Duke Leopold, "the friend of the people," had to be content with a modest place in the middle of the book.

Blittersdorff, with the insight of hatred, had named Rotteck's followers "Frenchifying Germanophils,"[1] and in truth their blind and servile enthusiasm for France's new

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, April 2, 1831.

liberty was as incontestable as their hazy enthusiasm for a German fatherland somewhere in the clouds. Reason and nonsense, blustering phrases and sober recognition of the needs of the time, existed in these men's minds in friendly juxtaposition. Badenese liberalism represented the interests of an increasingly influential middle class, voicing the well-grounded demand of that class for the emancipation of the soil and for freedom of speech and of trade, but it was wholly dominated by the vainglorious "enlightenment" of earlier days, and nowhere in Germany had the enlightenment taken firmer root than in this lovely corner of the earth, which seemed made for romanticism; it held that the class policy of the bourgeoisie was "the inspired expression of the rational social will," and falsely imagined its vocation to be "to subjugate to the law of reason that historical right which is based solely on the principle of authority." The nursery of the bourgeois law of reason was the university of Freiburg, at that time a very modest light of German learning; the majority of the Heidelberg professors had thrown off the yoke of the abstraction "natural law," and held aloof from the new movement.

The old curse of Badenese constitutional life, the preponderance of officialdom, was once again manifest. Nearly all the spokesmen of the opposition were civil servants; the government did not venture to refuse leave to attend the diet, and speedily became aware that it was being pressed more and more hardly by its own subordinates. Already during the elections keen onlookers could not fail to note that a revolutionary party had come to life almost unobserved, a party whose goal lay far beyond that aimed at by the liberals. But the members of this advanced school felt too weak as yet to come forward in parliament as an independent party, and Adam von Itzstein, who among the deputies was most in sympathy with the newer radical tendency, was far too wise publicly to own allegiance. It was characteristic of Itzstein that in his native Mainz he had countenanced the intrigues of the radical clubs; but his cool fanaticism recalled that of the jacobin partisans of Convention days. Metternich therefore feared him as the one dangerous member of the Badenese opposition. Ever on the watch, Itzstein's keen insight enabled him, by timely admonition, to keep the vacillating to the point. On the rare occasions when he spoke in public

his scathing phrases caused mortal offence, for it was plain that every word was deliberately chosen.

Long ere this Rotteck had drawn the conclusions to which his radical theories inevitably led, those which were the logical outcome of his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. In his textbook on the law of reason he openly declared that a republic alone was just and good, and that a constitution was satisfactory only in so far as it approximated to the republican ideal. But since, as a practical politician, he had to recognise that in Baden a portion of the power primitively belonging to the people had been ceded to the sovereign, by the good-natured friendliness of his bearing he modified many of the crudities of his earlier utterances. Of very different metal was Welcker, a thickset man, with stern, florid countenance, and great, passionate eyes. Rising like a fighting bull, he delivered himself with such impetuosity, with such torrential eloquence, that one forgot that, in theory at least, he did not go so far as Rotteck. He liked to style himself an "old champion of liberty"; he was entirely absorbed in the struggle against reaction; and he looked upon the Bundestag as his personal enemy. Seldom could he find solace for the wickedness of princes, and that only when in his room he complacently reviewed his collection of civic crowns and goblets of honour, votive offerings from his staunch admirers. Among the professors of note at Heidelberg university one alone threw in his lot with the opposition. This was a strict Catholic, Mittermaier by name, an Old Bavarian. A jurist of astounding erudition, he was famed for his knowledge of foreign legal forms. For long he had been earnestly advocating trial by jury and prison reform. He was regarded rather as polyhistor than as original thinker, and was by no means insensitive to the changing moods of public opinion. To these leaders there adhered a crowd of true disciples of the liberal law of reason: from Freiburg came the able lawyer Duttlinger, who had, singlehanded and for so long, withstood the reactionary majority in the diet; from Heidelberg the bookseller "Father Winter," longtime protagonist of freedom of the press; from Oostal, Councillor Herr, a popular and warm-hearted priest, so devoted to the grand ducal house that great freedoms were permitted him at court.

At the outset of the struggle, Itzstein swung his censer

before the French: "A nation arose in western Europe, outstripped all others in culture, and in national sentiment, and gave itself a burgher king." In imitation of this glorious example, the Badenese were likewise to demand back their freedom, and to reincorporate into the constitution the article which, six years previously, had been modified.[1] This alteration in the constitution had not done much harm. Since the recent electoral successes, the liberals were warranted in maintaining that the will of the people could gain far stronger expression now than in former days, for previously only a quarter of the assembly had had to seek reelection, whereas now the chamber was to be reelected in its entirety every six years. The fundamental law of Baden was regarded as a holy of holies. The sacrilegious tamperings of reaction must be rectified. The assembly, therefore, unanimously agreed that the article as originally drafted should be reembodied word for word in the constitution. During the debate, the portals of the hall were set wide, for the galleries could not accommodate the flux of auditors; after the division, the house rang with jubilant cheers. Even Winter recorded a favourable vote, for he felt that the sense of justice of the whole country demanded this atonement. He then placed before the chamber a well-contrived communes' ordinance which completely broke with the old system of Rhenish confederate tutelage. The chamber accepted the plan, but modified the prescriptions for the suffrage in so radical a manner that political party strife was henceforth introduced into the communal elections, thus hindering, for some years to come, the peaceful development of the new system of self-government.

Passion flamed yet more fiercely when Welcker demanded the instant promulgation of a press law. The previous autumn, in a printed petition to the Bundestag, he had claimed for Germany "absolute and complete freedom of the press." Having failed in Frankfort, he was now endeavouring to attain his end for Baden alone. Thus did the Carlsruhe diet pass once more under the spell of its old and sinister destiny, beginning another hopeless struggle against the Germanic Federation, and again spurning the prescriptions of the written law. The general longing for freedom of the press was not difficult to understand, above all in this frontier land, where the foreign newspapers came under men's eyes day by day.

[1] Vide supra, vol. IV, pp. 122, 123.

Unfortunately, however, the Badenese state had no right to deal with this question of freedom of the press on its own initiative, for it had tied its own hands. Article 17 of the constitution specified: "Freedom of the press will be determined by the future decisions of the federal assembly." If the Badenese desired to break the hampering bonds of the censorship, it was necessary for them to induce the Bundestag to repeal the Carlsbad press law. But this course, the only legal one, was absolutely barred; and when Schaaff, one of the deputies, proposed to move in this direction, Welcker fiercely declared that this would be to play tricks with the Badenese people. Since the legal impasse was conspicuously manifest, the mover in this matter, in excess of zeal, had recourse to sophistical interpretations which were ill-suited to his fundamentally straightforward character. Welcker insisted that the above quoted article in the constitution, which was quite unambiguous, meant the very opposite of what it seemed to mean, signifying that freedom of the press, not slavery of the press, was promised to the Badenese. Such freedom must therefore be established even in opposition to the will of the Bundestag. Nay, more, he went so far as to maintain that the federal press law merely specified that no writing containing less than twenty sheets might be printed "without the previous knowledge and approval of the territorial authorities." Consequently, no censorship had been commanded by the Federation, and the word censorship did not appear in the law at all! This was an odious legal quibble, and the Berlin foreign office was justified in speaking of the Badenese liberals' action as "truly jesuitical." [1]

Twelve years earlier the Carlsruhe chambers had been dominated by an honest detestation of anonymous authorship, but this sentiment had been completely annihilated by the odious persecutions. Welcker continued to use emotional phrases concerning the free citizen's duty to stand up for his own words, but went no further than to demand that the printer's or publisher's name should be given, thus admitting the right of the journalist to remain anonymous. He concluded with the threat that should the ministers fail to introduce a press law "they would render themselves liable to be accused of treason against people and prince." Rotteck cordially supported his friend, openly advocating revolt against the

[1] Frankenberg's Report, February 4, 1832.

Germanic Federation, for now that the Bundestag had so grossly misused its right to regulate the freedom of the press, the liberals (with the exception of a few among them who saw further than the rest) were almost compelled to unfurl the banner of particularism. "To us the Germanic Federation is merely a verbal expression," said Rotteck. "We had no part in the federal treaty, which was agreed upon among the princes alone. Consequently, all that we recognise is a twofold law—the eternal law of reason and our territorial constitution." He went on to extol the *vox populi, vox Dei,* and to assert with innocent credulity the absolute impossibility that the press should ever make a bad use of its powers.

Tempers became more strained from hour to hour, volley after volley of angry talk being discharged at the Carlsbad "ordinances." The French perversions of liberalism were manifested in the use of Frenchified phraseology. Just as the Carlsbad "decrees" (*Beschlüsse*) were called "ordinances" (*Ordonnanzen*), so Welcker's "proposal" (*Antrag*) was termed a "motion," and suggestions for its modification were spoken of as "amendments" instead of as *Verbesserungen.* Following the Parisian custom, parliamentary orators thundered against the *justemilianer* (men of the "juste milieu," Laodiceans) as invertebrate, and warned the government that it was risking the fate of Polignac's "deplorable" ministry. Councillor Herr went so far as to give freedom of the press ecclesiastical benison, speaking of it as "a divinely ordained institution which will help us to the attainment of all that is essential for time, death, and eternity." Since the anonymous journalistic advocates of liberal doctrine were regarded as tribunes of the people, they were entitled to be judged by the free popular conscience, trial by jury was their inalienable right. Even Duttlinger, the least emotional among the opposition leaders, succumbed to the general infection. This German exponent of law was not ashamed to declare that jurors' courts were above the law, and did not hesitate to extol to law-abiding Teutons as a model the scandalous partisanship which French jurors invariably displayed in political trials. "Trial by jury," said Duttlinger, "can protect freedom of the press against severe and unnatural laws by the simple verdict of, Not Guilty!" Finally, in plain violation of the constitution, the chambers misused their right of supply as a threat, declaring that the budget would not be approved until the government

had introduced a press law and certain other legislative proposals.

How painful a situation was this for the well-meaning minister! In Winter's view, the censorship was injurious to the common weal, but was it possible for him to abolish it in flat defiance of the provisions of the federal law and of the constitution? The grand duke, although he would willingly have gone a certain way to meet the chambers, was by personal sympathy quite on the side of the eastern powers. Whenever the Russians gained a victory, amid the loud lamentations of the liberals, Leopold would ask Otterstedt to send congratulations to the king of Prussia.[1] Nothing would ever induce him to revolt against the authority of the Germanic Federation. The autumn before, with Baden's approval, the Bundestag had recommended the governments to enforce the censorship strictly; new resolutions of the same character were now in course of adoption; not a single one of the federated governments ventured to think of the mitigation, still less of the repeal, of the Carlsbad laws at a time when half Germany was in a ferment. From Darmstadt, Butzbach, Tübingen, and other South German towns, addresses were sent petitioning the federal assembly to put an end to the bloodshed in Poland, lest the cholera should be introduced into Germany. This was obviously a subterfuge, for to march federal troops into "the land of the knout and the cholera" was indubitably the best means for securing the widespread introduction of cholera into Germany. The Bundestag appointed Blittersdorff referendary, and on this occasion Blittersdorff asked for instructions. With Türckheim's approval, he then proposed and secured that the Bundestag should not merely reject the petitions of the Sarmatiophils but should in addition prohibit the future presentation of political addresses (October 27th).[2] On November 10th the attention of the courts was again expressly drawn to the prescriptions of the federal press law, and on November 19th the Bundestag prohibited the import of *Constitutional Germany* from Strasburg. This last decision was a justified measure of self-defence, for a periodical openly advocating rebellion and openly demanding the reconstitution of the Confederation of the Rhine could not fail to exercise a disastrous influence on the frontier. The Badenese

[1] Otterstedt's Reports, March 18 and June 6, 1831.
[2] Blittersdorff's Report, October 4; Türckheim's Instruction, October 6, 1831.

envoy was in secret a zealous collaborator in all these activities, and Türckheim's only regret was that Blittersdorff had not been able to control his tongue with more discretion, for Munich had become aware of the Carlsruhe court's opinion concerning the Strasburg periodical.[1]

During the very days when, in the Federation, Baden was supporting the old Carlsbad policy, Winter promised the diet that the desired press law should at once be laid before it. He could do no otherwise in view of the threats of the diet, for he could not allow matters to go to an extremity, to a refusal of the budget and the dissolution of the chambers. As a precautionary measure, Türckheim had already written to Vienna to the effect that the Badenese press law would in any case conscientiously respect the rights of the Federation and of the allied federal states.[2] The bill presented to the chambers did, in actual fact, specify that whilst for general purposes the censorship should be abolished, it was to remain in force as regarded references to the affairs of the Germanic Federation and to those of other federal states. But the chamber, in the pride of victory, held that this was an undue concession to the federal law, and inserted a paragraph in virtue of which the editor of a newspaper who should infringe the above-mentioned prescription, and who should thereupon be found guilty and sentenced when prosecuted at the instigation of the Federation or another federal government, should be condemned to a supplementary fine of from five to fifty gulden. As thus drafted, the press law seemed to mock the prestige of the Germanic Federation. The Badenese liberal journals were already proclaiming their triumph, saying that in Baden the censorship no longer existed, that the Badenese were not subject to any censor, and that they would cheerfully pay the small supplementary fine should a court pass sentence for contempt of the federal authority. All shuffling notwithstanding, the new Badenese press law, which came into force on March 1, 1832, was in plain contradiction with the federal law demanding a censorship. Nor was the contradiction lessened when in the same March the Carlsruhe government promulgated the latest federal decrees, simultaneously declaring that its own press law—the very opposite of what was prescribed by the federal law—was to remain in force. The

[1] Türckheim, Instruction to Blittersdorff, November 24, 1831.
[2] Türckheim, Instruction to Tettenborn, September 26, 1831.

grand duke was greatly distressed by these equivocal activities, and privately assured the Prussian envoy that he would be glad to modify the obnoxious law on the demand of the Bundestag.[1] How, moreover, could he hope to maintain so untenable a position in defiance of all the other federal states?

In the diet, meanwhile, Rotteck had renewed his long standing demand, the one which more than anything else had secured for him the favour of the countryfolk, the demand for the abolition of tithes and the corvée. The reform was essential in view of the changed conditions of agriculture, but was conceived in a painfully radical and partisan spirit. It had been the glory and good fortune of Germany that, following the Prussian example, the transition to the new conditions of rural proprietorship had everywhere been effected with perfect legality, and with reasonable compensation for prescriptive rights, whereas in France and Spain the change had been brought about by robbery and violence. The protagonist of the law of reason could never realise in this matter how excellently his fatherland had led the way. In his view, the old established rights of landownership, rights consecrated by prolonged usage, were nothing more than scandalous injustice, and it seemed to him astounding that the Germans should even think of paying compensation. Still, as a concession to German kindliness, he proposed compensation upon a scale that was unjust because far too low, sadly adding that "a Frenchman or one who dwelt across the Rhine" would consider the payment altogether excessive.

The landowners sitting in the upper house, thus threatened in their possessions, were prompt in opposition. Alike at the Bundestag and at the court of Carlsruhe, the house of Löwenstein entered formal protests on behalf of the rights of landownership. The ministers yielded to the pressure of the lower house. Their position was most embarrassing, Türckheim's above all, for in earlier years he had vehemently defended the rights of the nobles as landed proprietors, and yet felt that at this juncture Baden must not lag behind her neighbours.[2] When the upper house rejected the law for the commutation of the "Neubruch-Zehnten," *i.e.*, tithes on land newly brought under the plough, Rotteck expressed his wrath in the words: "The joint will of the government and the

[1] Otterstedt's Report, February 28, 1832.
[2] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, September 29, 1831.

people is thus to be frustrated by the veto of a handful of junkers!" By the formulas of his law of reason, the bicameral system was oppressive and unnatural, and the only thing to do with it was to abolish it. He related how, in the upper house, even some of the members nominated by the crown had voted against the law, and in his partisan fury the champion of unflinching loyalty to conviction went so far as to maintain that it was the duty of these members to sacrifice their convictions to the ministers! Since the president of the lower house permitted the invectives to pass unreproved, the affronted upper house lodged a complaint. Rotteck absolutely refused to withdraw his expressions, declaring amid thunderous acclamations: "I am not made for a courtier, I am a representative of the people!"—a winged word which was subsequently to adorn innumerable goblets of honour and addresses of thanks. In the end, however, it was necessary to make some trifling concessions to the landowners, the prince of Fürstenberg, a kindly and cultured aristocrat, mediating between the houses. Two laws were passed, dealing with the corvée and the Neubruch-Zehnten; others were in prospect; and Rotteck could claim the distinction of being the pioneer of agrarian reform.

The presumption of the liberals was likewise displayed in matters of less importance. Upon their demand a censor who, over his beer, had given vent to some candid opinions concerning Louis Philippe and the French, was promptly deprived of his position—for any doubt as to the virtues of the nation that played the part of Messiah to liberty was tantamount to treason. Nor were there lacking the motions customary in Carlsruhe for the abolition of the celibacy of the priesthood, although neither Rotteck nor any of his Catholic friends was inclined to refuse obedience to the Church of Rome. The demand dear to all liberals that the army should swear fealty to the constitution was also brought forward, but was happily dropped for the time being. The officers, however, by the new service regulations, were placed in a legal position identical with that of other state servants, "being thus transformed," as Rotteck exultantly phrased it, "from armed slaves without will of their own or from blind tools of authority to become patriotic warriors." The debates about the military estimates were extremely violent. For many years Grand Duke Louis had personally received the emoluments of

commander-in-chief and minister of war. Hitherto the chambers had tacitly ignored this unprincely conduct, for the late ruler had in fact administered these two offices. Now, however, amid much fracas, the matter was dragged into the light of day and, in accordance with the custom of the time, the minister of war was actually threatened with impeachment. Itzstein discharged a quiverful of poisoned arrows at the court, concluding a venomous speech with the sublime words: "The late ruler rests in his tomb, thus affording a striking proof that princes, like their subjects, are dust, and to dust shall return."

As far as the future was concerned, the most momentous achievement of this session was Welcker's motion on behalf of "the organic development of the Germanic Federation." For the first time some one had the courage to utter a formal demand for a German parliament. Like all new ideas, this fruitful thought first presented itself in nebulous and confused lineaments, but was henceforward to remain an essential item of the national thought. Welcker made no secret of his view that liberty seemed to him of far more consequence to Germany than unity. It was a profound mortification to him that the French newspapers should speak of the Germans as slaves, and that English writers, with their wonted moderation, should speak of our people as "the basest and most cowardly on the face of the earth." He perceived that there was an irreconcilable contradiction between the absolutist central authority of the Federation and the diets of the individual states. He recognised the utter futility of a constitution which in set terms denied the nation any power to conduct its affairs as a joint state. From these considerations he deduced the conclusion that a lower house consisting of the mediatised nobles and of elected representatives of the people must be formed side by side with the Bundestag. He did not as yet see the need for a strong federal executive, and still less did he dream of Prussian hegemony, for now that Berlin had poured cold water upon the Sarmatiophil enthusiasm of the Badenese liberals he inclined to regard Prussia as a semi-foreign and almost hostile state. Nor did this honest fanatic trouble his head with the thorny question under what conditions the many-headed Bundestag was to exist in conjunction with an even more ineffective Reichstag. In his partisan zeal he had incorporated into his motion certain preposterous suggestions.

The difference between the absolutist and the constitutionalist territorial authorities was, he said, far greater to-day than had of old been the contrast between religious beliefs. He therefore demanded that the federal envoys of the constitutionalist states, following the example of the old Corpus Evangelicorum, should constitute a closed corporation, with the right of *itio in partes* (voting *par ordre* and not *par tête*), when constitutional questions were under discussion! Such were the monstrosities born of the political immaturity of the time. The unhappy religious cleavage which had for so long paralysed the imperial authority was now, for the sake of the law of reason, to be artificially revived in the political field—and this proposal emanated from the mouth of an apostle of German unity.

Nevertheless Welcker's motion contained a sound kernel. The ministers merely gave a fresh exhibition of their weakness and perplexity when they refused to discuss the proposal, and ultimately walked out of the house. It was plain that Winter dreaded a joint attack by the diets upon the federal constitution, for in Cassel at this time Sylvester Jordan (unquestionably after discussing the matter with his friend Welcker) was proposing that the federal protocols should be published, and that at the Bundestag the activities of the constitutionalist states should be more closely associated. Jordan's suggestion remained void of effect, for the Hessians had their hands full with their own domestic troubles. Similarly the Badenese deputies were far more concerned about the happiness of the exemplary land of Baden than about the future of Germany, and under the influence of private representations they were induced to shelve Welcker's motion. How disastrous a spectacle was this! The Bundestag forbade the Germans to send it political addresses, and now an exceptionally pliable government actually contested the right of its diet to discuss federal affairs. If the nation were thus to close every legal pathway to federal reform, what possible course would remain open other than revolution?

The sitting of the diet at length came to an end in December, after Rotteck had delivered another passionate speech, this time against the latest federal decrees, and against "the yoke of Austria and Prussia," and after he had triumphantly reported the recepit of thirty-four addresses of thanks sent in from all parts of the country. Joy was universal. The popular representatives were welcomed home under

triumphal arches and by maids of honour, took part in processions, and were entertained at congratulatory banquets. On the Christmas cake of the town of Heidelberg stood, moulded in sugar, the beautiful goddess of fame, with one hand holding a trumpet to her lips, in the other bearing a tablet inscribed with the names of the distinguished Badenese parliamentary orators; Europa was admiringly reading the list whilst the spirit of slavery, scourge in hand, a disconsolate figure, was seated in the background. The sentiments of the festive little country were most faithfully reflected in the verses sung in Carlsruhe at the farewell banquet of the chambers:

> Where'er I let my vision roam,
> No beauty charms like that of home!

Was it possible that the great powers should continue to allow free scope to this self-satisfied liberalism, which so arrogantly ignored the federal constitution? At the outset, the court of Berlin was extremely tolerant. The duke was exhorted to take a firm attitude, but was warned at the same time against any infringement of the constitution. Repeated assurances were given that Prussia would not interfere in Badenese affairs.[1] Not until the press law was passed did the mood change. The king could not endure that the federal law should be brought into contempt. Moreover, the duplicity displayed by the Carlsruhe government in relation to the diet and to the Bundestag was repulsive to him. Shortly after the close of the session, the Badenese envoy in Berlin reported with dismay: "Prussia no longer trusts us!" He foresaw that a dangerous storm was threatening to break over his homeland.

§ 2. FERMENT IN NASSAU, WÜRTEMBERG, AND BAVARIA.

The Nassau diet had likewise been visited by storms. The trouble here was the old and deplorable dispute about property rights in the royal domains, a dispute in which was comprised the entire constitutional history of this ill-governed land.[2] Duke William spoke of himself as an ultra-royalist, as one permeated by Viennese principles. He declared that

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Arnim, January 21, to Otterstedt, July 15: Bernstorff, Instruction to Otterstedt, November 18, 1831.

[2] Vide supra, vol. II, p. 690.

it was "a mere rhetorical flourish" to say that the laws should rule, and he looked forward to the day when, with the help of the Federation, "without resistance and with a good conscience, Germany's modern constitutions could be abolished."[1] Under such a regime, the diet, which met in January, 1831, could effect little. It assumed a very modest attitude, but it insisted that the country had a right to the domains, and it was consequently prorogued after a few months. Even Heinrich von Arnim, the Prussian envoy, an able romanticist belonging to the crown prince's circle, could not deny that the discontent prevailing throughout the populace was mainly due to the pride and selfishness of the duke and to the autocratic methods of Marschall the minister.[2]

When the estates reassembled in the autumn, the duke increased the number of members of the "Herrenkurie" (upper house) from six to seventeen, so that at the joint sittings of the diet he could always be sure of a majority. The second chamber proposed a refusal of supply, since no financial statement had been vouchsafed as to the income from the domains. The house was dissolved, and when the new diet reassembled in April, 1832, it could make no headway against governmental ill-will. After a single day's sitting most of the members of the lower house resigned their seats. Five members only, Marschall's henchmen, remained at their posts, and these five had the impudence to vote with a few trifling erasures the budget submitted to them by the minister. Disturbances in Wiesbaden and other towns were suppressed without difficulty, but, as Arnim admitted, "general indignation" prevailed throughout the country. Even among people of so peaceful a disposition embitterment was necessarily aroused by a dispute of this personal character between the greed of the princely house and the popular sense of justice. The officialdom, notwithstanding its immense power, could not entirely escape the well-grounded popular anger.[3] Odious prosecutions, instituted by Marschall against Herber, president of the chamber, and against the other deputies who had resigned, had the effect of oil upon the flames. The duke rewarded the devoted members of the Herrenkurie, railed against the disloyalty of

[1] Witzleben's Diary, September 12, 1825; Arnim's Report, September 18, 1832.

[2] Arnim's Reports, May 13, 1831, and subsequent dates.

[3] Arnim's Reports, May 16 and 17, June 19, September 2, 1882.

his subjects, and threatened to invoke the help of the Bundestag. But since his conscience was uneasy, he did not venture to carry his threat into execution, and contented himself with the revenge that was available in the form of a petty police persecution. An association in Wiesbaden, aiming to supply the poor with cheap bread until the ensuing harvest, was prohibited because some of its members were known to be liberals. Apropos of this incident, Arnim wrote mournfully: "What feelings, towards a government whose motives are beyond his comprehension, must animate the mind of the poor wage-earner as he eats the bread of affliction whose price is thus deliberately raised!" At the very doors of the Bundestag a dangerous conflagration was in progress.

At first, Würtemberg was immune from parliamentary struggles, although here too the vigorous breeze of the new time soon made itself perceptible. The diet had sat until the spring of 1830, and, by the terms of the constitution, need not be resummoned until three years had elapsed. King William, whose views had now permanently assumed a strongly conservative complexion, had no inclination to cut this respite short. He openly announced his intention to wait until the general ferment had subsided. The budget had been passed; the finances, under the prudent management of Baron von Varnbüler, were in good order; and in other respects there was no urgent occasion for legislation. In the event of a sudden attack by the French he had determined to divert to military purposes the moneys voted for public works.[1] He therefore allowed the administration to conduct business quietly at its own discretion, and once again rejoiced his country by a benevolent innovation. In April, 1831, the unhappy ordinance of the year 1829, by which the territorial university had been deprived of its ancient freedoms, was repealed. Tübingen regained the right of electing its rector and its dean, and by an ably drafted new charter the university was placed on the same footing as other German universities. The fierce literary campaign instituted by the offended professorial world of Germany, in conjunction with the representations of the Würtemberg diet, had convinced the king of his previous error, and he did not hesitate to undo the mistake.[2]

[1] Salviati's Reports, April 5 and September 29, 1831; May 5, 1832.
[2] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 119.

The unrest was not stilled by these concessions. Throughout the country was heard a clamour that the estates should promptly be summoned. The malcontents had no definite aim; they merely desired to give some sort of expression to the sense of grievance with which their hearts were filled. The electoral struggle, which had previously been of so mild a character, was now extremely violent, for a network of liberal associations had spread throughout the country. Newspapers shot up like mushrooms. In Stuttgart alone there were eight new journals, almost all of them liberal in complexion, and it was without avail that the king requested Ernst Münch to voice the cause of the government in the *Stuttgarter Hofzeitung*. The Swiss publicist and historian, a superficial scribbler, had once sat at the feet of Rotteck, and now proved by no means equal to his opponents. Most of the Swabian liberals were staunch Germans at the core, less receptive than were the Badenese to the Parisian doctrines of salvation, but in accordance with local tradition they were extremely obstinate, and, having gained a victory at the polls in the beginning of 1832, they hastened to demand as an incontestable right the immediate summoning of the diet. The king, however, supported by his confidant and intimate Maucler, an able bureaucrat, clung no less obstinately to the precise wording of the constitution, and as soon as the elections were over he issued a strict prohibition of all meetings for the discussion of political affairs.

Wangenheim now reappeared upon the stage, for a Würtemberg constituency had offered a seat to the exile at Coburg. As of old, he was a doctrinaire, half romanticist, half constitutionalist. He loved, in the spook-haunted garden at Weinsberg, to give reverend ear to the Eolian strains of his friend Justinus Kerner, and at Tübingen to listen to the pronouncements of Eschenmaier, mystic and natural philosopher. Now he petitioned the king to grant him, as a foreigner by birth, the confirmation or renewal of his civic rights. William overcame his suppressed resentment against the discarded minister, and granted the petition. But the king was much astonished when Wangenheim promptly espoused the liberal cause, and announced with customary self-complacency that whilst, as far as the cause of monarchy was concerned, being a man of the golden mean, he advocated the sovereignty of all the German princes, he also desired to secure for the

Swabians the blessings of the July revolution, describing this movement with ardent enthusiasm.[1] In April, 1832, the liberal deputies lost patience, since the diet had not yet been summoned. Meeting at Boll spa, Wangenheim among them, they formally expressed their concern at "the arrest of constitutional life." In the name of the Boll assembly, Schott, a hotblooded young lawyer, now addressed a strongly worded petition to the king, writing: "In the annals of political life in constitutionalist states there is no precedent for the failure to take notice of the popular demand that the estates should be summoned."[2] King William held his ground, and continued to do so for another year, positive law thus showing itself stronger than the constitutional law of reason. But complaint was ripe among the people that the Swabians were being muzzled.

King Louis of Bavaria was in a more difficult position. Such was his general outlook on life that he could not fail to regard the July revolution with loathing. He became gloomy and taciturn, and it was soon observed that the clericalist circle, which the liberals (following the Parisian example) spoke of as the "Congregation," was quietly gathering strength.[3] Of the trusty adjutant-generals, one, General Duexponts, was a cousin of Polignac, whilst the other, Prince Constantine Löwenstein, was in ill-repute among liberals as a leader of the reaction. At the castle of Heubach on the Main there assembled around the able and cultured prince all the South German leaders of the ultramontanes, and also those feudalist members of the nobility in whose view the new agrarian legislation was nothing but "legalised club-law." Grandauer, the powerful cabinet councillor, was secretly working towards similar ends. Field-marshal Wrede, who had now made his peace with the Viennese cabinet, was again in high favour at court. The country was still tranquil, although the high price of beer aroused much anger among the customers of the state brewing concerns. When Louis laid the foundation stone of the Walhalla on the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, Minister Schenk boasted in his oration, "how firmly

[1] Wangenheim to Hartmann, February 28 and August 12, 1830, October 23, and 26, 1831; Wangenheim to King William, October 13 and November 17, 1831.
[2] Schott, Petition to the King May 10, 1832.
[3] Küster's Reports, August 25, 1830, et seq.

and tranquilly the king of Bavaria stands, happy because he makes others happy," whereas unrest was rampant in all the countries round. The king went so far as to have a medal struck commemorating the loyalty of his Bavarians, dedicating to them the verses :

> You face all tests with hearts aglow,
> E'er loyal to your King's behoof.
> Since hist'ry's dawn 'twas ever so.
> 'Gainst touch of time your souls are proof !

Whatever special measures he might consider requisite for the public safety, he held his hand until after the new elections, which took place in December.

During Christmas week, however, the peace of the capital was several times broken by the misconduct of the students. Nothing took place beyond an ordinary street row, quite devoid of political significance, and no more than indirectly favoured by the indefinite impulses of a time of excitement. But King Louis, influenced by the suggestions of his entourage, imagined himself to be faced by a terrible conspiracy, and commanded numerous arrests, some of which were illegally effected. He closed the university for a time, and took this opportunity of putting into action the special powers he had requested from the Bundestag. On January 28, 1831, Minister Schenk issued a press ordinance subjecting to the censorship the discussion of home affairs, and, among other provisions, forbidding the newspapers to indicate the excisions of the censors by the use of gaps in the printed text—for of late the misused liberal press had availed itself of this measure as a means of defence against the censorship, whose suppressions were often of an extremely drastic character. The ordinance was in accordance with the constitution, which prescribed a censorship for all political and statistical journals, but it conflicted sharply with the milder practice that had prevailed for a good many years, and conflicted also with the king's own words. How often in his younger and more sanguine days had he boasted that his Bavarians were able without restraint to utter their views concerning Bavarian affairs ! It next transpired that of the fifty-four national or local officials elected to the chamber, five had received no furlough. In this matter, too, the king considered that he was merely exercising his constitutional right. It was however plain to everyone that in the

case of these five deputies leave, was refused because of their liberal opinions, and not owing to the exigencies of the public service. Moreover, it was still a moot question whether municipal employees required furlough at all.

Such universal discontent was aroused by these governmental measures that the town councils of Nüremberg and Bamberg considered themselves justified in addressing petitions to the king, petitions whose wording was far from respectful. The Nürembergers declared that "the unhappy ordinance of January 28th" was positively "unconstitutional and a violation of the royal oath"; they complained that "men who among all the deputies enjoy the fullest confidence of the people" should be excluded from the chamber; they asseverated, "in the country there prevails a ferment quite unprecedented in character, and the inhabitants of Nüremberg shudder when they contemplate the immediate future." The king's rejoinder was gently worded. He found it painful, he said, to be misunderstood, but just as he had guaranteed free choice to the electors, so also he desired to maintain his own rights.[1] The soft answer failed to turn away wrath. From the mountains of Allgau a yet more violent address was sent to the diet, to the following effect: the government had stretched its powers for the refusal of furlough to such an extent "merely in order to show itself complacent towards the grand alliance, now happily annihilated by the events of July. We are to enjoy no more than a pseudo-representation, but are expected to be just as good-humoured as if the representation were genuine. The ministers are hastening to appropriate the tragical heritage of Charles X, but their calculations are just as false as were those of the deplorable ministry. Representatives! disclose to the king the dreadful abyss towards which the hypocritical pietists have been conducting him!"[2]

How could these good fellows of the lower middle class, who were accustomed to meet over their early beer at "eleven o'clock mass" in the "Crown" at Kempten or the "Post" at Immenstadt, have been induced to employ such Frenchified locution? No one could fail to see that there was

[1] Petition from the Town Council of Nüremberg, February, 1831. Cabinet Despatch from the king to President Baron Zu Rhein, and to Burgomasters Binder and Bayl, February 8, 1831.

[2] Address from Kempten to the chamber of deputies, February 17, 1831.

considerable public excitement, but it was also obvious that the flames were being fanned by a newspaper press that had got out of control and was largely nourished upon the crumbs that fell from the Parisian table. With what distress did Stein, not long before his death, note how the venerable name of "publicist," which by our forefathers had been bestowed upon such men as Puffendorf and Möser, was now being degraded by application to a rout of shallow and unscrupulous writers for the daily press. Among the mass of minor journals which had recently sprung to life, the *Bayrische Volksblatt* was still the most moderate in tone. In its columns, Eisenmann, the medical writer, so long ill-treated by the demagogue hunters, advocated Rotteck's doctrines with more zeal than knowledge. Coremans, a Belgian, used stronger language in the *Freie Presse*. Most unrestrained of all was Wirth, the Franconian, whose organ was the *Deutsche Tribüne*. These knights of the pen, though not themselves deputies, speedily acquired a disastrous influence upon the diet. Before an important vote, it was Coremans' habit to issue a threatening manifesto to the deputies, while after the vote the names of those on the right side were published in rolls of honour printed in red. In this way many good fellows were intimidated, for in petty bourgeois circles there still prevailed a childishly devout credence in the gospel of the newspapers. Wirth was also an adept at lobbying, and it would often happen that an obscure honourable member who had never before spoken a word would rise in the house to deliver a mighty impromptu speech in whose phraseology and thought the hand of the editor of the *Deutsche Tribüne* was unmistakable. The proceedings of the estates were utterly poisoned and falsified by the terrorism of officious journalistic collaborators.

In his speech from the throne on March 1st, the king reiterated what he had so often said before, "I do not wish to rule as an absolute monarch"; but he added warningly, "There must be no attempt to secure popular favour to the detriment of the interests of state." At the opening of the proceedings Baron von Closen complained fiercely, but on good grounds, of the arbitrary arrests in Munich. From his father, a companion-at-arms of Washington and Lafayette, the eloquent Palatiner had inherited an ardent enthusiasm for liberty, but he had no inclination to transcend constitutional limits, was a personal admirer of the king, and honestly respected him as

a patron of the arts. One of the five deputies to whom leave had been refused, he had resigned his post in order to enter the chamber. The government, in incredible infatuation, far from endeavouring to win over this true-hearted man by kindness, sought to destroy him. It actually raised the question of Closen's right to sit in the house, seeing that, his resignation notwithstanding, he had still been a state servant at the time of his election. The diet rejected the governmental motion by an overwhelming majority, and from all sides a strong current of disfavour began to flow against the ministers. Schenk, "the father of the press ordinance, the Bavarian Polignac," was a special mark for illwill, and his impeachment was suggested on the ground of a violation of the constitution. The decrees of the Bundestag were referred to with anger and contempt. Even Ignaz Rudhart, who once more devoted all the fire of his eloquence to the cause of moderate liberalism, took an extremely low estimate of Bavaria's duties to the Federation, and demanded unrestricted freedom of the press.

After prolonged and violent struggles, the king at length recognised that the detested minister must go. Schenk was made a provincial governor. A new and moderately worded press ordinance was laid before the estates. By this, the free discussion of Bavarian affairs was granted, so that the measure was in flat contradiction with the new federal decrees, which had been issued at Bavaria's own instigation. Even this failed to satisfy the chamber. Feeling ran so high that President Seuffert, the diplomatist of the house, went so far as to declare: "All or nothing!" The upper house, however, was unwilling to follow the deputies upon so precipitous a path, and the consequence was that all the tumult remained without practical effect. The crown continued to possess a free hand in press matters. The issue of the tedious dispute concerning the refusal of furlough was no less unsatisfactory, for the king could not be induced to renounce his constitutional right.

Months passed, and not until its hundredth sitting did the chamber begin the discussion of the budget, promptly displaying its thoroughness by deleting numerous items from the estimates, although Armansperg, by his parsimonious administration, had changed a deficit of nearly three million gulden into a surplus of seven millions. The army was inadequate, and the military estimates were far too low, but these were to be still further

reduced. It was also proposed that the army should be compelled to swear fealty to the constitution. Even the moderates considered this preposterous demand an inviolable article of the liberal catechism, but Rudhart was shrewd enough to declare his unwillingness to display any lack of confidence in the monarch, who was loyal to the constitution, and he thus secured a further postponement of the suggestion. The liberals, however, desired to reduce the civil list by nearly a fourth, and the discussion of this item could not fail to wound the king deeply, for it was notorious that his income was not used for personal gratification but was devoted entirely to art. During the reign of King Louis, cultivation of the arts was the only thing that gave dignity and meaning to the national life of Bavaria, but this was a matter of which enlightened liberalism had little understanding, and almost all the estimates for new buildings were rejected. The massive freestone walls of the Pinakothek were already rising above the ground, but the chamber (perhaps in accordance with the letter, though unquestionably in opposition to the spirit, of the constitution) refused to supply means for the continuation of the work. A liberal orator triumphantly exclaimed that the building might remain as it was, "as a ruin bearing witness to legality!" The king was compelled to advance half a million gulden from his privy purse.

Amid all these disputes, it was conspicuously manifest to how small an extent the territorial oppositions of the Bavarian state had hitherto been reconciled. The Palatiners and the Franconians almost all marched under liberal colours, led by Schüler, a lawyer from Bergzabern. The newspapers spoke of Schüler as "a pillar of the people, a colossus in mind and character." He was, in truth, a man of keen intelligence, almost invariably advocating his radical views with prudence and decorum. On the other hand, the Old Bavarians were inspired by traditional enthusiasm for the throne and the altar, this sentiment being even more prevalent among the populace than among the deputies. The middle classes of Munich, and the workmen, numbering many thousands, employed by the king in his building operations, murmured at the reduction of the civil list, and when the monarch returned from a journey they conducted him to his palace in a formal procession. The peasants of Gauting assembled under the leadership of Baron von Hallberg, the well known "Hermit

of Gauting," and sent an impassioned address, to the effect that the king need merely give a hint to his loyal peasants, "and in an hour your majesty will no longer have any enemies alive!" Henceforward for many years the name of "Gautinger," as in earlier days on the Rhine the name of "Hatzenporter," was used in the liberal press as a synonym for a man of servile spirit.

Baron von Rotenhan, a young man sprung from the imperial Ritterschaft of Franconia, occupied a difficult intermediate position between the parties. A Burschenschafter, in his student days he had been an intimate friend of Stüve, and of Frommann, the Jena bookseller. A relative of Grolman, he was likewise closely associated with the Berlin president by community of sentiment. A sincere patriot, liberal and far-seeing, he exhibited equal independence towards those above him and those beneath him in social station. The liberals still undervalued his candour, for he was a fervent Protestant, and as a thoughtful reformer he often strongly opposed the inflammatory speeches of the demagogues. A kindred spirit was his friend Count Giech, Stein's son-in-law. These two men constituted almost the only link between the historical sense of the state characteristic of the north and the rationalising liberalism of the south. The width of the chasm between these two outlooks was manifest to Christian Rauch when he visited Munich at this time to complete his statue of the late king. Thiersch and other Bavarian friends considered the sculptor little better than a Cossack because Rauch, as a good Prussian, had no respect for constitutional government, and because in the Poles he could see nothing but enemies of his fatherland.

After prolonged chaffering, however, the budget was passed, the deletions being so extensive that it was possible to remit one-fifth of the direct taxes. In other respects the noisy assembly effected very little. In the matter of abolishing statute labour and tithes, and in respect of the indispensable legislation for the promotion of agriculture, all that could be achieved was the expression of sundry wishes. No agreement was secured about practical proposals. As for the limited freedom of occupation provided by the new system of concession, the diet actually displayed hostility to the reform, for the members of the lower middle class, alarmed by the rapid development of competition, overwhelmed the house with

addresses complaining of the new liberties. It is true that when the estates were dismissed at Christmas with a few dry words, the parting was tolerably peaceful. For the moment a breach had been avoided, and the Prussian foreign office gratefully recognised that in Bavaria the proceedings of the diet had been less stormy than in Carlsruhe or Cassel.[1] But Rotenhan, and other thoughtful deputies free from hostility to the court, contemplated, the future with concern. The king, who in this strictly monarchical state still wielded decisive influence, made no secret of the anger aroused in his mind by the foolish and inflammatory speeches delivered in this "wearisome and harassing diet." He had grown out of sympathy with the constitutionalist ideals of his youth. Like other disillusioned enthusiasts, he turned sharply away from these fine dreams, and although he had never a thought of formally abrogating the constitution, he gave free rein to autocratic inclinations. "Prose gains the victory in this world," he sadly exclaimed when the liberals thwarted his artistic plans, and Goethe sent condolences to the misunderstood master-builder. He complained of the fickleness of popular favour, and longed for the vanished loyalty of ancient days:

> Good German folk, of old so grandly true,
> Your spirits leal doth folly now assail!
> Become once more the men our fathers knew,
> Equalled by none in hist'ry's varied tale.

Nor did matters rest here—with the utterance of words of censure. The opposition had been completely mistaken in the hope that Schenk's dismissal was to herald a liberal regime. Zentner, who for so long a period had preserved harmony between the officialdom and the diet, retired at the end of the year. At the same time Armansperg was ungraciously dismissed, to the great regret of the Prussian government. His services to the national finances and in connection with the Prusso-Bavarian customs treaty now counted for nothing, seeing that the Austrian court and the members of the Munich "Congregation" had long suspected him (though quite unjustly) of being a secret patron of liberalism.[2] Field-marshal Wrede now became president of

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Küster, January 8, 1832.

[2] Küster's Reports, February 14, April 18, May 7 and 24, December 22 and 31, 1831.

the ministerial council. The new minister of foreign affairs, Baron von Gise, was, like Wrede, an adherent of Metternich. Little had hitherto been heard of Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, an able man of the world, to whom the king quite unexpectedly entrusted the administration of foreign affairs. This much only was certain, that the sympathies of the new government would incline towards the Hofburg much more strongly than had those of its predecessor. Empress Caroline Augusta unceasingly plied her royal brother with pious councils. Outside the circles of the high officialdom, a conservative party in the political sense could hardly be said to exist in Bavaria. For these reasons, considerable anxiety now began to prevail lest King Louis should ere long succumb to the influence of the powerful clericalists, with whose views his romanticist tendencies led him spontaneously to sympathise.

§ 3. THE HAMBACH FESTIVAL.

The newspaper press of South Germany, flourishing like a crop of weeds, did even more than the diets to force the courts into the paths of reaction. Among the journals of highland liberalism, the *Politische Annalen*, edited first by Posselt, then by Murhard, and still more recently by Rotteck, was considered the most respectable, and yet how preposterously radical a cosmopolitanism was represented in its columns. No word was said here about Germany, no word about the duties of national honour and self-preservation. The good Freiburg doctrinaire could see nothing in the world beyond the Gallic cock, ever crowing about freedom, and the "holy alliance," its deadly enemy. "The history of the world," wrote Rotteck in January, 1831, "can point to no other year of such immeasurable and momentous importance as the one that has just drawn to a close." He found it abominable that "Lafayette, the idol of all well-meaning Frenchmen, should be sacrificed to the scandalous hatred of the aristocrats." He demanded the intervention of the German powers in favour of the Polish rebels, saying that this intervention was "justified by the very principle of non-intervention." To Rotteck's profound concern, the pacifism of the men of the "juste-milieu" led them to disdain "Belgium, so indispensable to the safeguarding of France against the military power of the

"holy alliance"; and the Badenese sage expressed a heartfelt wish lest France "should have cause to repent all too late on account of this pacific determination." When Hornthal, the ever-busy Bavarian parliamentary orator, published a pamphlet demanding Germany's neutrality vis-à-vis the July revolution, he was severely censured by Rotteck, who declared that this was far too little. Liberty and civilisation were now at stake, and the constitutionalist princes of Germany were therefore called upon to take a side, "to lay their words and their weapons in the scale of the constitution." Thus with all the naive ignorance of the political dilettante did the Freiburg demagogue advocate the disintegration of his fatherland, and it was not surprising that General Clausewitz and other Prussian patriots should regard him simply as a traitor.

The small fry of the press did their best to excel their master. If they were to be believed, the whole of national life was summed up in newspapers, and in speeches made in parliament. Since the Prussians had as yet known little of these dubious delights, they were regarded with unmitigated contempt, no one remarking that in daily life, in respect of right of domicile, as regards marriage, in point of freedom of occupation, and in municipal affairs, the Prussian was incomparably freer than the South German in bureaucratic leading strings. The *Hochwächter* of Stuttgart, a comparatively moderate newspaper edited by Lohbauer, in its issue of January 9, 1832, summarised in the following terms the principles of constitutionalist infatuation: "At this juncture, the constitutionalist Germans must regard as foreign every state which pursues interests conflicting with those of constitutionalism. It may sound harsh and may seem to express a desire to perpetuate the unhappy division of Germany, that we should thus declare that our Prussian and Austrian fellow tribesmen must be regarded as foreigners. But now that we have come to consider the words 'German' and 'constitutionalist' as synonymous, our Austrian and other co-linguals must submit to our refusal to accept them as brethren until they are willing to walk with us along the same road. We do not suggest that our attitude towards the Prussians or the Austrians should be one of contempt, but they must not take it amiss if for the nonce we are less friendly towards them than towards the French, to whose good offices we look for the protection of our constitutions."

In Freiburg, immediately after the promulgation of the new press law, the liberals combined to form a joint stock company and founded the *Freisinnige*. For a time this was edited by Baron von Reichlin-Meldegg, a Catholic priest who now became a convert to Protestantism, attaching himself to the rationalistic school of Paulus of Heidelberg. He was indubitably honest, but was so foolish that in good society he could be tolerated only as a buffoon. Loud were the rejoicings when "this firstborn of freedom of the press" was ushered into the world. A copy of the *Freisinnige* printed upon satin was carried through the town by the students in solemn procession. In the evening came the inevitable banquet, and an embassy from the printers' corporation presented Welcker with the no less inevitable crown of laurels—for Welcker, to quote the current phrase, was the man "who brings forward such splendid resolutions." Rotteck proposed a toast: "To the united liberals of all civilised countries in Europe and throughout the world, as contrasted with all persons of authoritarian and slavish sentiments!" A young university graduate then proposed the health and long life of a certain bird, the Gallic cock, the vigorous pulsion of whose wings had for a second time broken chains asunder. In conclusion, there rose to his feet "a noble Pole" (equally inevitable) to express his regret on account of the regime of the "juste-milieu" now prevailing in France, whereupon Rotteck, to console him, called for three cheers for Lafayette, "the purest incorporation of the most perfect nobility of spirit and character in the French Revolution and in the French people." The newspaper hailed with these exalted expectations now proceeded to discuss foreign policy with blind passion and profound ignorance, persistently reiterating to its readers the idiotic fable that just as Napoleon had once led the French against the Spaniards, so now Austria and Prussia desired to lead the Germans, inert slaves, to attack the liberties of France.

As regards home affairs, the judgments of the *Freisinnige* were calmer and better informed, and no one who compared this newspaper with the other and thoroughly mischievous offspring of the new freedom of the press could fail to discern that in the Badenese opposition there already existed two fundamentally contrasted parties. In the highlands, the *Schwarzwälder*, edited by Bader, the young lawyer, fulminated against the pygmies of the cabinets and against the caste of

so-called nobles, against their sensuality and dissolute living: "We defy them, these minions of tyranny!" In Mannheim, Franz Stromeyer, able and original but unstable, produced the *Wächter am Rhein*. His brother-in-law, young Carl Mathy, would from time to time contribute a well-written article, but Stromeyer's own work consisted for the most part of wild accusations, threats as to what the league of the peoples would do against the princes, direct challenges to the two great powers. "All hearts are beating on behalf of Baden's freedom of the press. Hesse, Nassau, Rhenish Bavaria, and Brunswick are with us to the death. This is Baden's strength! Put your hands to the work! Strike hard! Give the watchword for the rebirth of the fatherland!" But as long as the two factions were combined in opposition to the menacing Bundestag, no sharp distinction could be drawn between the radicals and the moderate liberals.

Amid the general ferment there was such a medley of opinion that not one of the parties possessed any clear vision of its own aims. Many of the South German admirers of France imagined in all good faith that they were merely continuing the work of the wars of liberation, and that their endeavours to develop internal freedom would serve solely to complete the growth of national independence. A writing printed in Strasburg, but manifestly emanating from Baden, *A word with Arndt and Jahn*, asked the Turnvater with an air of surprise whether it could possibly be true that he had expressed opinions unfavourable to the July revolution. "It is incredible, old champion, that you can have said anything of the kind, you who opened the way for freedom in Germany. The French are the young people of Europe, and assuredly of all the nations of the earth must be the most pleasing to you." Arndt's attack on the Belgians, unfortunately an indisputable fact, seemed to this Badenese writer an incomprehensible aberration. "Were it not that Arndt is a man of the people, one might believe his book to be the purchased voice of a governmental hireling or minister." The only independent Badenese paper, the only one to stand up against the liberals, was the *Mannheimer Zeitung*, which adroitly made fun of Rotteck's rationalist commonplaces, and cleverly exposed the overwhelming conceit of his associates. Some of the articles were obviously penned by Heidelberg professors. But in this newspaper, as in almost all the conservative organs

of the south, clericalist aims were unmistakable, and consequently in the Protestant parts of the country it could exercise but little influence.

Equally vociferous were the newspapers of the neighbouring territories. In Würtemberg the *Schwäbische Merkur*, whose views upon matters of German commercial policy were remarkably sound, had a hard fight against the numerous freshly created radical journals. The *Beobachter* of Reutlingen had as its motto "No man of honour will put up with disgrace," and beside the motto was a picture of a stake with Gessler's hat upon it. "The main current upon which the all-powerful zeitgeist is floating" was naturally directed against the barrier imposed by the holy alliance. All men of energy, courage, and firmness were to find a platform in the *Beobachter*, whilst the pledge was simultaneously given to these valiant souls that their names would never be divulged—for the demoralising anonymity of journalism appeared already quite inviolable. The utterances of these Swabian radicals seemed extremely moderate in comparison with the sayings of the *Zeitschwingen*, published in Hanau by G. Stein, under the very eyes of the old elector, who looked on with malicious amusement, whilst, to the terror of the Bundestag, the newspaper was circulated in Frankfort by secret agents. In its columns there appeared stormy demands for the unconditional unity of the fatherland, for the destruction of all separate states or statelets, whether these were known by the name of Prussia or by that of Hesse-Homburg. But, in Börne's manner, the inborn phlegm of the German Michael was censured; the constitutionalist Germans were exhorted to follow the example of Poland, "the paragon of the nations," and to begin the struggle against Prussia. "I hate an enemy, but a hypocritical enemy is an object, not for hatred, but for utter contempt. Just as Prussia was able to persuade Germany that she, Prussia, was the buckler of freedom, so now does she declare to the world that her only desire is the peace and happiness of Europe, whereas her alliance with the northern enemy makes that enemy master of our fortune (our misfortune, alas !)."

All these extravagances were greatly exceeded in the language used by the journals of the Bavarian Palatinate. Once again, for a time, did the disintegrated political life of the nation find an unnatural centre of gravity. Like Coblenz

in the days of the *Rheinische Merkur*, and like Jena in the days of the *Nemesis* and the *Isis*, the remote frontier region of the Palatinate became the focus of the German literate opposition, although in this little territory of petty bourgeois and petty peasants there was positively nothing that could give a firm standing ground or a leverage to the political press. But a natural soil was provided in the Palatinate for the cultivation of the intense resentment that animated liberal writers, for nowhere else were the miseries of the fragmentation of Germany so palpably felt. Hemmed in between the customs lines of France and those of the Prusso-Hessian union, isolated from the main territory of Bavaria, the Palatiners' experience of the blessings of free trade was almost exclusively confined to an acquaintance with the spurious six-pfennig pieces by which the country was flooded through the friendly offices of the Coburg Duke of St. Wendel. Export trade was at a standstill. Emigration towards the fabulous Eldorado of the far west was even brisker from the Palatinate than from the other territories of the south. Since no remedy had as yet been suggested for the new phenomenon of widespread poverty, this emigration, this outflow of priceless national energies, was acclaimed by public opinion as a genuine social panacea. The merry Palatiners continued to regard as enemies the Old Bavarian officials, whose manners were rough and whose methods were cumbrous, although under the leadership of President Stichaner the administration had of late become somewhat more efficient. French legislation was still in force, and the Palatiners clung to their French laws with true German fidelity. As late as 1799, when in France itself the idealism of the revolution had long since evaporated, volunteers from among the cultured youth of the Palatinate had exultantly flocked to the French army in order to fight for liberty against the despots.

It was therefore by no means surprising that the new clamours for freedom now being uttered in Paris should find a resounding echo in the Palatinate, and that the discontented Palatiners should promptly enter into friendly association with their neighbours in Strasburg. Nevertheless the people were essentially German, the call of the blood remained dominant, and, if we except Savoye, the lawyer, and the little circle of his radical intimates, there were but few to desire a formal union with France. It was felt that the Bavarian

administration, however much disliked, was at least milder than the rule of the Napoleonic prefects, nor did anyone yearn for French-speaking officials. Most of the Palatiners were enthusiastic advocates of a free and united Germany, which was to be closely allied with free France, was to relieve them of the oppressive internal customs dues, and to free them from the petty tyrannies of the censorship and the police. So innocent were they that it hardly occurred to them to ask whether French amity might not be too dearly purchased. Since the territory was equally devoid of dynastic loyalty and of respect for the Bavarian state, these obscure popular impulses could very readily be misguided.

To everyone the danger was obvious, except to King Louis, who had never a doubt as to the truth of his own fine phrases about "Bavarian loyalty," and who was above all unwilling to harbour suspicion as to the possibility of rebellious thoughts in the beloved cradle of his race.[1] But the confident tone of the Munich court underwent speedy alteration when Dr. Siebenpfeiffer began his demagogic activities. A pettifogger of the common type, of dubious character, a ready writer, and a man of indefatigable energy, he had just enough talent to loom large in the eyes of half-cultured vulgarians. He issued a monthly review, *Rheinbayern*, "a record of the legislation of constitutional states at home and abroad, and especially of France." Its tone was still comparatively moderate, but its columns were by no means free from the customary abuse of the unconstitutional proceedings of the officials of Prussia," the German Siberia," of the shameless insolence of the Prussian aristocracy, and of the throne of Frederick the Great now debased to the level of a Russian satrapate. All that he demanded was local self-government for Rhenish Bavaria, under the rule perhaps of one of the royal princes, but with the formal recognition of the French declaration of the rights of man legally proclaimed in the Palatinate. He desired that education should have a political trend and that classical education should be abolished, for to the liberal advocates of the law of reason the classics seemed an apanage of the privileged classes and were therefore suspect. Matters unsuitable for incorporation in the articles of a monthly were published plainly enough by Siebenpfeiffer in the brief inflammatory paragraphs of his daily newspaper the *Westbote*.

[1] Küster's Reports, August 13, 1830, and subsequent dates.

in this latter he gave utterance to what he had already admitted in private conversation with his old friend Rotteck, saying that he was utterly weary of the sugary half-measures and the constitutionalist falsehoods of the men of the "juste-milieu" in Baden. Throne and republic, the sovereignty of a prince and the sovereignty of the people, were incompatible; princes were merely the incorporated idea of aristocracy. In the day when all supreme authorities were appointed by popular election, "the undermined thrones would collapse, and the divine right of rulers would take refuge in the forests of Russia!" Consequently the Casselers, the Brunswickers, and the Dresdeners were referred to with contempt because they had been satisfied to address complaints to the thrones. The Nassauers were urged "to shoot an ounce of lead through the base and lying heart of the faithless minister Marschall." To the nation at large the appeal was issued: "What German Brutus will snatch the dagger from the bloody corpse of ravished Poland, and will utter a rousing call on behalf of liberty?"

Among Siebenpfeiffer's associates was Wirth, the Franconian lawyer, who had so long worked behind the scenes in the Munich chamber, but who now considered it advisable to shelter his pugnacious quill under the ægis of French judicial procedure. Though an enthusiastic Teutonist, a man of good reputation, and an honest patriot, he was almost more radical than his comrade. His *Tribüne* did not merely extol the American ideal of the state, but in addition, at this early date, preached a shameless socialism. A great association was to educate the children of the poor, fitting them for higher callings as their gifts might render possible; a national treasury was to provide credit for the smaller men of business. Wirth refused to submit his journal to the censorship, openly invited all German writers to send him for publication passages excised from their writings, removed his publishing office from one Palatine town to another whenever an embargo was laid upon his hand printing-presses, and carried on against the police authorities a petty warfare which was all the more likely to arouse bitterness among the populace since the law courts had on several occasions espoused the hunted man's cause. The Palatine judges were widely acclaimed as the natural defenders of liberty, and it was a point of pride with them to prove to the world by the lenity of their judgments (at times open

to objection on legal grounds) that under the regime of the *code Napoléon* political campaigners were given a freer hand than was the case in Old Bavaria.

From far and near the younger radical writers now flocked round these two leaders. Among them were Kobb, editor of the *Speiersche Zeitung*, Georg Fein, the Brunswicker, Sauerwein of Frankfort, and a number of others, not one of whom rose above the level of mediocrity. Encouraged by the example of the Palatiners, Hundt-Radowsky, the Mecklenburger, published *Die Geissel*, now in one and now in another corner of the south. Under the protection of the lax Palatine censorship, the Hessian liberals founded the *Hessische Volksblatt*. All its contributors were Hessians, and it caused much disquiet to the ministers in Darmstadt. Börne helped from a safe distance, his letters from Paris becoming more impudent, more outrageous, day by day.

Attempts were soon made to influence the soldiery. In the *Allgemeine Anzeiger* of Zweibrücken, an alleged non-commissioned officer exhorted his comrades to refuse to allow themselves to be used against citizens, since "as citizens all inhabitants of the world have equal rights." To incite, in addition, the Prussian Rhinelanders, there was published in Zweibrücken a writing entitled *Rhenish-Prussian Happiness*, a futile compilation which could find nothing to complain of in Prussian administration beyond the tyranny of the censors, "whose chains were gilded for them by the states with the sweat of the citizens," and yet drew the conclusion that the Rhinelanders were orphans, not motherless indeed, but unquestionably fatherless. Here was labour lost. With infinitesimally few exceptions, the Rhinelanders were devoted to the Prussian state, so that President Ruppenthal, since Daniel's death recognised as the leading jurist on the Rhine, when opening the assizes of 1832, could point with just pride to the immutable loyalty of the province.

All the more pitiful, by contrast, was the resourcelessness of particularism in the Coburg princedom of Lichtenberg, the fertile homeland of the spurious six-pfennig pieces. In a passionately worded address the Lichtenbergers complained to their duke that whilst they were compelled to pay 10,000 gulden in hard cash for the army, they had never a sight of a soldier, that the dowager duchess had removed from St. Wendel, that so many Coburgers and Gothaers received official

appointments although Lichtenberg was bursting with native talent. Since these and other statements of grievance remained void of effect, a mild form of anarchy ensued. The country was badly administered, under French laws, but without the precise ordering of the prefectoral system. The government did nothing to prevent smuggling, and nothing to protect the unfortunate peasants from the criminal intrigues of the "bande noire," the Jewish usurers. Public meetings and riotous street assemblies were held over all the place, and a number of "red-caps" appeared amongst the mob. In St. Wendel, Pastor Juch held a "market" regularly, to read and explain to the peasants the radical journals of the Palatinate. At the request of the duke, a force of Prussian troops entered the duchy, and instantly everything became tranquil. But directly the soldiers had been withdrawn the disturbances broke out anew. At length, in front of the ancient Hallen-kirche in St. Wendel, a great tree of liberty was erected, bearing the defiant inscription: "Death will be the portion of any hangman's assistant who dares with sacrilegious hand to touch this sacred object!" The mob, keeping the gendarmes at a distance, spent the whole night dancing the carmagnole round the symbol of freedom.

The Bavarian Palatiners, meanwhile, were likewise beginning to advance from newspaper reading to deeds. The political clamourers held converse in every inn throughout the wine-bibbing land. Here and there a tree of liberty was set up, and was defended by the crowd against the police; in a few places a dog was crowned and then solemnly flogged. Wirth supplemented the Polish clubs by establishing a patriotic league for the protection of a free press. Branches of this organisation soon came into existence in many towns of the south-west, Wirth's primary aspiration being the reorganisation of the Germanic Federation. The supreme national authority was to be an elected chamber; there was to be a president with executive powers, holding office for two years, and unconditionally subordinated to the popular representatives. Every German province could organise itself by a popular vote to become an independent federal state, as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy. To most of the members, however, this programme seemed rather alarming, and for the present it was rejected. But what was likely to be the result of the futile activities of all these newspapers and associations,

just outside the gates of Mainz, most revolutionary of German towns, and close to the frontier of the rapacious land of France? It was already known in Berlin that Mortier, the French envoy, had confidentially informed Gise, the Bavarian minister, that it would be impossible for France to tolerate the entry of foreign troops into the Rhenish Palatinate. By foreign troops the Frenchman meant the troops of the Germanic Federation.[1]

How was it possible to expect that Baden would remain unaffected by the disturbances in progress among her neighbours? Early in 1832, when it was learned that the Bundestag proposed to take action against the Badenese press law, the liberals in Mannheim, Freiburg, and elsewhere summoned great public meetings, at which, after passionate speeches, resolutions were passed begging the grand duke to maintain the freedom of the press. Leopold refused to receive these resolutions, but it was felt that if matters were allowed to take their course the movement might easily become dangerous, for quite recently the Belgian clericalists had paved the way for their revolt by a well-conducted campaign of petitions. Siebenpfeiffer was extolling "the twofold oak of the tribunes and of the public press, beneath whose shade humanity unceasingly advances towards better things," and to the Bundestag these expressions seemed of sinister import. On March 2nd the federal assembly suppressed the *Tribüne*, the *Westbote*, and the *Zeitschwingen*; simultaneously the Berlin foreign office exhorted the South German courts to be on the alert.[2] The action of the Bavarian government was but half-hearted. The court of Munich was unwilling to enforce the federal decree in all its rigour, being loath to sacrifice its absolute sovereignty, and going so far as to tolerate the open continuance of the activities of the patriotic league, although these had already been prohibited by a Bavarian decree.

It was inevitable that the great powers should take a grave view of the South German movement, seeing how obvious it was that the Poles had everywhere a hand in the game. With touching zeal, as if doing something for the service of their own country, many South German towns had supplied the Poles with money during the war, and in Mainz there

[1] Küster's Report, April 5, 1832.

[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Otterstedt, March 8; Instruction to Küster, March 9, 1832.

was actually formed a young ladies' union to furnish the heroes of the east with lint. Since the autumn of 1831 crowds of refugees from Warsaw had descended upon South Germany. The principal bands were led by three generals of the Polish army, handsomely adorned with red-and-white sashes. One of them, Ramorino, was an Italian, whilst the other two, Langermann and Schneider, were Germans, although the last-named passed by the Polish patronymic of Sznayde. In Ratisbon and Augsburg they were hailed as comrades by the officers' corps; in Stuttgart, Denninger the brewer, a Jew from Strasburg, provided for them a formal reception; in Freiburg, Rotteck, Welcker, and the officers, arranged a huge Polish banquet. So great was the power of Napoleonic memories and of liberal phraseology, so weak was the national sense of honour in the federal army, that German officers could fraternise with the deadly enemies of Prussia. All over the south, people could be heard singing, "Not yet is Poland lost," or "The maiden chaste and free, in raiment white and red." The Badenese and Bavarian liberals lent a thoughtful ear to the mad boasts of their northern guests, nor did they betray any surprise when the Polish national committee in Paris, in a manifesto to the German people, modestly maintained that "the bourgeois emancipation of all classes had hitherto been realised in but one country in the world—in Poland through the constitution of 1791. The Poles were welcomed by all the clubs and all the journals of the South German radicals, and the recrudescence in the south of the foolish hatred of Prussia was mainly due to the inflammatory utterances of these foreigners.

By degrees only, as people became more intimately acquainted with the unsavoury ways of the chaste and free maid, Poland, did the fraternal enthusiasm of some of the more reasonable begin to cool. After the last refugees had left Germany, two leaders of the emigration expressed their thanks in the traditional Sarmatian manner for the hospitality that had been so richly bestowed. From Metz, Czynski wrote *Deux mots sur les Allemands* to invite the Germans to break up Austria and Prussia, for thus only could Germany be liberated and Poland restored. If anyone could still doubt that Germany was an enslaved country, let him remember the invasion of the sovereign duchy of Lichtenberg by three hundred Prussian soldiers, a scandalous infringement of the

principle of non-intervention. "For Germany a Prussian in St. Wendel is as shameful as for Italy an Austrian in Rimini or for Poland a Russian in Warsaw." Still plainer was the language of Mochnacki, in his writing *The Revolution in Germany*. The chief of the Polish radicals could hardly find words strong enough to convey his feelings about the Germans. They had, he said, been asleep throughout the modern age. While asleep, they had written more books than all the other nations in the world put together. At length they had been shaken out of their prolonged slumbers by Napoleon, by the July days, and by the Polish war. Now the Germans must see to it that they remained awake; they must abandon their debilitating literary activities, for in an age of revolution there was no need for anything beyond newspapers and works on practical science; and they must combine with the Poles for the destruction of Austria and Prussia. The more prudent among the leaders of German liberalism were alarmed by this overplus of Sarmatian folly, but throughout the rank and file of the party the great Polish legend long continued to exercise effective force. In Paris, the German refugees formed secret societies jointly with the Poles, gladly listening to the instruction offered them by the practised conspirators concerning Mochnacki's "science of revolution." According to the opinion of this Sarmatian apostle it was "far easier to make a revolution than to understand Hegel's *Phenomenology*." In Heinrich Heine alone were the poet and the spirit of mischief stronger than the radical. After observing close at hand the tawdry elegance of the life led by these boastful idlers, he found himself unable to refrain from depicting its ludicrous side, describing "the Polacks" in his witty poem about the great "Eselinski."

Nevertheless this South German liberalism, for all its blind enthusiasm on behalf of Germany's foes, cherished an inexhaustible wealth of patriotic love. Its self-conceit was the outcome of that sense of vacancy which must inevitably result in a highly endowed nation that lacks an adequate public life, and its noisy impatience was an expression of the yearning for national glory. Amid a desert of follies and immature reflections, the South German press nevertheless gave utterance to a certain number of sound ideas calculated to further the political development of the nation. Wilhelm Schulz, the Hessian officer who had been forced to leave the service owing

to the radical character of his writings, and had since then gained maturity of mind through serious work, endeavoured in a book entitled *The Unity of Germany secured by National Representation* to give plainer expression to the fundamental thought embodied in Welcker's motion. He was still by no means free from the illusions of youthful liberalism, remaining firmly convinced that the power of public opinion was irresistible, provided only that the petty diets made a relentless use of their right to refuse supply whenever ministers should prove refractory. But he saw clearly enough that there was no place for a parliament beside the Bundestag, and he therefore demanded that in addition to the Reichstag there should exist a well-ordered central authority, be it an emperordom or be it a federal republic. He hardly accounted Austria as being now a German state, whilst Prussia, "this Germany on the small scale," had unfortunately made herself generally detested by her Polish policy, so that for the nonce all that could be thought of was the formation of a constitutional league within the Federation. Thus dubiously feeling his way did he approach the solution of the great problem. Similar was the tenour of a number of articles in Rotteck's *Annalen* and in the political contributions of C. H. Hofmann, the Hessian liberal, these writers for the most part being far more favourable to Prussia than was Schulz.

How thin and dull seem these expressions of a vague yearning when compared with the deep and serious tones to which young Paul Pfizer gave vent in his *Correspondence between two Germans* (1831). Pfizer was the prophet of the new German nation under Prussian hegemony. A typical Swabian, serious, thoughtful, with a poetical imagination and a philosophical depth of mind, he was at the same time sober-visioned enough to discern the real and the vital amid the play of phenomena—beyond question the leading publicist of his day. Alike in respect of form and of content his book displays the characteristics of an epoch of transition, an age that is rising from literary creation to political activity. By the free elaboration of the philosophical letters which he had formerly exchanged with his friend Friedrich Notter the poet, he first became enabled to recognise that the moral life of the nations is based, not on necessity, but on freedom. In the second part of his book, the product solely of his own pen, he mooted the question of Germany's future, depicting with proud confidence this

people that with all its faults was the most intelligent and the most amiable, the most pious and the most conscientious, among the nations, but which, like Odysseus, awakening in tears on his native shore, was unable to recognise its own fatherland. This fatherland of the Germans, he continued in joyful strains, was already foreshadowed in the state of Frederic the Great, in the state that excelled all other German territories through the justice of its administration, through the humaneness of its laws, through its popular army and its alert intellectual life, and which excelled them no less through the strength of its national sentiment.

The valiant Swabian thus ventured to praise in plain terms as the finest quality of the Prussians that Prussian pride which was abused on all hands as self-opinionated particularism; and he ventured to express a candid censure of the ungerman and atheistic tendencies manifested by German liberalism, tendencies which were an unfortunate heritage from the French encyclopædists. He did not hesitate to admit the hopeless futility of the petty diets, answering the clamorous complaints of the demagogues by a statement of hard fact, saying: "The great obstacle to the unity of Germany is to be found rather in the peoples than in the princes." The epistolary form of exposition was happily chosen, for it enabled him to give a precise demonstration of pros and cons under the gaze of a doubling and struggling age. With victorious dialectic he annihilated all the objections to the one thing needful, disposing alike of the dreams of a sonderbund to constitute a so-called pure Germany, and of the false cosmopolitan enthusiasm which was interested in the national spirit of foreigners alone. A future of unmeasured greatness was foreshadowed in the poems with which the letters were supplemented. With the mind's eye he contemplated in the moonshine the rocky peaks of the Rauhe Alb, the district of his birth. He saw the Swabian emperor of old days descending from the pointed summit of Hohenstaufen. Then he turned his gaze towards the Hohenzollerns:

All our heroes have departed,
  And our glorious past is dead!
Soul, from peaceful tomb upstarted,
  Turn thee to the morning red,
As the eagle famed in story,
  Staufen's neighbour, winging bore
Eastward, eastward, Zollern's glory
  To the distant Baltic shore.

He clung ever to the hope that Frederick's eagle would cover the abandoned and the homeless with his golden pinions. Never before had any German uttered thoughts so beautiful and so profound regarding Prussia's great future; and in comparison with Pfizer's politically grounded conceptions, the bold prophecies of Fichte appeared to be nothing better than cloudy professorial dreams. This call to arms came from the lips of a Swabian thirty years of age, from one who had grown to manhood amid the narrow surroundings of his homeland, from one who presumably had never set foot upon Prussian soil. However hostile the enormous majority of South Germans might be to the thought of Prussian hegemony, it was impossible that this writing, with its peculiar setting, should have been conceived in any other environment than that of the German uplands, and for this reason the Swabians gave it a friendly welcome. The party struggles of the day were still almost entirely concerned with the conflict between the constitutionalist and the absolutist outlook, and since Pfizer was unsparing in his criticism of existing conditions and made no attempt to conceal his constitutionalist leanings, the Swabian liberals regarded him as one of themselves. Salviati, on the other hand, Prussian envoy in Stuttgart and a stubborn conservative, alluding in his reports to Prussia's ardent admirer, referred to him with respect, but as a declared opponent. In the north, Pfizer's book found many grateful readers. The young Prussians who were dreaming of a Hohenzollern imperial crown felt that their secret hopes were strengthened by the Swabian writer's philosophy of history. Lornsen and many other politicians in the North German minor states were compelled to reconsider their position, to abandon the particularist prejudices in which they had been brought up, and to take a calmer view of the relationships of power involved in federal policy.

Long before the publication of Pfizer's book, another South German had given expression to kindred ideas, though only in private. Friedrich von Gagern, eldest and most gifted of the imperial baron's many sons, following his father's advice, had entered the Netherland military service, learning there from personal experience how utterly the imaginative old imperial patriot had deceived himself concerning the fancied German characteristics of the Netherlands. Friedrich, whose love for the great fatherland was passionate, was now quite cut off

from Germany, and lived a stranger among strangers. When on furlough he visited his home at Hornau and found his brothers assembled round the loquacious father, he exchanged with them political ideas, so that in the Hessian countryside people soon began to talk of "the family politics of the Gagerns." Old Hans von Gagern remained, as he had always been, a political busybody. When the Belgian revolution occurred, with customary self-complacency he communicated his "lumières" to the Netherland court and to the Brussels congress.[1] He kept his pen vigorously at work, went the round of the courts, associated freely with his friendly opponent, Baron Stein, whose letters he edited after the great man's death, so that Gagern was the first of all Germans to erect a literary monument to Stein. In the upper house at Darmstadt he would sometimes deliver a brilliant but rambling speech dealing with questions of high policy. Another of the sons, Heinrich, had by this time acquired considerable prestige among the liberals of the lower house. Thus did Friedrich gain first-hand acquaintance with the political ideas that were animating South Germany, while the point from which he viewed them was sufficiently removed to enable him simultaneously to perceive the fatherland as a whole.

When he returned home in the year 1823 and noted with alarm the widespread discouragement, he wrote for his family a masterly essay entitled *Germany's Political Unity*. With military brevity, but with the assured touch of the born statesman, he gave a clear description of the futility of the minor courts and of the decay of Austria, destined in the future to experience nothing but defeats. Prussia alone could assume the leadership of Germany, "for ambition is the primary condition of Prussia's existence"; moreover, Prussia would have no difficulty in winning the affection of the Germans as soon as the king should summon the estates. In the year 1834, incited thereto perhaps by Pfizer's book, Gagern pursued the idea further, sketching the outlines of the future imperial constitution in a monograph *Concerning the Federal State*, a work characterised by a definiteness and brevity wherein it contrasts strangely with the prolix and confused dissertations which in those days exponents of political science were in the habit of producing.[2] He demands a hereditary emperordom

[1] Nagler's Report, November 28, 1830.

[2] Heinrich von Gagern (Life of Friedrich von Gagern, vol. I, pp. 355 et seq.)

The minor princes are to surrender to the central authority the management of military affairs, the control of foreign policy, and in addition some of their domestic sovereign rights; and they are to obey the emperor. There is to be a chamber composed of the semi-sovereign princes and there is to be a representative body elected by the people. Both are to assemble round the emperor in a great capital city, indispensable to the Germans as a mighty focus of national life, and therefore to be created in defiance of any prejudices to the contrary. There was naturally considerable obscurity in points of detail, but the thought destined to bear rich fruit in the future found luminous expression, the thought that the idea of national unity incorporated in the Prussian state, if it were to march on to victory, must become associated with the constitutionalist ideas of the south. The demonstration was all the more convincing in that it was written by an aristocrat, and by a man of moderate liberal views.

The incessant working of the impulse towards unity throughout all the confusion of German political life was recognised with gloomy anticipation by Edgar Quinet, a talented Frenchman, who at this time was living in Heidelberg, and who married a beautiful Palatine woman. Even here, in the clamorous Palatinate, where all voices were chorusing the demand for liberty, Quinet recognised plainly that the most intimate and lively thought of all German hearts was an aspiration for national power and glory. He perceived with alarm that the power to gratify this yearning was vested in one state alone, in that sinister Prussia, wearing in her girdle the keys of France, the Rhenish fortresses, and holding in her hand the conqueror's sword of Waterloo. "In Prussia," wrote Quinet in *Essays on Germany and Italy* (1831), "the unpartisan characteristics and the cosmopolitanism of old days have been replaced by a sensitive and irascible national pride. Prussian despotism is far-sighted, mobile, and enterprising. It lives by knowledge as other despots live by ignorance. Between the rulers and the ruled there exists a tacit compact to postpone

contends that this essay was written as early as 1826. But it is impossible that it can have been completed before 1834, seeing that the writer refers to the customs dispute between South Carolina and the American union. This, which took place during the years 1832 and 1833, is mentioned as "a very recent event." Moreover, in a letter from Eindhoven, under date April 14, 1834 (op. cit., vol. II, p. 204), Freidrich von Gagern declares, in an enumeration of work done in Eindhoven, that he had just written the monograph concerning the federal state.

the day of liberty, and to join hands in order to enlarge the heritage of Frederick."

The day was yet to come upon which the Frenchman's forebodings were to be justified. For the present, however, the energies for the construction of Germany's unity were still far from coalescent. Owing to the folly of the Palatine demagogues, the Prussian court, hitherto so tolerant, was compelled to take the field against the liberal movement in the German highlands, and the campaign was conducted with such severity that a deadly hatred for the northern power flamed up anew in the south.

To give their movement a fresh impetus, Wirth and Siebenpfeiffer determined to summon great public meetings. These are invariably two-edged weapons; and on this occasion, since the initiators had no definite or coherent aim, mischief and disorder were the inevitable results. An appeal issued by Siebenpfeiffer invited all Germans to assemble at Hambach castle near Neustadt-on-the-Hardt, to celebrate "the German May," to keep a festival of hope on the birthday of the Bavarian constitution; during this month of joy the free Franks had of old foregathered in their *champ de mai*, and during this month the free Poles had received their constitution. Once again the court of Munich failed to take a strong line, being unwilling to admit to the Prussian envoy that in Bavaria there could be any danger to the public peace.[1] Yet Wirth had openly declared the aim of his press club to be "the organisation of a German realm in the democratic sense"; whilst the Palatine radicals, at a festival in honour of the returning deputy Schüler, had asserted with equal plainness that it was impossible to come to terms with the principle of legitimacy, and that the reform of Germany could be effected solely upon the foundation of unconditional popular sovereignty. The Zweibrücken militia, which had spontaneously taken up arms, invested the cavalry barracks and stood on guard round Schüler's house prepared to sound the tocsin should the popular hero be threatened. President Stichaner, a well-meaning man, was led by such indications to infer that the Palatine movement was likely to take a disastrous course, and, weary of the incessant disputes, he sent in his resignation. His successor, Baron von Andrian, though promptly hailed by the press as a

[1] Küster's Report, May 3, 1832.

"bloodthirsty bailiff," proved utterly ineffective from the first. He began by prohibiting the Hambach meeting, but withdrew the prohibition because the town council of Neustadt and the rural councils of Rhenish Bavaria protested against his decision. Thus the government had displayed its alarm and yet had failed to carry its will through. The radicals exulted, and the festival committee, recording in its report the names of the heroic town councillors and rural councillors, explained that these names were "handed down to posterity for grateful commemoration."

Now on both banks of the Middle Rhine everyone was preparing to celebrate the Festival of All the Germans. In Mainz, where many of the old Giessen Blacks were living, black-red-and-gold cockades and favours suddenly appeared, and the colours of the Burschenschaft were known henceforward as the colours of German liberty. Tricolored, after the French example, must be the banner of national unity and freedom, in contrast to the bicolored banner of the old dynasties. The Austrian governor promptly issued prohibitions, and his action was approved by the federal assembly, with the proviso, however, "it is undesirable to pay any particular attention to the party's fantastical designs and insignia, lest this might seem to give them an undeserved importance."[1] The prohibitions were void of effect. On May 26th all the roads leading up and down the Rhine, passing through the plain or out of Odenwald and Westerich towards the charming town of Neustadt, were thronged with carriages and pedestrians, and the German colours were everywhere displayed. At least twenty-five thousand persons flocked to the festival city; bells were rung, salutes were fired, bonfires were lighted on the hills. For the second time a hilltop festival was to be significant in the annals of the Germanic Federation, but how immense was the contrast between the Christian and patriotic enthusiasm of the Wartburg and the secular radicalism of these new days. In this noisy and bibulous assembly there was little trace of the romanticist charm which had illuminated the festival of the Burschen, nor, unfortunately, during the intervening fifteen years, had there been any notable advance in political culture. The overstrained idealism of youth had been replaced by the false idealism of the adult.

On the morning of the 27th the procession set out, three

[1] Private Minute of the Sitting of the Federal Assembly, May 24, 1832.

hundred handicraftsmen singing to the air of Schiller's *Reiterlied* a poem composed by Siebenpfeiffer: *Up, Patriots, to the Castle, to the Castle!* Among the women, who had been specially invited, and of whom numbers had responded, marched an ensign bearing the white-and-red banner of Poland. Next came the marshals, carrying a German flag, with the inscription, "To the Rebirth of Germany." The unfortunate vinedressers bore a black flag of mourning, and in a dolorous song bemoaned the unsatisfactory sales of Palatine wines. On the castle the colours of Germany and of Poland had been solemnly unfurled. The ancient enemies, the black and the white eagle now flew in harmony side by side—a dubious omen for the future of this German tricolor, which was never again to be displayed as a party insignia. Sinister memories of German enslavement enveloped the walls of the Kästenburg, the old acropolis of the ill-famed bishops of Spires. During the peasants' war it had been destroyed by the desperate country-folk, being subsequently rebuilt by its destroyers at the command of the merciless prince. Now it lay once more in ruins, thanks to the French, and in this great popular festival it was to be consecrated for all time to liberty. The crowd camped on the slopes beneath the splendid chestnut trees, many greeting with shouts of exaltation the towers of Spires and Mannheim, which could be seen in the distance across the fertile plain. Wine flowed in streams. Patriotic songs resounded, all adapted from Schiller (for Schiller through the might of his emotion, had long ere this become the darling of the common people), and all voicing a fine wrath on account of "the Germans' shameful situation."

Numerous messages had been received from friends at a distance, from various parts of Germany, from the Polish national committee in Paris, from the radical club of the Amis du Peuple in Strasburg. Some Rhenish Prussians had also sent greeting; they bitterly lamented "the blithe bird of the Rhine, which had been shut up in a cage with the old eagle-owl"; but they refrained from adding their names "lest it should harm the good cause." In a lengthy speech, Siebenpfeiffer expounded "the ideas animating to-day's festival, the most magnificent and the most important held in Germany for centuries." He looked forward to the coming of the day "when the princes will exchange the ermine mantle of feudalist rule by divine right for the toga virilis of German national

dignity; when German women will no longer be the servile handmaidens of dominant males, but will become free companions of free citizens; and when our sons and daughters will begin as sucklings to drink in the spirit of freedom." He concluded by calling for cheers for Germany, Poland, and France, for every people that could break its chains, for fatherland, national freedom, the league of the peoples. Wirth's language, was even more vigorous. Demanding cheers for "the united free states of Germany and for confederate republican Europe," he suggested that a few resolute men should assume the joint leadership of the German opposition. But as an honest patriot he warned the Germans against France's ambitions on the Rhine.

Whilst he now proudly thrust towards the four winds the sword of the press club, a gift from Frankfort, the speeches and songs continued without intermission. Rey of Strasburg, speaking with a strong French accent, insisted that France had no desire for conquests, but longed only for a free union with free Germany. Two noble Poles spoke in similar terms. Scharpff, a Palatiner, insisted that even the best prince by God's grace was "a born traitor to human society." Brüggemann, a student from Westphalia, spoke in a vein hardly less radical, but displayed notable talent and a pleasing patriotic ardour, amid the acclamations of other students, who had come in great numbers from Heidelberg. Many in the crowd invoked solemn curses upon all the German princes. Towards the last all articulate words faded away amid the general drunkenness. Carl Mathy, a silent auditor, was disagreeably impressed by the riotous proceedings, whereas to Ludwig Börne, who had joined the mob but was not slow in returning to his safe refuge in Paris, the wildest of the speeches seemed to err on the side of moderation. The mood of the assembly is best reflected in a song that was in every mouth:

Take courage, God is on our side!
In him we trust, his word our guide!
Ardent alike in love and hate,
We gird our loins, defying fate!
The dragon foul lusts for our blood!
We'll slay him yet and all his brood!

The poet wisely omitted to name the dragon, judiciously refrained from specifying Prussia or the Bundestag, and thus

aptly expressed the feelings of his hearers, who were all moved by a mighty lyrical emotion, thrilled by the echoes from the golden age of German poesy, uplifted in heart, and inspired by a vague aspiration for some unusual happening.

Next morning the leaders, meeting in Neustadt, appointed trusty representatives for various parts of Germany, and suggested that it might be possible to establish forthwith a provisional government for free Germany. The proposal was negatived, since no one had any mandate of such a character from his supporters at home. The festival, therefore, had no direct result, but the disorderly clamour after so many years of profound calm caused general excitement. When the Mainzers were passing through Worms on their way back from Hambach, they found that a mob rising was in progress, the men of Worms being under the delusion that the days of freedom had now come. It was unquestionable that the French secret societies had hoped for great results from the German May festival. On the day of Hambach the German radicals in Paris held a banquet under the presidency of Lafayette, and a few days later a dangerous rising occurred in the French capital.

In other districts of the Upper and Middle Rhine, public meetings were held simultaneously, and manifestly by a generally concerted prearrangement. In this glorious spring weather it was easy to get from place to place; wine was cheap; and the miseries of Germany were incontestably distressing. The patriots, decked with white and red and gold cockades, met at Weinheim-an-der-Bergstrasse, in Bergen and Wilhelmsbad near Frankfort, and in the Rauhe Alb. In some places an invitation from an enterprising tavern keeper proved sufficient allurement for the sovereign people. On June 11th the Badenese liberals held a congress in Badenweiler, and here it became plain how sharp were the contrasts within the South German opposition. The idea of unconditional national unity was beyond Rotteck's grasp. When a student wished to unfurl the German banner, Rotteck insisted on its removal, and called for a toast to Baden's independence, saying: "I wish for no unity through which we run the risk of being involved in war against our natural allies; I wish for no unity under the wings of the Austrian or of the Prussian eagle; I desire a unity of the German peoples that will protect them against the union of the princes and of the aristocrats."

Amid thunderous applause, he summed up his wisdom in the phrase, "I would rather have freedom without unity than unity without freedom," a sentiment which, continually reiterated, remained for years the catchword of liberal particularism.

For two decades after the days of Hambach the South German bourgeoisie made a regular practice of these patriotic drinking bouts. Though interfered with from time to time by the authorities, they exercised an influence almost as irresistible as that which five centuries earlier had been exercised by the Misereres of the flagellants. To retail newspaper gibberish over his cups, or at a "Welcker dinner" to listen to a speech by the great German councillor, now became a proper part of life for a South German bourgeois. Alike the idealism and the indiscipline of the year 1848 were largely generated by the continuous intoxication of these public banquets. No one was more intimately acquainted with revolutionary philistinism than the lovable Nadler, who wrote verses in the Heidelberg dialect, and was a merry Palatiner in everything except political views. He had no inclination for the never-ending wine-seasoned cries of Long live Germany—what time the German flag could not float over Strasburg nor the German warfleet sail to Kronstadt. He made Hackstrumpf, master-shoemaker, captain of the grenadier militia, and most thoroughgoing of all the liberal beerswillers, deliver himself in the following terms:

> At last I know it!
> I am a man, a German, and a citizen,
> Nor change would I with you, northern automaton,
> Satrapospot's minion, strangler of liberty,
> Scourge-wielder base amid a world of slaves!

However ludicrous all this noisy brawling may appear to-day to a more experienced and harder generation, at that date, when public meetings were still almost unknown, it was inevitable that great alarm should be aroused by the incitements to rebellion to which the Hambach orators gave vent. It was impossible for the Federation to permit the imperilled western march of Germany to remain a meeting place for the revolutionists of three nations.

CHAPTER V.

RECONSOLIDATION OF THE OLD AUTHORITIES.

§ 1. THE SIX ARTICLES.

In the current of history one wave often seems to resemble another, for the reason that the new ideas of national life can gain the victory but slowly, after unsuccessful attempts, and through struggles which are similar in successive instances. The statesman is distinguished from the doctrinaire on the one hand and from the unreflective practitioner on the other in that this semblance of repetition does not deceive the statesman, nor lead him to ignore the inexhaustible variations of human history, conditioned ever by the human will. During the last thirteen years the situation in Germany had been completely transformed. Liberalism had notably advanced in respect of the number of its adherents and of the confidence of its aims, though becoming associated at the same time with obscure and dangerous energies. On the other hand, the might of inertia had been notably weakened through the victorious campaign of the constitutionalist system in North Germany and through the changed grouping of parties in the European society of states. Yet one who took a superficial view might well imagine that the Germanic Federation again found itself in a situation identical with that which had existed at the time of the Carlsbad conferences. Now, as then, the opposition had seriously exposed itself to attack, public order was once more endangered, at all the minor courts a feeling of intense anxiety was predominant, and vigorous action on the part of the state authorities was absolutely essential. It is therefore readily comprehensible that throughout the diplomatic world people began to ask themselves whether it was not time to adopt the old method of Carlsbad, and to

maintain public tranquillity by coercive measures against the universities, the diets, the press, and the political clubs.

Alarmed by the Göttingen disturbances, in which the students had been no more than accessories, in March, 1831, the Hanoverian government proposed the promulgation of a new federal law against the universities. Whoever was shown to be a member of a Burschenschaft was to be forbidden attendance at any German universities for a period of from two to four years, and in no circumstances was to be exempted from the operation of this decree by the favour of his territorial sovereign. Even at the Bundestag the draconian proposal aroused considerable indignation, and no immediate action was taken, since it was necessary for the federal envoys to ask for instructions. But when disputes became accentuated in the chambers in Munich, Carlsruhe, and Wiesbaden, Marschall of Nassau considered that the time was ripe for the destruction of the new constitutions, a measure he had fruitlessly advocated during the Carlsbad and during the Vienna conferences.[1] In a memorial concerning estates and representative constitutions submitted to the courts at the new year of 1832, he bluntly demanded a coup d'état on the part of the Bundestag. Since article 13 of the federal act merely specified that there should be a constitution of estates, the Federation must carry this prescription into effect by a simple majority vote, must prohibit ministerial responsibility, civil lists, and everything that conflicted with the monarchical principle, and must enforce a thoroughgoing constitutional alteration in the two Hesses, Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria, where the supreme control of the state authority had already been taken out of the hands of the sovereigns.[2]

General Borstell, commander-in-chief in the Rhenish province, looking on from close at hand at the anarchistic doings of the Palatiners, and kept thereby in a state of unceasing tension, privately assured General Thile, the king's aide-de-camp, that in his view the only way to save the situation was by force of arms, used to compel the lesser territories to introduce deliberative estates resembling those of Prussia. Among Prussian statesmen, the first to moot the plan of

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 310.

[2] Marschall, Memorial concerning the difference between Constitutions of Estates in the Sense of Article 13 and Representative Constitutions constructed after a foreign Model. Submitted to the court of Carlsruhe on January 12, 1832.

holding a new Carlsbad conference was Count Maltzahn, the envoy in Hanover, who made the suggestion as early as August, 1831. Nothing was to be expected from the Bundestag unless it were goaded to activity from without. As a sequel of the disputes concerning Brunswick and Hesse, the mutual quarrelsomeness of the federal envoys had increased once more to such an extent that honest du Thil, who had occasion at this time to visit the Eschenheimer Gasse, could hardly conceal his disgust.[1] For these reasons Maltzahn considered it essential that the leading ministers of Germany should meet as they had met in Carlsbad to discuss general principles for the management of internal affairs, and to agree as far as might be possible upon the adoption of an identical system for all the federal states.

Bernstorff did not allow his equanimity to be disturbed by these reactionary currents. In a ministerial despatch under date of November 1, 1831, he answered the envoys in detail. Since the time when the Vienna final act had given such definite expression to the monarchical principle, the Federation had not, he said, suffered from any scarcity of conservative principles; the only thing lacking was a serious will on the part of the governments to enforce the laws at their disposal. The immediate task was to invigorate this will. He was equally opposed to any change in the federal law and to the idea "of a forcible suspension of the constitutions granted by ill-advised sovereigns." But he was by no means inclined to condemn the Bundestag to complete inactivity. He recognised that it was impossible to rest content with the suppression of newspapers, always an odious measure, and that the time had at length arrived for the long promised and definitive federal press law. He therefore instructed Eichhorn to draft a Prussian press law which, though it failed to satisfy all the wishes of the liberals, nevertheless made notable concessions. Henceforward scientific works were to be exempt; the censorship was to apply to political newspapers alone, and was itself to be subject to the supervision of an independent supreme board of censorship, consisting of members of the Academy and certain high officials.[2] This Prussian reform was to constitute the foundation of a new federal press law, and the embassies were commissioned to

[1] Du Thil's Sketches, October 18, 1831.
[2] Frankenberg's Report, February 4, 1832

come to an understanding about the matter with the South German courts. Since 1829, Bernstorff had likewise been seriously considering the problem of publicity in respect of the proceedings of the federal assembly. It was in direct conflict with the aims of the Prussian court that the federal protocols should be kept secret. The view of Berlin was that whilst pending negotiations should be secured against any intervention on the part of the newspapers, there should be no question of depriving serious students of all knowledge of federal proceedings, and the Prussian court therefore recommended that, with few exceptions, at the beginning of every recess, the federal protocols of the previous session should be published in a single volume. In Frankfort private negotiations with this end in view had been going on for years. Münch had invariably been able to frustrate the proposal by the use of his favourite method, declaring always that he could take no action until he had asked for instructions from Vienna—instructions which Metternich never sent.

Such were the designs for the introduction of cautious concessions cherished by the Prussian minister when in September, 1831, the Viennese court invited him to enter into confidential discussions concerning the situation in Germany. Since the fall of Warsaw, Metternich had drawn a deep breath of relief, and had been able to summon energy for fresh activities. Throughout the winter he had been in close communication with the envoys of the two other eastern powers, exchanging with them memorials concerning the system that was to be jointly and promptly introduced in order to hold the revolution in check. To this comparatively sterile play of ideals he gave the high-sounding name "deliberations of the Vienna conference," so that Vienna might once more appear to be the centre of gravity of conservative European policy.[1] As regards the control of the German revolution, Metternich consulted solely with the Prussian envoy, Baron von Maltzahn, for Nesselrode knew how to maintain the decencies, and explained to the envoy Tatischcheff that while it was urgently necessary to come to the help of the lesser German governments, precedence in this matter must be given to the German great powers.[2] In the view of the Austrian statesman the time had now arrived to make a clean sweep of the German constitutions

[1] Vide supra, p. 94.
[2] Nesselrode, Instruction to Tatischcheff, October 7, 1831.

conceived in the neofrench style, and the faithful Marschall's bold plan for a coup d'état was greatly to his liking. Maltzahn, on the other hand, had specific instructions to veto any illegal attack on the territorial constitutions. He declared that the prescriptions of the final act would prove perfectly adequate if utilised with resolution. The Bundestag should content itself with giving definite expression to the sense of its fundamental laws, and with giving precise instructions to the governments in the matter of execution. The misconduct of the press and of the assemblies could be controlled if the Federation and the territorial authorities were to take immediate action, and were to issue strict prohibitions based upon existing laws. Since a new organic federal law could be secured only by a unanimous resolution, Metternich had in the end to give way to Prussia,[1] and agreement was reached concerning six articles to be laid before the Bundestag. In essentials these contained nothing new, and were merely designed to effect a strict interpretation of existing laws.

The six articles appealed to the "monarchical principle" of articles 57 and 58 of the final act, declaring that, since the entire state authority must remain vested in the sovereign, all the German rulers must reject proposals on the part of the estates which might conflict with this principle. Further, the estates were not justified in refusing to supply the sovereigns with the means requisite for the conduct of government in accordance with the terms of the constitution, nor were the diets entitled to make supply conditional upon "the carrying out of other desires"—a definite answer to the conduct of the Badenese diet during the discussion of the press law. Thirdly, the legislation of the federal states was not to impose any obstacle to the fulfilment of their federal duties. In the fourth place, a special committee of the Bundestag was appointed to supervise the proceedings of the diets and to draw attention to all encroachments on the part of these bodies. By the fifth article the governments pledged themselves to prevent any attack on the Federation by the diets. Finally, attention was again drawn to the fact that the federal assembly was alone privileged to interpret the fundamental law of the Federation.

In this manner did Bernstorff, immediately before the close of his political career, once again take the edge off the

[1] Tettenborn's Report, Vienna, January 3, 1832.

reactionary proposals of the Viennese court. On the other hand, he was compelled to renounce his own modest plans for reform. Even in the present ministry his draft for the press law encountered insuperable opposition. Altenstein, who preferred to hold aloof from the vexations of federal politics, irritably declared that they could get on well enough with the old press law;[1] there was absolutely no reason to think that the Prussian censorship was unduly severe, and the Russian envoy never ceased to complain of the sarmatiophil attitude of the Berlin newspapers. Such was the fate of the press law in Berlin, and in Vienna the proposal to resume publication of the federal protocols met with no better success. In a lengthy memorial, breathing a spirit of grave concern, Metternich expounded the dangers to which the Bundestag might be exposed, not only from newspapers and pamphlets, but also from the false theories of the textbooks. Bernstorff's rejoinder was made through the pen of Eichhorn. "Never," he said, "can the Bundestag win prestige so long as its activities remain secret and are consequently exposed to manifold misinterpretations." The "national sense indispensable to the Germans" would become relaxed unless Germany were afforded a true picture of her joint political life. The science of federal law would lose itself amid empty abstractions were it thus to be deprived of all positive content.[2] The reasoning was admirable, but was most unlikely to carry conviction to the court of Vienna, to which this same "national sense indispensable to the Germans" seemed the most dangerous of its enemies. Metternich persisted in his opposition, and ultimately, on April 18, 1832, Bernstorff was compelled to instruct the federal envoy to let the matter drop for the time being.

During the course of these tedious negotiations the envoys of Bavaria and Würtemberg had been invited to participate. King William unhesitatingly approved the six articles, for he had long held the opinion that something must be done to put a stop to the increasing anarchy.[3] The Bavarian court was somewhat slower in coming to a decision. The policy of Munich, described by Blittersdorff as "a system of isolation

[1] Frankenberg's Report, October 9, 1832.

[2] Both these memorials are republished by Kombst, The German Bundestag, towards the close of the year 1832, pp. 107, et seq.

[3] Blittersdorff's Report, January 9; Nagler's Report, February 22, 1832.

and playing off one power against another," was hardly compatible with the enforcement of strict federal decrees; but in the end, since Austria gave a definite assurance that there was no thought of interfering in Bavarian internal affairs, assent was given to the proposal.[1] In a detailed circular despatch, dated April 12th, Metternich now communicated the six articles to the other courts, where no objection was raised. At the outset the Saxon government betrayed some hesitation on account of the fundamental law of Saxony.[2] For months past the Carlsruhe court had been resolved to accept any proposals made by the great powers provided they did not involve direct infringement of the Badenese constitution. In the interim had come the alarming tidings of the Hambach festival. Metternich overflowed with glee at "this unprecedented scandal." He foresaw that even those most inclined to temporise would now be carried away by anxiety, and the event proved him to be right. On June 28, 1832, Münch delivered a long speech describing the horrors of the German revolution "marching with long strides towards its goal," and immediately thereafter the Bundestag unanimously adopted the six articles, the only addition being one proposed by Bavaria, that the federal commission for the supervision of the diet should be appointed for no more than six years.

This was succeeded on July 5th by a positive inundation of extraordinary measures for the public safety, the majority of which had previously been discussed in Vienna. Political clubs were prohibited; public meetings and popular festivals were forbidden unless a special permit had been secured; trees of liberty and German cockades were placed under the ban of authority. The governments were reminded of the laws relating to the universities, and were exhorted to a strict enforcement of police measures. A demand was issued to the court of Baden that within a fortnight the Badenese press law should be annulled. Within the next few weeks the Bundestag, basing its procedure upon the Carlsbad press law, forbade the publication of the *Wächter am Rhein*, the *Freisinnige*, Rotteck's *Annalen*, and Mebold's *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*; subsequently the Saxon *Biene*, issued by

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, January 19; von Fahnenberg's Report, Munich, February 18, 1832.

[2] Buch's Report, Dresden, May 19; Jordan's Report, Dresden, June 1, 1832.

the "Bienenvater," was suppressed, and so were a number of other journals, until in the end nearly all the definitely opposition papers had been destroyed. The most notable publicists among the South German liberals, Wirth, Siebenpfeiffer, Rotteck, Stromeyer, Mebold, and others, were forbidden to issue a newspaper within the next five years.

The Carlsbad days of terror seemed to be returning, and the anger of the cultured classes was even greater than it had then been. It was universally declared that Germany had now her own June ordinances. The liberal press of the south utilised the short shrift to empty the vials of its wrath upon the Bundestag and the two great powers. The "German minor states," said the *Freisinnige*, "are the slaves of slaves. Expunged for ever is the respectful memory of Austria's rising in the year 1809 and of Prussia's rising in the year 1813." Even those moderate North German liberals who definitely disapproved of the noisy doings of the Palatiners, were alarmed at the strength of the reactionary movement, Dahlmann sadly declaring: "A star of ill-omen shines over all that is German."

Beyond question the tranquillity of Germany was now far more seriously menaced than it had been in the days of the Burschenschaft movement. The Federation had a better ground for intervention, and did not on this occasion outstep the limits imposed by the formal tenour of the law. The six articles were not, as the liberals contended, laws of exception, being in essence no more than authentic interpretations of extant federal laws. Justly and intelligently applied they would not infringe the territorial constitutions, for, with the solitary exception of the new Electoral Hessian fundamental law, not one of the German fundamental laws accorded to the estates the unrestricted right of supply. The suppression of newspapers was accordant with the federal press law, and if the Federation proposed in addition, "for the maintenance of domestic safety," to supervise clubs and public meetings, it could appeal, in justification for its action, to the free assent of all the German sovereigns.

It was however impossible for the liberal party, profoundly disillusioned, to rest content with the formal legality of the federal decrees. The six articles were issued four weeks after the Hambach festival. For this reason, although they had been in preparation for months, they were generally regarded as the Bundestag's answer to the threatening utterances of

Hambach, and were looked upon as the product of pitiful terror. The story was universally current that Metternich had delivered himself as follows: "The Hambach festival, if we made a good use of it, may prove to have been the festival of the good characters, for there can be no doubt that the bad characters have overreached themselves on this occasion." How confident had been the expectation that the new day, inaugurated by the clarion crowing of the Gallic cock, would bring also to the Germans freedom of the press and parliamentary government; and here was the Bundestag giving the most rigid monarchical interpretation to the rights of the diets, which before had been modest enough in all conscience. Those who asked for bread were, as always, given a stone; instead of being accorded freedom of the press, they were visited with a detestable persecution, the chastisement not being confined to revolutionary writings, but extending also to such cultured and well disposed journals as Rotteck's *Annalen*. How enthusiastic and how sincere had been the aspirations on behalf of the glories of a great fatherland, and now the nation was even forbidden to use its new flag. In the *Wächter am Rhein*. Stromeyer complained: "For a moment, then, thou must disappear from the gaze of thy enemies, O holy tricolor, divine image of purity, earnestness, and courage! Withdraw thyself to the recesses of our naked breasts. There thou canst pulse in response to every beat of our hearts, and there dost thou impart to us the electrical influence of the sacred fire." However inflated the words may sound, the underlying complaint was fully justified. How distorted, how false was the situation, when the supreme authority in Germany, the one whose function it was to incorporate the national unity, treated the symbol of that unity as a badge of criminality!

The wording, too, of the six articles was of such a character as to give the liberals good reason for anxiety, for, like all the federal decrees, these articles exhibited that dangerous ambiguity which ever characterises the legislative labours of the amateur jurist. The peculiarity of federal legislation was so well known even in Frankfort, that Blittersdorff on one occasion, with customary cynical audacity, wrote as follows in a report to his chief: "Of the federal laws, a twofold interpretation is possible, one constitutionalist and liberal and the other monarchical. Which interpretation do you wish me to apply on this occasion?" [1] How much, for

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, January 7, 1832.

example, might be read into the second article, the one forbidding the estates to refuse the governments the means requisite for carrying on the administration in a constitutional manner! This prescription might readily be misused for the complete annihilation of the constitutional right of supply, and suspicion that it would be thus misused was extremely natural at a moment when the courts were displaying such pitiless severity towards the newspapers and the political clubs. It is therefore easy to understand why the liberal party, with much exaggeration, interpreted the six articles in the most odious of possible senses, lamenting that "pseudo-constitutionalism" (this was the latest journalistic phrase) was to become a governmental method in Germany.

Moreover, in how glaring a light was now displayed the essential falsity of the tendency which from the first had characterised federal policy! The Federation did absolutely nothing to promote the unity which was as essential to the nation as was daily bread; it did nothing to secure unity in the military system or unity in commercial policy. Prussia's endeavours in these directions had to be made independently of the Bundestag. In respect, likewise, of other concerns of general utility this body displayed scandalous inertia. Amid contemptuous merriment, a new anecdote displaying the pitiful conduct of federal affairs had just been going the rounds. For years a committee of the Bundestag had been sitting to ascertain the nationality of a certain huntsman named Lemnitzer, living in Thuringia. At length the envoy Leonhardi was able to report that the man belonged neither to Prussia nor to Reuss, but to Meiningen, adding the distressing tidings that pending the settlement of the question the poor fellow had attained the age of eighty years and had unfortunately just died.[1] But when the work in hand was to make the various territorial constitutions (which ought naturally to conform to local peculiarities) all fit into one mould, or when the Bundestag wished to use measures of police repression in order to stifle the political life of the nation, this assembly, at other times so slothful, would display a febrile energy Prohibitions and commands were issued to sovereign princes; an unhesitating use was made of powers far exceeding those properly falling within the modest competence of a federation of states. Polyarchy where unity was essential, centralisation

[1] Nagler's Report, July 17, 1831.

where the rights of particularism were indisputable—these were the leading principles of German federal policy. Seeing that the Bundestag misunderstood its duties thus completely, it was inevitably blamed even for adopting measures necessary to the public safety, and was regarded by the nation as nothing more than a petty and detestable police authority.

Dissatisfaction was universal. Even the Prussians, who as a rule troubled themselves little about the doings of the Bundestag, were now out of humour. It seemed to them humiliating that all these new prohibitions should be applied to them, whose loyalty had never for a moment been in doubt. For some months the uneasiness at court had been increasing. The king had been greatly concerned about the doings of the Palatine demagogues. At the Ordensfest, in January, he turned a grateful ear when Bishop Eylert, in an adulatory oration, spoke of the love displayed by the sovereign for the true Prussian constitution, and when the bishops compared this valiant people to a family of happy children. No one could now venture to say a word to him about the promised estates of the realm, and the Prussian envoy in Hanover was instructed to lodge a complaint even on account of a writing so excellent and so respectful as Dahlmann's *Rede eines Fürchtenden.* Yet greater was the alarm of Ancillon. It was a delight to him that he could open his career as minister with a master-stroke against the demagogues. He repeatedly assured the Viennese court that Austria and Prussia must save Germany in spite of the new "improvised constitutions, bad imitations of a bad example"; they must "electrify the sovereigns of Germany," now that the revolution had "raised its mask, unfurled its banner." Sincere was his gratification that "the real Germany, the Germany incorporated in the Bundestag," had at length spoken and had thus provided all Europe "with an anchor of safety." [1] But becoming aware of the profound discontent prevailing above all in high official circles, Ancillon began to vacillate, and advised the king to make an express declaration to his faithful subjects, to the effect that he had no thought of hurting their feelings by unmerited mistrust. The consequence was without precedent, for Prussia now permitted herself the issue of a proviso after the Bavarian

[1] Ancillon, Instructions to Maltzahn, June 4 and 14, July 9; Instructions to Brockhausen, July 23 and August 13, 1832.

manner. When Frederick William promulgated the federal decrees in September, he accompanied them with a cordial assurance that he was doing so merely in order to fulfil his duty as a federal sovereign; in Prussia the public peace had never been disturbed. He possessed the most trustworthy guarantees for the maintenance of domestic tranquillity in the confidence and tried affection of his people.

Greater still was the embarrassment of the constitutionalist rulers. For years they had been oscillating in hopeless perplexity between the Bundestag and the diets, and without exception they asked nothing better than that the Federation should support them against the claims of the estates. But they had no thought of infringing the constitutions—if we except the duke of Nassau and the regent in Electoral Hesse, who were perhaps secretly contemplating coups d'état. When complaints now resounded on all hands that the six articles endangered the very foundations of the territorial constitutions, they had twinges of conscience, and endeavoured to appease their indignant subjects, for in truth they had had no such design when they promoted the adoption of the federal decrees. Du Thil, an ultra-conservative, went so far as to beg the grand duke, when promulgating the federal laws, to add an assurance that these would not involve any change in the territorial constitution. The duke of Meiningen gave a similar assurance. Even the prince co-regent of Saxony, in promulgating the federal decrees, expressly guaranteed the prerogative of his estates. His ministers were in anxious frame of mind. The news from Frankfort had aroused general discontent in Saxony. The newspapers were recommending an alliance with France against the German great powers; in Vogtland a newly constituted press club was circulating radical writings; and in the sacred precincts of the Dresden nobles' club Otto von Watzdorf actually ventured to expose for signature a protest against the six articles.[1]

King Louis of Bavaria vacillated for a considerable time before coming to a decision. Painfully surprised by the rebellious proceedings of his Palatiners, upon the urgent recommendations of Metternich and Ancillon he decided at length upon severe measures, and despatched Field-Marshal Wrede to the disturbed province with a considerable force of troops. It soon became apparent how little revolutionary

[1] Jordan's Reports, July 29 and August 4, 1832.

fervour there was behind the boastful talk of the demagogues. The old warrior's attitude was conciliatory but firm. He promised that all well-grounded complaints should receive attention. The clubs were closed, the trees of liberty were removed, there were many arrests, and order was reestablished without serious resistance. Meanwhile the Franconians had in their turn held a noisy forest festival at Gaibach. Youthful enthusiasts, their heads fired by the fumes of wine, chaired Behr, the liberal burgomaster, and hailed him as "our king of the Franks." Here also sharp measures were instituted, with judicial enquiries and many arrests. The king made no secret of his uneasiness, even dreading an attack upon his person; and when the Würzburgers, in a bombastic writing, placed "the goods and blood of the whole people of Bavaria" at his disposal for the struggle against the Bundestag, he rejected the address in ungracious terms.

Equally repellent was his reception of a representation sent in from the Rhenish Palatinate by "citizens faithful to the constitution." This was an impudent document, discharging in one volley the entire artillery of radical phraseology. Here is a specimen: "Civil war, this is what the Bundestag's action means. How is it possible that the Rhenish Bavarians, law-abiding and devoted to freedom, should remain unaffected by the terrible, colossal, almost incredible tidings that the Bundestag has destroyed the German constitutions! What have we to do with Austria? What have we to do with this old, rotten, worm-eaten stock? What advantages can absolutist Prussia offer to constitutionalist Bavaria? Prussia is a frail reed that breaks beneath him who desires to lean upon it. How can Russia protect Bavaria's rights? Russia is a glowing Moloch of despotism to which, in pagan frenzy, a father must offer up his child. King, thy people implores thee not to enter into an unhappy league with these absolutist powers! Put away temptation! Do not trifle with the affections of thy Bavarians!"[1] It was inevitable that such language should anger the king. To the federal envoys who waited upon him in Franconia he expressed his detestation of liberalism, declaring violently to Blittersdorff: "I was betrayed and sold

[1] Address to the king from the burghers of Würzburg, undated.—"Representation from patriotic burghers of Rhenish Bavaria, a Declaration concerning and a Protest against the federal Decrees of June 28, 1832." Signed by a number of rural councillors, deputies, burgomasters, teachers, etc.

by my previous ministers." [1] Yet he found it difficult to make up his mind to promulgate the decrees for whose drafting he was himself partly responsible. He could not endure that his sovereignty should formally incline before the arch-sovereignty of the Bundestag. Czar Nicholas sent him an autograph letter reminding him of the loyalty he owed to the Federation, but this remained void of effect.[2] Not until October did he succeed in overcoming his reluctance; but even then, in promulgating the decrees, he accompanied them with the declaration that they effected no change in the Bavarian constitution, but would serve rather "to fortify the true observance of that constitution."

Nowhere were the manifestations of popular displeasure so stormy as in Würtemberg. Since the Swabians had not as yet been able to give public expression to their desires, since they were still vainly awaiting the summoning of their diet, all the concentrated anger of these two years was visited upon the new federal decrees. The committee of the estates alone retained its sobriety, and after detailed examination could find no reason to think that the six articles involved any direct menace to the constitution. But with this exception the country was unanimous. A petition sent in by the burghers of Stuttgart demanded the abrogation of the federal decrees, and the king's friend Maucler was hardly exaggerating when he wrote to Frankfort saying, "It is not merely the eternal opponents of the governments, the advocates of the unity and liberty of Germany," that are profoundly incensed—for this, he said, was equally true of the loyalists.[3] An anonymous writing, *Germany's July Ordinances*, which spoke of "the most scandalous, the most blameworthy treason to the welfare of mankind," and referred to "the monarchical principle of Caligula and Nero," found many credulous readers. Even Paul Pfizer shared his fellow countrymen's indignation. He was now engaged upon a work dealing with German liberalism. It was his design to warn his South German friends against the delusions of liberal extravagance, against the dangers of an alliance with France, and to explain to them that the best they could hope for at present was a South German sonderbund, destined at some future date to pass under the

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, September 17 and 24, 1832.
[2] Küster's Reports, August 3 and 22, 1832.
[3] Blittersdorff's Report, August 19, 1832.

protection of Prussia. Thus once again, unaffected by Welcker's moral indignation, did Pfizer display his admirable superiority to party prejudice, though he admitted that to many Swabians the notion of a Prussian protectorate would seem "utterly unthinkable." But whilst this work was in the press he received intelligence of the Frankfort "ordinances," and in intense wrath he added a passionate postscript, concluding with the threat that the cherishing hands of the governments had now "provided the nation with something hitherto lacking, a common interest and a common enemy."

Alarmed by the widespread ill-feeling, the ministers and privy councillors, when promulgating the federal decrees, accompanied them with a solemn assurance that these decrees did not in any way infringe the prescriptions of the Würtemberg constitution, and above all did not invalidate the Würtemberg estates' right of supply (July 28th). "For the more complete tranquillisation of our faithful subjects," the king, who was now at Leghorn, in a despatch which was promptly published, gave this proviso his formal approval. But the country would not be appeased. Addresses continued to pour in from the capital, from Ulm, and from Tübingen. The citizens' committee of Stuttgart arranged for a formal procession, in order to convey the Stuttgart address to the royal cabinet. Crying, "Only over my corpse!" and amid the loud murmurs of the burghers, the procession was dispersed by Klett, the governor of the city. King William cut short his Italian tour and hastened home. He strongly reproved the men of Stuttgart for their rebellious behaviour, returned them their address, saying that it had come into being "mainly through the machinations of an ill-disposed party," and reiterated his inviolable fidelity to the constitution; while simultaneously he gave confidential assurances to the envoys of the great powers of the delight he felt at the issue of the federal decrees.[1]

To Prussia and Austria these shifts on the part of the constitutionalist courts were most unwelcome, but the two great powers rightly regarded them as a sign of weakness merely, not of opposition to the law. In Frankfort the question was discussed in confidential conversations, but without bitterness. Ultimately, the Bundestag determined to safeguard its prestige, declaring on November 8th that the "interpretative clauses" attached in promulgating the decrees could not, "as a matter

[1] Salviati's Reports, August 11, 16, and 26, November 6, 1832.

of course" in any way affect the binding force of those decrees, "nor is there any reason to suppose such to have been the object of the governments concerned." The envoys of the five courts which had issued provisoes with the decrees all voted for this resolution with the others, although for them it involved a gentle slap in the face. Thus did the state authorities continue to move in a circle, and the suspicious opposition was forced to conclude that the courts were engaged in a piece of impudent trickery.

All the other constitutional rulers, with the exception of these five, promulgated the federal decrees without any proviso. The co-regent of Hesse seized the welcome excuse to enable him to get rid of his estates for a time. In this unhappy territory certain after-effects of the excitement of recent years were still at times perceptible. At the customay Polish festivals, loud pereats were invoked against the three eastern powers. In Hanau, on one occasion, the soldiers actually mutinied, to the accompaniment of cheers for France and Poland. The German colours were seen everywhere on flags and cockades, and on the handkerchiefs of the handicraftsmen. It was, however, already plain that the Hessians were weary of the eternal unrest; even their delight in the civil guard was manifestly cooling, for the game wasted a good deal of time. But the electoral prince and his servant Hassenpflug hardly troubled to conceal that they desired a dispute with the estates which would enable them to invite the entry of Prussian troops. The more intimate Hänlein became with the character of this ruler, the more plainly did he perceive "that the electoral prince can be neither counselled nor helped, and that with his policy of never looking beyond the immediate day his fate is inevitable." [1] It was the regent's fault alone that during a sitting lasting sixteen months the diet succeeded in passing no more than one useful law—the law for the abolition of certain feudalist conditions of land tenure and for the constitution of an agricultural credit treasury. Thus at length did Electoral Hesse take the first step on the path of agrarian enfranchisement, a field of reform which the neighbouring territories had long ere this entered. Almost everything else that the estates proposed was shelved by the cabinet, and it cannot be denied that Jordan and his friends, by their arrogance and their impossible claims, made every attempt at an understanding

[1] Hänlein's Reports, February 25 and March 13, 1832.

difficult. The inspired doctrinaire behaved as if Electoral Hesse were situated upon an island in some remote ocean. "Never," he proudly exclaimed, "will our diet kiss the Bundestag's rod!" Fruitless were the warnings conveyed to him by the envoys of the two great powers. At the very moment when the Bundestag was taking active measures against the newspapers, and when, as everyone knew, the annulment of the Badenese press law was close at hand, with fiery zeal Jordan was urging the discussion of a press law for Hesse. As soon as the estates had concluded their deliberations about the freedom of the press, Burkard Pfeiffer threateningly declared that the government must accept the scheme without delay. "If they fail to do this, then we shall know that our ruler's word, so often solemnly pledged, has been no more than an empty form, and that the oaths repeatedly sworn by the ministers have been a mere farce played with essentially fragile materials."

Thus fierce was the party struggle when tidings arrived of the new federal decrees, and when the official promulgation of these decrees by the electoral prince promptly followed the estates were infuriated. Whilst Pfeiffer, in an impassioned oration, glorified the flag of the old Burschenschaft and extolled the colours of liberty, Jordan insisted that the federal decrees were invalid, and demanded the impeachment of the ministers. This was to play into the hands of the electoral prince. On July 26th the diet was dissolved, and Heinrich von Arnim, who was passing through Cassel at the time and attended the closing sitting, reported with a shudder the horrible threats uttered from the gallery by moustachioed men wearing black-red-and-gold sashes.[1] Nevertheless, the country remained quiet. Jordan, the father of the constitution, was now caught in the trap which he had carefully set beforehand for the monarchical authority. Wishing to make it difficult for the government to dissolve the estates, he had had a regulation carried to the effect that at the close of every session the diet must issue instructions for the committee of the estates.[2] But now the diet had been suddenly dissolved before it could issue these instructions, and when the committee promptly endeavoured to enter a protest against the federal decrees, Hassenpflug scornfully pointed out, with indisputable justice, that the committee, not having received instructions from the

[1] Arnim's Report, July 26, 1832. [2] Vide supra, p. 160.

estates, was, by the terms of the constitution, unable to formulate any legally valid resolution. Thus the adroit juggler had disarmed both the diet and its committee. The feeling was universal that under this regime Hesse would never know the blessings of peace.

The Badenese government likewise promulgated the six articles without proviso, fearing to lay itself open to attack by any such superfluous addition,[1] and needing to devote all its powers to an attempt to save the press law. The grand duke had long been keenly desirous of making peace with the great powers. To convince the Hofburg that his sentiments were above reproach, he sent Baron von Falkenstein to Vienna in the spring, but the only answer he received was an amicable hortatory epistle from Emperor Francis.[2] He was dissatisfied with his ministers. It was true that Winter had shown his anger against Rotteck and the latter's chief follower. "Herr Wirth, at any rate, is an honourable opponent," he wrote on one occasion. "The fellow is a radical, quite crazy, but at least he is a German radical, and tells you what he wants in plain terms. The Freiburgers are hypocrites."[3] Nevertheless, Leopold could not conceal from himself that this minister, a friend to the middle classes, could never win the confidence of the two great powers; and in May therefore the grand duke recalled Baron von Reizenstein from his learned leisure in Heidelberg, and appointed him chief of the ministry. This was the excellent statesman who had cooperated so successfully in the foundation of the grand duchy and in the establishment of its constitution. A vigorous old man, whose loyalty to the constitution was unquestionable, he had been greatly incensed by Rotteck's speeches. Of opinion that the celebrated "ever-memorable and incomparable diet" had made a scandalous misuse of its rights, he assured the Prussian envoy (to Ancillon's lively satisfaction) that he would not rest until he had put limits to this lack of discipline.[4]

The grand duke, however, could not make up his mind to the complete annulment of the press law. No such dictatorial demand had ever before been made of any federal ruler. Besides, Leopold feared that if he gave way he would forfeit

[1] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, August 10, 1832.

[2] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, May 28; Otterstedt's Report, June 9, 1832.

[3] Winter to Otterstedt, June 18, 1832.

[4] Otterstedt's Reports, May 26 and June 21; Ancillon, Instruction to Otterstedt, June 10, 1832.

the confidence of his subjects. His hesitation was prolonged. The Badenese liberals confidently assured one another that in his need the grand duke had secretly begged for help from his French neighbour, and (so utterly in this part of Germany had the national sense of self-respect been destroyed) in their view this redounded to their sovereign's credit. In reality the patriotic Leopold had never thought of such an act of treason. At the Bundestag, however, he defended his view obstinately for several months. Blittersdorff, who at the bottom of his heart was personally opposed to the liberal law, had to devote all his sophistical arts to the reiterated demonstration that Baden recognised the legal validity of the federal press law prescribing a censorship, but was at the same time justified in abolishing the censorship by a press law of her own.[1] Not one of the other federal envoys supported the Badenese. The formal legal point was obviously on the other side. Since the Bundestag persisted in its demand, on July 28th the Carlsruhe government was at length compelled to reestablish the censorship. Blow now followed blow. The liberal journals already prohibited by the federal assembly were suppressed, and prosecutions were instituted against many of the speakers at public meetings. In September, the Bundestag, not yet satisfied, demanded the punishment of the university teachers who had edited the suppressed *Freisinnige*.

In Freiburg the six articles aroused indescribable indignation. Rotteck attributed to them a criminal intention from which they were entirely free. He immediately composed an address against them, declaring with bitter scorn that these federal decrees of June 28th would for all well-disposed citizens constitute an enormously more effective insignia of union than the dreaded tricolor. His fanaticism for the law of reason had now attained such a pitch that in Europe he could distinguish only two peoples, the freemen and the slaves, saying that in the light of this classification he lost sight of "almost all the old national sympathies and antipathies, kinships and distinctions, existent now only for the unreflecting masses." He entered into a dispute with the municipal council, because this body had established a civil guard to prevent public meetings, and since the students once more engaged in sundry demonstrations the government considered it necessary to

[1] Nagler's Reports, May 23, 1832, and subsequent dates.

destroy this nest of rebellion on the Dreisam. In its alarm it went far beyond the demands of the Bundestag. The university of Freiburg was closed, and was subsequently reopened with a new charter. Rotteck and Welcker were retired with pensions, and Duttlinger escaped the same fate only because his professorial activities were indispensable. This was not merely a gross injustice against honest opponents who had always held aloof from underground intrigues, but it was also a political blunder. As professors, the influence of the two dismissed men had been inconsiderable, but they had now been provided with the martyr's halo, and were at the same time given leisure to devote their energies exclusively to party life. Their adherents endeavoured to console them by numerous marks of esteem. Welcker, who vigorously defended himself to the last in comprehensive writings, was honoured by his fellow countrymen in Giessen at a great banquet. To Rotteck additional goblets of honour were despatched from various parts of constitutionalist Germany. In the end he had twelve of these tokens, and the Badenese presented their hero with a costly cabinet in which to keep the precious gifts. When he contemplated his treasures, Rotteck would proudly ask: "What minister of state can display such superb orders of distinction?"

Nevertheless the resentment was confined to narrow circles. Anger concerning the dangers of the six articles, dangers in part real and in part imaginary, was necessarily incomprehensible to the populace, although Rotteck, the "peasant hero," had great prestige among the masses. When the grand duke, accompanied by Reizenstein, visited Breisgau in the autumn, he found his highlanders perfectly happy; the vines and the cornfields had yielded an abundant harvest. The old minister was firmly convinced that his wholesome severity had been of service to the state, and greatly appreciated the thanks expressed by the court of Berlin. He took a diplomatist's view of the situation. The country was utterly defenceless, without a single fortress, and was directly threatened by French greed. As he explained to the Prussian envoy, the desirable alternatives were a real peace, or, if needs must, a rapid and crushing offensive campaign. In either case, Prussia's friendship was indispensable.[1]

[1] Otterstedt's Reports, October 12 and November 24; Ancillon, Instruction to Otterstedt, September 20, 1832.

Thus it was that even in Baden the movement became arrested, and during the next two years only one newspaper, Mathy's *Zeitgeist*, still ventured to defend liberal ideas. The first number appeared a few weeks before the recently established Badenese freedom of the press was abolished, and day by day Mathy had now to conduct a petty warfare against the childish terrors of an arbitrary censorship. Nothing pleased him better than to stand alone in the breach which others had feared to enter. Since Mathy had not yet attained the age prescribed by law, his printer Erasmus Bartlin signed as editor, and it was a delight to see the doughty Bartlin carrying the *Zeitgeist* to the censor's office in the evening, and saying proudly: "Here is my newspaper." Though not entirely free from the fanatical exaggerations and clamorous catchwords of youthful liberalism, the newspaper showed by its sound knowledge of affairs and by its concise and well-informed style that the opposition already possessed a few men of real political power. Mathy frankly admitted the economic superiority of the north, and speedily recognised that Prussian commercial policy contained the seeds of real German unity. Naturally his first aim was freedom of the press, or, as he bitterly phrased it, "the reestablishment of the natural right of the freeman, the right promised by the fundamental law, the right to distinguish himself from the brute beast and from the slave, by the expression of his thoughts at his own peril and responsibility."

The spirit of reaction robbed the Badenese of their free press, but to the dissatisfied populace of the principality of Lichtenberg it brought an unexpected happiness—incorporation into the Prussian state. Since the disorders in St. Wendel continued without end, the duke of Coburg had once again to ask help from Prussia, and once again Prussian troops restored order without striking a blow. How much trouble had the Coburg rulers taken in the days of the Viennese treaties to woo the favour of the great powers and thus to secure an enlargement of territory to which they had no legal right, and how dearly had they had to pay for their land hunger. Duke Ernest at length recognised that he must rid himself of this remote possession. On June 18, 1832, he acknowledged to the king of Prussia that the maintenance of order and the prevention of smuggling were beyond his powers, and he suggested the cession of the principality to Prussia. Enlightened by previous experiences, he did not on

this occasion venture to suggest an exchange of territory,[1] but demanded compensation by Prussian domains. Conceiving the request would surely be granted, he already had his eye on certain state properties in the Golden Aue, which he hoped to round off to form a stately mediatised territory. But now the tenant farmers and peasants raised the alarm, for the Coburg ruler was by no means in good repute as a landlord, and von Rochow, governor of Merseburg, told the king plainly that the cession of domains would arouse general discontent throughout the country. The financial councillors took a similar view, considering that it would be altogether too freehanded to dispose of several of the finest estates in the province of Saxony in exchange for "the Laplanders of Hunsruck," as Kühne termed the unfortunate Lichtenbergers. Besides, the domains were security for the national debt, and the state finances relied upon an increasing yield from this source. The crown prince was among the objectors. On principle he was opposed to the sale of domains, for, by Haller's doctrine of the state, monarchical authority must be founded upon the possession of extensive landed properties in the hands of the royal house. After tedious negotiations the king gave it as his final answer that the only compensation could be a money payment on an extremely liberal scale. Duke Ernest agreed, but desired that the business should be kept as secret as possible, so that he could not be publicly accused of having sold his subjects for hard cash.[2]

For this reason the treaty drawn up on May 31, 1834, and ratified next month by both parties, was obscurely worded. Compensation was allotted to the duke, to consist not merely of an annual revenue of 80,000 thalers, but also of the right "to acquire landed property, in part by the taking over of Prussian domains and in part by the purchase of other estates." On the basis of this very indefinite pledge the duke endeavoured for years to effect the purchase of domains in Silesia or Posen, but was hindered in every case by the Prussian ministry of finance from carrying his desires into effect. The duke's last hope vanished with the death of Frederick William III, for the successor to the Prussian throne disapproved of the

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, pp. 121, 122.

[2] Duke Ernest to King Frederick William, June 18, 1832. Memorials from Governor von Rochow, September 12, 1833, and from Stägemann, June 29, 1834. King Frederick William to Duke Ernest, March 5; Reply, April 14, 1834.

entire negotiation, and the Coburg ruler finally dropped the matter in the year 1843 after the specified purchase money had been paid over in full. For the shrewd relatives of Leopold of Belgium the bargain was extremely satisfactory from the mercantile point of view. They received two million one hundred thousand thalers in national bonds for a territory whose annual yield up to date was estimated by the Prussian official financiers at 45,000 thalers, and by some as low as 30,000 thalers.[1] Thus disappeared the principality of Lichtenberg, whose national independence had given so much concern to the Poles, the French, and the South Germans, to become the circle of St. Wendel in the Prussian monarchy. The smuggling trade came to an end. The neglected territory began to thrive under a just administration; and since the only channel of inlet for the Coburg six-pfennig pieces was now closed, the fertilising stream of false coin had in future, much diminished, to make its way across territories where a gulden currency was in use. Petty princely sovereignty had for the first time declared bankruptcy, and had been compelled to admit that in a time of excitement it was unable to fulfil the primary duties of every state authority.

On the whole, the resistance encountered by the six articles was trifling, and a close view of the situation could not fail to show that the number of definite opponents was at the outset inconsiderable. During these days Luden of Jena withdrew from the Weimar diet because he was unable to carry a protest against the federal decrees. Abroad, however, the loud outcries of the liberal press aroused the impression that Germany was on the verge of civil war. In the English house of commons, on August 2, 1832, Henry Lytton Bulwer proposed that a petition should be sent to the king asking him to take action at the Bundestag against the new decrees, which annihilated Germany's independence. The fiery orator, a sincere friend to Germany, angrily demanded whether so gross an infringement of the most sacred promises had ever before been heard of—and this in the birthland of freedom, in the country of Luther, to whom England, too, was indebted

[1] Finance Minister Count Alvensleben to General Thile, January 19, 1841. Memorial of the Ministry of Finance concerning the Coburg Compensation, June, 1843. The account given by Duke Ernest IV (Aus meinem Leben, vol. I, p. 100) is a medley of truth and fiction.

for the reformed faith, and among the offspring of men to whom freedom of thought had ever been a watchword leading on to victory! Palmerston's answer was cautious and evasive. In non-committal terms he extolled the popular league of all the constitutional states, and at his request the proposal was negatived as inopportune. A few days later, however, the foreign minister had changed his mind. Why should he not once more attempt to play without expense the part of magnanimous protector of popular liberties? Why should he not, by loyal-seeming exhortations, incite the German courts one against the other, and thus increase the delightful confusion prevailing on the continent? Moreover, Lieven, the Russian envoy, had expressed his gratification at the federal decrees, and the suspicious Briton drew the inference that Czar Nicholas had contributed to the origination of the six articles.[1]

On September 7th Palmerston sent to the embassies in Germany a despatch claiming for England, as co-signatory to the treaty of Vienna, the right to say a word in German federal affairs. This pretension, unfortunately, lacked even the semblance of justification, seeing that the first eleven articles of the federal act were contained in the final act of the Vienna congress. The liberal powers of the west had long been accustomed to appeal to the Vienna treaties, or to dispute the legal validity of these treaties, as circumstances might dictate. In the tone of an anxious friend Lord Palmerston begged the German government "to bridle the inconsiderate zeal of the Bundestag, and to prevent the adoption of measures likely to lead to disturbance and even to war." In Munich, simultaneously, Lord Erskine sent in an urgent warning against the six articles, and especially against the federal committee which was to supervise the diets.[2] This hypocrisy must have seemed all the more odious to the German courts since the king of England had, as king of Hanover, given his free assent to the latest federal decrees. The straightforward Guelph ruler manifested his dissatisfaction with Palmerston's attitude as plainly as was possible to a parliamentary shadow-king, choosing this moment to bestow the Guelph order upon Münch and Nagler, expressly stating it was conferred as a mark of thanks for their services in the matter of the six articles.

[1] Brockhausen's Report, August 17, 1832.
[2] Küster's Reports, September 18 and 21, 1832.

Yet more suspicious, if possible, was the conduct of the French diplomats, who marched everywhere hand in hand with those of England. In Munich, Mortier, a vainglorious and frivolous chauvinist, and in Dresden, young Reinhard, repeatedly assured France's old associates in the Confederation of the Rhine that France was ready to protect them against the tyranny of their German guardians, and Mortier even went so far as to protest against the fortification of Germersheim. Whenever Werther complained in Paris or Jordan in Dresden, the invariable reply was that the young diplomatists had exceeded their instructions.[1] But in his private conversations with the Bavarian envoy, Sebastiani took exactly the same line as Mortier, while his official newspaper published an article by Bignon, the old Bonapartist, declaring the six articles null and void, and endeavouring to revive all the passions of Rhenish confederate days. The position was aggravated by the enigmatic activities of the numerous French agents along the Rhine. Were these agents watching the German demagogues, or were they helping them, or were they playing a double game? No one knew. Taking a general view of the situation, the two German great powers felt compelled to meet the English advances with an unqualified refusal.

When Abercrombie, chargé d'affaires in Berlin, read Palmerston's despatch to the Prussian minister, Ancillon rejoined with unwonted asperity that he found it necessary once for all to dispel the intentional or unintentional preconception that the two great powers ruled Germany. The six articles had been unanimously adopted in Frankfort. England had better carry her complaint to that quarter, for the king of Prussia would have nothing to do with it. Nevertheless the Englishman, with the delicacy characteristic of his nation, ventured to send Ancillon a copy of the despatch; this was promptly returned to him unread, with a curt covering letter.[2] In Frankfort, Cartwright now applied to the federal envoys, and received both from Münch and from Nagler the blunt answer that the Federation could not allow any intervention on the part of a foreign power. Ancillon sent cordial thanks to the court of Dresden for its dignified attitude, adding:

[1] Ancillon to Küster, June 11 and August 25; Jordan's Reports, August 8 and September 5, 1832; etc., etc.

[2] Ancillon to Abercrombie, September 24, to Brockhausen, September 24, 1832.

"It has always been the idea of France, and is so more than ever to-day, to sow dissension among the German states that she may rule Germany for her own purposes; for France feels that Germany, if compact, united, and fighting in complete harmony under the banner of the Federation, would be at least equal to her powerful neighbour." [1] Metternich could not refrain from sending the English minister, who certainly required instruction in these matters, a long despatch dealing with the principles of the federal law (October 31st); and he subsequently issued a circular to the German courts to strengthen them in well-doing. This last exhortation was utterly superfluous. Vis-à-vis the foreign world, the German princes were as one. What could they hope from England? What could they hope from the bourgeois monarchy, weak as it was, and striving for mere existence?

So embittered, however, was public feeling that the nation displayed no recognition towards the estate of princes for this honourable behaviour. Wiseacres contended that the whole affair was a farce. The opinion of the majority was that while the rulers of Germany showed their teeth to the western powers they humbled themselves in the dust before the white czar. Our liberal newspapers were utterly ignorant of European policy, although most of their columns were devoted to foreign affairs, and although they never ceased puzzling their heads about other nations. All their talk was a mere rehash of what they heard from the Polish refugees, the commercial travellers of the revolution. It was for this reason that they implicitly believed Germany to be ruled by the Russians. Yet the czar had held entirely aloof from the discussion of the six articles, for he knew that he could count upon the conservative sentiments of the German great powers. On but one occasion had Nicholas interfered in the matter, sending a friendly letter exhorting the king of Bavaria to be loyal to the Federation; whereas the arrogance of the western powers towards the Germanic Federation had been positively shameless. Moreover, in matters of high politics the influence of Russia was far from being decisive, and all the czar's warlike designs had hitherto been frustrated through Prussia's moderation. But it was inevitable that the persistent attacks of the liberal press should increase the Russian autocrat's self-opinionatedness. The more zealously the liberals painted the devil on the wall,

[1] Ancillon to Jordan, August 11, 1832.

the more loudly they proclaimed the czar as the despot of central Europe, the greater became his prestige in the diplomatic world. On St. Nicholas' day Münch gave a dinner to the federal envoys, and amid thunderous applause proposed a toast to the Russian ruler, saying: "Long may he live as protector and guardian of the kings, who are ever on the watch for the happiness and welfare of their peoples." [1] The unmeasured hostility of the sarmatiophils could serve only to accentuate the exaggerated notions concerning Russia's might which had long prevailed throughout Europe. Not many years were to elapse before the czar was really to acquire in the northern league that premier position which was now erroneously ascribed to him.

In one German territory alone, in Würtemberg, was a serious parliamentary struggle ventured against the six articles, but it was undertaken far too late and in the most unfavourable circumstances. When the year 1832 was drawing to a close, and when the interval prescribed by the constitution had nearly expired, King William was compelled to make up his mind to summon the diet, whose members had long ere this been elected. In the interim he had secured a man after his own heart in the new minister of justice, Schlayer by name, a distinguished jurist, whose unceasing industry had raised him out of a position of obscurity. From youth upwards a declared enemy of those who supported the old rights, a thoroughly modern bureaucrat, eloquent, alert, vigorous, and well versed in affairs, he promptly expressed his determination to repress the opposition with iron severity. Just as little as Schlayer did Maucler and Hügel (a minister in ill repute for his nepotism) understand how to win the hearts of the Swabians.

The sentiments of the government were made plain as soon as Wangenheim took part in the preliminary discussions of the deputies. To the king the attitude of his ex-minister, whose civil rights as a Würtemberger had been so recently and so graciously renewed, seemed black ingratitude.[2] To the astonishment of the unsuspecting electors, the authorities suddenly declared that Wangenheim was ineligible because he did not reside in the kingdom. To justify this decision they appealed to an ill drafted and far from incontestable clause

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, December 22, 1832.

[2] Vide supra, p. 290.

in the constitutional charter. Wangenheim fell from the seventh heaven. As the king was well aware, he had had his civil rights confirmed solely in order that he might be able to enter the diet. Now a spoke had suddenly been put in his wheel. He devoted all his dialectical skill to maintaining the validity of his election, publishing a detailed writing on the question, in which he did not hesitate to reprint a passage from one of the king's private letters. William's anger now became intense. Expressing his "full indignation" to the man who had thus broken confidence, he wrote in conclusion: "Equally disagreeable to me have been the commendations you expressed regarding that portion of my letter which you failed to reprint—for in existing circumstances I cannot but find extremely offensive the favourable opinion of a man who is a member of the party to which you have openly acknowledged your adhesion." With such contumely did the Swabian king give the liberal his dismissal. For the nonce the declaration of war remained a secret, for Wangenheim, who was quite unable to see that he had himself been to blame, proudly opined: "Compassion demanded that I should keep my own counsel about this unkingly letter, whilst I regarded it with too much contempt to deem it worthy a rejoinder."[1]

The diet was soon to learn that the king looked upon his political opponents as personal enemies. It was the custom in Swabia for the new deputies to kiss hands on taking the oath to the constitution. But among the newly elected on this occasion was Paul Pfizer. He had just left the state service, his official superior having called him to account for publishing the *Correspondence between two Germans*. King William would on no account give his hand to Pfizer, who had suggested that the house of Würtemberg should subordinate itself to the house of Hohenzollern. The young deputy was privately requested to absent himself from the opening sitting. Though a modest young man, he could not accept so shameful a humiliation, and he had received no direct command from the king. The consequence was that the opening of the estates was effected under unfortunate auspices (January 15, 1833). The dreaded young liberal appeared, but the formal visit to the monarch was put off at the last moment, the deputies being sworn in by one of the ministers, in William's

[1] King William to Wangenheim, September 9; Wangenheim to Hartmann, September 27, 1832. Cf. Appendix XXV.

stead.[1] Acrimonious discussions about the elections immediately followed. By a small majority Wangenheim's election was declared invalid, the only consolation for the holder of the vacated seat being that the members of all parties vied with one another in their grateful recognition of his services in connection with the founding of the constitution. Even Uhland, an old opponent of Wangenheim, said: "Does there not also exist a spiritual right of domicile, quite independent of the soil? May we not say that a man lives in a country when he lives in the thoughts of its inhabitants, and when they show their confidence in him by choosing him as their representative in parliament?"

The fate of the ex-minister was shared by four other deputies who some years previously had been sentenced to confinement in Hohenasperg, for demagogic intrigues, and had subsequently received the king's clemency. The liberals maintained with good reason that through the restoration of their civil rights these four men had likewise reacquired their eligibility for election. But the king's rancour led him to prefer to restrict the prerogative of his own crown, rather than to permit the entry into the chamber of these four, though they were men of high personal character.[2] Yet in former days William had frequently boasted that demagogues were treated in Swabia with exceptional leniency! As it was, by a bold reading of the law Minister Schlayer and his henchmen were able to show that the exclusion of the four demagogues was justified, for by the letter of the constitution no one could sit in the diet who had been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment in a fortress, and they contended that not even the king's clemency could restore the forfeited right. Here was a strange reversal of roles, for the opposition defended and the ministers contested the monarch's unrestricted right to pardon, and Uhland uttered words of warning which resounded powerfully throughout the land: "In the unfulfilled wishes of the peoples and in the effective German constitutions there lies a germ of evil that will produce feelings of profound bitterness in the minds, not of the young alone, but in those also of persons of riper age." Salviati, too, the Prussian envoy, was astounded that the blind partisanship of the government should lead it to injure itself in this manner.

[1] Küster's Report, January 15, 1833.
[2] Küster's Report, January 20, 1833.

The liberals no less, spurred on by honest patriotic zeal, committed one blunder after another. In words of flame, Schott demanded freedom of the press for the Swabians, declaring the Carlsbad decrees null and void, and singing the the praises of the most peaceful land in the world, the United States of America, a country where the press was free, and one which had acquired a wonderful reputation for political happiness. The deputies thronged round the speaker, who stood deeply moved in the centre of the hall while thunders of applause came from the galleries. But the ministerial bench was empty, and how could anyone possibly expect that Würtemberg would follow this dangerous example now that the Badenese press law had been suppressed by the federal authority? The conflict of parties became more and more definite, the *Würtembergische Zeitung* going so far as to say, "The situation has now cleared; it is now simply a question between us and it!" For nearly two years excitement had continuously prevailed among the Stuttgart burghers. During this period the most trifling personal and local matters had been debated in the journals with the utmost bitterness. Now disturbances broke out in the streets. The king consequently issued a threat that if these disorders continued he would remove the court to the palace of his ancestors at Ludwigsburg. The Stuttgarters thereupon began to tremble at the prospective loss of what was to many of them a means of livelihood, and sent the angry monarch a humble address bearing sixteen hundred signatures. The town representatives who brought this address were ungraciously received, the king speaking of "a rout of disorderly persons well-known to the authorities," persons who were "endeavouring to introduce ungerman practices into Swabia." He would promise no more than this, that his decision would depend upon the future good behaviour of the town.

The opposition meanwhile had armed itself for the main battle. Pfizer undertook to deliver the first blow—by no means to his advantage, for those endowed with the qualities of the seer are especially apt to get into false positions in the medley of everyday political life. On February 13th he brought forward a "motion" which, being immediately reprinted as a pamphlet (since the censors prohibited its publication by the newspapers), attracted great attention throughout constitutionalist Germany. The motion bluntly demanded that the six articles

should be declared invalid until the governments had come to an agreement with their diets and with the Bundestag upon the formulation of alternative decrees. Pfizer's speech was masterly, thoughtful, and infused with lofty emotion, but his proposal was utterly impracticable, and lacked even the excuse of necessity. The speaker did not venture to maintain that the six articles directly infringed the territorial constitution, contending merely, "They carry within themselves a capacity for altering the fundamental law." Now the king had very recently given a solemn pledge that he would never make a wrongful use of the federal decrees. He had hitherto strictly fulfilled this pledge, and although Pfizer's language when speaking of William was personally respectful, it was inevitable in the circumstances that the monarch should interpret the liberal leader's words as a deliberate affront. Moreover, how grossly particularistic was the proposal. How hopelessly confused were the issues of German political life when this admirer of Prussia, this champion of national unity, this man whose view as to the futility of the petty diets was so incisive and so perspicacious, should now suggest that the Würtemberg constitution was above the federal law! He could not fail to be aware of the contradiction, but felt that only as advocate of liberalism could he win prestige among his fellow countrymen, and openly declared: "I wish to convince those who misjudge me that the unity of Germany I desire is a unity of justice and of freedom, and to satisfy them that I have no wish to see the unity of Germany secured at the cost of the oppression and annihilation of the individual German territories." So long as the German states were possessed of sovereign power, and so long as there was no German Reichstag, the diets had a right to demand that in case of need the ministers should keep them informed as to the instructions sent to Frankfort; but Pfizer went further, insisting that the federal envoys of Würtemberg could only be regarded as rightful representatives of that country if their instructions were drawn up with the assent of the estates. This would involve the subordination of the German central authority to the commands of a dozen or so petty diets, and the motion seemed all the more dangerous inasmuch as Pfizer rejected as illegal the "monarchical principle" of federal legislation—a principle dear to all the federal sovereigns. At the court of Würtemberg there was intense indignation, and Schlayer showed himself

perfectly ready to give an unprecedentedly severe expression to the monarch's wrath at the "insolent" proposal.

Within a few days a royal embassy to the chamber instructed it "with due regard to the king's dignity and to the dignity of his federal associates to reject the motion with the disfavour that it merits." To many supporters of the government, and even to the Prussian envoy, such language seemed extremely injudicious; and the opposition, which had hitherto been no more than a powerful minority, now suddenly became a majority. After Pfizer had defended himself in well-chosen words, the chamber declared in an address composed by Uhland that it must perforce defend its liberty and the independence of its members "against the far-reaching interference with the regular course of our proceedings, an interference which extends to prescribing the frame of mind in which we are to make the suggested decision." Nine days later, on March 22nd, the diet was dissolved with every sign of the king's displeasure, William declaring to the Austrian envoy that he would make one further attempt to summon a chamber, but that it seemed almost impossible to carry on the government with these people.[1]

The "addled diet," as it was henceforth termed in popular parlance, excelled in point of eloquence any other diet that ever met in Würtemberg, but it advanced to direct attack when a straightforward legal protest would have been amply sufficient; it was inspired in this struggle with a wilfulness which signally recalled the attitude of the advocates of the old law; and it effected nothing for the welfare of the country. Amid the attacks upon the Bundestag, amid a mass of motions dealing with matters of high policy, the excellent agrarian law which the government had brought forward to the terror of the landowners was almost forgotten. A pamphlet entitled *The Addled Würtemberg Diet in the year* 1833 was circulated by the court as a measure preparatory to the new elections. The document made an adroit appeal to the practical understanding of the common people, comparing the sterile proceedings of this representative body with the indisputable benefits conferred upon the country during the last fifteen years by a thrifty and orderly administration. Everything possible was done to impose difficulties in the way of supporters of the opposition. Police measures were adopted

[1] Salviati's Report, March 23, 1833.

in advance against a writing by Elsner, a liberal who had fled to Strasburg, on the ground that the work would "presumably be couched in a definitely revolutionary sense."[1] Moreover, the government could count on the support of the two great powers. The king of Prussia, less just than his envoy, saw nothing amiss in the violence of its proceedings and expressed his full approval of its wisdom.[2]

This was the last storm about the six articles. It was only in the world of abstract thought that the dispute long persisted regarding the legal limits of the federal authority. Many notable publicists participated in these struggles: Wangenheim, C. H. Hofmann, Gruben, Pfizer, Wurm, and Reyscher. But none of them was able to find any secure legal principles, for such principles were in fact undiscoverable. The theory of the federal law was destined to remain no less barren than, within the Federation, the field of practical politics. The contradiction between the absolutist central authority and the representative constitutions of the federated states was insoluble, and now that the Bundestag had converted itself into a police authority for united Germany, all the essential conceptions of the federal law were thrown into confusion. This Federation could hardly be regarded as a federation of states, and it was equally certain that it was not a federal state.

§ 2. THE FRANKFORT TOCSIN.

Parties composed of extremists rarely become discouraged when they constitute a minority so small as to have no prospect of effective action. In most cases their sense of weakness serves merely to spur them on to use more outrageous language and to undertake more foolhardy ventures. The less the liberals were able to achieve any success in their objection to the six articles, the more conspicuously did the small radical party detach itself from the liberals, coming to regard lawful resistance with contempt, and building its hopes on physical force. Whilst Wirth, Miller, and others who had taken part in the Hambach festival, endeavoured by boastful descriptions of that great popular assembly to keep "the Hambach spirit" alive, the Strasburg printers continued to

[1] Beroldingen, Instruction to Bismarck, March 29, 1833.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Salviati, March 31, 1833.

provide fresh and fresh inflammatory literature for despatch across the Rhine—pamphlets entitled *The New World*, *Domestic Library for the German People*, and similar stuff, all these writings being packed with coarse invectives against the asinine proceedings of the German princes, and announcing the imminent struggle. Garnier of Rastadt and the anonymous author of the pamphlet *Betrayed Baden* used similar language. In Frankfort, Sauerwein wrote a *Primer of Freedom* in the jocular Jewish style which had been brought into fashion by Heine and Börne, concluding with a glorification of the red cap of liberty. A leaflet by Herold, entitled *Revolt*, circulated in the Frankfort district, and bluntly declared war on the moderates in the following terms: "All books and speeches concerning reform, legality, and lawful methods, are nothing more than presentations of cowardice in a learned style. Whilst the promoted philistines have been drinking toasts to princely faith and civic freedom, the crowned assassins have been weaving intrigues, whetting knives, mixing poison, and hiring bravos—there has been a successive appearance of Viennese diplomatic pieces, Berlinese cabinet decrees, Frankfort protocols, barrack puppets from Potsdam, and mercenaries from Austria. But we were ready for them. A grand opera, *The People's Revenge*, is about to be staged in all the capitals, and the overture will be played in Frankfort. From mouth to mouth there is now passing a word of power, transmitted to us from all the diets and all the newspapers: Expel the princes! This is our watchword, and our only prayer is: Lord give us this day our daily shot! Let us up and be doing! The Lord has appointed us to be reapers, our harvest the poisonous flowers of royalty!"

These sterile blusterings of Herold were but a noisy echo of the radical catchwords to which Börne gave vent in his *Paris Letters*. Börne had now gone so far as to speak maliciously of honest Rotteck as "an old woman playing at demagogy in order to help the sale of rotten books." Heine's language in the preface to his *French Conditions* was cleverer but even more impudent. It was astounding to see this Jewish sans-patrie who continually changed his colours like a chameleon without ever losing his inborn Hebraic peculiarities. Just as he had in earlier days abandoned the faith of his people and yet had systematically posed as a persecuted Jew, so now, by the dinners, the grisettes, and the newspaper-catchwords of

the Parisians, he had been so thoroughly bewitched as to have been practically transformed into a Frenchman. Most of his later works were published in both tongues simultaneously, and he had so ardently adopted the French outlook that Thiers could justly speak of him as "the most brilliant Frenchman of his day." Nevertheless in the quiet depths of his heart, which had remained German, there still persisted a yearning for the dreamland of his youth, and he continued to consider himself justified as a German in reading lectures to his betrayed homeland. Of "this magnificent city, where a piece of world history is daily played," he spoke with extreme servility, as if every Parisian rag-picker represented the flower of mankind; yet, in truth, he had nothing to produce beyond shallow gossip and the customary foolish abuse of Casimir Périer's policy. He looked upon "our woes at home" through the spectacles of the Parisian radicals. While the French press never ceased demanding the natural frontier, and while the German patriots (with the exception of a few legitimist hotheads) were thinking of nothing but the defence of the fatherland, Heine, with habitual mendacity, turned everything topsy-turvy. He spoke of blameless and peaceful France, continually menaced by the artificially inflamed national hatred of the stupid Teutons; he desired that there should be no more nations in the world, but only two parties, the aristocracy and the party of reason. Of course all this was based upon the tacit stipulation that Prussia was to be destroyed and the left bank of the Rhine ceded to France. The "deplorable" six articles were solemnly declared null and void, but moral indignation was so ill-suited to his vein that the reader was left in doubt whether the voice was that of a jester or of a tribune of the people.

Far more spirited was his rude abuse of the Prussian jackass which imagined that in the War of Liberation it had given the final kick to the dying lion. Unmistakably Heine here spoke from the heart. In the atmosphere of Paris his old hatred of Prussia had increased to frenzy, for he secretly felt that the avaricious dreams of his French friends had no more dangerous enemy than the sword of Prussia. Consequently all the men who in recent years had openly manifested their Prussian sentiments were liberally besprinkled with mud. He vilified Hegel, Arndt, Schleiermacher, and Stägemann. He spoke of "poor Ranke, a man with a fine talent, as pleasant

as mutton with young Teltower turnips." He reproached them all with cowardice, for he could only judge others by his knowledge of himself. With the poet's prophetic vision, he foresaw for the light-fingered Hohenzollerns, not the crown of Charlemagne for which they yearned, but rather the fate of some other Charles—say Charles X of France or Charles of Brunswick. Concerning a Franco-German war he held the following opinion: "Should the abominable thing happen; should France, the motherland of civilisation and liberty, be ruined through levity and treason; should the speech of the Potsdam junkers be heard grating once more through the streets of Paris; should filthy Teutonic jackboots besoil once more the sacred boulevards; should the Palais Royal reek yet again of Russia leather—then would all the curses known to man be well applied to one responsible for such a desecration."

The preface to *French Conditions*, even more vulgar than the rest of the work, was separately printed and widely circulated throughout the Mainz district, in order to inflame the Rhenish Hessians against Prussia. It secured many admiring readers, for it was plain that international Jewry had drawn the last logical deduction from that doctrine enunciated by Rotteck according to which the European world was divided into the two nations of freemen and slaves. Cosmopolitan dreams, fantastic aspirations towards a world-wide revolution, towards a brotherhood of all free peoples, falsified and obscured the ideal image of national unity. The German democracy was now drawn into the network of revolutionary secret societies which had long enmeshed the Latin countries. During the twenties, no more than a few isolated German radicals had exchanged ideas with Lafayette's mysterious "comité directeur." Now, when the Polish refugees had become natural intermediaries, this intercourse became livelier. General Bem, in Dresden, was engaged in secret correspondence with Cornelius, Siebenpfeiffer, and other southern radicals, hoping to outweary the hated Prussian government by unceasing petty warfare.[1] The newly established press club in Paris was affiliated with the society of the rights of man, with the aims du peuple in Strasburg, with Lelewel's Polish national committee, and with the great "depot" of Polish warriors which the neighbourly French government maintained at Besançon, close to the German frontier.

The greatest, boldest, and noblest of all internationalist

[1] Frankenberg's Report, Berlin, March 17, 1832.

demagogues, Guiseppe Mazzini of Genoa, was already attempting to stretch forth his strong hands towards the German radicals. For some time past this typical fellow countryman of Machiavelli had been the despair of all the police authorities on the continent. Slipping through their fingers like an eel, he was omnipresent in his activities, and had recently been at work in Paris under the name of Strozzi. With the fervour of the mystic, he believed in the divinely willed rule of the people throughout the world; and it was the young who were to help this Teo-Democrazia on to victory, with the use of every means, rebellion, assassination, and falsehood. "The essence of the matter," he wrote to the Badenese Garnier, "is that young people must take the destinies of mankind into their hands, for they alone possess energy, staying power, and enthusiasm; they alone are competent to make a religion of liberty." From Marseilles he had already founded the secret society Young Italy, which, through its well-ramified hierarchy of "ordinators" and "propagators," was by this time in control of several cities in the peninsula. A Young Poland was in the process of formation. Now the malcontents of Germany were to be recruited for a Young Germany—and so on, and so on, until ultimately the united youth of Europe, meeting power by power, could defy the cabinets.[1]

Seldom indeed could the German governments seize any thread attached to these webs, but what they did learn was quite sufficient to accentuate their mistrust of the court of Paris. It was impossible that Louis Philippe could desire any extensive success for the radical propaganda, since he had cause to tremble for his own bourgeois throne. When on one occasion he was afraid that Italian demagogues would make an attempt upon his own life, he did not hesitate to request the help of the Hofburg. Nevertheless, France remained the great asylum of radicalism. Under pressure of public opinion, the bourgeois king, to quote the bitter phrase of Casimir Périer, "opened a current account with all the revolutions." Thousands of refugees lived in Paris and the provinces. The government kept an eye on them, but provided millions for their support. German refugees enjoyed especial favour. The Palais Royal had remarkably precise information regarding the demagogic intrigues across the Rhine, and the last doubt disappeared when two confidential circulars issued by the

[1] Strozzi (Mazzini) to Garnier, Paris, February 17, 1833.

French ministry of the interior fell into the hands of the authorities. One of these documents commissioned the secret agents of France in Berlin and in seven other west German states to draw up a list of members of the opposition who were favourable to the French, giving particulars as to their private means. The other instructed the prefects of the departments adjoining the eastern frontier to treat German refugees with respect and consideration, to deal with them more gently than with Polish refugees, to assist those who were in needy circumstances, and not to interfere with their postal correspondence or with their communications with emissaries passing to and from the homeland: "for the Germans are little inclined to promote confusion or sow dissension in foreign lands; the comparison they are always making between the unwholesome and pitiful political condition of their own country and the state of affairs in France was the cause and the occasion of the Hambach festival, and likewise of the subsequent disturbances." [1] Engelhardt, French consul in Mainz, a declared chauvinist, had such suspicious relationships with the numerous radicals of the town that the Prussian government became anxious, and proposed to the Bundestag that in this threatened federal fortress none but German consuls should in future be tolerated. The grand duke of Hesse, however, was unwilling to offend the French.[2]

The Bundestag could expect little help from such a neighbour. Fortunately, of all the participators in the international conspiracy, the German secret leaguers were by far the least dangerous. The straightforward honesty of the Germans made these subterranean activities repugnant. The conspirators hardly ventured to approach Rotteck, Uhland, and the Swabian liberals, for their law-abiding sentiments were well known. When Welcker, being on a journey, found his way into a demagogue circle, he bluntly expressed his detestation of all secret societies. Silvester Jordan received frequent visits from the conspirators' emissaries, for they believed that "he knew Electoral Hesse like the palm of his hand," and it is probable that he learned many of their plans; but they could not induce him to participate. Rector Weidig of Butzbach,

[1] Circular Despatch from the French Ministry of the Interior to the Agents in Luxemburg, Frankfort, Stuttgart, Carlsruhe, Cassel, Berlin, Coblenz, and Zweibr cken, September 14; to the Prefects of Moselle, Upper Rhine, and Lower Rhine, September 2, 1832.

[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, November 11, 1833.

the only man of established position among the initiates, soon drew back, and warned the conspirators that their undertaking was utterly impracticable. Thus it came to pass that the circle was limited to a handful of vulgar demagogues and to those unhappy dreamers who surround themselves with a web spun by their own false imaginations until they can no longer tell whether they are deceiving themselves or others.

There was in Ludwigsburg a radical lieutenant named Koseritz, who by money and smooth words had won over a few non-commissioned officers. With the aid of these he imagined that he would be able to raise the garrison, and would then perhaps be able to induce King William to participate in the struggle for liberty. Franckh, the Stuttgart bookseller, regaled him with wonderful stories of a secret society in Paris which had existed since 1786, had numbered one of the Robespierres among its members, and had since then been the cause of all the European revolutions.[1] He also declared that in Besançon there were four hundred Poles ready at a word to invade Baden by way of Switzerland; twenty Polish officers were waiting by the lake of Constance to lead the rebellion in the Black Forest. It was true that another of the conspirators, Dr. Gärth of Frankfort, had been in correspondence with these Poles, and had found them ready for any folly. The most zealous of all the band was Rauschenplatt. He took Honour as his fancy name, turning up now here, now there, in the Central German states, and disappearing without leaving a trace when the catchpolls were about to apprehend him—for a warrant had long been out. The hope was that in the spring of 1833 the rising would occur simultaneously in various places. The first blow was to be delivered in Frankfort, because the Bundestag was especially in need of chastisement, and because in the Mainz district the radical party could count upon a large measure of support. In Homburg, there were two efficient helpers in the brothers Breidenstein; in Wetterau, Weidig had gathered round him a tribe of faithful disciples; in the reading club at Giessen, Paul Follen, the lawyer, brother of Carl Follen, and Vogt, the Follens' brother-in-law, a professor of medicine and father of the natural philosopher, set the tone; in Nassau, everyone detested Marschall, the all-powerful minister; in

[1] Reports from the Governor of Ludwigsburg concerning the examination of Lieutenant Koseritz, May 25, 1833, and subsequent dates.

Odenwald, the peasants of the mediatised territories were greatly disaffected owing to the double burden of taxation.

The common people of Frankfort were likewise much embittered. After the great week, in pamphlets and petitions they had begged for freedom of the press and for publicity of debate in their legislative body, but had in addition, after the manner of citizens, begged for "adequate protection of food and industry" against the competition of other parts of Germany. In the autumn of 1831 there had actually been a miniature sequel to the July revolution, because during the vintage the octroi had been so strictly enforced. Blood had flowed on this occasion, and since that time there had been much abusive language vented against the roughness of the infantry soldiers, and against the nepotist rule, at once lax and domineering, of the senators, locally nicknamed "the Roman lords." Among the young men of the cultured classes, some were members of the forbidden press club, which had now set up its secret head-quarters under the very eyes of the Bundestag, and in vigorously phrased pamphlets continued to declare that the princes had broken their words, and that the peoples, too, were consequently absolved from their oaths of allegiance. From all these indications of disaffection (which did in truth exist, but was quite powerless), Rauschenplatt and his fellows now drew the conclusion that a fortunate coup de main in Frankfort would immediately lead to the flaming up of rebellion in the entire neighbourhood. What was to happen after this? Was there to be a federal republic, or merely a German parliament? It does not appear that the matter was given serious consideration, although some of the conspirators had certainly prepared a list of the three presidents of the German republic. The whole plan was so childish that some of its originators soon became anxious. They began to lose faith in one another's windy boasts; and even Koseritz cooled, being alarmed at "the incredible carelessness of the conspirators." Hardly anyone was willing to strike the first blow; and in the upshot, as commonly happens, credulous and valiant youth had to carry out what the deliberate folly of mature age had conceived.

Now, as at all times, the national life was faithfully mirrored in the conditions obtaining at the universities. After the July days the Burschenschafts had everywhere been strengthened or reconstituted, and before long the Germania,

a radical organisation, gained the upper hand over the moderate party of the Arminians. At the students' conventions the South Germans secured the leadership. The Prussian Burschenschafts took little part in these meetings, and in the end held completely aloof, the Breslauers being formally excluded because they would have nothing to do with political intrigues. Henceforward the spirit of neofrench radicalism unceasingly continued to permeate these youthful circles. At the Frankfort students' convention, in September, 1831, it was decided that every Bursch must pledge himself to the introduction, by force if need be, of a free and just political system, based on national unity. The Burschenschaft was now to abandon its old Christo-Germanic character and to accept Jewish members. At a further congress held in Stuttgart at Christmas, 1832, it was already announced that the revolution would take place in the spring, and that members must make ready. The zealots of the Heidelberg Burschenschaft now formed a secret society. Two of their former chiefs in Frankfort gave them news and instructions: Gustav Bunsen, a hotheaded medical man, whose mettle had already been tried in the Polish revolutionary war; and Dr. Georg Körner, a young lawyer of remarkable promise, who had in later days an honourable political career in America. The conspirators cherished hopes that they would be able to suspend the Bundestag in plenary session; they thought they had made sure of the Frankfort soldiery through a captain in this force, who had no detailed knowledge of their designs; in the Taxis palace was stored at the moment a sum of four hundred thousand gulden destined for the fortification of Mainz—money enough for the conduct of the war of liberation.[1] On April 2nd about twenty students from Heidelberg, Würzburg, and Erlangen, including two from Göttingen, assembled in the federal capital. With them were the Frankforters, several Poles, the inevitable Rauschenplatt, and a number of older comrades—hardly more than fifty conspirators in all. At a meeting in Bockenheim, roles were allotted by Bunsen and Körner, the attempt being fixed for the evening of the next day.

On the morning of April 3rd the plan was betrayed by an anonymous letter from Würzburg, and had the authorities

[1] Among other sources of information I avail myself here of My Frankfort Experiences by one of the participators, the recently deceased Dr. Eimer of Frieburg-im-Breisgau. Cf. Appendix XXVI.

done their duty the rising, so inadequately prepared, could without difficulty have been entirely prevented, or at least suppressed in its very inception. Military help from the neighbouring town of Mainz was urgently requisite, since the Frankfort garrison was no more than three hundred and eighty strong. Such help could readily have been secured, for the governor, warned by the disquieting rumours which had long been current, was ready for all eventualities. But Baron von Manteuffel, Saxon federal envoy, acting president in the absence of Münch and Nagler, remained entirely inactive. All he did was to send to Mainz a casual announcement that some disorder might be anticipated; and, to Blittersdorff's despair, he would not even summon an extraordinary sitting of the Bundestag.[1] The officiating burgomaster detailed ten men more than usual for the main guard, all with unloaded muskets, and sent two policemen to the foot of the Pfarrturm to guard the alarm bells. The soldiers not on active duty were kept in barracks awaiting events, supervised by one of the senators.

In view of these striking indications of political alertness, it was natural that the liberals should subsequently suspect that the Bundestag had intentionally given the disturbers of the peace a free hand for a time, so that the demagogues might be seized in the act. The accusation was universally made, but there is no proof that it was true. The tragicomical course of the affair is fully explicable without any such supposition, and was probably dependent upon nothing more than the characteristic futility of Frankfort proceedings. The military force of the federal city was no less ineffective than were the troops of the other minor contingents; Baron von Manteuffel belonged to the old school of Electoral Saxon officials, to the group which was only now beginning to lose political influence—a group composed of men distinguished rather for cumbrous pedantry than for diabolical cunning; while the Frankfort senators, or "Roman lords," had in these unquiet days been frequently scared away from their wine or from the whist table by false alarms, and they could easily persuade themselves that on this occasion also the rumours had no serious foundation.

In the evening a number of the conspirators, students almost exclusively, met in Bunsen's house. Among them were several spirited young fellows, including Eimer, a medical

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, April 4, 1833.

student from Baden, and A. L. von Rochau from Brunswick, in later years a leading German publicist. The unhappy men already knew that everything had been betrayed, but felt that as chivalrous Germans it was impossible to draw back. They started fully armed, and decorated with black-red-and-gold sashes, led by Rauschenplatt, who was not to-day wearing his great jack-boots, but was dressed in a fine Polish uniform. At half-past ten the whole body emerged from the narrow alleys near the Zeil and burst into the quarters of the main guard. In a moment the weapons hanging in the ante-room were seized, and the sentinel was wounded and taken prisoner. The officer in command, a callow lieutenant, jumped out of a back window and took to his heels; the unarmed men in the guard room surrendered after two or three shots had been fired. Vainly did the conquerors now attempt to talk over the crowd which made its way to the scene of disturbance; no one would touch the captured muskets, no one (so complains one of the conspirators) "would take a hand with us in the liberation of Germany." Even the freed political prisoners in the upper storey remained for the most part quietly sitting where they were; others, and among them the dreaded demagogues Freieisen and Sauerwein, surrendered voluntarily on the following day.

Meanwhile another section of the insurgents took possession of the Pfarrturm and sounded the tocsin. A third body met in an inn, near the police-station at the other end of the Zeil. A serving-maid, who was witness of these happenings, swooned from terror when the conspirators loaded their muskets and blackened their faces. She was laid upon a bed, and as each man took his departure, greatly affected, he kissed the beautiful girl. Led by a Pole, Major Michalowski, the heroes of German freedom at once marched to the assault on the police-station. The command to storm was given by the major in the French tongue, and here also an easy victory was gained; after a brief hand to hand struggle the defeated guardians of the law took refuge in a neighbouring shed. Now an infantry battalion appeared upon the scene; the insurgents made a brave resistance for a time, but had to flee before overwhelming odds. A number of peasants from Bonames, speeding to the town under the leadership of one of the conspirators, inspired by the ancient hatred of the countryfolk for their Frankfort masters, found the city gate strongly

guarded, and made good speed back to their village. The whole fight lasted barely an hour; the streets in the neighbourhood of the Zeil remained perfectly tranquil; in the adjoining theatre the opera was quietly played out, and not until the members of the audience were returning homewards did they learn that the annals of Frankfort had been enriched by a revolution. This criminal piece of folly cost the lives of six soldiers and that of one of the rebels; about four-and-twenty were wounded. The leaders and the Poles all got off scot free, but most of the incautious students were arrested. Several of them, on leaving the battlefield, had guilelessly returned to the inn where they were staying, to be awakened during the night by the policemen who came to arrest them. During the very next days it transpired that the disturbance was no mere outburst of youthful folly, but was connected in some way with the plans of the Polish refugees for an international rising. On April 7th, as previously arranged, three hundred Poles crossed the Swiss frontier from Besançon, and were only prevented by the disastrous tidings from Frankfort from continuing their march into Baden. Simultaneously a force of rebels from Galicia invaded Russian Poland, whilst almost immediately afterwards a dangerous conspiracy among the troops was suppressed in Piedmont, and it is most unlikely that the Polish general Ramorino was free from complicity in this matter.

The radicals' mad coup initiated a new era of political persecution. Ancillon promptly wrote as follows to Vienna: "The Frankfort rising may be the saving of Germany if we are not slow to take full advantage of the occurrence." [1] Münch and Nagler received extensive powers, and after their return to Frankfort the Federation decided on June 30th to reestablish a central authority for political enquiries. This body was to sit in Frankfort; Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Darmstadt nominated the five regular members, whilst Electoral Hesse and Nassau each appointed a substitute member. Saxony and Baden were intentionally passed over, in consequence of their reputation for liberal views. It seemed that the calamitous days of the old Black Committee of Mainz were about to be renewed, and two of the members of that body, Wagemann, the Austrian, and Preuschen, the Hessian, were nominated upon the new committee.

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, April 25, 1833.

Half satisfied and half concerned, Blittersdorff opined that great steps backward had been made since 1832.[1] However, it was easy to perceive that even the Bundestag had been compelled to make certain concessions to the spirit of the new time. The middle-sized states, led by Bavaria, refused to allow the Federation to intervene directly in their legal procedure, and the great powers did not venture to offend the pride of federal allies.[2] The consequence was that the new central authority possessed powers far less extensive than those which had been assigned to the old. It was incompetent to conduct independent investigations, and could merely take note of the investigations in the individual states. It never ventured to practise such odious persecution as had been undertaken by the Mainz committee.

The federal assembly had simultaneously to provide for its own safety and to guard the captives. In view of the behaviour of the Frankfort senate and of the military incompetence of that body, the question of removing the Bundestag to a better protected town was seriously debated. King Louis strongly desired that this worthy successor of the old Reichstag should sit in Ratisbon as a neighbour to the new Walhalla. Prussia wished the prisoners to be sent to Mainz for safe custody, and when the objection was raised that the name of Mainz had been too seriously discredited by the doings of the Black Committee, Nagler had regretfully to admit that the name of Frankfort had a yet more evil sound to the popular ear.[3] But the senate of the free city refused to surrender its traitors, and since it could not make up its mind to request from the Federation the indispensable military reinforcement, the Bundestag, exercising an undoubted right, did what was necessary (April 12th). About two thousand, men Austrians and Prussians, were summoned from Mainz, and were temporarily quartered in Sachsenhausen and adjoining districts, under the command of Piret, the Austrian general. The inner city and the prisoners remained under the trusty guard of the Frankfort battalion, which was only to be placed under Piret's orders "should disturbances actually break out." Thus scrupulously was the sovereignty of the

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, July 4, 1833.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, June 25; Blittersdorff's Report, June, 1833.
[3] Nagler's Report, April 23, 1833.

federal city respected: the Prussian troops had to render unconditional obedience to the federal general, but no one ventured to impose such a humiliation upon free Frankfort. Nevertheless the senate was profoundly hurt, and sent the Bundestag an ill-humoured declaration which was almost tantamount to a legal protest, but which was allowed to lie on the table.

The French envoy, Baron Alleye, a hot-blooded radical Creole, scented here fresh opportunity for sowing dissension among the Germans. He reported to his chief, and during the last days of April received from Broglie a despatch which was a repetition of the familiar sirens' song of the independence of all German states and territories. But when he favoured the presiding federal envoy, Manteuffel, with a private reading of this document, the Saxon refused on principle to enter into any such discussion, and endeavoured to give the Frenchman some general idea of the German federal constitution; but unfortunately he spoke with a politeness which failed to make sufficient impression upon the representative of western civilisation. An enquiry sent in by the French envoy in Vienna was countered by Metternich in even stronger terms; whilst at the court of Paris Werther promptly entered a protest.[1] The Bundestag approved its president's conduct; all present strongly condemned French presumption; and the alarmed representative of Frankfort had to give a humble assurance that it had been far from the intention of his exalted senate to contest the validity of the latest federal decrees, and that still less had it been the idea of that body to seek assistance from abroad.[2]

How strangely, meanwhile, had the mood of the Frankforters been transformed. During the rising they had remained indifferent; but now became active that sentiment of compassion for political criminals which is ever an indication of an unwholesome state of political life—and who, indeed, could refuse human sympathy to the unhappy students. Those who had led them astray had escaped, whilst they, who had known little or nothing of the hidden designs animating their Polish fellow conspirators, had to pay for their errors by unending imprisonment, and acquired an intimate acquaintance with all

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, May 15, 1833.

[2] Blittersdorff's Reports, April 30, May 10 and 23; Nagler's Report, May 23, 1833.

the sins of the governmental system which flourished under the Frankfort oligarchy, experiencing to the full its mingled severity and lenity. In the enquiry the judges were severe, and often rough. Upon those who persistently denied the offences laid to their charge extraordinary punishments were visited, under an ordinance of Charles V which was still in force at Frankfort. In the prisons, on the other hand, discipline was kindly, and most of the warders displayed a magnanimity which left nothing to be desired. By long practice the young men acquired astonishing facility in all the minor arts of prison life. They held converse by tapping or whistling, and one and all carried on regular correspondence with the outer world, becoming adepts in the discovery of little notes concealed in the lumps of sugar sent them with their early coffee, and despatching answers in the corks of their empty beer bottles. Watch-spring saws were at times concealed in the interior of the cakes and rolls sent them by their Frankfort well-wishers.

Half the town was concerned about the fate of the daring young fellows, and hardly a week went by without talk of some fruitless attempt at escape. At length, on a foggy October evening, Lizius, one of the students, having sawed through the grating of his window, succeeded in letting himself down by a rope; the Frankfort watchman stationed immediately beneath the window had left his post because some of Lizius' friends had created a disturbance in the street. The student made good his escape, and the street arabs, when a senator passed them in the street, did not fail to call after him mocking rhymes referring to the matter.

This new example of Frankfort efficiency filled the Bundestag with justified alarm. General Piret had long been in despair at the doings of the independent forces of the sovereign city, and at the failure even to notify him when disorders occurred. The military committee of the Bundestag was already discussing the issue of new regulations; and since it now became evident that there was risk in delay, the work was speeded up in so far as this was possible to the Bundestag. On January 16, 1834, three and a half months after the momentous escape just related, the proposals of the committee were submitted to the federal assembly. The suggestions were such as would have been taken as a matter of course in every other army. The Frankfort troops of the line were to be united with the Austrian and Prussian forces to constitute a single corps under

Piret, and in case of need the town militia was likewise to be placed under the orders of the general in command. Directly these proposals were made known, a cry of indignation arose from the sovereign populace of Frankfort: the city militia and the splendid Bonapartist headgear of their officers were the pride of the town, and the force would never render obedience to a German foreigner. In a declaration filling a whole quire of paper the senate insisted upon its sovereign rights, saying that this was not a question of military safety but one of "primary political principle"—with much more nonsense of the same kind.

When yet another three months had elapsed, a vote was at length taken on April 3rd, and the proposal of the committee was adopted. Frankfort again protested, and General Piret vainly demanded that the Frankfort troops should now be subordinated to his command in accordance with the terms of the federal decree. Burgomaster Stark loftily rejoined that the Frankfort battalion had already been assigned a place of assembly in the event of a disturbance of the peace, and that the muster roll of the force was sent to the general every Sunday; this was amply sufficient, and it was impossible that the Bundestag could design "to approach more closely to an infringement of the rights of this city.[1] Thereupon the Prussian envoy lost patience. He proposed and the Bundestag agreed to insist that Frankfort should promulgate the federal decree at its next sitting. On the first of May, however, the senate entered "a formal protest" against this command, and the protest was at once quashed as contrary to the federal constitution. But the senate, not satisfied, actually demanded the recall of the federal troops, on the ground that Frankfort was fully capable of maintaining order without assistance. Such was the piece of impudence permitted itself by this city state, which had acquired its sovereignty but nineteen years before through the inconsiderate magnanimity of the powers, and which had on that occasion expressly undertaken all the duties devolving upon it as seat of federal government. It is not surprising that the question of removing the federal assembly was once again considered. But Nagler objected. Prussia saved the Frankforters their sovereignty, for the king was of opinion that in the absence of the

[1] Piret's Report to the Federal Assembly, April 22; Stark to Piret, April 14 and 22; Piret to Stark, April 19, 1834.

Bundestag this town, with its pitiful government, would become a focus of revolution and would become above all a centre of French intrigues.[1]

No more than four-and-twenty hours were to elapse after this boastful declaration on the part of the senate before facts were to give it the lie. On the evening of May 2nd the force on duty in the police station was extremely drunk in the guard room, for townsfolk in communication with the prisoners had provided the soldiers with an ample supply of cider. Heavy drays were being driven up and down over the stone paving of the Zeil, making a tremendous hubbub, to enable the students in the upper storey to complete unheard the task of filing through the window gratings. A disorderly crowd suddenly surrounded the prison, and during the riot all the captives endeavoured to escape. The intoxicated soldiers seized their muskets and fired at random among the crowd; a burgher was killed and several were wounded. Only one of the students got safely away, another was killed, two were injured in the descent from their windows, and the remainder were recaptured. The Frankfort authorities, thus publicly put to shame, revenged themselves by gross cruelties, making the prisoners wear fetters, even the unfortunate Eimer, who had broken his leg and was unable to walk properly for several months.

The liberal powers of the west contemplated these purely German disputes with extreme complacency. The national pride of the Frankforters was at this period in full bloom. The senate had just concluded a commercial treaty with England, designed to impose a friendly obstacle to the menacing progress of the Prussian customs union, and it became a matter of course that Frankfort's disinterested customs ally should now break a lance on behalf of the sovereignty of the free city. The envoy Cartwright, the archetype of narrow British arrogance, handed the presidential envoy on May 24th a verbal note whose shamelessness was unprecedented even in the annals of English diplomacy. This document declared that England, justified in any case in intervening in accordance with the terms of the Viennese treaties, "regarded it as a British interest to maintain the independence of every European state, however small." In the latest federal decree England could not fail "to see a violent infringement of the rights of an

[1] Nagler's Report, June 4, 1834, with Marginal Note by the king.

independent state." Alleye now returned to the charge, undismayed by his recent snubbing. His verbal note opened in the paternal, gently irritating tone characteristic of old Bourbon days: "The French government finds it hardly possible to believe that sovereigns who indubitably value their independence as highly as do the other European powers should pave the way for the destruction of this independence by establishing a precedent that will infallibly, when occasion arises, be quoted against them. The French government is therefore convinced that the German princes will open their eyes and will take counsel before committing themselves to so decisive a step." But in conclusion came the scarce concealed threat: "France can never admit that anyone is entitled to make German independence (l'indépendence germanique) an empty word."

The western powers had made a false reckoning. Hoping to strengthen their Frankfort protégé in his resistance, they had really built a bridge for that protégé's retreat. As soon as the two notes were read to the Bundestag, the representative of the free city was overwhelmed with reproaches from all sides, and Nagler, who presided, enquired officially whether Frankfort was responsible for this foreign intervention. The Roman lords took fright, and solemnly protested their innocence. Nagler scorned to enter into a close examination as to the half truth of this assurance, though he could not fail to know that Cartwright and Grouchy, the French secretary of legation, were in close touch with several senators;[1] but he took the opportunity of insisting all the more earnestly that Frankfort must manifest her German sentiments by deeds. The use of forcible measures was already imminent when the refractory senate gave way (June 3rd), placed its troops under Piret's command, and promised in addition to reorganise its wretched police system.

The notes of the western powers were answered by the Bundestag (June 12th) in dignified terms of remonstrance, which were approved in Vienna by all the members of the German ministerial conference, with the solitary exception of the Hanoverian.[2] But the quiet tone of the rejoinder encouraged both the envoys to draft further notes (June 30th and July 18th). They appealed once more to the Viennese treaties,

[1] Nagler's Report, May 18, 1834.
[2] Brockhausen's Report, June 7, 1834.

and, as before, the Englishman used the roughest language. It was impossible, he wrote, for the states that had participated in the Vienna final act to permit "that the Germanic Federation, which had been created for the protection of the weak, should become an instrument of oppression in the hands of the strong." It now became evident to Nagler that plainer language must be used to these western Europeans, these men of fine perceptions. On September 18th he read to the assembly an impassioned presidential declaration wherein he unsparingly condemned the two notes for "their presumption, their utter ignorance, and their incredible confusion of ideas," and notified the western powers that their own protégé, Frankfort, had repudiated them. Thereupon an exceptionally vigorous resolution was adopted unanimously (for on this occasion even Hanover voted against England), to the following effect: "Never will the Federation concede to foreign powers, as co-signatories to the congress act, rights in federal affairs which, by the wording of the federal treaty and also by the contents of the congress act, accrue solely to the members of the Germanic Federation and to the totality of that Federation."

Nagler sent this resolution as it stood to the two envoys without vouchsafing any formal reply to their notes. Cartwright and Alleye were greatly offended, and in two fresh notes (October 17th and November 21st) they complained of such a "complete departure from European diplomatic custom," and persisted in their contention as to the meaning of the Vienna treaties. The Bundestag let the despatches of these two indefatigable envoys lie on the table unanswered, and the western powers had perforce to put up with contumelious treatment for which they had themselves alone to thank, and had to realise that the harmony of the Germanic courts was, after all, not so easy to disturb. Unfortunately this exchange of despatches, which redounded solely to the honour of the Bundestag, was never published in extenso. The liberals continued to sing the praises of the free-spirited west, and to carry on their campaign against the Muscovite despot of the Germans, although Russia had not interfered in any way in the Frankfort disputes.

Simultaneously the Bundestag was engaged in another, and most odious, negotiation with France. After the fall of Warsaw, it was formally announced in Paris that all the Poles could be sure of an asylum in hospitable France, and it was only

in reliance upon this assurance that the German governments had allowed free passage to Polish refugees. Now the bourgeois monarchy suddenly declared that the Poles who had invaded Switzerland from Besançon were forbidden to return to France. The Confederation had no desire to retain these dangerous guests, for, having been strongly reinforced, they now constituted a regular revolutionary army, with captains, lieutenants, and corporals, and might at any time head a revolt in the German south. The neighbouring states, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg, considered themselves seriously threatened, and in their anxiety these constitutionalist cabinets proposed measures far harsher than any formerly employed by the court of Berlin, declaring to the Bundestag that the Poles must be handed over to the czar as soon as they set foot on German soil. To prevent this extreme step, Switzerland desired to send the refugees to England or America, and was already in treaty with the Germanic Federation and the Netherlands concerning a safe conduct for the Besançon legion down the Rhine. At this stage, however, France abandoned her double game, and permitted the Poles to make their way to the sea across French territory.[1]

Amid these serious European struggles, unity of military command in the German federal city was ultimately secured. Nine soldiers of the Frankfort battalion were sentenced by court martial for complicity in the last attempt at escape. Nevertheless the guarding of the inner city was, as before, exclusively entrusted to these republican forces, and the youthful traitors had still ample opportunity to give further trouble to the Bundestag. In October, 1836, sentence was pronounced on the prisoners; the following day Rochau disappeared, accompanied by his warder, who had been bribed. In January of the following year, six more students escaped from the police station while the guard was enjoying a game of cards, and now at length the Bundestag agreed to what Prussia had proposed four years earlier, and the unhappy six who were the residue of so many escapes were transferred to the safer custody of Mainz.

For the time being, the liberal movement came to an end with the Frankfort rising, and it was only here and there that tongues of flame might still be seen to start from the

[1] Despatch from the Vorort Zurich to Count Münch-Bellinghausen; July 30; Nagler's Reports, November 15, 1833, and subsequent dates.

expiring embers. The Palatiners could not refrain from endeavouring to celebrate the first anniversary of the Hambach festival by holding a new popular assembly at Kästenburg. The meeting was prohibited; troops appeared; the soldiers, who had long been embittered by repeated pinpricks, behaved with deplorable roughness, wounding and mishandling a number of innocent people. Popular excitement increased yet further when, shortly after this, towards the end of July, 1833, for nearly three weeks Wirth, Siebenpfeiffer, and their Hambach associates, were tried by jury at Landau. Most of the accused professed without circumlocution the radical principle of universal equality. Wirth candidly declared that he aimed at establishing the one and indivisible German republic, but without bloodshed, and solely through "a spontaneous uprising of the populace." This republican constitution was, he said, nothing other than the old and only lawful German emperordom. "The sole difference is this, that I desire the chief of the united German realm to bear the title of 'president,' whereas the German constitution terms him 'Kaiser.'" He spoke with such ardent and patriotic enthusiasm and made so adroit a use of moving catchwords from Jean Paul, "the leading poet of all nations and all ages," that jurors, counsel for the defence, and spectators, noisily manifested their admiration for this "political Luther." All the accused were acquitted, although the revolutionary significance of the Hambach speeches was plain to every one. Subsequently, however, some of the accused were subjected to police proceedings for libelling official persons, and were condemned to various terms of imprisonment. To all appearance the Palatinate was tranquillised, although the tacit hostility towards Old Bavaria still persisted. In Bavaria on the right bank of the Rhine, and in Würtemberg, that which the Bundestag spoke of as "order" was likewise restored, as the result of numerous arrests.

It was only in the grand duchy of Hesse that there occurred a belated sequel to the revolutionary movement. When the diet was reelected in the autumn of 1832, the country took little interest in the matter; and since, in accordance with South German custom, some of the younger officials openly supported the opposition, liberal alertness was rewarded by the return of a notable majority. As if feeling that the country was not behind it, the new chamber advanced with feverish haste. It remained sitting for ten months

without any serious attempt to deal with its main duty, the approval of the budget. Instead of this, it spent its time over thunderous speeches against the six articles of the Bundestag, and made violent attacks upon the government. It spoke of a new electoral law, of annual diets, of the abolition of the censorship, of the introduction of the *code Napoléon* upon the right bank of the Rhine—and all this at a time when it had long ceased to be possible for the liberals to count upon success. Side by side with the old leaders of the Hessian liberals, E. E. Hoffmann and Jaup, there now first came into prominence Heinrich von Gagern, a handsome imperial knight, full of self-confidence, and inspired with ardent patriotic sentiments—a man resembling Czar Nicholas in the capacity for deceiving contemporaries as to the mediocrity of his gifts through his possession of the outward characteristics of a great man. Minister du Thil felt incompetent to encounter the unmeasured hatred which was now exhibited towards him, and he tendered his resignation. But the grand duke made answer in words that were to be literally fulfilled fifteen years later: "If Herr Jaup ever becomes minister, I shall have abdicated first!" [1] In November, 1833, the diet was dissolved, having effected nothing.

The radical party in Wetterau had not yet given up the game. Despising the parliamentarians as "liberal sneaks," it continued to consolidate its own forces in "the league of the rights of man" and similar secret societies. Paul Follen and his friend Münch emigrated to America, having lost all hope of success. Weidig, however, continued to stand by the flag, and this Christo-Germanic enthusiast was now joined by a radical atheist, young Georg Büchner, a writer of extraordinary imaginative power, simultaneously enthusiastic and blasé, one of those Hamlet natures which flourished in the literary ferment of the day. As a student in Strasburg he had made the acquaintance of the Saint-Simonians, and was the first to give definite expression in Germany to those socialistic ideas which were already sketchily foreshadowed in Wirth's defence at his trial, and in isolated liberal pamphlets. A realist in politics as in poesy, he considered that the success of the revolution could only be secured by physical force. Laughing at the fools who wished to stir up the populace against the six articles of the Bundestag, he looked rather to the effect which hungry

[1] Du Thil's Sketches.

stomachs would produce on the crowd. His sympathy for the common people was heartfelt, and with some justice he was subsequently extolled as having played the part of John to Lassalle's Messiah.

Weidig had already circulated among the people his *Lights and Luminaries of Hesse.* Further, a *Peasants' Lexicon*, printed somewhere in Thuringia, was passing from hand to hand, explaining to the commons how at ministerial congresses the great men gorged and swilled, and how the league of devils for the murder of freedom had been formed. All these writings were enormously excelled by Büchner's *Hessian Messenger*, a masterpiece of unscrupulous demagogic eloquence. So blind was partisan fanaticism that Weidig, the constitutionalist, did not hesitate to cooperate in this savagely radical effusion, while Büchner, the atheist, allowed his believing friend to intersperse the text with quotations from the Bible and with pious turns of phrase.

The whole order of bourgeois society was herein described as a state of robbery: "You are compelled to give what your insatiable extortioners demand, and to bear the burden which they lay on your shoulders; every day your property is filched from you in the name of taxation, to feast a few paunches to repletion"—and so on, and so on. Even the yield of the domains was counted by Büchner among the moneys squeezed from the starving people. This inflammatory writing scattered the first seeds of the tares that were to spring up in later years. For the nonce it had little effect. Most of the peasants who found copies of the *Messenger* that had been thrust beneath their doors, greatly alarmed by the sinister pamphlet, spontaneously brought it to the authorities. Du Thil who was far from nice in his choice of means, received intelligence from his spies as to what was in progress. Büchner fled at the right moment. Weidig and some of his friends were seized, and thus were extinguished the sparks of this last focus of revolt.

§ 3. THE PARTITION OF LUXEMBURG.

During all these complications, the dispute about Luxemburg had been protracted at the Bundestag for years. This was

a wretched controversy, wherein everything rotten in German political life was openly displayed—the falsity of the entire federal constitution, the confusion and obscurity of public opinion, the egoism of the petty courts, the cowardice of the Bundestag, the machinations of the western powers and, it must unfortunately be added, the weakness of Prussia's deliberately pacifist policy. For centuries Luxemburg had shared the fate of the other provinces of Belgium, successively enduring in common with these the rule of Spain, of Austria, of France, and of Holland. Only the western half of the territory was Walloon, but under the existing foreign regime it was impossible that a German national sentiment should develop even in the German eastern moiety. The decisions of the Vienna congress, by which the grand duchy was incorporated in the Germanic Federation, passed almost unnoticed in the territory, for how could the masses of the people understand this diplomatic artifice sprung from the fertile brain of Hans von Gagern? The inhabitants regarded themselves as belonging to the Catholic Netherlands, and directly the rising against Holland began in Brussels, the banner of Brabant waved likewise throughout Luxemburg. Beyond question the king of the Netherlands was chiefly responsible for the disastrous turn of affairs. Ignoring the difficult duplex position of the grand duchy, he had always treated this German federal territory as a Belgian province, neither granting to it a constitution of its own nor forming in it the prescribed federal military contingent. Had the territory been guarded by Luxemburg federal troops, as specified in the federal law, the revolt, whose proportions were at first inconsiderable, could have been readily suppressed. But the movement was entirely unimpeded, and extended rapidly. The only thing that remained German in this frontier land was the federal fortress, a little northern Gibraltar, whose significance for the conduct of war on the large scale had in Gneisenau's view already become trifling. The impregnable rocky eyrie was strictly guarded by the Prussian garrison, and closed its gates against the rebels.

On October 15, 1830, Count Grünne, in the name of the king-grand-duke, requested the help of the Germanic Federation, for with the exception of the fortress and its immediate vicinity the whole territory was in the hands of the rebels. The Luxemburg federal envoy consolingly added that his

king would henceforward meet the wishes of the Federation in the most friendly manner possible, and would therefore allow supplies for the federal fortress to enter duty-free. There could be no question about the legal responsibilities of the Federation. However artificial the state structures inaugurated by the Vienna congress, however much the king of the Netherlands may have been led astray by his anti-federal sentiments, it was unquestionably the duty of the Federation to come to the assistance of its harassed member, and it made no difference whether the Belgians were to be regarded as rebels or as a hostile foreign power. The prompt despatch of federal troops might save the land for its lawful sovereign; or else, should an exchange of territory prove necessary, this might be effected voluntarily, and without touching Germany's honour. So irrefragable were these considerations, that even the London conference in its first resolutions expressly reserved the Germanic Federation's rights in Luxemburg. But in Frankfort hopeless perplexity prevailed, for everyone dreaded lest the Luxemburg question should involve Germany in a war with France. The behaviour of the nation was, if possible, more lamentable. There could be no clear ideas about this Netherland province, despite the fact that with one foot at least it stood within the Germanic Federation. Moreover, by the new liberal doctrine of salvation, the Belgians, being rebels, were worthy of all support. Public opinion, in so far as it was concerned about the question, was soon widely sympathetic to the revolt, and the only persons to manifest strong feeling on behalf of the king-grand-duke's rights were the crown prince of Prussia and the small circle of strict legitimists in Berlin.

After prolonged deliberation, the Bundestag came to the conclusion that war must be avoided whatever happened, and that therefore the Luxemburg troubles must not be regarded as invasion by a hostile power, but as an uprising in a federal domain with which the federal executive must deal. This gave the desired excuse for further procrastination. The Luxemburg envoy must first furnish detailed reports as to the situation in the country; next General Wolzogen must visit Luxemburg to ascertain precisely how strong a force was requisite for federal action. These delays would occupy months, and in the interim (such was the hope in Frankfort) the whole affair might be happily buried. To give an earnest

of its intentions, on November 18th the Bundestag addressed a confidential request to Austria and Prussia, asking them to take up the question of the German federal territory at the London conference, and to secure, if possible, that federal action might be rendered wholly or partly superfluous. The Federation hesitated to send a representative to London, for it was felt that such a purely German diplomatist would occupy a ludicrous position beside the envoys of the two German great powers. Blittersdorff alone could not see that without Austria and Prussia the Germanic Federation did not belong to the great powers. He vigorously but fruitlessly demanded that the Bundestag should directly cooperate in the London conferences.[1]

Since the legality of the federal action was incontestable, the French court had to rest content with doing all it could to interfere with the carrying of the Bundestag's determination into effect. In a circular despatch dated December 30th France expressed to the minor German courts a benevolent desire that coincided only too well with the hopes of these cabinets, namely, "that the Bundestag would display in the measures now to be undertaken the deliberation and the wise moderation with which all its actions have been characterised, that every possible postponement may be made and even renewed. This patience will be in harmony with the character of the Bundestag, whose aim it is to maintain unity and peace by the use of the most conciliatory means." Simultaneously in Frankfort Alleye was to represent to the federal assembly that "the precipitancy manifested in the preparation of military measures threatens to increase the excitement in Belgium."[2] In order to place another obstacle in the way of the Federation, France now advanced an impudent claim that the fragment of the principality of Bouillon which by the Paris treaty had been united to the old duchy of Luxemburg could not be regarded as an inseparable constituent. The Federation was compelled to draft a lengthy refutation of this claim.[3] Nothing could, however, have been clearer than Germany's rights; and at length, on March 18, 1831, the Bundestag determined to

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, April 22 and 30, 1831, and subsequent dates.

[2] Circular Despatch from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the embassies in Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, etc., December 30; Instruction to Alleye, December 29, 1830.

[3] Count Reinhard, French envoy in Dresden, Memorial concerning Bouillon; Rejoinder by Smidt, junior, January, 1831.

despatch an army of 24,000 men in order to restore the prestige of lawful authority in Luxemburg and simultaneously to garrison the federal fortress on a war footing.

The decision came far too late, for during the intervening six months the rebels, encouraged by the indecision of the federal assembly, had established their own authorities throughout the territory. The federal fortress alone remained in the firm hand of the Prussian governor. Prussia had voluntarily increased her garrisoning force almost twofold, for the Luxemburg contingent, which in time of war was to constitute the lesser moiety of the garrison, was non-existent. But what a spectacle was it when the other federal troops now put in a tardy appearance, those destined by the Bundestag for the defence of the fortress, the legions of Detmold, Bückeburg, and Waldeck. They showed themselves worthy allies of the Frankfort army. They had mutinied on the march, and when they reached the fortress their conduct was so undisciplined that the Prussian governor had to take sharp measures. He had them paid at the Prussian rate, which was higher than their own, and had them initiated under Prussian supervision into the almost unknown art of marksmanship. Patriotic wrath was aroused in the Bundestag by the Prussian general's autocratic conduct, and with customary thoroughness the federal assembly now began to discuss the problem (unfortunately quite insoluble), who was to provide money for the soldiers' pay and for the cost of the shooting practice—the Federation, Prussia, or the respective sovereigns? In the end the Prussian government found the nuisance intolerable, and bluntly declared to the Bundestag that nothing could be done with such a rabble in a fortress surrounded by rebels. There was fresh perplexity in Frankfort. It was recognised clearly enough that the withdrawal of the three armies was inevitable, but it was felt that the respective rulers would be too deeply wounded if the true reasons were officially stated. On October 27th, therefore, it was decided that the three contingents were to return home, since "the grounds upon which the expedition was undertaken no longer exist." It was not for the military efficiency of the German army that the Federation displayed this paternal consideration, but only for the sensibilities of the petty princes. There was no occasion for anxiety about the federal fortress, for King Frederick William promptly issued orders that, in case of need, his

Rhenish army corps was to supply men to replace the 1,400 Detmolders and Waldeckers.[1]

The prospects of federal action now seemed practically hopeless. There was a curse upon everything undertaken by the unlucky Frankfort assembly. The Bundestag had made up its mind that Prussia must not participate, for the appearance of Prussian regiments outside the federal fortress might readily have given the signal for a European war. At the London conference France had urgently recommended that federal action should be taken in a form which would show "unambiguously" that the Federation alone was intervening in Luxemburg, and that the eastern powers had nothing to do with the matter.[2] In the existing posture of affairs the request was comprehensible enough, and it was one which the Federation could easily fulfil, for, on paper at least, it possessed other troops which to the irritable French would seem less suspect than those of Prussia. Federal action was therefore entrusted to the tenth and a portion of the ninth federal army corps under Hanoverian leadership. The Hanoverian government exhibited small gratitude for the honour, making a vigorous protest on account of the unendurable cost, and demanding in the end an advance of from two to three hundred thousand thalers which, by federal custom, could not possibly be paid for another six months. What was the explanation of this remarkable behaviour? In other matters avarice could not be charged to the Hanoverian nobles' regime, which loved to cut a stately and distinguished figure. There could be no doubt that Hanover was acting at Lord Palmerston's instigation. Both the western powers, influenced by delicate consideration for their Belgian protégé, desired to do their utmost to hinder federal intervention; and since the legality of federal action was absolutely incontestable it was necessary to have recourse to masked measures. Whilst Alleye was confidentially showing some of the federal envoys yet another French memorial, containing an urgent warning against the dangers of precipitation,[3] England-Hanover was sowing the dragon's teeth of dissension in the Bundestag. The Hanoverian envoy raised the figure of his demands, and even went

[1] Nagler's Reports, August 1 and 19, September 28, November 4, and December 3, 1831.

[2] Bernstorff, Instruction to Maltzahn, November 14, 1830.

[3] Alleye, Annotation sur Luxembourg, March, 1831.

so far as to insist that the order for the despatch of the federal troops ought not to be issued until all the states concerned had been heard, and until the question of costs had been settled among them.

Holstein and several other of the lesser North German states supplying military contingents hastened to follow Hanover's praiseworthy example, and likewise demanded security for the payment of expenses. Nagler, valiantly supported by the Bavarian envoy, opposed these intrigues to the utmost, for they verged upon open treason to the Federation. The dispute became intolerable; the worst days of the Ratisbon Reichstag had been revived.[1] Friedrich von Gagern, visiting Frankfort in March with a commission from the Dutch government, prophesied with much perspicacity that the Federation would assuredly take no action, for no serious will to action existed. In actual fact, the year 1831 was entirely devoted to this unworthy dispute about money, without a single federal soldier having been moved to the scene of disturbance. Meanwhile, the London conference had already taken steps by which federal action was rendered superfluous—and this had from the first been the ardent desire of the Bundestag.

To ensure the safety of the fortress of Luxemburg, the Prussian court did far more than was prescribed as a matter of federal duty, honestly endeavouring in Frankfort to spur on its vacillating federal allies and to induce them to come to a decision, whilst at the London conference repeatedly and expressly maintaining the rights of the Federation. Bernstorff wrote to Vienna as follows: "The Federation would be dishonoured, would condemn itself in the future to lack life and political activity, if it were to omit on this important occasion to fulfil a duty which is no less clear than it is formally imposed." Simultaneously (November, 1830), a definite instruction was sent to Bülow in London: "The relationships of the grand duchy and of the fortress of Luxemburg to the Germanic Federation must be irrevocably maintained. Every attempt at a forcible change in this respect is to be regarded as an invasion of the rights of the Federation and as an infringement of treaties consecrated by the common consent of Europe."[2] But Prussian policy did not advance beyond the

[1] Nagler's Reports, April 26, July 2, 10, and 23, November 10, 1831.

[2] Bernstorff, Instruction to Maltzahn, November 1; Instruction to Bülow, November 4, 1830.

modest measure of these self-evident demands. It had no other idea than this, that forcible changes in federal territory were not to be tolerated. If, however, any peaceful means were discoverable whereby, without any diminution of the federal domain, and with the assent of all those rightfully concerned, the vexatious dispute could be brought to an end, this solution would be most accordant with the pacific inclinations of King Frederick William. Such a solution was now unexpectedly indicated to him by his Netherland brother-in-law.

For a time the king-grand-duke continued to cherish the hope of regaining his German federal territory by force of arms. In March, 1831, he sent Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to the fortress of Luxemburg, to attempt a royalist crusade from that centre. The plan was, however, speedily abandoned, for the entire grand duchy was now in the hands of the rebels. Subsequently King William endeavoured to induce the Federation to declare war against Belgium, but this design likewise proved fruitless, for the Bundestag had already decided upon its course of action. A considerable time before this the London conference had agreed in principle upon the breaking up of the United State of the Netherlands. Even the Dutch plenipotentiaries began to feel that these accomplished facts were inalterable, and their only aim now was to secure for their country as favourable a boundary as possible. Along the Meuse, in Limburg, the old frontier of 1790, which was the determinant in drafting the present plan of subdivision, was extremely disadvantageous to Holland. Here Venloo, Roermonde, and other ancient Dutch cities were surrounded by Belgian territory. For this reason the Dutch negotiators confidentially assured the Prussian envoy that their king would be inclined to cede the western half of Luxemburg to Belgium, if Belgium would in return give to Holland and the Germanic Federation the right bank of the Meuse and the northern extremity of the province of Limburg. As soon as this proposal was communicated to the London conference, it secured general approval, nor did the Bundestag raise any objection.[1] As far as Germany was concerned, such an exchange of territory was by no means unacceptable. The only place of military importance, Luxemburg, the federal fortress, was to remain

[1] Bülow to Nagler, August 27; Eichhorn's Memorial Concerning the Netherlands, October 25; Nagler's Report, September 13, 1831.

German; the region along the Meuse in Limburg marched directly with Prussian territory; and since it was in name merely that the grand duchy had hitherto belonged to the Federation, little importance could unfortunately be attached to the question whether for the future, instead of a hundred and fifty thousand Luxemburg Walloons a like number of Limburg Low Germans were to be counted among the inhabitants of the federal area. The youthful Belgian state having been declared neutral, the king of that state could not enter the Germanic Federation, and it was necessary that Germany should be compensated by Dutch territory for the loss of the western half of Luxemburg.

In view of all these considerations, the solution suggested in London seemed to provide the sole way out of the difficulty. The only ignominious point about the arrangement was that the Belgians, unhindered by the Federation, already occupied the German federal territory, and could therefore boast of having compelled the great land of Germany to agree to a cession. The London conference disregarded this odious seamy side of the transaction, and in the twenty-four articles to which, on November 15, 1831, the great powers agreed with Belgium, the exchange of territory on the German frontier was formally decided upon, but with the express reservation of federal rights. This seemed to settle the quarrel. But the sloth of the Bundestag and the refractoriness of Hanover had now to be paid for. Had the Federation, in accordance with its duty, promptly despatched its troops to the rebellious federal territory, it could in dignified calm have waited until the king of the Netherlands had at length signed the twenty-four articles, and could then have freely and honourably given its assent to the exchange of territory arranged in London. But the favourable moment had long passed. The Belgians remained in possession of the whole territory, which the king of the Netherlands had, indeed, expressly ceded to them for the duration of the truce; and since the king did not make peace with the Belgians until 1839, the German island which still reared its solitary head above the Belgian flood, the federal fortress, was soon in a quite untenable position. The German liberal world, however, was so fully occupied over the disputes of the minor diets, over Russia and Poland, over Spain and Portugal, that it could not vouchsafe a glance at the disgraceful state of affairs upon the western march.

The only man to play a creditable part in this federal scandal was General Dumoulin, Prussian commander of the fortress of Luxemburg. To him alone and to his doughty troops was it owing that in this western march, where all the world made mock of the Germanic Federation, the black-and-white flag was at least still hated and feared. The son of a Dutch general, and himself a Dutch officer until the year 1806, in the Prussian service Dumoulin had soon become wholly German; during the difficult Napoleonic days he had gained Gneisenau's full confidence, and had valiantly contributed to the uprising of Germany. In accepting his new office, he was fully aware that he became warden of the marches of the fatherland; affairs of government were practically in his hands, for the governor, Landgrave Louis of Hesse-Homburg, an elderly man, after the princely custom spent the greater part of every year in travelling, and Dumoulin terrified the Belgians by his precise knowledge of Netherland affairs, while he alarmed the diplomatists of the Bundestag by the soldierly candour of his reports.

What a task was his! For nine years the fortress remained in a perpetual state of siege, completely surrounded by the enemy. For the garrison the general was indeed able to enforce freedom of intercourse with Treves and the domestic hinterland, but only for the garrison. Every bale of goods consigned to the civil population was subject to the Belgian customs, and the rebel custom house officials made a deliberate misuse of their powers. Trade was at a standstill; the enforcement of law ended with the radius of the fortress, for the Bundestag did not recognise the Belgian authorities; even postal communication with Germany was at an end, and Dumoulin had to send the inhabitants' letters by his orderlies. The Belgians did not venture to approach the ancient ramparts which in massive zigzag lines commanded the rocky valleys of the Elze and the Petrusbach; but they endeavoured to stimulate treasonable practices. Now the general had to have a Belgian flogged for endeavouring to induce a Prussian soldier to desert (a punishment sanctioned by military law, and one which had a very wholesome effect); now a brigade of Belgian custom house officials would be arrested within the precincts of the fortress; whilst at other times it would become necessary to prohibit the militia levies of the Belgians, or to deal with their offences against the forest laws. In addition, there

were repeated attempts on both sides to establish volunteer corps; repeated arrests, protested against now by one side and now by the other; and a most unpleasant correspondence with General Tabor, Belgian military governor in Arlon, whom it was necessary to set to rights sharply before he would realise that he could not treat a Prussian general so contemptuously as he treated the Germanic Federation. Even General Gödecke, Dutch civil governor in the fortress, gave the Prussian commander more trouble than enough, secretly favouring the intrigues of the little Orange party; requesting protection for imprisoned Belgians (for his king still hoped to win over the mutinous province by kindness); and actually demanding payment for the Prussian billeting. Even the Bundestag complained because the Prussian engineers were strengthening the fortifications in face of a menacing enemy, and a considerable time elapsed before this extraordinary outlay was approved.[1] The most insane thing of all was that the Federation had never yet been able to come to an agreement regarding a boundary law for the federal fortresses. The consequence was that the commandant had to determine the radius upon his own authority. When, owing to the unceasing harassments of the Belgians, he considered it necessary to enlarge the fortress domain to a circuit of ten miles, the federal assembly entered an objection, to which the general made answer in blunt terms that on this occasion he found it impossible to obey his superiors in Frankfort.

To make confusion worse confounded, the western powers took a hand in the game. Since the king of the Belgians had not yet secured general recognition, and since his plenipotentiaries had consequently been more than once discountenanced by the Bundestag, England and France considered themselves the natural representatives of their protégé. Alleye and Cartwright entered one protest after another on account of alleged encroachments on the part of the Luxemburg commandant, resuming in this matter the rude and quarrelsome tone which had so ill become them in the Frankfort dispute. It seemed as if they must desire to give additional proof to the world what was to be thought of the boasted civilisation of the west. When Dumoulin had expelled certain Belgian soldiers from the precincts of the German

[1] Nagler's Reports, December 28, 1831, January 24, March 10 and May 8, 1832.

federal fortress, the English envoy expressed the opinion, "So arbitrary an act can be based only on the right of the stronger." When the levying of the Belgian militia was forbidden within the fortress area, Alleye declared, "The French government has reason to fear that General Dumoulin and those who are behind him are deliberately attempting to bring about a conflict." [1] It did not suffice that these two men should brazenly contest rights clear as daylight, for in addition they trampled upon all diplomatic usage. They actually ventured to state their grievances directly to the commandant of Luxemburg; and although they knew that by its regulations the Bundestag could receive nothing but verbal notes from the foreign envoys, they repeatedly endeavoured to treat personally with Münch, the presidential envoy, and on one occasion Alleye had the impudence to retail to the Bundestag an alleged oral utterance of Münch, with the remark that this was tantamount to a pledge of honour! Such insolent behaviour on the part of the two western diplomatists continued for years. But even the Bundestag knew how to deal with these notorious disturbers of the peace, giving nothing but curt and negative rejoinders, which were expressly supported by the German great powers,[2] so that the two envoys lost all influence in Frankfort. They received the cold shoulder from diplomatic society. Blittersdorff reported: "People here seem inclined to regard Lord Palmerston as a semi-savage, as a man with whom they can have nothing to do." [3] Yet these western powers, which were thus molesting the Germanic Federation by presumptuous attempts at intervention, were again and again extolled by the liberal press as Germany's natural allies.

Meanwhile Luxemburg's future remained in the balance. The king of the Netherlands, who still secretly based his hopes upon a general war, could not make up his mind to accept the twenty-four articles. Palmerston, by his ill-bred arrogance, rendered yielding difficult for his betrayed Dutch ally. It was plain that the English minister wished the dispute to be prolonged; the truce which left the Belgians in possession of the greater part of Luxemburg and Limburg was extremely

[1] Verbal Notes to Münch, from Cartwright, September 25, 1833, from Alleye, February 26, 1834.

[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Maltzahn, November 6, 1834.

[3] Blittersdorff's Report, September 13, 1834.

advantageous to England's new favourite—and woe to British trade should the continent ever experience complete tranquillity!

It was natural enough that during these long years of uncertainty King William should occasionally allow his anger against the inactive Germanic Federation to exceed reasonable limits. In November, 1833, he indicated to the Bundestag that he was prepared to cede the western half of Luxemburg to Belgium. He could not, indeed, offer the Federation compensation in territory and people, but he proposed, after the cession as before, to fulfil the federal duties which had devolved upon the undivided grand duchy, and he hoped (he added as if in scorn) that the pledge would be recognised as "a proof of federal sentiments." By making strong complaints of the inactivity of the Bundestag, he then attempted, for good or for ill, to justify this dishonouring and preposterous demand, which plainly conflicted with his own earlier promises.[1] The two German great powers were by this time so utterly weary of the dispute that they urgently recommended the minor courts to accept the Netherland proposals. Ancillon opined that it would be absurd to expect compensation, since there was no territory available for the purpose. It would, moreover, be unjust, for the king acquired no new territory but merely retained what he already possessed.[2] Now came an unprecedented development. King Louis of Bavaria and several of the German courts showed themselves more patriotic than Prussia, insisting that Germany must receive territorial compensation.[3] Twice, therefore, in 1834 and in 1836, the Bundestag formally demanded full compensation for "western Lützelburg." King William at length gave way. On April 19, 1839, peace was signed between Holland and Belgium on the basis of the twenty-four articles. On September 5th, the Bundestag agreed that this newly formed Netherland duchy of Limburg, with the exclusion of the fortresses of Maestricht and Venloo, should enter the Federation; in exchange therefore Walloon Luxemburg, an area of about the same size, together with the German town of Arlon and about 32,000 German inhabitants in all, was handed over to Belgium. Even the agnates of the ducal house of Nassau accepted the decision. During all these proceedings they had given utterance to many

[1] Nagler's Reports, November 20, 1833, January 16, 1834.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Bülow, December 15, 1833.
[3] Dönhoff's Reports, Munich, December 19, 1833, February 28, 1834.

brave words, but in the matter of sending federal troops to Luxemburg their conduct had been just as petty as that of Hanover. They now renounced their hereditary claims upon the western half of Luxemburg, and received monetary compensation from King William.

In this manner a reduction of the federal domain was happily avoided. The new duchy of Limburg was, like the ceded territory, a Netherland province belonging in name to Germany, and the Bundestag cherished the hope "that his majesty's wisdom will lead him to adopt measures likely to avert the inconveniences which might otherwise possibly arise out of these relationships." Anyone who could place confidence in such consolatory fancies could maintain with some degree of credibility that the exchange of territory on the western frontier would prove advantageous to the Germanic Federation. Since the reduced Luxemburg was now far removed from the kingdom of the Netherlands, the king had at length to atone for all the old sins of omission. Henceforward the grand duchy was treated as an independent state, connected with the Netherlands solely by a personal union, and receiving its own special federal contingent. In the year 1841 it also acquired a constitution of its own, and to all appearance therefore drew closer than before to German life.

But what could this satisfaction to Germany amount to in comparison with the terrible moral defeat which the Germanic Federation had prepared for itself? When the Bundestag put up with Hanover's refractoriness and lethargically allowed the proposed federal action to drop, it announced to all the world its incompetence to perform the first of its duties. All the German states were equally involved in this scandal, not excepting Prussia and Bavaria, for in such a case well-meaning words were of no avail. Such small prestige as the Federation had hitherto been able to maintain in Europe was now completely destroyed. Little Belgium, the timid July monarchy, and Palmerston (whose courage was displayed only against the weak), ventured henceforward to exhibit open contempt.

How disastrous, too, proved the contemplation of German weakness in its effects upon the sentiments of those Lützelburgers who were still within the Federation. The decision of the London conference by which their homeland was sundered in twain could not be looked upon by the inhabitants of the little territory in any other light than that

of the judgment of Solomon, nor could they consider patiently expectant Germany to be anything better than a stepmother. During nine years people had become accustomed to Belgian administration, and it was not surprising that the good German petty burghers in Diekirch, Wasserbillig, and Grevenmachern should long for reunion with free Belgium. Even the town of Luxemburg was Belgian in sentiment, for though it had earned much money through the presence of the Prussian garrison, more than it had gained in this way had been lost through seclusion from the environment. Minister Türckheim, who was seldom inclined to censure a federal decree, was astounded that the Bundestag should constrain these frontier dwellers to desire "to escape the decay to which federal stagnation condemns everything that the Federation touches." [1] Moreover, there still existed here as in Belgium a small party of "Fransquillons," whose members intrigued with France; and there was also a party of contented particularists who desired independence. But there was no German party. It is true that the proprietors of the great mines and factories desired free trade with their natural market in the east, and one could find here and there a young lawyer who had imbibed German ideas in Bonn or Heidelberg. But apart from such exceptional instances the whole country resounded with scorn and mockery of everything German. Prussia alone was feared, but was feared as an enemy. The black-and-white flag upon the ramparts of Luxemburg, though unfurled for the protection of the territory, was now regarded by the populace as the symbol of tyranny, after it had averted for nine years the entry of the tricolor of Brabant. Apart from this, to the bigoted Catholic population, a population accustomed every Whit Tuesday to devote itself to the repulsive mummery of the Echternach jumping procession in commemoration of relief from the medieval dancing mania, the German state, with its parity of beliefs, had ever been suspect, and the clergy, a powerful body, still inspired by Spanish ideas, did not hesitate to stimulate this sentiment of distrust. Contempt for the German name and hatred of Prussia—such was the seed which the Bundestag had scattered over the soil of this old German frontier land. The tares sprang up luxuriantly, and the crop still flourishes to-day.

[1] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, August 3, 1835.

§ 4. THE MÜNCHENGRÄTZ CONFERENCE.

Since the summer of 1832 it had been settled that Germany was once more wholly attached to the policy of the eastern powers, and nowhere was this strengthening of the old authorities more cordially greeted than in St. Petersburg. Proud of his victory over the Polish rebellion, and prouder still of the fierce invectives by which he was assailed in the liberal press, the czar's dreams were still entirely occupied with the thought of a great crusade on behalf of legitimist right. At Christmas, 1830, in a private memorial upon the European situation, he wrote: "Let us cherish the sacred fire for the solemn moment which no human power can avert or postpone, for the moment when a struggle will inevitably break out between justice and the principle of evil." There was no definite political aim underlying these sonorous words of fanatical hatred; and General Schöler aptly observed, "The emperor deceives, not others alone, but himself also, regarding his own wishes." [1] This much only was plain, that Germany was to bleed in the struggle against the revolution, and that Russia, with the aid of her celebrated "formidable reserves," which bulked so largely on the paper of the St. Petersburg memorials, was at her leisure to garner the fruits of the war.

The more confident Nicholas' sense of security after the fall of Warsaw, the more profoundly was he embittered by the defeats which Prussia's cautious and pacifist policy had entailed upon him. He continued to make a parade of his personal veneration for the king, ardently declaring, "He is my father, I am his son." But this did not prevent him from overwhelming the court of Berlin with unreasonable demands, such demands as sons are by no means accustomed to make of their fathers. After all the friendly services which Prussia had rendered him during the Polish revolt, he still ventured to ask that the German neighbour state should establish hard by the Russian frontier a supreme police authority with which a Russian official was to collaborate, and he even requested the king to force into the Prussian army those Polish refugees who refused to return home (March and June, 1832). Both these requests met with a flat refusal, and the political friendship became manifestly cooler. Moreover, Ribeaupierre,

[1] Schöler's Report, September 24, 1833.

the new Russian envoy, did not understand, as his predecessor Alopeus had understood, how to win the personal confidence of the Berlinese statesmen. General Schöler, on the other hand, was becoming a persona ingrata at the court of St. Petersburg, because long experience had made him proof against the dramatic arts of Muscovy, and because he was continually warning his countrymen: "It is a national peculiarity of the Russians to expect the most extensive and the most varied sacrifices from their friends, their gratitude for these being evinced in the very opposite sense from that which might have been anticipated." [1]

Although the Belgian dispute had been largely settled (with the cooperation of Russia), and had therefore ceased to involve any risk of war, the czar continued without cessation to demand the formal renewal of the league of the eastern powers: the three courts were to demonstrate before all the world their resolve "to maintain divine right." In January, 1833, Prussia rejoined that the old alliance was more firmly established than ever, but that its formal renewal would be superfluous and even dangerous, for this could only result in a close approximation between the western powers, which would widen the cleavage in the society of nations. After prolonged endeavours, all that Russia could secure was that on March 9, 1833, a harmless treaty, and one almost void of content, was signed at Berlin between the eastern powers. The three courts merely pledged themselves to settle the Belgian question upon the basis of the twenty-four articles, that is to say, an understanding with the western powers; and they agreed to protect the king of the Netherlands against further attacks, attacks which no one designed to make.

While Prussia thus maintained an attitude of reserve towards St. Petersburg policy, that policy was subserviently endorsed by the Hofburg. After the July revolution, Metternich unremittingly and with scant dignity wooed the friendship of Russia. He hoped that the confidential position which Prussia had so long preserved in St. Petersburg would now fall to the Austrian court, and he continually inflamed the repressed anger of the czar by calumniating Prussian statesmen and by more or less definite complaints of the cowardice of Berlin. His confidant, the Austrian envoy, Count Ficquelmont, one of the most ingenious diplomatists of the

[1] Schöler's Report, December 28, 1833.

chancellor's school, listened deferentially to the Russian autocrat's legitimist outbursts, continually fortifying the czar's anger by his cordial and loyal-seeming soldierly approval. Now, as before, Metternich's timidity rendered him averse from the thought of war, but he dreaded the revolution in Italy. His repeated endeavours to establish an Italian league of princes had been frustrated by the particularist pride of the Neapolitan Bourbons; and the tidings of disorder in Piedmont gave him cause for serious alarm. Among the ranks of the conspirators were already heard the dread names of Gioberti, Mazzini, and Garibaldi. How soon might Austria find herself compelled to despatch troops to Turin, thus leading to a French invasion of Italy and to a general war! In such an event, the Hofburg would have to count upon Russia's support; were this assured Austria believed that Prussia's military cooperation would inevitably follow. It seemed superfluous to Metternich to show delicate consideration for the feelings of his North German ally, for at this very time the court of Berlin was taking another vigorous stride towards the abolition of German dualism. Like one blow following another, news came to hand of Prussia's customs treaties; and although the Austrian statesman was far from having attained to a clear recognition of the long enduring consequences of these proceedings, he nevertheless recognised a hostile power in the growing customs union. For these reasons the court of Vienna concentrated all influences in order to strengthen the alliance with Russia; and even in the eastern question, which had so often been a cause of friction between the two imperial powers, Austria now exhibited a quite unexpected pliancy towards the St. Petersburg cabinet.

Arrogant and passionate as was Russian policy in the west, in the east, where Russia alone had precise knowledge of the circumstances, that policy was prudent and masterly. Since the peace of Adrianople the czar had been playing the part of magnanimous protector of Turkey. He did everything in his power to make it easy for the sultan to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of peace, remitting a large part of the war indemnity, endeavouring to control the Porte indirectly through his agents. After mature consideration his advisers came to the formal conclusion that the maintenance of the Turkish empire was for the time being in Russia's interest. But when the London cabinet expressed a wish that Russia

should sign a treaty with England guaranteeing the inviolability of Turkey, this guileless demand met with a decisive refusal.

From 1831 onwards, new dangers had begun to threaten the Turkish realm. Mehemet Ali, the powerful viceroy of Egypt who had fought against the Greek giaours, demanded from his lord paramount the bestowal of the long promised Syrian pashalic. He raised the flag of revolt, and in an irresistibly victorious campaign his son Ibrahim led the Egyptian army through Syria into the north-west of Asia Minor. At the beginning of 1833 the victors were no more than a few marches from the Bosphorus, being almost as close to the capital as Diebitsch had been four years earlier, and now as then European diplomacy, greatly affrighted, imagined that the end of the Osmanli dominion was at hand. In reality this terrible rebellion was perhaps capable of bringing salvation to the tottering Turkish empire, were salvation at all possible. By oriental standards Mehemet Ali was not a traitor, and the ardent veneration which throughout the war he manifested for the sultan was not entirely simulated. It was impossible that he should contemplate the dethronement of the house of Osman. Should the boldest and most cunning statesman in the eastern world succeed in forcing the successor of the caliphs to grant his house the hereditary grand vizierate, it was quite conceivable that the Turkish state would be rejuvenated from within as France had been of old under the regime of the Carlovingian mayors of the palace. The liberator of the holy places of Mecca could count upon the enthusiastic devotion of all the Moslem faithful, and his Napoleonic rule in Egypt showed with what mastery he was able to adapt to oriental life the European arts of government.

But the distracted condition of European public opinion, through which the existence of the Osmanli realm had so often been preserved, proved disastrous to Turkey on this occasion. Not one of the powers which honestly desired the maintenance of the Turkish state took a sound view of the situation. Prussia, as was her custom, would have nothing to do with Turkish affairs as long as they did not directly threaten world peace. Palmerston knew absolutely nothing about the eastern question, and foolishly let the right moment slip. Metternich again proved unable to do justice to the power and growth in history, applying to the politics of the orient the yardstick of his legitimist doctrine. Just as in the Greeks he had been

able to see nothing but rebels, so now did he unreservedly condemn "the thoroughly subversive aims of Mehemet Ali," declaring "direct repression of the revolution" to be the first principle of all "sound policy." Nothing would ever induce him to act as mediator between a rebel and his lawful sovereign. He breathed more freely when the czar likewise manifested indignation against the Egyptian rebels, and henceforward was so firmly convinced of the straightforwardness of Russia's aims that he regarded every doubt expressed on this subject as tantamount to a personal affront. "If our cabinet is easy in its mind," he declared, writing to Paris in a tone of profound injury, "other cabinets have no right to harbour doubts." The ambiguous policy of the July monarchy could not fail to increase the infatuation of the Viennese court. Paris desired the maintenance of Turkey, but did not wish to abandon the Egyptians altogether, for the land of the Lower Nile had long been reckoned within France's natural sphere of influence. The result was that the French made awkward attempts at mediation, these serving only to add new strength to the Austrian chancellor's belief that the revolutionaries on the Nile and the revolutionaries on the Seine were all of the same kidney.

The court of St. Petersburg was the only one that knew its own mind. Refusing to participate in joint intervention, when the danger rose to a climax Russia offered military aid to the sultan. Mahmud gratefully accepted the helping hand proffered by this magnanimous protector. A Russian army was landed on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and by a masterstroke of St. Petersburg policy the investment of Antwerp was requited and thrown into the shade. With the friendly cooperation of his northern patron, the sultan now made peace with the Egyptians, a peace fully accordant with the aims of Russian policy. Mehemet Ali acquired for Ibrahim the hereditary viceroyalty of Syria. Even Cilicia, the gate of Asia Minor, and the mountain forests of the pashalic of Adana, indispensable to the fleet, were ceded to him. In this way the power of the Porte was notably reduced, but in compensation the disturbers of the peace withdrew from the conquered interior of Asia Minor, and in the counsels of the Sublime Porte the Russian envoy was supreme instead of the dreaded Egyptian, the Muscovite being careful to see that no reforms were carried out that might be of any help to the state.

Austria and Prussia hailed the conclusion of peace with heartfelt satisfaction; the revolution had been quelled, and in name at least the existence of Turkey had been preserved. But in Paris the result was felt as a painful defeat. Even Palmerston recognised too late how great an opportunity had been missed, but consoled parliament with the commonplace which is ever grateful to the ears of the easy-going Britons, saying that England would never go to war for abstract principles. Plainer evidence was soon to be given as to the real meaning of Russia's protectorate over the enfeebled Turkish realm. At the sultan's first nod, the troops of the northern saviour obligingly started on their homeward march; but on July 8, 1833, a treaty of alliance was signed between the two powers at Hunkiar Iskelessi, wherein Russia and Turkey mutually pledged themselves to the territorial status quo, and since the sultan was not in a position to fulfil his part of the bargain he promised to close the Dardanelles to all foreign war fleets. Consequently the approach to Constantinople was forbidden the western powers, whilst the city was always open to the Russians from the Black Sea.

In this way, by a coup de main, Russia gained preponderant power in the near east, and after so brilliant a success the czar imagined himself strong enough to assume authoritative airs even towards the western world. He desired, as a matter of principle at least, to declare war on the revolution, thus endangering the peace of the world; he hoped to renew the happy days of Troppau, though his own advisers were strongly opposed to anything of the kind, and there was no valid reason for a meeting of the monarchs. The first invitation for this new congress had emanated from Vienna. Emperor Francis confidentially enquired through Ficquelmont whether during the summer of 1833 he might have the pleasure of welcoming the Russian emperor to the Bohemian castle of Münchengrätz. With a little mutual accommodation the meeting could be so arranged that the king of Prussia could also participate in it during his annual visit to Teplitz spa. But Metternich, who had not seen the czar since Nicholas ascended the throne, wanted to have the Russian ruler all to himself, for the Austrian dreaded the presence of the old king, who was regarded by his son-in-law as by his own children with a certain diffident veneration, and who was apt to hold to his opinions very tenaciously. For these reasons

the preliminaries for the conference were so maladroitly conducted that General Schöler angrily exclaimed: "This imperial journey threatens to make all meetings of monarchs seem ridiculous." [1] King Frederick William was merely informed that his son-in-law thought of visiting him and the emperor of Austria, but nothing definite was said about the date of the journey. After waiting a long while, he went to Teplitz in July, met Emperor Francis at Theresienstadt on August 14th, and had an interview with Metternich immediately afterwards in Teplitz, discussing details of Germany's federal policy, general European questions being touched on only in passing. Having drunk the waters, he returned home; and not until he was back in Berlin did he learn that the czar had now disposed of his urgent business and thought of visiting Germany early in September.

Thus it came to pass, to Ficquelmont's unconcealed satisfaction, and certainly not without the tacit assistance of the czar, that the proposed congress had to be divided into two parts. In a similarly bungling manner attempts were made to deceive the foreign courts concerning the political aims of the meeting. Nesselrode wrote to England to the effect that this reunion of the friendly rulers took place only to gratify the private wishes of the czar. Ancillon assured the envoys that Nicholas had come solely in order to greet his beloved father-in-law and to make the acquaintance of the Austrian crown prince.[2] Yet it was a matter of common knowledge that Chancellor Nesselrode, Ficquelmont, and a number of officials attached to the foreign office, accompanied the autocrat upon his quiet family journey. It was natural that Palmerston should say with his customary roughness: "Why do these fellows take the trouble to write such stuff? It seems as if they wished to force us to refuse to believe in future a word of what they say!"

King Frederick William now awaited his son-in-law in the castle of Schwedt, on the river Oder. A star of ill omen presided, however, over this fortuitously summoned congress. The czar's ship was compelled by violent storms to take refuge in the port of Riga. The king had to pass several days of utter tedium, relieved only in the evenings to some extent by the extravagant improvisations of Beckmann, the comedian,

[1] Schöler's Report, September 16, 1833.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to the embassies, September 7, 1833.

and a few other actors from the Berlin boards. Such torrential rain was falling that even the charming Uckermark Versailles was an unpleasant residence. Then, all of a sudden, when tidings were still tensely awaited from the coast, the czar's carriage came rattling over the bridge across the Oder (September 5th); carrying out another of his favourite surprises Nicholas had made his way from Riga by land. His welcome was as cordial as ever. A shower of Russian orders of merit rained down upon the Black Dragoons of Schwedt, this being the first occasion upon which Nicholas displayed his fancy for that extravagant distribution of orders which, since then faithfully imitated by the other courts, has deprived these tokens of honour of all significance. With customary official felicity of phrase Ancillon described to the envoys the marvellous harmony of the Schwedt conversations: "The emperor has repeatedly declared that he desires what the king and his cabinet desire, that he desires nothing else, that he desires neither more nor less." [1]

To his intimates, however, Nicholas expressed lively dissatisfaction concerning these three days' conversations.[2] The king was far from being inclined to accede to every capricious proposal made by his son-in-law, and it was by no means his intention to endanger the laboriously safeguarded peace by any foolish attitude of challenge. He accorded a friendly assent to the czar's legitimist phrase-making; he, too (to quote Ancillon once more), recognised "that the increase in the revolutionary spirit had been determined by the sinister activity of Parisian propaganda and by the monstrous principle of non-intervention." He would gladly do everything in his power "to dam up these two sources of disaster, for one of them originates revolutions, whilst the other insures their immunity from punishment." For these reasons it was his own recommendation that the three eastern powers should jointly demand the suppression of demagogic intrigues in Paris. He was also ready, he declared, to take "the first opportunity" of informing the French court that the three powers would maintain the right of intervention. But Frederick William would go no further. His resistance to the Russian's warlike suggestions was so stubborn that Nicholas never ventured to propose the conclusion of a formal treaty. The conversations

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Schöler, September 15, 1833.
[2] Schöler's Report, September 24, 1833.

did not get beyond the stage of a comparatively unfruitful exchange of ideas, and the czar made up his mind that the discussion of matters of closer interest must be deferred until he met the Austrians at Münchengrätz.

It was all the more impossible for him to suggest that his father-in-law should undertake a second journey to Bohemia, seeing that the manœuvres, which the king never failed to attend, were imminent. Nicholas therefore proposed that Ancillon should accompany him. But the minister declined with unwonted firmness, going so far as to say to the autocrat, "Regard for the dignity of Prussia would not allow me to take such a step."[1] Nicholas, who in any case could not endure the pacifist theologian, was greatly incensed. The minister foresaw how awkward would be his situation if he were alone with the two emperors, and he therefore made up his mind that he would rest content with ascertaining subsequently in Berlin what had happened at Münchengrätz, and would consult the ailing Bernstorff about these matters—for he obviously had more confidence in Bernstorff's courage than in his own. He persisted in refusing, and the king endorsed his refusal. Solely in order to maintain the semblance of harmony before the world, at the request of the czar the crown prince accompanied him to Münchengrätz, but Frederick William gave his son strict injunctions to pledge himself to nothing and to take no part in the political negotiations. Thus the two monarchs parted on friendly terms, but not entirely without dissension.

The czar was more fortunate during the ten days he spent in Wallenstein's old castle in the Iser valley. Emperor Francis, indeed, seemed more pitiable than ever. He was convalescent from an illness which had visibly aged him, and his talk was inexpressibly dull. But Nicholas speedily found himself on the best possible terms with Metternich, overwhelming the Austrian statesman with favours, and with his customary emotional ostentation declaring: "I have come to put myself under the commands of my chief." Not even this flattery was too gross for the Austrian's vanity; Metternich really believed himself to hold the reins, what time the control of

[1] This utterance is recorded in the Diaries of Princess Metternich (Posthumous Papers, vol. V, p. 435), and appears to have been actually uttered. The fact was generally believed at the Bundestag. (Blittersdorff's Report, December 13, 1833.)

the league of emperors was inconspicuously passing into the hands of Russia. Even social life in Münchengrätz sufficed to show how the centre of gravity of the alliance had moved since Laibach days. The czar's refulgence dimmed all lesser lights. The high nobility thronged to pay him homage, above all Duke William of Nassau, the most extreme reactionary in the German estate of princes and for this reason Nicholas' declared favourite. Upon the czar alone was concentrated the attention of all the secret agents who from far and near had flocked to the cities and spas of Bohemia. In his honour brilliant reviews were held ; and the diplomatists of the old school, in whose opinion the army was not altogether presentable at court, were in a disagreeable position when the chief topic of conversation was the exploits in horsemanship performed by the regiment of Hungarian hussars which Emperor Francis had placed at his guest's disposal, and when they had again and again to asseverate how magnificently the new uniform became the handsomest man in Europe.

While all this was in progress, the course of the diplomatic negotiations showed that in the struggle for political power a strong will can ever gain the victory over a subtle intelligence. The czar gained all that he wanted from Metternich. First of all he secured that the two powers should enter into a secret treaty (September 18th) by which they exchanged mutual pledges to maintain the status of the Osmanli realm under the existing ruling house, to forbid the pasha of Egypt any encroachments in the sultan's European provinces, and to continue harmonious cooperation upon a jointly concerted plan should Turkey nevertheless collapse. Metternich was jubilant. Was it not a wonderful triumph of his wisdom that Russia should now formally abandon her old designs upon Constantinople, at the very time when the suspicious Palmerston was already dreading lest the imperial powers would come to an understanding in Münchengrätz to effect the partition of Turkey. In reality, Nicholas' confidant, Count Alexis Orloff, the negotiator of the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi, had once more overreached the Austrian with consummate craft. For if Turkey should continue to exist under the sway of the decaying house of Osman, if insuperable restrictions were to be imposed upon the Egyptian, the only man who might perhaps still have restored health to the sultan's dominions, Russia's protectorate on the Bosphorus was

safeguarded for several years to come, and everything that St. Petersburg desired for the moment was secured. The court of Berlin, maintaining the reserve that invariably characterised its policy in the near east, did not formally participate in this treaty, but gave it cordial approval, for Ancillon saw no better than Metternich the real purport of the new friendship between the sultan and the czar. When the western powers, enlightened at length as to the situation, lodged protests in St. Petersburg against the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi, these protests were loftily disregarded. The Prussian minister expressed his cordial gratification "at the dignified and victorious answer. . . . The two powers," he continued, "have deserved a lesson, for they interfere in matters with which they have no concern." [1] In all good faith, like Metternich, Ancillon assured the western powers that Russia's motives were entirely unselfish, and that Russia did not mean to carry the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi into effect. Simultaneously, he poured forth commiserating expressions regarding the Grand Turk's fragile state of health, being the first to employ the cognomen of "the sick man."

Russia could record an additional success in a treaty dealing with Poland, signed in Münchengrätz by Austria, and signed shortly afterwards (October 16th) by Prussia. During the Polish rebellion Nicholas had thought at one time of ceding to his allies as unworthy of Russian rule the disloyal land westward of the Vistula. Nothing more was now heard of these sentimental outbursts. The czar wished to retain a firm hold of his possessions, and Metternich subserviently prohibited the secret privileges which Archduke Ferdinand of Este had hitherto accorded in Galicia to the more distinguished among the Polish refugees.[2] Russia demanded that the three powers should renew mutual guarantees for their Polish possessions, that they should pledge themselves to reciprocal assistance in the event of rebellion, that they should undertake to extradite Poles accused of high treason, and that they should subject participators in the last revolt to strict supervision. At the present juncture, and for some years at least, the treaty had the excuse of necessity, for all the partitioning powers were menaced by the Polish conspirators' intrigues. But in the long run this agreement would advantage the Muscovites alone, for in intercourse between nations the more

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Schöler, November 27, 1833.
[2] Maltzahn's Report, April 28, 1833.

primitive state almost always has the advantage, and that mutuality of rights and duties which is the essential precondition of international law can rarely be maintained between states at a different level of civilisation. No Prussian accused of high treason had ever yet sought asylum in the freer atmosphere of Russia. Consequently, the duty of extradition devolved solely upon the German powers, both of which therefore appeared to the world to be the servile tools of Russia.

More highly than all these things did the czar wish that the eastern powers should take action against the bourgeois monarchy, and this desire of his heart was one which Metternich was also willing to fulfil. Emperor Francis was all the more incensed on account of the misdemeanours of the Parisian propagandists because Louis Philippe had just appealed to Metternich for assistance against the numerous legitimists who assembled in Austria round the person of the expelled King Charles. It was an open secret that the malcontents of all countries could count upon the tacit support of the western powers. Large numbers of demagogues were travelling about the continent under false names, furnished with English passports. At the minor courts, several diplomats of Palmerston's school, and notably the hotheaded Lord Minto, were rallying centres for the opposition parties. If the eastern powers were to take open action against such disturbances of the peace, doing so in the first instance by a joint protest at Paris, they would be acting well within their rights, and would be adopting a course whose justice not even France could dispute. But how could this protest be suitably associated with the declaration made in Schwedt against the non-intervention doctrine of the July monarchy? Nicholas forgot, or chose to forget, that he had said not a word to his father-in-law about a formal treaty. Feeling freer among the Austrians, he demanded the issue of a solemn manifesto which, like the Troppau circular despatch, was to announce to the world the saving doctrine of the right of intervention. What did it concern him, in his blind passion, that since the days of the Troppau congress the world had undergone a radical transformation, and that he and his associates had not to deal with weakly Naples, but were confronted by the fanatical war lust of revolutionary France? Metternich, however, supported the insane proposal. His fear of the Italian revolution, and his ardent desire to win the czar completely over to his

side, had led him utterly to forget his wonted caution. "The condition of Europe is intolerable; we must bring this state of things to an end," he said to the Russians, although he had no serious desire for war.

A formal treaty was now discussed. The three powers were to make open profession of the principle of intervention, declaring themselves "ready at any time to devote their united forces to sustaining rightful intervention." This treaty was to be jointly laid before the French court, and in curt and masterful terms the wish was to be expressed "that all the other governments would henceforward accept these principles for the guidance of their conduct." It was impossible that Nicholas should expect such an agreement to secure any immediate gain for Russia. He knew that at this epoch Turkey was not yet considered to belong to the region within which European international law was valid, and that for this reason his allies could not intend their doctrine of intervention to be applied in Russia's favour in the east.[1] Consequently, the only aim of the treaty was to issue a menace against France, and one which in the existing posture of affairs could not fail to function as a deliberate provocation. If the bourgeois monarchy, aware of its own weakness, had formulated a futile revolutionary doctrine, there was certainly no occasion to counter this demonstration by proclaiming in an offensive form a no less futile legitimist dogma. Should the Münchengrätz treaty, as drafted, become known in Paris, the Orleans ruler would find it extremely difficult to hold the warlike passions of the radicals any longer in leash. War would probably ensue, and this war would be waged, not in order to decide a dispute concerning the real relationships of power, but simply on behalf of the empty catchwords of the revolution and of legitimacy. Who can tell whether the narrow intelligence of Nicholas foresaw all these consequences? However this may have been, the czar had attained his immediate end, and returned home well content without revisiting Prussian territory. His entire journey had lasted no more than four weeks, and from first to last its course showed that it had not originated in any clear statesmanlike calculation, but was solely the outcome of a despot's caprice. The Austrians rejoiced exceedingly at the reestablishment of friendship between the

[1] This is expressly stated by Ancillon (Instruction to Schöler, January 12, 1834).

two imperial courts, and even after the lapse of many years Metternich wrote that to Emperor Francis these days of Münchengrätz were among the most cherished recollections of his long life.

But was the king of Prussia to endure that his allies should conclude treaties without consulting him, and in manifest contradiction with the Schwedt conversations? Was he to collaborate in conjuring up a war by means of vain threats, a war whose consequences were nowhere better understood than in Berlin? General Schöler was extremely well informed regarding the state of the renowned Russian army. Again and again he reported to his court the ill feeling that prevailed among the officers on account of the czar's terrible severities, on account of the excessive routinism of the service, on account of the immoderate multiplication of disciplinary punishments. Should war break out it was unquestionable that the Prussian army would be more adequately manned, more fully animated by a fighting spirit, better prepared, and more enduring than the Russian.[1] The imperial powers seemed to be aware how unreasonable was the claim they were making upon the king, and for this reason, in order to secure Prussia's assent, they sent to Berlin two of their ablest diplomats, Nesselrode and Ficquelmont. Ancillon received the envoys coldly. The Münchengrätz treaty had been utterly unexpected by the king, and threatened to affect the future of the three powers, nay, the future of Europe, so seriously, that the most detailed consideration seemed desirable.[2] The Berlin negotiations lasted three weeks. Metternich was consumed with impatience. To his intimates, he raged once more against Prussia's cowardice, describing the state which had just demonstrated its energy by establishing the customs union, as a pitiful abortion, a juste milieu between the powers of the first rank and those of the second.[3]

The Prussian minister did not allow himself to be swayed. The king and Bernstorff stood behind him, and his own love of peace fortified his courage. He compelled the Austrian negotiators to expunge the three most formidable articles from the Münchengrätz treaty. What was left, signed at length on October 15th, still sounded foolish enough, but no longer

[1] Schöler's Report, December 28, 1833, and subsequent dates.

[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Brockhausen, September 26; Instruction to the embassies, October 14, 1833.

[3] Brockhausen's Reports, October 1, 9, and 19, 1833.

had the tenour of a manifest threat. The three powers recognised that in case of dangers menacing at home or from abroad every sovereign was entitled to appeal for help to another sovereign, and that in such a case no third power had any right to hinder the intervention. They further declared that when any one of themselves should have been asked to intervene, and should on account of such intervention have been attacked by a third state, all the allies must make the cause of the attacked power their own. The principle thus formulated was less hopelessly unreasonable than the French doctrine of non-intervention, but just as little was it unimpeachable, for if every sovereign state were to be entitled upon its own free judgment to render help to a neighbour, it logically followed that every other sovereign had an equal right to counteract this intervention. Nevertheless, Prussia had blunted the edge of the dangerous enterprise, and the czar's undertaking, conceived in so much passion, became dissipated in doctrinaire disquisitions concerning future eventualities. Moreover, upon Prussia's demand, the three powers mutually pledged one another that for the time being the treaty should be kept a profound secret. Their envoys in Paris, when protesting against the propaganda, were to refer to the principle of the right of intervention upon which the eastern powers had agreed, but without making any reference to the actual treaty. This seemed to remove the danger of war, and all that it was needful to anticipate was a lively academic discussion with the Paris foreign office.

Nicholas put a good face upon his discomfiture, repeatedly declaring his "delight" with the Berlin discussions.[1] Meanwhile Prussia had had fresh experience of the value of Russian pledges. The secret treaty had hardly been signed when, on October 16th, Nesselrode sent from Berlin a circular despatch to the embassies at the minor courts, quite unconcernedly communicating all the essential details of the recent proceedings, concluding with the assurance, "the principle of intervention is in conformity with the interests of all legitimist governments."[2] It was manifest that this premature announcement, which could not possibly be kept secret, was designed by Russia to accentuate the dispute and to irritate the French court.

[1] Ancillon to Schöler, November 7, 1833, and subsequent dates.

[2] Nesselrode, Circular Despatch to the embassies in Dresden, Munich, Turin, etc., October 4/16, 1833.

On October 30th, when von Hügel, Austrian chargé d'affaires, visited the Duc de Broglie, in order to communicate to the minister what had been agreed upon in Berlin, he found the Frenchman primed, and extremely reserved. De Broglie curtly declared that his king could not tolerate intervention in Switzerland or in Belgium—and this was self-evident, seeing that both countries were recognised as neutral. But on the following day a ministerial council was held, and Louis Philippe decided that the bow must not be overstrung. Consequently on November 1st Pozzo di Borgo and Werther secured a much more friendly reception, the Prussian, indeed, being welcomed quite cordially. De Broglie promised to do everything he could to check the misconduct of the refugees' clubs, and raised no more than trifling objections to the allies' doctrine of intervention.[1]

Thus the great diplomatic drama seemed to end in a flood of unmeaning phrases. Unfortunately, however, there was an odious sequel. De Broglie was unable to refrain from issuing a circular to the embassies wherein the three interviews were described with doctrinaire complacency. The arrogant language of this document could not fail to wound. Every nation has its natural faults. Among the Teutons doctrinairism may be associated with innocent good-nature, but among the Latins doctrinairism invariably degenerates into an intolerable pose of impeccability. Still worse was it that the self-righteous Frenchman did not shrink from deliberate untruths. He insisted that he had said France's refusal to tolerate intervention extended also to Piedmont. The three envoys unanimously denied this, and there now began a prolonged and repulsive personal quarrel, even the benignant Ancillon accusing the Frenchman of duplicity and weakness of character.[2] The upshot was that for a considerable time the relations between east and west were extremely strained. The statesmen of the Tuileries had again much to say about the natural alliance with the smaller neighbouring states, and could not understand why neither the German princes nor the strictly legitimist Charles Albert of Piedmont yearned to be under a French protectorate. Even Palmerston felt injured, speaking of the conduct of the three powers as a campaign

[1] Pozzo di Borgo's Report, October 21/November 2; Ancillon, Circular Despatch to the embassies, November 19, 1833.

Ancillon, Instructions to Schöler, December 8 and 22, 1833.

against the constitutionalist states; and in his private despatches he permitted himself the use of a number of coarse and ill-bred phrases which, speedily made public, aroused further ill-feeling. But in Vienna and St. Petersburg there prevailed before long a half unwilling recognition that Prussia's moderation had saved the world from a serious danger.

§ 5. FURTHER MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES IN VIENNA, 1834.

The European policy of the two imperial powers was vigorously and persistently resisted by the court of Berlin, but in the struggle against the German revolution Prussia cooperated cordially with Austria. The storming of the main guard at Frankfort and all that subsequently transpired as to the plans of the radicals filled the courts with dismay. When the conspiracy among the soldiers at Ludwigsburg came to light, King William of Würtemberg felt as if the ground were sinking beneath his feet, for he had always reposed absolute confidence in the loyalty of his troops. In the first outburst of anxiety, dreading a general rebellion in South Germany, he turned to Vienna for aid. Thereupon, in May, 1833, Prince Lichnowsky confidentially informed the courts of Stuttgart and Carlsruhe that an Austrian corps would be held ready on the western frontier, to protect in case of need the order of the German south.[1] But this step would be taken only in the last resort. Metternich hoped that gentler means would suffice, and sent the king an instructive memorial, wherein he alluded to the possibility of "a wholesome reform" in the territorial constitutions, even elaborating a new metaphor. Plague and cancer having become something musty, the concerned political physician on this occasion compared the revolution with influenza.

The courts soon learned that the imperial chancellor was meditating a fresh and important coup in federal policy. In July, when he visited his castle of Königswart, a stately troop of aspiring diplomats waited upon him, some desiring to hearken to his words of counsel, others wishful to lay before the minister

[1] Maltzahn's Reports, April 28 and May 28; Salviati's Reports, June 13 and 22, 1833.

their own proposals for Germany's salvation. Among the guests was Blittersdorff, who wrote a memorial to show that the Bundestag must henceforward assume leadership of the struggle against "the constitutionalist principle," that its policy must everywhere be more active, in European as well as in purely German affairs, and that consequently, to enable the nation to understand the central authority, the federal proceedings must in part be made public. But the Austrian knew only too well the capacities of the Frankfort assembly. Hoping to attain his end by passing over the Bundestag, he recommended, when meeting Ancillon at Teplitz in August, the summoning of a fresh ministerial conference, after the model of those held in Carlsbad and Vienna. The Prussian minister now gladly acceded to a proposal which his predecessor two years earlier had decisively rejected, for he, too, had been profoundly alarmed by the follies of the radicals in Hambach and Frankfort. But Ancillon held fast to Bernstorff's principle that there was no occasion for new federal laws, and that nothing more was requisite than an understanding for the vigorous enforcement of the laws already in existence.

The two statesmen cooperated in drafting a circular despatch to the German courts, and this was at once sent by Ancillon, on August 24th, whereas Metternich held it up until October 5th, after the Münchengrätz meeting. The circular invited the leading ministers of the larger federal states to meet in conference in order to avert "the ever more menacing evils of the time," definitely expressing the opinion that the suitable application of existing federal laws would suffice to secure this end. Directly the issue of the invitation became known, the liberals once more scented St. Petersburg intrigues, whilst Palmerston, who was himself at this very time inciting the Frankfort senate against the Bundestag, had the facile impudence to assert that these German ministerial conferences were the work of Russia quite as much as of Austria. It is certainly possible that in Münchengrätz Metternich discussed his plans with the czar, and his striking delay in the despatch of the circular may seem to confirm this supposition; but Prussia's invitation was sent out before Nicholas set foot on German soil. Moreover, Russian diplomacy took no part, however indirect, in the work of the conferences, and not until the close of the deliberations

did the czar receive a report of the proceedings—a report which was naturally furnished in view of the friendly relationships existing between the courts.[1] Obviously the proposed ministerial meeting was to be mainly directed against the diets, although the universities and the newspapers, those other favourites of the Hofburg, were again to receive their share of attention. Since the latest revolutionary conspiracies had been initiated almost exclusively in constitutionalist Germany, Metternich inferred that they were rooted in the representative system, and he hoped that the formulation of a joint policy would enable the courts, seeing that the new constitutions were now irrevocable, at least to restrict the efficiency of these.

The minor constitutionalist governments saw through the plan, and were again thrown into a state of hopeless perplexity. One and all desired protection against their diets, but most of them shrank from infringing their oaths to the constitution, and they were unwilling to permit their sovereignty to be limited by the Federation. Anxiety was all the more general since no definite information could be secured as to the aim of the conference. Enquiries to this effect received the same answer from Vienna and from Berlin, "This is what we want you to tell us." The ministers of the constitutionalist states were to formulate their grievances against the representative system, and discussions would thereupon ensue as to the provision of a remedy. In the autumn, when Lindenau, the Saxon minister, visited the courts of Munich and of Stuttgart on business of the customs union, he took the opportunity of making confidential enquiries as to what could be done at the conferences to protect the territorial constitutions. But no agreement could be reached, for views concerning the insoluble riddles of the federal law, and above all concerning the proper limits of federal authority, were too widely divergent, and the best consolation available was the tacit but agreeable expectation that a really effective resolution could never be secured in the Germanic Federation. Stralenheim, the Hanoverian federal envoy, frankly expressed this hope in the name of his well-meaning government. If the lesser states would only avoid irritating the great powers, and would content themselves with "dilatory methods," the territorial constitutions would remain unaffected, and the new ministerial assembly at

[1] Brockhausen's Report, June 17, 1843 with Marginal Note by the king.

Vienna would be no less sterile than the one held in the year 1820.[1]

In Metternich's view it had become necessary to make sure at least of the sentiments prevailing at the court of Munich, which had so often by its reserves put obstacles in the way of Austrian federal policy. Once more, as had happened nine years earlier, when the Carlsbad decrees had been extended, he had the good fortune to secure personal audience of the king of Bavaria. His reception by King Louis at Lenz in October was friendly. The king was still greatly incensed against his stiff-necked diet, and expressed his willingness to strengthen "the monarchical principle" in the territorial constitutions; but, like Prussia, he thought it would be preferable to hold the conference in Prague or Linz rather than in Vienna.[2] The chancellor, however, could not absent himself from his duties in Vienna for so long a time, and thus it happened that in January, 1834, Emperor Francis had the pleasure of entertaining at the Hofburg the leading statesmen of Germany, who visited him just as if he had been their emperor, coming as representatives of the seventeen votes of the inner council. The times were no longer suitable for a lighthearted reactionary coup d'état after the Carlsbad manner. All that Metternich had been able to secure in Linz was an understanding as to conservative commonplaces. He had no definite plan, his aim merely being, without any clear insight as to ways and means, to restrict the sinister powers of the petty diets. It was inevitable therefore that inertia, particularism, and loyalty to the constitution should speedily deprive his undertaking of its sting.

On this occasion the grouping of parties differed from that which had obtained at the first Vienna conference fourteen years earlier. As far as Metternich was concerned, the reverses of recent years, as soon as he had overcome his first alarm, far from disposing him to give way, had served only to feed his self-complacency. Everything had been foreseen by him, everything had turned out as he had prophesied. Petrified in arrogance, he looked down upon the little mortals at his feet, and when Varnhagen did him servile obeisance the chancellor declared: "I am the man of truth, and during the last five-and-twenty years I have done nothing that I

[1] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, November 21; Blittersdorff's Report, November 21, 1833.

[2] Dönhoff's Report, Munich, December 2, 1833.

have had occasion to regret." So firmly settled was he now in his office as to consider it quite impossible that he would ever have to relinquish it. Behind the scenes, his third wife, Countess Melanie Zichy, had acquired a great influence over the aging statesman. A young and impassioned woman, she made no secret of her strongly legitimist inclinations, and her offensive attitude towards the French envoy was at times embarrassing even to her husband. She idolised Clemens, regarding him as the saviour of the world, going so far as to discover what no other human being had hitherto perceived, a striking mental kinship between her spouse and the apostle Paul. Under the guidance of these gentle hands, Metternich had imperceptibly drawn closer to the clericalist standpoint. He now thought with pride of his ancestor Lothar, Elector of Treves, one of the collaborators in the foundation of the Catholic league, and it gave him pleasure to recall all the other ecclesiastical memories of his ancient canonical family. Although he could never entirely lay aside the secular outlook of his eighteenth century upbringing, it was now entirely to his satisfaction that Gentz the Kantian should be replaced by Jarcke the renegade as the man who held sway among the publicists of the Hofburg. As these ultra-conservative leanings grew stronger, he visibly discarded that captivating amiability of manner to which he had been so greatly indebted for his earlier diplomatic successes. An elderly man, hard of hearing, impervious to all new impressions, ever reiterating the same stock of ideas in the dictatorial manner of a schoolmaster, he nonplussed all the novices by his ceremonious dignity, and no one ventured to contest his reputation as the Nestor of European diplomacy. Seldom, however, was it possible to him to win over or to persuade.

Of all the members of the conference, Ancillon stood nearest to the Hofburg. How proud did he feel when he first entered the assembly and could unctuously exclaim: "The eyes of Germany and the eyes of all Europe are upon us." He was received with general respect, for upon his blameless head there had fallen a reflection from the latest brilliant success of Prussian policy, the establishment of the customs union. He spent no more than six weeks in Vienna, being summoned home by official duties. For the remaining four months, since Berlin did not venture to send Eichhorn, so greatly detested by the Hofburg, his place was taken by Privy Councillor

Count Alvensleben, an able jurist and a moderate conservative, but a declared adherent of the Austrian faction and for this reason recommended by Wittgenstein to the king.[1] The choice was unfortunate, for as an official of the second rank, strictly bound by his instructions, Alvensleben could not venture to take an independent stand against Metternich such as Bernstorff had taken in earlier days. In other respects Prussia's attitude was influenced by an almost unavoidable tragic destiny. Just as of old the Hohenstaufens, embarrassed by their situation between the Roman curia and the luxuriant growth of German territorial authorities, had been compelled to favour the order of princes as against the towns, so now had the Hohenzollerns to fight liberalism. The Prussian court, acting in this against Russia's wishes, desired to continue its reasonable policy on behalf of the peace of Europe, but was loath to endanger the indispensable league of the eastern powers. Prussia, moreover, acting here in opposition to the will of Austria, desired to favour the practical unity of Germany and to maintain the customs union, without destroying the Germanic Federation which for the nonce was no less indispensable. But how could Prussia fulfil this doubly difficult task, without, in these pitiful negotiations, making certain concessions to the federal policy of the Viennese court, a policy that had now degenerated to the level of mere police measures? No support was to be secured from among the liberals, who were hostile to the customs union, and were friends of Poland. In short, Alvensleben usually followed suit to Metternich and Münch, the presidential envoy being the sole representative of the Bundestag at the conferences. The spokesman of Prussia only refused cooperation in any manifest infringement of the constitutions, and whilst in Metternich's eyes publicity of the proceedings of the diets must be absolutely rejected, in Alvensleben's view no more than a restriction of publicity was expedient, seeing that the right to publicity had been conceded in the new fundamental laws.[2]

Among the ministers of the lesser states, du Thil distinguished himself by monarchical zeal. Greatly irritated by the presumption of the last diet, he had compiled an abstract of the more outrageous utterances of the deputies in Darmstadt, and hoped that the conference would pronounce

[1] Frankenberg's Report, January 1, 1834.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Alvensleben, January 27, 1834.

a formal condemnation upon this syllabus of liberal heresies. The Danish minister Reventlow-Criminil was also a man whose views were no less strongly conservative than those of Pechlin, the federal envoy, and of King Frederick VI himself. When, during the Vienna conference, the new Danish provincial diets began to exercise their extremely restricted functions, the Copenhagen court thought it expedient to give an express assurance to the German powers, which ran as follows: "His majesty is definitely determined to maintain the monarchical principle intact in all respects, and he will abandon no jot of the privileges of the crown, whether as concerns legislative authority or as concerns the right of supply. Accordingly he has put obstacles in the way of those who cherish designs for the limitation of sovereign powers, designs so dangerously characteristic of our time, and so menacing to the repose of the nations." [1] Minister von Berg unhesitatingly followed in the footsteps of the representative of the friendly Danish court, for Oldenburg had as yet no constitution. Metternich could always count upon his oldtime intimate, Plessen of Mecklenburg; and even Burgomaster Smidt from Bremen now adhered to the Austrian party, because the commercial policy of the Hansa towns was still guided by the hope that with the aid of the Hofburg it would be possible to destroy the developing Prussian customs union. For similar reasons, in order to court the favour of the great powers in the Belgian affair, Verstolk van Svelen, representative of Luxemburg, followed the banner of Austria—for what did this Dutchman care about German constitutional questions? [2]

These eight conservative voices were confronted by a majority composed of nine constitutionalists, a motley crowd, united only in one resolve, to avoid anything which might lead to an impeachment of ministers when they returned home. The leader of this group was Bavaria, represented at first by Gise, Bavarian interests being subsequently and most skilfully advocated by Minister von Mieg. Both these statesmen had been commanded to report to their king in profound secrecy and unknown to the ministerial council; their specific instructions were to safeguard the independence of the Bavarian "realm" against any encroachment.[3] Reizenstein, from Baden,

[1] Circular Despatch concerning the new estates, issued by the Danish minister for foreign affairs, May 27, 1834.

[2] Du Thil to Prince Emilius of Hesse, January 18 and February 7, 1834.

[3] Dönhoff's Report, February 6, 1834.

was somewhat more guarded in his defence of the territorial constitutions, being often in conflict with his old opponent du Thil—for the longstanding neighbourliness between the Badenese and the Hessians found expression in these disputes.[1] Minckwitz, from Saxony, and Beroldingen, from Würtemberg, although their personal views inclined towards those of Metternich, usually followed the lead of Reizenstein; and the same could be said of Ompteda from Hanover, Trott from Electoral Hesse, and von Strauch who represented the pygmies. It need hardly be said that Fritsch, the brilliant Thuringian, Metternich's antagonist of Carlsbad days, was not missing from this circle. Nor could the Hofburg count any longer upon the ever faithful Nassau, for Marschall had just died, and for the time being Ompteda disposed of the curiate vote of Nassau and Brunswick. Confidential discussions went on about the design for a sonderbund of constitutionalist states, but these were naturally fruitless, for the only real agreement that could be secured was upon a policy of timid negation.

With the parties in a condition of such equilibrium it was from the first inevitable that the conference would prove sterile. On January 13th Metternich opened the proceedings, declaring in an emotional address that the Federation had been formed fourteen years earlier and that the present question was to maintain its existence. There followed the familiar and blood-curdling picture of German conditions: "From the storms of the time a party has sprung, whose audacity has been increased to an arrogant extreme, if not by general acceptance of its aims, at least by yielding ground before it. Unless a dam of safety be speedily opposed to the stream that is overflowing its banks, it may well happen before long that in the hands of many of the rulers even the shadow of monarchical authority will be dissipated." Between the monarchical principle of the federal constitution and the modern idea of popular sovereignty incorporated in the forms of the representative system, there was a cleavage which must be done away with. Hence it was necessary to give a plain answer to the question, "What, in view of the dangers of the time, the Federation is to expect in the future from the German governments, and what the governments are to expect from the Federation." Thus Austria made no proposal, but merely propounded a question. To discover the difficult

[1] Alvensleben's Report, February 11, 1834.

answer for three and a half months the congress continued to bury itself in the obscurity of its sittings in committee. So strictly was secrecy preserved that even the envoys accredited to Vienna by the German courts learned nothing about the ministers' deliberations. Each one of the seventeen plenipotentiaries received but a single manuscript copy of the protocols, a second impression being despatched to every German cabinet.

When the conference held its second sitting on March 26th, the committees were able to furnish no more than scanty details concerning their profoundly confidential labours, and it was not until after further and extremely arduous discussions that agreement was secured as to twenty-seven articles dealing with the diets. In conflict with the primary intention, the view now gained acceptance that it would be impossible to get on without new federal laws, and in order to put an end at length to the eternal disputes about the interpretation of the territorial constitutions and about the delimitation of the rights of the estates, it was decided to establish a federal court of arbitration. Each of the seventeen voices of the inner council was to appoint two nominees, and from among these, when necessity arose, each of the contending parties was to choose three judges, while the Bundestag was to select a president. It was the first occasion upon which the Germanic Federation had screwed itself up to the inauguration of any permanent federal authority. But in this plan, obviously well-intentioned, and elaborated by Alvensleben with extreme diligence, there was a fatal defect. Since the nominees were appointed by the governments alone, the governments alone were entitled to demand from the Bundestag the summoning of the federal court of arbitration, and the most that the diets could do was to request that it should be called. In view of the state of public opinion, it was inevitable that the new tribunal should be considered essentially partisan, designed only to protect the crowns against the diets, and not likewise to protect the constitutions against the sovereigns. To the general surprise, Bavaria, which had hitherto invariably contested all extensions of federal jurisdiction, now went to the length of demanding the constitution of a second federal court of arbitration to deal with disputes between the federal states. But particularist obstinacy proved too strong, and all that could be secured was the comparatively unmeaning decision

that the members of the Federation were to have the option of bringing their neighbourly disputes for settlement before the first-mentioned federal court of arbitration.

Next came decisions concerning the rights of the estates, some reasonable, others arbitrary, but all distinguished by that obscurity of form which was ever characteristic of federal legislation, all saying either too much or nothing at all. The reason for this was that, since all resolutions had to be unanimous, the advantage invariably lay with the most ambiguous mode of expression. For example, it was stated: "The governments will not concede that the estates shall deliberate and decide concerning the validity of federal decrees." Metternich had desired to issue a direct prohibition to the chambers, saying that they were not allowed to discuss federal affairs at all; but Reizenstein had objected to the chancellor's proposal, although his own government, in a fit of timidity, had quite recently denied this right to the diet.[1] Nor was it possible to agree upon strict service regulations for German officials, such as Metternich had long desired to institute, and all that the conference decided was that officials might not become members of a diet unless granted furlough for the purpose. Just as little was it possible to agree upon an unambiguous prescription concerning civil lists. For some years the ultra-conservative party had adopted the Hallerian doctrine that a sovereign's entire income ought to be derived from landed property, and in Hesse Prince Emilius had actually endeavoured, following the Old Hanoverian example, to secure that the administration of the domains should be entirely severed from the state finances—a course that seemed unreasonable even to du Thil. But since the spirit and the letter of some of the territorial constitutions were absolutely incompatible with such wishes, the assembled ministers rested content with the harmless prophecy: "The sovereigns will endeavour to secure that the civil list shall be based upon the revenue from domains," and so on. Hardly less futile was the decision (in itself well-grounded enough): "Never will the governments concede that soldiers shall have to swear fealty to the constitution." Even the Electoral Hessian minister cheerfully voted for this resolution, for in his opinion such a statement had no retrospective force, and had therefore no bearing upon the swearing of fealty to the constitution

[1] Vide supra, p. 286.

which had already been introduced for Hessian troops. Even the articles dealing with publicity and with freedom of speech in the diets amounted in effect to no more than this, that the governments would be careful to see that the needful restrictions were imposed.

Coming to the right of supply, which to the assembled ministers seemed peculiarly dangerous, all that was ventured was to formulate a few involved propositions which were unmeaning for a conscientious constitutionalist government, whilst one that was unconscientious could easily make use of them as an excuse for a coup d'état. One sentence seemed to say that the estates had no power to declare a completed item of expenditure invalid; but the next sentence left open "the way permitted by the constitution," and thus annulled what had been said before. If no budget were passed, the federal court of arbitration had to intervene; but this, too, was a blow in the air, for who could compel the governments to demand that the Bundestag should summon the court of arbitration? Amid all the pitiable performances of federal legislation, this first section of the Vienna conference decrees was unquestionably the most lamentable. In the aimless medley of amateurish principles there was everywhere betrayed the tacit desire to invalidate the federal constitutions, but there was also manifest a fear lest oaths should be infringed. This playing fast and loose with honesty and good faith was detestable; and, still more, it was a grave political error, at a time when radical passion flamed high, that behind the backs of the diets Germany's princes should endeavour to come to an agreement regarding the interpretation and manipulation of the territorial constitutions they had sworn to maintain. Not one of the constitutionalist ministers could subscribe to these articles with a clear conscience and without unexpressed reserves. Least of all was this possible to the representative of Electoral Hesse, for the constitution of that state was the only one in Germany which was closely akin to the new French Charte, and no interpretative skill could possibly harmonise it with the Vienna decrees.

A second section, comprising ten articles, gave prescriptions dealing with the censorship, stated that a special permit must be obtained for the issue of new newspapers (being herein in absolute conflict with the specifications of the Saxon and of the Electoral Hessian constitutions), and permitted every

state to recensor or to prohibit writings already censored by another member of the Federation. Thus was care taken that no dangerous author should ever slip through the net. The German booksellers, who were at this time petitioning again for protection against literary piracy, were fobbed off by the conference with an unmeaning article vaguely promising assistance in the future. For the time being no remedy was provided for the way in which the Reutlingen pirates, under the aegis of the crown of Würtemberg, robbed the great publishing houses of Leipzig, circulated their stolen goods, through the instrumentality of poor pedlars, from the Rauhe Alb to the lowlands, and regularly settled accounts with these unsuspecting accomplices at the pirates' fair, the celebrated "Eningen Mercantile Congress."

The third section, that which concerned the universities, was based upon the Hanoverian proposal which three years earlier had aroused so much admiration at the Bundestag.[1] Some of Hanover's suggestions were discarded as unduly severe; but what remained was harsh enough. With philistine pedantry the conference endeavoured in seventeen articles to regulate every detail of student life. Travelling, above all, was rendered extremely difficult for students, and Beroldingen of Würtemberg even suggested that the customary academic excursions in the neighbourhood of university towns should be permissible only after special sanction on the part of the authorities. It seemed as if undue conceit were to be forced upon these young fellows. How important must they seem to themselves, when now, after the Frankfort rising, they were actually forbidden for some time to come even to pass the night in the federal city.

One more article followed as an appendix, prohibiting the *Aktenversendung* in criminal cases, the reason being that the faculty of Tübingen had recently passed a very mild sentence upon certain demagogues.[2] Many of the other wishes of the hotspurs of reaction were perforce disregarded, for it would have been impossible to secure a unanimous resolution for the restriction of trial by jury or for similar proposals.

The mediatised, who in South Germany and especially in Baden and Würtemberg had good reason to complain, knocked vainly at the door of the conference. In a petition (February 1, 1834) they demanded the previously promised

[1] Vide supra, p. 324.
[2] Alvensleben's Report, February 14, 1834. See also vol. II, p. 543.

curiate votes at the Bundestag; they asked also for an authentic interpretation of article 14 of the federal act; and finally they pleaded for the establishment of an independent tribunal which was to secure for them the rights guaranteed in that article. Towards these mediatised lords Prussia had never failed to display the magnanimity which well becomes the strong. The crown prince was their loyal patron. He considered it a point of honour to extend the hand of friendship to all the earlier estates of the realm which had been "sacrificed to the violence or avarice of their sometime co-estates." He desired that certain possessions of the mediatised (not the lands newly granted them in compensation, but "those which as far back as German history extends have been ruled by the same house") should be governed "according to our own laws, but as genuine mediatised princedoms, or counties controlled by their own territorial sovereigns acting as feudatories of our crown, and not as subjects."[1] The sober-minded Prussian officialdom would not go this length, being unwilling to agree to the formation of petty states within the state. Nevertheless the royal instruction of May 30, 1820, gave the high nobility of the empire a respected position which was all it could reasonably expect; and although the members of this order had their grievances even in Prussia, they confided on the whole in the justice of the Hohenzollerns.

For these reasons, before the opening of the conference ten of the mediatised princes and counts applied to King Frederick William begging him to support them in a plea which was in truth well justified. The king was not averse, and he returned a friendly answer; but it was impossible for him to give any definite pledge, for the curiate votes promised to the mediatised in the federal act could be accorded solely by a unanimous decision. It might be foreseen with certainty that the mediatised imperial nobles, who at the diets had ever been so rigidly conservative, would vote at the Bundestag on the side of the two great powers. For this very reason, their ancient enemies, the South German middle-sized states, were firmly resolved that the pledge given in the federal act should not be fulfilled.[2] Most unfortunately, too, the fanatical

[1] Separate Opinion of the crown prince attached to the Report of the ministry of state upon the legal position of the mediatised, July, 1824.

[2] Petition of the princes von Hohenlohe, Löwenstein, Leiningen, and others, to King Frederick William, November, 1833; Reply, February 13, 1834; Ancillon, Instruction to Alvensleben, February 13, 1834.

feudalist Prince Constantine Löwenstein was spokesman in Vienna for the members of his order. He did not hesitate to declare that if torture were still extant in the dominions of a mediatised lord, it could not be abolished by any law promulgated by the new territorial sovereign. Through his immoderate pretensions he angered even those ministers who were friendly to his cause. After heated discussions, wherein the old established hatred of Nassau for the mediatised was once again displayed, the conference decided to leave the whole question unsettled, and referred the plaintiffs to the Bundestag. Thus through its own fault and through the faithlessness of the South German states was the old imperial nobility fixed ever more hopelessly in its unnatural and anomalous position.

The upshot of the deliberations was at length comprised in a final protocol of sixty articles. But the breeze of liberalism was already blowing so freshly across the world that the compilers no longer ventured to publish this protocol as the Carlsbad decrees had been published. A few only of the articles were to be announced in Frankfort as federal decrees. The remainder, and above all the dangerous agreement concerning the rights of the diets, were kept secret. But the governments exchanged secret pledges to abide by these secret articles no less inviolably "than if they had been regularly formulated as federal decrees."

At this stage there was imminent danger that the ship would be stranded just before entering port. The court of Munich, to whose wishes the conference had never failed to defer, suddenly raised objections, and Türckheim had good reason for expressing the opinion that behind these objections there lurked "the arrogant principle of isolation, and a concern ascribable rather to timidity than to honest liberalism" [1] For the moment King Louis was content with his new diet; moreover, he thought it would be undignified to subordinate his realm to a formal decree of his federal allies. The most he would do was to enter into a free treaty, and his confidant among the ministers, Prince Wallerstein, who liked to play the liberal, strengthened him in his objection to the federal court of arbitration.[2] Great was the consternation in Vienna. Ancillon considered it necessary to bring his heavy artillery into

[1] Türckheim to Blittersdorff, June 14, 1834.
[2] Dönhoff's Reports, May 31 and June 19, 1834.

action, and sent to Munich a despatch stuffed with flatteries and exhortations. "We were convinced that we had confirmed and had therefore strengthened the unity of Germany. How was it possible to conceive that the prince whom Germany has largely to thank for the magnificent work of the customs union, the prince who has never ceased to regard the customs union as a pledge of harmony and as a new prop of unity, should now weaken this unity or expose it to risks by detaching himself from his federal allies, now, above all, when it is so essential to maintain peace at home and to safeguard independence abroad?" [1] Even before this sermon was read to him, the wayward Wittelsbach ruler had thought better of his decision, and had commanded his representative to sign the final protocol. Nevertheless he made a few trifling conditions in order to impress the conference with due respect for Bavaria. Upon his requisition, several items were modified at the eleventh hour. The articles relating to the press and to the universities were to be valid for six years only; no joint regulations were to be issued to control the activities of the censors; and various other futilities. Now at length, on June 12th, the final protocol was unanimously accepted and signed. Ancillon requested as a special honour that the precious charter should be sent to him in Berlin, that he also might attach his signature to the document. Metternich closed the proceedings with a ceremonious address. In a further despatch the Prussian minister exhorted the Munich cabinet to be instant in the carrying out of what had been decided, and Mieg, the Bavarian, solemnly pledged himself to this course in the concluding sitting.[2]

In Berlin alone was the pitiful issue of these five months' deliberations greeted with any satisfaction. A very modest view prevailed in Prussia regarding the duties of the Federation, now that the policy of a vital German unity had found scope for great activity in the customs union. It seemed enough if the semblance of harmony were maintained between the federal allies, and if serious efforts were made to stem the revolution. The king therefore sent cordial thanks to Metternich, for, despite difference of opinion during recent years, his personal respect for the Austrian statesman was undiminished. In a despatch to the embassies, Ancillon, however, extolled

[1] Ancillon, Instruction to Dönhoff, June 2, 1834.
[2] Ancillon, Instruction to Dönhoff, June 26, 1834.

the splendid success of the conferences. Neither the federal laws nor the constitutions to which the rulers had pledged themselves had been altered; all that had been done was "to prevent the degeneration of existing laws." These things had been happily effected as far as concerned the diets, the press, and the universities, though several of these last seemed to-day nothing better than "nurseries of demagogy and even of rebellion." [1]

The French government, too, ever ill-informed upon German affairs, regarded the Vienna conference as a momentous event. Rigny, the new minister for foreign affairs, in a despatch and in personal interviews, endeavoured to warn the diplomatists of the middle-sized states against the tyranny of the great powers, asking how monarchs whose sovereignty was guaranteed by France could voluntarily submit themselves to a foreign "subaltern jurisdiction?" [2] The warning fell upon deaf ears. The minor crowns were well aware that the activities in Vienna had been a mere semblance. The Bundestag had to agree to publish as a federal law the article concerning the federal court of arbitration (October 30, 1834). But this tribunal, so pompously trumpeted by all the official journals, never assembled down to the year 1848, for the constitutionalist princes one and all preferred to wash their dirty linen at home instead of appealing to the suspect arbitration of the Federation; and when on one occasion the Electoral Hessian estates requested the summoning of the court, the Bundestag rejected the petition. Subsequently the articles dealing with the universities and with the *Aktenversendung* were promulgated as federal laws. All the rest, as had been settled at Vienna, was kept profoundly secret, and the envoys in Frankfort were loud in their complaints of the scandalous way in which pressure had again been exercised upon the Bundestag. It was inevitable that the nation should consider this impenetrable secrecy a sign of an uneasy conscience, and ridiculous fables were current as to the devilries concocted at Vienna. When in the end, after nearly ten years, Welcker published the final protocol, readers, long prepared for the worst, put so evil a construction upon all the articles, not excepting those that were harmless or unmeaning, that a sulphurous aroma, in truth but half deserved, continued to cling to the Vienna conference. Not

[1] Ancillon, Circular Despatch, June 30, 1834.
[2] Jordan's Report, December 6, 1834.

until a generation had elapsed (1865) did F. von Weech make public all the important items in the protocols.

Without exception, the loyal-minded constitutionalist ministers speedily formed a tacit resolution to be somewhat lax in the carrying out of the Vienna agreement. Lindenau frankly told the Prussian envoy in Dresden that the articles issued as federal decrees would be strictly enforced, whilst the others would be put into operation subsequently—if the chambers offered no opposition. But the reactionaries murmured. "Since the Vienna conferences," said the duke of Nassau, "I know that Austria can no longer take the initiative in Germany, and I cut loose from the Austrian system." [1] Many years later, du Thil considered that the ultimate reason for the revolution of 1848 was to be found in the disloyalty of the liberalising ministers who had made the Vienna final protocol a dead letter. Münch-Bellinghausen's judgment was equally gloomy, but less prejudiced. It ran as follows: "The conferences have resulted in no more than a half measure, for the tendency exhibited by Germany since the July revolution has become irresistible." [2]

Such was, in fact, the case. It had been possible to put an end to open revolt; and the demand for freedom of the press, with many other well-grounded claims of the day, had been temporarily shelved. But the new parliamentary political forms were established henceforward in almost all the lesser German states. Despite the timidity of the courts and despite the excesses of the liberals, their foundations could no longer be shaken; and any one thoroughly acquainted with the tenacious vitality of these by no means model constitutions, could not fail to foresee that constitutionalist ideals would ere long gain the victory throughout Germany.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, February 21, 1835.
[2] Blittersdorff's Report, October 27, 1834.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS UNION.

§ I. ADHESION OF ELECTORAL HESSE. THE SPONHEIM NEGOTIATIONS.

RADICAL theories derive the state from the free will of the sovereign people. History teaches us, rather, that in primitive conditions states for the most part come into existence through conquest and subjugation, and in opposition to the will of the majority of the people. Moreover, just as war continues to exhibit its state-constructive energy even in the days when civilisation has become self-conscious, so also is the internal policy of free peoples far from being exclusively determined by the mutations of public opinion. The most momentous political achievement of the epoch now under consideration, one which entirely overshadowed all the petty struggles about constitutional rights, indubitably ran counter to the will of the majority of the Germans. National cooperation was indirect only, and half unconscious, and took place in so far as the angry outbursts of the liberals against the miseries of Germany and in so far as the well-grounded complaints made by the business world to the governments exercised an influence in the right direction. The greatest practical success of the idea of German unity was the work of the very crowns which prosecuted people for displaying the German colours and rejected as a revolutionary heresy the proposal to establish a German Reichstag. Thus inexorably did the reason immanent in events constrain to its service even the unwilling and the short-sighted.

After the death of Motz, the only statesman who had a perfect prevision of the practical consequences of the Prussian commercial union, his friend Maassen, founder of the customs law, became chief financial adviser to the crown. The king could have made no better choice. Maassen excelled his predecessor in point of detailed knowledge. Prudent, just, and

kindly, he was invariably able as a negotiator to preserve the confidence of the suspicious lesser sovereigns. He lacked, it is true, the daring and the comprehensive statesmanship of Motz. He preferred to allow things to happen of themselves, and knew nothing of the ambition that had animated Motz to influence Prussian policy as a whole, though, as the ablest man in the ministry, he saw clearly enough how in the other departments mediocrity was again beginning to make itself comfortably at home. When his faithful collaborator, the ardent Ludwig Kühne, implored him to give some indication of his mental superiority to the other ministers, Maassen would shrug his shoulders and reply that at sixty-one he felt too old.[1] Moreover, the minister for finance had quite enough to do in providing the funds requisite for the extraordinary military preparations, the activities of the foreign office being at this time wholly engaged in dealing with the danger of war and with the disturbances in Germany. This explains why it was that, though the laborious work of bringing about commercial unity never ceased to progress, the forward movement was less rapid for the nonce than might have been anticipated after Motz had successfully incorporated the last enclaves, entered into a customs union with Darmstadt, concluded a commercial treaty with Bavaria and Würtemberg, and practically disposed of the hostile commercial union of the Mid-Germans.

The sequels of the July revolution were advantageous to Prussian commercial policy, suddenly sweeping away all the hindrances which the old system had opposed to the customs union in the North German middle-sized states. By the decline of feudalist anarchy in Saxony and of arbitrary despotism in Hesse, administration in these two territories was more closely assimilated to that of Prussia, so that it was inevitable that an understanding would sooner or later be secured. It was in Electoral Hesse that the rottenness of the old customs system first became plain. Among the causes of the popular movements in the autumn of 1830, economic stress was one of the most considerable. The territorial area comprised 154 square miles (German) while the frontier was 154 miles linear. Contraband was more audacious here than anywhere else on German soil. The smugglers went about in large bands,

[1] In what follows I make considerable use of a transcript of Kühne's Memoirs which Privy Councillor von Jordan has been kind enough to place at my disposal.

and fought with the revenue officers in the open. Whilst the costs of customs administration consumed nearly all the revenue from the import duties, the yield from the lucrative transit dues now began to fall off, for trade was tending to flow along the new Thuringian road. When the disturbances broke out, all the revenue officers in the Hanau and Fulda districts forsook their posts; large quantities of foreign goods were imported duty free, and Meyerfeld, the federal envoy, told the Bundestag that the government could not possibly venture to reestablish the custom houses.[1] Blittersdorff wrote with disgust: "'Customs' may readily become a watchword of rebellion throughout Germany."

Yet how could Electoral Hesse escape from its intolerable situation? The government was bound by twofold obligations, those to the Mid-German customs union, and those involved by the Eimbeck treaty.[2] The former was in its death agony; the latter was no more than a draft, and could do nothing to relieve the troubles of the country. Prolonged hesitation ensued. As late as the autumn of 1830 Privy Councillor Meisterlin, one of the originators of the Eimbeck treaty, wrote an address to the estates rejecting the idea of entering the Prussian customs system, on the ground that Hessian industries would be unable to endure the competition of the Rhenish manufacturers. The elector's long standing dislike for Prussia had not been overcome, and he had an objection to breaking his twofold obligations without adequate excuse. He desired, in common doubtless with most men in the country, a customs union for all Germany, which would have per se put an end to the sonderbunds. Meyerfeld was instructed to address confidential enquiries in this sense to Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian federal envoy. But the Munich cabinet was now acquainted with the commercial designs and the methods of the court of Berlin. Consequently Count Armansperg sagaciously instructed Lerchenfeld to the effect that he should cautiously endeavour to give the affair such a direction as to enable it to be settled in Berlin under Prussia's leadership.[3] Nevertheless the elector was still loath to treat with detested Prussia and with the cousin in Darmstadt whom he had so grossly offended. Even in the following spring Meyerfeld

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, October 7, 1830.
[2] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 529.
[3] Armansperg, Instruction to Lerchenfeld, October 29, 1830.

was commissioned to propose at the Bundestag the amalgamation of all the German customs unions, but Nagler assured him that Prussia would never consent to so utopian a proposal.[1]

Meanwhile Motz, a relative of the late Prussian minister, had become Hessian minister for finance. The anarchy in customs' affairs was intolerable; the commissaries of the Eimbeck union, now sitting in Hanover, could not come to an agreement. Motz and his trusty colleague Schenk von Schweinsberg at length succeeded in inducing the elector to send Privy Councillors Ries and Meisterlin to Berlin in June in order to enter into a customs union simultaneously with Prussia-Darmstadt and Bavaria-Würtemberg. Eichhorn, however, was absolutely firm in his assurance to the two plenipotentiaries that Prussia must abide by her old principle, and that negotiations with several states at once offered no prospect of success. It was vain for the elector to kick against the pricks. He was compelled to comply with the demands of the court of Berlin and to treat with Prussia-Darmstadt alone. Ludwig Kühne was commissioned by Maassen to conduct negotiations. The homely little man showed himself in this affair, as subsequently in everything he did for the customs union, to be a masterly diplomatist. He developed his proposals clearly, succinctly, with outstanding knowledge of the subject, and with straightforward good will. But when he was opposed by the stupid mistrust of the petty-minded, his sharp little eyes would sparkle, and with incisive sarcasm he would sweep all subterfuges off the board. When the Prussian asked whether Electoral Hesse were not still bound by the Mid-German commercial treaties, the Hessian negotiators would give no answer, for they had uneasy consciences. This sore point, therefore, was tacitly passed over.[2] The Electoral Hessians urgently desired haste, for they were afraid of a fresh gyration at their own court, where Austria and England-Hanover had every possible influence at work. Moreover, alarmed by the approaching cholera, they wished to depart as soon as possible from the inimical soil of Berlin. Everything was ready by August 29th. In order to do honour to the king of Bavaria, who was so friendly to the customs union, the treaty was antedated August 25th, the feast day of St. Louis. Electoral Hesse entered the Prussian customs system on essentially the same terms as Darmstadt. The old elector

[1] Nagler's Report, April 24, 1831. [2] Kühne's Memoirs.

suffered this humiliation a few days before handing over the reins of government to his son. In Berlin seven years earlier the Prussian statesmen had been willing to grant an enhanced revenue to Electoral Hesse; but now the electoral princedom had lost its transit trade, and by error heaped upon error had forfeited all claim to preferential treatment. Hesse had to content herself with a revenue from the customs proportional to her population.

For Electoral Hesse this treaty was a political necessity for it saved the land from nameless misery. Even the Cassel diet did not venture to raise any objection, although Sylvester Jordan bitterly complained that indirect taxation was now removed from the control of the diet, and that the absolutist Prussian crown had acquired power over free Hesse.[1] It is true that the Mid-German allies uttered threats and noisy complaints. There was good reason for these, seeing that Electoral Hesse had rudely renounced her treaty obligations without any serious attempt to come to an arrangement with her sometime allies. The gain to Prussia, on the other hand, was obvious. Just as the Gotha-Meiningen road had safeguarded trade with the South German union, so now the long desired connection between east and west had been established, and the Mid-German union had been broken through in a second place. Whilst in Thuringia the duty free Prussian road was a danger to the Mid-German allies, Electoral Hesse had to introduce the higher transit dues of the Prussian tariff. In response to urgent representations from Bavaria, Prussia soon reduced these Hessian dues by one half. A further reduction was impracticable for the present. The Mid-German allies, and especially the Frankfort merchants, were to be made to feel their dependence upon Prussia, and by wholesome pressure were to be strengthened in their now commencing conversion.

The Mid-German commercial union was annihilated by the secession of Electoral Hesse. Less quickly did liberalism abandon the use of its favourite phrases. In Bavaria, Siebenpfeiffer declaimed against the customs, which should have been turned to the popular advantage but had become the enemy of the people. In Baden, Stromeyer wrote a clamorous article in the dreaded newspaper *Rheinbayern*, which may be summarised as follows: "The Prussian aristocrats have the insolence to appeal to national sentiment! In Prussia the inevitable

[1] Hänlein's Report, October 18, 1831.

consequences of the mercantile system prevail, and prevail there with greater intensity than anywhere else in the world. The Mid-German union, on the other hand, represents liberty. Baden, therefore, must cling firmly to her excellent and liberal customs system. Then Würtemberg, whose high political culture approximates her to the exemplary constitutionalist state, will soon join the Badenese system, and her example will be followed by Bavaria, Saxony, and Electoral Hesse!" One of the noblest and most learned representatives of German science splintered a lance on behalf of the dying sonderbund. Johann Friedrich Böhmer wrote his extraordinary booklet, *The Customs System in Germany in the Light of History.* The legitimist of the Holy Empire advocated the bold doctrine that the freedom from dues of the German rivers should extend by rights to the high roads as well. He extolled the Mid-German union as "the latest attempt to safeguard, as far as possible, and at least by treaties, that which was once accepted as a common right and liberty of all Germans." He railed against Prussia as "enemy of the realm and disturber of the public peace." He warned the minor states "how readily annexations follow in the wake of customs unions." He solaced himself with the fine words uttered twelve years earlier by the Austrian presidential envoy, who declared: "The high federal assembly will undertake to foster and develop German commerce!"

The Saxon courts were no longer in a position to content themselves with such whimsies. As Motz had prophesied, their economic needs and the loud complaints of their peoples compelled them to knock humbly at the door in Berlin. The breach of treaties this involved was excused by contemptible legalist artifices. Meiningen maintained that the Mid-German union had been invalidated by the Eimbeck treaty. Treachery being encouraged by treachery, as soon as the little Thuringians began to rat, the Dresden cabinet appealed to an article in the Cassel treaty, in accordance with which areas completely surrounded by territory foreign to the union were not to be subject to the statutes of the union. It was contended that this was the position of Saxony, now that Thuringia had come to terms with Prussia—a manifest sophism, for this clause related solely to remote enclaves. Had the court of Saxony wished to act honourably, it would at once have summoned a new congress of the Mid-German allies, have there proposed the dissolution of the impracticable union, and would not till

then have begun to negotiate with Prussia. But even under the new Lindenau ministry, the old policy of subterfuge, half measures, and mistrust of Prussia was not readily abandoned. The Saxon government imagined that it would more easily be able to carry its wishes into effect in Berlin if it still had in reserve the ghost of the Mid-German union, and for this reason it began to treat with Prussia before it had been discharged from the earlier obligation.

As early as August, 1830, the Dresden cabinet had made tentative enquiries of the South German crowns, but in the end old King Antony had to make up his mind to write direct to the king of Prussia. Declaring that he had long purposed to enter into a commercial union with Prussia, he proceeded as follows: "I shall thus continue to act in the sense of the highly important and beneficent aim whose attainment your majesty has so long desired. It would seem essential to success that these negotiations with Prussia should now be initiated." Lindenau, carrying this autograph letter to Berlin in January, 1831, simultaneously handed in a memorial wherein Saxony expressed the resolve to bring about the dissolution of the Mid German union. "Occasion, purpose, and reason no longer exist for the union. The needs of a disturbed epoch, confidence that the opening of the now suggested negotiations would be the best means of tranquillising public opinion, and the hope, finally, that a union thus embracing the majority of the federal states would exercise upon events in the outside world a favourable influence in the direction of peace," encouraged the Saxon court to make advances to Berlin.[1]

Yet more lamentable was the humiliation of Weimar. Schweitzer, the very minister who for years had been attacking the Prussian customs system as the deadly enemy of German commercial freedom, assured the foreign office, in July, 1830, "that, for the furtherance of the work begun by the king of Prussia, ever more manifestly designed to advantage Germany, for the furtherance, that is to say, of free trade and traffic in the German fatherland, radiating from Prussia, the grand duke of Weimar, in understanding with the kingdom of Saxony, is glad to offer a helping hand." Fritsch, another Weimar minister, then sang the swan song of the sonderbund:

[1] King Antony of Saxony to King Frederick William, December 29, 1830; Lindenau's Memorial concerning Commercial Unity, January 4, 1831.

"It is no longer possible to count upon sufficient time for the development of the union, seeing that the great historical events that have ensued since July 25, 1830, and the consequences of these upon German soil, have rendered far prompter help essential, so that it may be said that evils that were to have been treated as chronic have now become acute. It could only bring harm, it could only entail destruction, if in such circumstances we were to continue to impose restrictions upon one another, to continue to consider ourselves mutually pledged to inaction, in a period which in all public affairs imposes upon us quite other claims. It was impossible to foresee, it was impossible to suspect, in the year 1828, that which the years 1829 and 1830 have brought to pass. The Cassel union was and remains a notable undertaking, and one not devoid of important consequences. History is more likely to do justice to the founders of that union in proportion as at this juncture they show themselves ready and willing to admit that an entirely new epoch has dawned." [1]

Frederick William's answer to the king of Saxony was couched in friendly terms. Declaring himself ready to consider Saxony's proposals, at the same time he gave frank expression to the national aims of his commercial policy, saying: "Although these treaties are invariably concluded with individual states alone, they have not been entered into with an eye to the exclusive interest of those immediately concerned, but have in every case been guided also by the desire that the separate treaties might serve as means to promote freedom of trade throughout Germany." To the Weimar court, the minister for foreign affairs expressed his satisfaction that in the eyes of Weimar, too, Prussia's work was "ever more manifestly designed to advantage Germany." Then, in incisive terms, he reiterated the exhortation issued a hundred times before by Prussia, that the Thuringian states should come to an understanding among themselves, for then only could Prussia treat with them.[2]

These successes served only to strengthen the conviction in Berlin that the tried method of negotiating with individual states was the sole means of attaining the desired goal.

[1] Schweitzer, Despatch to the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1830; Fritsch, Despatch to the Saxon Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 31, 1831.

[2] King Frederick William to King Antony of Saxony, January 24, 1831; Bernstorff to the Ministry of State in Weimar, October 22, 1830.

Bernstorff wrote confidently to the king: "The creation of a general German customs and commercial system, or of any other permanent institution of similar nature, is a task for which the Federation will remain incompetent until it is organised in a manner very different from that which now obtains." After the break up of the Mid-German sonderbund, the path seemed open for the complete amalgamation of the two friendly customs unions of the south and the north. What obstacle was there now, when both parties had a lively sense of the impracticability of existing conditions; when the intervening states were no longer hostile, but desired incorporation into the union; when the fundamental law of the Prusso-Hessian union spontaneously suggested itself as the standard for the larger union? Nevertheless Prussia had again and again to plough her way through the shifting sands blown hither and thither by the desert winds of German particularism. For nearly three years, from 1830 to 1833, Berlin was engaged, with numerous interruptions, in a triple series of laborious negotiations, with Bavario-Würtemberg, with Saxony, and with the Thuringian states, respectively; and the affair would never have been brought to a successful issue had not Prussia, in accordance with the aforesaid principle, been careful to keep the bargainings with the individual groups sharply distinct one from another. The comparison involuntarily occurs to the mind that the German customs union issued from the Prusso-Hessian union amid similar struggles and difficulties to those amid which, at a later date, the German empire arose from the North German Union. The customs union, like the North German Union, encountered its greatest difficulties when the larger middle-sized states, with their firmly rooted and not wholly unjustified particularism, with the abundance of their ostensibly or genuinely divergent interests, came to take part in the negotiations. In Versailles, as forty years earlier in Berlin, the South German crowns behaved at the outset as if they had to do with the construction of an entirely new edifice, as if it had been were no fundamental law already in existence. Only after prolonged and distressing hesitation would they recognise the order already existing in the north—but in proportion as the structure was enlarged was the solidity of its masonry imperilled.

The commercial treaty between Prussia-Hesse and Bavaria-Würtemberg was designed from the first to allow for progressive

expansion. In Munich, however, the ultramontane party began to pull and to gnaw at the new league. The leaders of that party, Schenk, Görres, and Ringseis, were in communication with the Hofburg through Wolff, Austrian secretary to legation; Count Bray, Bavarian envoy in Vienna, was on Metternich's side, and recently Wrede, the old field-marshal, had espoused the same cause. In view of this powerful opposition and of King Louis' incalculable caprices, it seemed to Bernstorff essential to do everything in his power to meet Bavaria's wishes. The first desire of the court of Munich was the entry of Baden into the Bavario-Würtemberg union, for Badenese territory extended like a wedge between the Bavarian Palatinate and the main body of union territory, and under the aegis of the renowned free trade policy of Carlsruhe (which did very little to guard the customs lines on the frontier) a dangerous smuggling traffic flourished in the Black Forest and on the banks of the Rhine. Not until the ailing South German customs union had been reinforced by the accession of Baden, were, in the opinion of King Louis, negotiations to be undertaken as to the complete amalgamation of the unions of the south and of the north. Motz had acquiesced in this somewhat artificial and roundabout plan, and out of regard for Bavaria, Bernstorff continued to approve it, despite Maassen's assurance that there need be no hesitation in going further, and in concluding straightway with Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden a genuine customs union based upon the Prusso-Hessian model.[1]

There was however no prospect of effecting a commercial understanding between Bavaria and Baden, so long as the two courts continued to regard one another as enemies, and so long as King Louis would not abandon his illusory claims upon Badenese territory. When Grand Duke Louis died and his successor was promptly recognised by all the powers, Munich no longer ventured to maintain that with the Hochberg line's ascent to the throne the house of Zähringen had become extinct. The Wittelsbach ruler quietly interred his supposititious claim to the "reversion" of the Badenese Palatinate. All the more, therefore, was he now concerned that the Sponheim dispute at least should be settled satisfactorily, so that he could prove to the world by an accession of territory that Bavaria had after all not been entirely in the wrong.[2]

[1] Maassen to the Foreign Office, October 15, 1830.
[2] Vide supra, vol. IV, pp. 461 et seq.

Towards the end of May, 1830, Armansperg paid a secret visit to Berlin in order to beg Prussia's good offices. King Frederick William undertook to mediate in conjunction with the king of Würtemberg, and Böckh, the Badenese minister, was invited to Berlin. The king hoped, not merely to bring this harassing territorial dispute to an end, but also to induce Baden to enter the Bavario-Würtemberg customs union. At length, on July 10th, through Bernstorff's conciliatory intervention, there was effected an agreement in virtue of which Baden consented to join the South German union; in return for this, both parties promised to renounce their hereditary claims upon Sponheim, and to declare the old Beinheim decision annulled. In order to give full satisfaction to Bavaria it was provided that in addition some trifling exchange of territory upon the eastern frontier of Baden was subsequently to be arranged. It thus seemed as if the wretched squabble had been finally settled. Metternich hastened to express his congratulations to all the participants, and King Louis sent his warmest thanks to the Prussian minister. "Without an understanding with Baden," he wrote, "a closer relationship with Prussia would be impossible. But that such a closer relationship should be entered into seems to me of the utmost importance for the advantage of our common German fatherland. I am absolutely convinced of this, and also that my house has to thank the house of Prussia for that it is still in possession of Bavaria. How delightful to deal with a man of honour!" [1]

As soon, however, as negotiations were begun for the carrying of the agreement into effect, Bavaria demanded an increase of about 20,000 souls, nor would she abate this demand even a trifle until after long haggling. Upon the romantic Wittelsbacher, beautiful Wertheim, the Heidelberg of the Main, exercised an irresistible attraction. The Carlsruhe court definitely refused this extended cession of territory, entrenching itself behind the patriotic indignation of its subjects. It is true that the town of Wertheim would have had little objection to the cession, for Badenese officials looked upon the Main-Tauber circle much as Russians look upon Siberia. Even Prince George von Löwenstein, who held his court in the town, would, as a true German patriot, have been well enough pleased to accept the change of suzerainty if only thereby the

[1] King Louis to Bernstorff, July 22, 1830.

vexations of the internal tolls could have been abolished.[1] The great majority of liberals held other views. Not a single square mile did they desire to see alienated from the model land of constitutionalist freedom, and their resolves were all the more firmly fixed inasmuch as they were suspicious of the customs union. The principal trade of this long strip of territory ran from north to south, so that there could be little gain from joining the Bavario-Würtemberg union. They did not, or would not, see that this was to be a mere preliminary step to a subsequent union with Prussia; and it cannot be denied that the Bavarian plan was too artificial and too complicated to be readily understood by the people.

Throughout Baden enthusiasm was rife for an all-German customs union. Through Prussia's victories the ideal of German commercial unity had at least gained ground to such an extent that no one now ventured to reject it without discussion. It is true that many Badenese liberals employed the fine phrase about a general German customs union merely as an apron to cover the nakedness of their particularist egoism. After all, how pleasant was life under Badenese free trade—at the expense of one's dear neighbours! In a pamphlet by F. Meyer, the Rastatt merchant, entitled *The Badenese Customs*, we read of the pride with which the Badenese observed their neighbours from Alsace, Swabia, and the Rhenish Palatinate, coming to visit the little land where prices were so low and hospitality was so abundant, and then, on the homeward journey, smuggling their cheap purchases across the frontier. Never should these comfortable arrangements be disturbed by a strict supervision of the frontier. The commercial classes of Freiburg made represention to the diet to the effect that a customs union would "transform law-abiding and honest fellows into a rout of revenue officers, smugglers, informers, and rogues—the fact that the great majority of the Badenese business houses, above all those engaged in the grocery trade, had long served to shelter contraband, being passed over in discreet silence. Yet more vigorous was the language of the Strasburg paper, *Konstitutionelle Deutschland*: "Customs, customs, we are to have Prussian customs! Unhappy fatherland! In secret, in the darkness of night they are imposed upon thee! Woe

[1] Burgomaster Weimar of Wertheim to Prince George von Löwenstein, May 28; Prince George von Löwenstein to Otterstedt, May 30, 1831.

unto thee, chamber of 1831!" When Grand Duke Leopold visited the highlands, urgent appeals were made to him from all sides, and Winter, always at sea in questions of high policy, was afraid to run counter to a popular conviction of such apparent strength.

Thus the dispute continued for nearly a year and a half longer. The two mediating courts exhausted their powers of eloquence. Berlin spoke gently, but the language of Stuttgart was blunt, for King William's realm was directly affected by Badenese contraband. He went so far as to threaten the court of Carlsruhe, saying that Bavaria and Würtemberg would "take joint measures, doing everything in their power to counteract the doings of Baden, hitherto entirely hostile, so that we may avert the continuance in the midst of our union of the system practised by a government which deliberately fosters discontent and disquiet in so dangerous an epoch." [1] No less fruitlessly did King Louis write to the grand duke in his ponderous and involved style: "In my last proposals I did my utmost to secure a settlement of the Sponheim affair, and I value greatly the willingness to which your royal highness has given expression, to the effect that this settlement and accession to the customs union may be brought to pass, convinced as I am that goodwill will lead to both being accepted by your estates." [2] The goodwill in question was entirely lacking at the court of Baden. The ministers' advocacy of accession to the South German customs union was half-hearted. With characteristic exuberance, Welcker railed against the absolutist crown of Prussia, whilst Rotteck supported him in somewhat calmer language. The bombastic debates were little to the credit of the model diet. A few only of the members, men in a large way of business, had an apt word or two to say about the economic significance of the question—such men as Buhl of Ettlingen, a liberal manufacturer, and Lotzbeck of Lahr, a tobacco merchant. E. E. Hoffmann, the liberal, who came over from Darmdstadt to reason with the Badenese fanatics, was unsuccessful. Ultimately the diet effected one of those insincere compromises so typical of parliamentarism when the orators have nothing more to say. The chambers unanimously rejected the idea

[1] King William of Würtemberg to Margrave William of Baden, November 12; Reply, November 17, 1830.

[2] King Louis to Grand Duke Leopold, May 9, 1831.

of entering the South German union, and empowered the government to negotiate for an all-German customs union (November, 1831). About this everyone could think as he pleased, for there no longer existed any serious belief in the possibility of a customs union with Austria, Hanover, and Holstein. The cession of territory demanded by Bavaria was rejected by the lower house, in a unanimous vote, and amid deafening cheers for the grand duke.

The ruler thus acclaimed was greatly discomposed by the enthusiasm of his loyal opposition. In an imploring letter he once more sought the aid of Bernstorff, expressing his "profoundest gratitude" for the minister's "exalted self";[1] and the patient Prussian minister actually essayed once more the thankless task of mediation. But King Louis regarded the decision of the Badenese diet as a personal insult, considering that he would suffer shame were he without any compensation to abandon a demand about which so much dust had been raised. Such was his wrath that it was now waste of time to reason with him. The king of Würtemberg, too, declared after a time, in contumelious words, that he would have nothing more to do with the unteachable court of Baden.[2] The view taken in Berlin was less severe, but the renewed negotiations were sterile. The royal poet of Munich bequeathed the imaginery Sponheim claims to his successors as a sacred heritage, and to servile historians as precious material for Bavarian braggadocio. Baden, hitherto a valiant champion of German commercial unity, was thus, in part by the folly of both houses of parliament, and in part by an unusual diplomatic complication, thrust into the background, and was for some years excluded from the critical negotiations concerning the customs union.

The passion and bitterness, to us of a later day barely intelligible, attaching to this Bavario-Badenese dispute was reflected in an extraordinary affair which kept peoples' minds busily occupied for a number of years. At Whitsuntide, 1828, a young peasant lad, ostensibly named Caspar Hauser, arrived at Nuremberg to join the light cavalry. His personal appearance indicated neglect, but he had been vaccinated,

[1] Grand Duke Leopold to Bernstorff, December 5, 1831.

[2] Note to Bernstorff from the Würtemberg envoy, Baron von Linden, April 20, 1832.

could read and write fairly well, could answer simple questions after a fashion in the dialect of the Upper Palatinate, and carried with him the devotional books in common use among the Bavarian peasantry. He produced a mysterious letter, in a handwriting very similar to his own. The obscure significance of this document and the young fellow's timid and peculiar character aroused general curiosity. Foolish cross-questioning soon elicited an astounding and fabulous narration. From his earliest childhood, he said, he had been kept in a gloomy subterranean prison, and then, all of a sudden, his gaoler had taught him to speak, read, and write. Burgomaster Binder of Nuremberg then announced in an inflated manifesto, well calculated to touch the feelings of emotional readers, that the municipality regarded the foundling "as a love-pledge entrusted to it by Providence." The burgomaster's son-in-law, Daumer, an able, but raw, and thoroughly eccentric professor, was asked to undertake the education of the prodigy. Pedagogues, physicians, and criminologists, homeopathists, miracle-mongers, and seers, blasé men of the world, and sensation-hunters of all classes, flocked to the spot to examine this man-cub, who was supposed to differ in all respects from ordinary mortals, and to subject every organ of his body and his soul to hazardous experiments.

An entire literature of essays and pamphlets was devoted to "the child of Europe." Here reckoning was taken for all the weaknesses of an epoch poor in deeds and yet thirsting for activity, for the weaknesses of romanticist belief in wonders, of nervous irritability, of excessive acumen, of love of scandal, and of radical hatred for the upper classes. Even to the sober-minded this much at least seemed certain, that the fabulous history must contain a kernel of solid truth, and that the mysterious enemies of the ill-treated youth, enemies who eluded all search and made mock of all offers of reward for their discovery, must be persons wielding great influence. Only Councillor Merker, of the police department in Berlin, and a few other experts in criminal matters, already ventured, to the profound indignation of the cultured public, to declare the child of Europe a common cheat, on the ground that the history he gave of his imprisonment was in manifest opposition to the laws of nature. Among the credulous were to be found, not merely Saphir and similar literary swashbucklers, but also men of light and leading: such men as Klüber, the great

authority on constitutional law; Hitzig, collaborator in the issue of *The New Pitaval*; and above all Anselm Feuerbach, who, inspired with profound compassion, espoused the foundling's cause with all the ardour of his passionate heart, and who, in a work specially devoted to Caspar Hauser, described the extraordinary prison story as an *Instance of a Crime committed against the Human Psyche.* Thus deliberately led astray, elevated into an object of general amazement, and absolutely invited to become a humbug, Hauser was more and more hopelessly entangled in his own world of lies. With a certain peasant cunning he played the role which was half forced upon him of one gradually awakening from a prolonged slumber of the soul, and by degrees relearned everything that he had already known before his appearance in Nuremberg; but the educational arts of his patrons could force little more than this into his thick skull. When he felt that his prestige was waning, inflicting a wound upon himself, he reanimated the interest of all gentle souls by announcing that he had been attacked by an unknown assassin. Becoming a clerk in official service at Ansbach, in the palace garden of that town he repeated the same experiment, but on this occasion drove his knife further home than he had intended, and died of the wound three days later (December, 1833). Since it was not possible to prove with absolute certainty that this wound was self-inflicted, and since the young fellow's known cowardice made the theory of self-infliction to some extent improbable, Hauser's death gave fresh nourishment to current rumours. His epitaph named him *aenigma sui temporis*, while at the place where the misadventure had occurred in the palace garden a memorial was erected bearing the ambiguous inscription *hic occultus occulto occisus.*

After many fanciful suggestions, the suspicion had been conceived that Hauser was the heir to the throne of Baden, who had been born in the year 1812 and had died within a few days. The notorious Major Hennenhofer was supposed to have substituted a dead infant and to have got the prince out of the way in order to secure the throne for the Hochberg Zähringers. There was no proof; there was not even reasonable ground for suspicion: but years before, the sudden deaths of the two sons of Grand Duke Charles had given rise to much empty chatter; people were eager to believe any evil of Grand Duke Louis and his creature Hennenhofer; and thus it was

that the new legend secured ready credence. Even Feuerbach believed it, and sent the Munich court a private memorial which did more honour to his ingenuity than to his intelligence. Both King Louis and his imaginative minister Prince Wallerstein allowed themselves to be persuaded. The king was easily affected by the charm of romance, and his old antagonism to the Zähringers may unconsciously have played a part. Even his stepmother Queen Caroline had detailed enquiries made, and seems to have credited the fable for a time,[1] although she was a Badenese princess, and rarely agreed with her stepson. The Badenese court had long been in possession of documents which afforded indisputable proof of the young prince's natural death, and could by a public declaration at once have put an end to the malicious gossip. But like all the courts of that day it had an almost morbid dread of publicity, and had perhaps reason to fear that through such disclosures more authentic and unsavoury stories from the days of the two last grand dukes might be unearthed. Whatever the reason, the authorities maintained silence, and the sinister rumours, which appear to have originated in Bavaria, spread far and wide throughout Baden. In Carlsruhe, more prone to scandal than any other German capital, the slanderers enjoyed great days, for here the embittered liberals welcomed anything that tended to discredit sovereign princes. Among the nobles of Breisgau, who still lacked confidence in the Protestant ruling house, there were many to turn a willing ear. The good-for-nothing demagogue Garnier, a man who spoke of himself as the Rastadt Ravaillac, now undertook to describe in a foolish sensational romance and with a wealth of detail the sorrows of the heir to the throne of Baden, the prince who had endured a living death. Henceforward the myth was firmly established, and was elaborately embellished in inflammatory writings issued by the ultramontanes and by the radical enemies of the house of Baden. To the revolutionary parties the Hauser legend served as an effective means for demonstrating to the masses the corruption of courts. The amount of hatred and suspicion engendered in South Germany by these neighbourly quarrels seems hardly credible. When Feuerbach died a few months before his protégé, many of his admirers were firmly convinced that those responsible for

[1] Cf. certain observations in the oft-quoted Sketches by her chaplain, von Schmitt.

the crime committed against Caspar Hauser's psyche had now poisoned Hauser's powerful patron, believing this although everyone knew that the great jurist, prematurely aged by hard work and emotional stresses, had already had several strokes of apoplexy. For many years popular belief in the kidnapping of the infant Badenese prince was so widely prevalent that serious science was loath to concern itself with the unpleasant topic—for the historian is unable to reject a deeply rooted popular conviction with the same bluntness as the judge in criminal cases, who unhesitatingly discharges the accused when definite proofs of guilt are not forthcoming. Not till the year 1875 did the Badenese court decide to publish the documents bearing upon the prince's death. Since then, the tissue of lies has been finally destroyed by the writings of Mittelstädt and von der Linde. Although many details remain obscure, the question of the young humbug's real origin no longer possesses historical interest.

§ 2. ADHESION OF THE SOUTH GERMAN CUSTOMS UNION.

After all that had happened, an understanding between Bavaria and Baden was for the present inconceivable. Strangely enough, however, the negative attitude of the Badenese chambers proved advantageous to the cause of German commercial unity. The artificial plan of first strengthening the South German union, and then only seeking amalgamation with the north, was now abandoned. The South German kings, being unable to maintain their unprofitable sonderbund, were compelled by the failure of the suggested expedient to have prompt recourse to a more radical measure, and submitted to the Prussian cabinet proposals for complete amalgamation. Negotiations were opened in Berlin in December, 1831. Numerous difficulties soon became apparent. Prussia had made considerable financial sacrifice in accepting the two Hesses into the union. The yield of her customs, which in 1829 had amounted to 25·3 silbergroschen per head of population, was now on the down grade. Were the highland kingdoms, which still consumed far less foreign and colonial produce than the two Hesses, to be accepted on the same conditions? The Berlin financiers dreaded severe losses, and the event proved them to have been right, for during the years 1834-39

the average receipts from the Prussian customs amounted to no more than 22 silbergroschen per head of population. They demanded preferential treatment for Prussia, thinking it absolutely necessary to avoid any decline in national revenue in so disturbed a time. The Bavario-Würtemberg financiers, on the other hand, were under the extraordinary delusion that the consumption of goods was more active in the south than in Prussia, and believed themselves to be displaying exceptional magnanimity in conceding that the receipts from the customs should be divided proportionately to population.

In Hesse the introduction of the Prussian taxes upon articles of consumption had been effected without difficulty. But Bavaria was not in a position to make any change in the taxes imposed upon malt. Whilst Prussia secured barely 1,300,000 thalers (3 silbergroschen per head) by taxing beer, the return from this source in Bavaria on the right bank of the Rhine amounted to 5,000,000 florins (21 silbergroschen per head), and by the terms of the constitution the interest on the national debt had to be paid out of this item of revenue. It was absolutely impossible for Prussia to increase her taxes on beer to the same level. The hereditary thirst of the Bavarians could just as little be transplanted to the north as could the privileges of the Bavarian brewers which rendered this high taxation possible, but which were incompatible with the Prussian principle of freedom of occupation. Since equable taxation of domestic consumption was therefore unattainable, the Prussian financiers were stubborn in their insistence upon the introduction of compensatory taxes. Since the year 1818 the sound view that any customs union presupposes that the indirect taxes levied by the members of the union shall be approximately identical, had been one of the leading ideas of Prussian commercial policy. The financiers of Berlin had cherished this conception for so long that they inclined towards fiscal harshness in the endeavour to realise it. Chiefly through the fault of Prussia, the compensatory duties long remained a blemish of the customs laws. Even later, when they assumed the purely fiscal character of " transitional taxes," they burdened trade and produced an insignificant yield.

If Prussia was at fault here, the southern states on their side raised most inequitable claims. At first they demanded a complete transformation of the tariff, considering in especial that the Prussian duties upon cotton goods were unendurably

high, for as yet the highlands possessed hardly any cotton spinning mills of their own. It was, however, impossible for Prussia to give way. Saxony's accession was in prospect, the Prussian manufacturers were loud in their complaints as to the threatened competition of the Erzgebirge; even to Maassen, the free trader, it seemed undesirable to reduce the duties at such an hour. Nor could the reduction of the sugar duties demanded by Würtemberg be carried out, for the interest of the flourishing beet-sugar industry of Magdeburg must not be sacrificed. Again, the dreaded Prussian transit dues were still indispensable as a hint to Prussia's neighbours. Moreover, the situation was at the moment far from favourable to a simplification of the tariff, and the Prussian statesmen foresaw that in the near future the South German courts would change their colours, and with protectionist zeal would demand an increase in the duties. Yet more lively than this economic dispute was the "state rights struggle," to use the phrase current in Munich. The sound specification of the Prusso-Hessian treaties, in accordance with which Prussia alone was as a rule to conclude commercial treaties for the customs union, seemed to the Bavarian and Würtemberg courts to involve shameful subjugation. They demanded unconditional equality in every respect.

Experienced statesmanship could alone harmonise these conflicting tendencies. Very foolishly, however, presumably from parsimony, the High German courts had commissioned two junior officials for this difficult mission. The saving thus effected was destined to cost them dear. Eichhorn had already had many strange experiences in dealing with negotiators from the minor states, but such a personality as that of the Würtemberg plenipotentiary, Assessor Moritz Mohl, was quite new to him. The diplomats of Berlin could not find words to express their astonishment at this impetuous man with his red mop of hair and his tightly stuffed portfolios. What prolix pettiness, what a delight in sterile theoretical disputation, what a wealth of crude information, how obstinate a mistrust of Prussia! The political sage of Swabia, precociously ripe, already displayed all those talents which forty years later were to fascinate the German Reichstag. Ludwig Kühne described him as "a conceited fool who aspires to preach his childish constitutionalist wisdom to the northern bears." When Mohl proposed to forbid the only coastal state in the customs union

to conclude navigation treaties, the Prussian rejoined: "In that case we shall have to cede one of our Baltic sea ports to Würtemberg in order to maintain equality between the members of the customs union!" Burdened with such a colleague, the Bavarian assessor, Bever, could make no headway. The Prussian statesmen, officials of high standing, soon found it intolerable to have to deal with subordinates who were compelled to write home for instructions about every trifle. Soon, too, to the general misfortune, the old struggle between the Berlin departments broke out afresh. Kühne and Eichhorn, though they both wanted the same thing, were jealous of one another. Quite unexpectedly, therefore, the negotiations with the friendly states of the south culminated in an irremediable cleavage of opinion, and had to be broken off in May, 1832.

Moritz Mohl now wrote a gigantic memorial to prove that the customs union with Prussia would involve the certain destruction of Würtemberg. A generation later, Baron von Varnbüler rescued this classical document from oblivion in order to prove to the world the popular politician's perspicacity. Afterwards, as before, King William hoped for a settlement. Even Wangenheim had learned something, and signalled from a distance for an understanding. But throughout the territory the great majority remained opposed. The manufacturers, who had hitherto derived large profits from the control of the Bavarian market, dreaded the competitive industry of the Lower Rhine; the members of the powerful order of scriveners trembled for their ease at the prospect of strict Prussian control; liberal partisans crossed themselves at sight of the spectre of North German absolutism. More than six months elapsed before the South German courts could make a further determination. In the interim, the Austrian diplomats and the representatives of the foreign powers continued their intrigues at the courts of the middle-sized states. For a time it seemed as if the great cause were hopelessly lost. "Baden has done well to abandon for the nonce all thought of joining the customs union," said Gise, the Bavarian minister, to Fahnenberg, the Badenese envoy; Prussia puts forward preposterous claims, demanding material sacrifices and the restriction of sovereignty; Electoral Hesse has already had occasion to rue her hasty accession!"[1] Moreover, there

[1] Fahnenberg's Report, May 30, 1832.

was little love lost between the officials of the two southern kingdoms, but fortunately Schmitz-Grollenburg, Würtemberg envoy in Munich, possessed the confidence of King Louis, and was able to prevent the entire breaking of the threads.

Thus the year passed in a mood of distressing depression. At length King Louis pulled himself together, and on new year's eve had a pithy note sent to Schmitz-Grollenburg, to the effect that the South German union was practically dissolved, and that the resumption of negotiations with Prussia was absolutely indispensable. At the same time a serious warning was despatched by the court of Berlin that if the fresh discussions were to be fruitful, it was essential that the persons sent to the Prussian capital should be capable and highly placed statesmen and not useless subordinates. The counsel was followed. In the end of January, 1833, von Mieg, Bavarian minister for finance, went to Berlin as plenipotentiary for both the southern crowns. A friend of King Louis in the happy youthful days at Salzburg, he was an able and exceedingly well-informed official with exceptional powers of work, which the king exploited to the uttermost. His views upon commercial policy were extremely liberal; he was kindly and amiable, highly cultured, and of pleasing appearance. He avoided travelling by way of Stuttgart, for he dreaded the cumbrous pedantry of the Würtemberg scriveners, but he looked in at Dresden, where he came to an understanding with the Saxon financiers, and reached the Prussian capital on February 6th. Eichhorn and Maassen gave him a hearty welcome, and there was once more displayed what Blittersdorff spoke of with grudging praise as "Prussia's peculiar gift for getting upon the right side of foreign statesmen in Berlin." There were still many difficulties to overcome, but since Prussia could refer to her well-tried tariff, and could point to her firmly established customs administration, nothing remained but to adopt, with some trifling modifications, the order already existing in the north. Despite the warnings of the financiers, Prussia renounced any preferential treatment. The revenue was allotted proportionally to population, the only exception being that for the navigation taxes on the Oder and the Vistula, which were altogether outside the customs community, Prussia was to receive a lump sum. The dearest wish of the Bavarians was fulfilled; Bavaria's feelings as a great power were respected; each of the states retained the right to conclude commercial treaties,

but the right of making treaties with Russian Poland was reserved to Prussia. In compensation for these extensive concessions, Mieg ventured to exceed his instructions upon one point. To shorten the period of transition, he agreed to the immediate provisional introduction of the Prussian customs administration in the south before the customs community passed into active operation.

On March 4th the Hessian plenipotentiaries were summoned to the first plenary meeting, and on March 22nd the treaty came into being. The allied states, "with the persistent design of favouring freedom of trade between their states, and in this way favouring it throughout Germany," were to form an "amalgamated union," which was to come into existence on January 1, 1834, for a term of eight years. In most respects the fundamental law was identical with the Hessian treaties, the principal difference being that the independence of the allies was notably enhanced. Unanimity must be secured for any proposal to alter the fundamental law. The worst defect of the union was to be found, not so much in the verbal propositions in which it was formulated as in the transference of the relationships of power. Through the accession of several large states with equal voting rights, the free activities of Prussian commercial policy were inevitably hampered. But the new rights given to the states now joining the union seemed more serious than they really were, resembling in this the exceptional clauses of the Versailles treaty. The competence to conclude commercial treaties, a treasure grasped by Bavaria with such passionate zeal, proved in practice a harmless toy, like the undiscoverable committee for foreign affairs, to be appointed by the federal council, which Prussia conceded in Versailles to the virile pride of the German kings. Vis-à-vis the foreign world Prussia was to be considered chief and representative of the customs union, and for this reason all important commercial treaties were to be concluded by Prussia in the name of the union. The strictness of control was relaxed at Bavaria's urgent request. The allies were merely to send customs plenipotentiaries to the central customs board and auditors to the chief customs offices of the allies; mutual inspection of the frontier service was no longer to take place. These formalities made very little difference, for in essential respects the union had hitherto been held together solely by mutual confidence and the power of self-interest. The allies

mutually pledged themselves to "unrestricted openness" in customs administration, and this pledge was faithfully kept. In order to comply with the traditional phraseology of federal patriotism and at the same time to guard against any possible attack from Frankfort, the allies agreed to dissolve their union as soon as the Bundestag should fulfil article 19—a promise it was very easy to make, and one to which Eichhorn can hardly have subscribed with a straight face.

Since Bavaria and Würtemberg were still under the sway of their preposterous anxieties about possible financial losses, in a secret article the allies reserved the right to dissolve the union before the specified time should the revenue of the customs union prove less to the extent of ten per cent. than the previous net yield. Maassen confidently agreed to this, for he knew that of the advantages of the new treaty the lion's share would accrue to the south. His expectations were more than fulfilled by the results. During the years 1834-1845, the north paid Bavaria 22,290,000 thalers, and to Würtemberg, 10,300,000 thalers; whilst in the period from 1854 to 1865 Bavaria received 34,000,000 from the north. At the settlements during the first two decades, payments had regularly to be made by Prussia, Saxony, Frankfort, and Brunswick; all the other states in the union were recipients. But in any case these large figures do not give a satisfactory picture of the situation, for a portion of the imports destined for the interior states paid duty in the harbours and commercial centres of the north. The comparative advantage accruing to the south is more plainly shown by the fact that the costs of administration in Bavaria declined during the very first years from 44% to 16% of the revenue, subsequently falling almost to 10%, whilst Bavaria's share in the coffee duty promptly increased threefold, and by the year 1845 had increased fivefold.

In order to avoid the very least appearance of Prussian hegemony, it was agreed that the annual conferences of the plenipotentiaries of the customs union should no longer, as in the case of the Prusso-Hessian union, meet regularly in Berlin. Their place of assembly was transferable at the will of the allies, and they met for the first time in Munich. Disputes were to be subject to the decision of an arbiter, nominated by a unanimous vote for each case. No such arbitral decision was ever called for—not because uninterrupted harmony prevailed, but because the arrogance of the petty

states invariably preferred a voluntary compromise to the shameful subjection to a foreign authority. The retention by Bavaria of her taxes on beer was inevitable. It was therefore agreed to be content to establish a maximum for the taxes on articles of consumption, and to look forward to the gradual approximation of the systems of taxation. In so loosely constructed an association, the *liberum veto* and the right to give notice were as indispensable for Prussia as for the lesser states, these being the last desperate means for wringing a decision from the cumbrous corporation. Nothing but the hope of extensive political gains could have induced the Prussian court to make such severe sacrifices, and to agree to such far reaching consideration for the whims and vanities of the middle-sized states. With masterly patience, Eichhorn awaited the time when from the almost ludicrous forms of this loose union there was to develop an insoluble community of interests.

Mieg returned home confidently expecting that a treaty so exceedingly favourable to Bavaria would procure forgiveness for having exceeded his instructions. He was much mistaken. King Louis, who could not bear independence of mind, received his friend with bitter reproaches. It seemed to the monarch a degradation of the Bavarian crown that the Prussian customs system was to be provisionally introduced without delay. The minister, profoundly wounded, was unwilling to repudiate his pledged word; he asked and was granted leave to resign. The Austrian party exulted, and Blittersdorff wrote with great satisfaction, "The only genuine federal system now regains preponderance."[1] The king took charge of the documents, and for a long time the fate of the treaty remained dubious. Lerchenfeld, Mieg's successor, recognised indeed, as soon as he had examined the papers, that it was essential to conclude the agreement, but he did not express a plain opinion to that effect. To crown all, Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, the versatile liberalising minister, proved in a detailed memorial that there must be no customs union without Austria, and that Prussian hegemony would lead to the destruction of Bavaria. The Prussian envoy considered all was lost, and wrote despairingly that Eichhorn alone could now save the situation. Thereupon, in July, 1833, Eichhorn hastened to Munich, and as an ultimate concession agreed that there should be no provisional introduction of the Prussian customs system.

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, May 5, 1833.

With his charming manners he was able to settle everything in a few days. The king's better nature now got the upper hand once more. He congratulated himself upon the return of Frederician days, had a medal struck to commemorate the success of the work which he above all others had brought to fruition, and said to Röntgen of Nassau: "Austria is a circumscribed state, with which we can conclude commercial treaties but with which we cannot enter into a customs union; Prussia is a flash of lightning which shoots through Germany."

Hardly had the crown of Bavaria been won over, when the struggle began with the Würtemberg diet. At the beginning of the year the Swabian and Badenese liberals had assembled in council at Pforzheim, and had there determined manfully to resist the advance of Prussian absolutism. The protectionists deplored the approaching downfall of Swabian manufacturing industry; the particularists demonstrated that the true line for Würtemberg's exports led towards Frankfort and Switzerland, not towards the north; many pessimistic radicals were unwilling to give the detested ministry an opportunity for credit which would accrue to the government alone, and they were still less inclined to permit the removal of an important cause of general dissatisfaction. Good natured people, while willing to consent to the necessary sacrifices, would make these only on behalf of a general German union. Even to moderate liberals there seemed to be many objections against permitting to an absolute crown an indirect influence in the finances of Würtemberg. Moreover, the chambers were invited merely to give their opinion about the treaty; their formal approval was not asked. The diet was bitterly conscious of its powerlessness. With King William it was a point of pride to carry the work through. There could be no doubt that he was quite prepared to complete the treaty without the assent of his loyal estates, a course that would show to all the world how empty were the glories of Swabian constitutionalism. For this reason, even Paul Pfizer, the admirer of Prussia, could not make up his mind to approve the treaty, for had he done so he would have lost all prestige in his party, all political influence in his constituency. Such were the tragical contradictions in which South German liberalism had become involved.[1] At length, in November, the diet approved the treaty after

[1] I owe to F. Notter this account of the reasons which determined his friend Pfizer's course.

violent struggles. A few only were persuaded to a favourable vote by the admirable memorial concerning Baden's accession which at the eleventh hour Nebenius published in order to win over the Swabians. The assent of the majority was due solely to blind obedience; the liberal leaders, Pfizer, Uhland, and Römer recorded adverse votes. The result was a complete triumph of a businesslike officialdom over liberal enthusiasm.

New and unedifying disputes ensued, for the Prussian customs system had now to be introduced in the south by a joint executive committee. How often had Ludwig Kühne, the Prussian commissary, to listen to bitter complaints from the easy-going Bavarian officials directed against the unpopular Prussian inflexibility; but he held to his point that along the frontiers, where smuggling was notorious, a strict control of imports should be continued for three months, to make a clean sweep of the system. The illiberal social legislation of the middle-sized states did not readily endure the transition to Prussian freedom. The first year of the new customs union (1834) brought the Bavarian people a new and very incomprehensible industrial law which, in a petty spirit, gave advantages to "inlanders." When the Prussian envoy raised an objection, and pointed out that the treaty provided for "uniform principles" of industrial policy, the court of Munich resented his interference. But in the main the treaty was honestly carried out. After a new customs director, the excellent Knorr, had been appointed in Munich, customs administration was firm and precise. With every day of further experience the customs union found new supporters in the south, and the more intelligent among the liberals shamefacedly acknowledged their error. Strange and unnatural was the spectacle of Germany's duplex life under the Germanic Federation! The Bundestag was an object of mockery for all the world, a scandal for the fatherland; and the very governments that were maintaining it were simultaneously working for national unification. A few days after the customs treaty had been signed in Berlin, in March, excited youths stormed the guard room at Frankfurt. The idea of German unity was arrayed against the courts which had just carried out one of the most momentous actions in our national policy.

§ 3. ADHESION OF SAXONY AND THURINGIA. NEW YEAR'S EVE, 1834.

Saxony was negotiating in Berlin simultaneously with Bavaria and Würtemberg. As Motz had foreseen, of all the negotiations concerning the customs union, the one with Saxony gave most trouble to the Prussian statesmen. Obviously Saxony's accession was in accordance with the nature of things. Thereby the Erzgebirge reacquired unrestricted intercourse with its former granary, the Mulde flats of the province of Saxony, whilst Leipzig regained the free use of its leading commercial route. Moreover, the power and importance of the customs union were notably increased as soon as it was joined by one of the principal manufacturing territories and the greatest trading centre of Europe. Nevertheless, the direct advantage was almost entirely on the side of Saxony, for from the Prussian outlook there were serious economic and financial objections. Prussia secured no more than a small market in Saxony, and a market already richly stocked with the products of Saxon industry. Since the standard of life, and consequently the wage of labour, were lower in the Erzgebirge than in any other manufacturing district, the Prussian manufacturers, and above all the weavers and calico-printers of Silesia and the province of Saxony, dreaded Saxon competition. From every side warnings poured in upon the ministry of finance, and on the Lower Rhine the first tidings that negotiations had been opened between Prussia and Saxony aroused widespread excitement.[1] The incorporation of a great trading centre into a customs system was still regarded by most people as an almost insoluble problem; it had been frequently mooted in the negotiations with Bavaria-Würtemberg, and had finally been shelved, since an understanding was despaired of.

Along the frontier between Saxony and Bohemia there had become established an extensive contraband traffic, the populace regarding this wretched state of affairs as a necessity, nay, as a blessing. Even Lindenau, in conversation with Blittersdorff after the customs union had been decided on, went no further than to say tentatively: "It can hardly be regarded as a misfortune that smuggling in the Erzgebirge

[1] Report of the lord-lieutenant of Düsseldorf to the ministry of finance, February 6, 1831.

will now be done away with." [1] The magnanimous sentiments of the new co-regent, Prince Frederick Augustus, secured cheerful recognition in Berlin, and so did the perspicacity of the able men whom the prince had summoned to form his cabinet. But an entire year passed before order was fully restored in the disturbed little kingdom, and Maassen asked himself with much concern whether a government which had exhibited so little strength and staying power in dealing with the trifling disorders in Leipzig and Dresden, would have sufficient courage and firmness to clear out the smugglers' haunts in the mountains. Besides, the course of the negotiations showed that the new government had not completely overcome the old paltry mistrust of Prussia. The statesmen of Berlin could not free their minds from the suspicion that Saxony would prefer a customs union with Austria if only the Hofburg would offer something more solid than empty phrases. If King Frederick William had no thought of addressing alluring invitations to any German state, least of all was he inclined to do this in the case of the Saxon court, which as founder of the Mid-German union had displayed so much malice and hostility. Baumgärtner, the Prussian consul, received an acerb demonstration of this when in the beginning of the year 1830 he wrote and circulated in Saxony a pamphlet demonstrating the need for a customs union between Saxony and Prussia.

Until the overthrow of the old system, the Saxon government, in accordance with the established practice of the middle-sized states, devoted itself to subterfuges and artifices. It enquired in Stuttgart and Munich whether Saxony could not join the South German union. Könneritz, Saxon chargé d'affaires in Berlin, begged Ancillon that Prussia should at once reduce her tariff in Saxony's favour, since the negotiations for an agreement must be postponed for the time being. Maassen replied, under date September 15, 1830, that "without a prearranged union for the mutual facilitation of commerce" Prussia could pay no regard to any other state in the regulation of her tariff.[2]

Lindenau's ministry was the first which had the courage to admit what was obvious to all, that in default of Prussia's friendship the manufacturing industry of Saxony would be

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, August 23, 1833.

[2] Salviati's Report, Stuttgart, August 26; Könneritz to Ancillon, August 2; Maassen to the foreign office, September 15, 1830.

ruined, for all the overseas exports from Saxony and nearly all the imports of raw cotton had to cross Prussia. Unfortunately accession to the union was favoured only by a portion of the manufacturers in the mountain districts; the population in general, and, above all, powerful Leipzig, uttered loud complaints about the imminence of ruin. Thus the commercial classes of the town on the Pleisse, ever patriotic, and in other respects far-seeing, demonstrated by their conduct the disagreeable truth that interested parties rarely know what is good for them. This demonstration was reinforced at a later date by the behaviour of the merchants of Frankfort, Bremen, and Hamburg. Even the man in a large way of business, as soon as he imagines his immediate advantage to be threatened, takes narrow views, and shows that he can see no further than the petty trader. Proud of his personal energy and individual liberty, he resents it when the men of the board room ask him to change his traditional business habits, and will not admit that where great commercial problems have to be considered, the decision must be guided, not by the dictates of private mercantile interests, but by the economic considerations of a wider statesmanship. Nevertheless, towards the close of the year the Saxon government decided to address a preliminary enquiry to Berlin. On January 24, 1831, the ministry for foreign affairs replied that the difficulties appeared very great, and that the interests were notably conflicting; nevertheless the attempt should be made, "for the scheme is one of general utility, and most worthy of German governments, which, in addition to caring for their own subjects, aim at favouring the welfare of Germany at large." The kings of High Germany, informed of all that was in progress, gladly confided the negotiations to the Prussian court. "In a large union," said Armansperg, "there will be little occasion to fear the superiority of Saxon industry, and the difficult question of supervising the frontier can be settled if the requisite goodwill is forthcoming."[1]

In March, 1831, von Zeschau, the Saxon minister for finance, came to Berlin. Next to Mieg, the Bavarian, Hoffmann, the Hessian, and Böckh, the Badenese, he was unquestionably the most capable of all the financiers with whom Prussia had to deal. He was active and well-informed, of chivalrous

[1] Ministerial Despatch from the foreign office, January 24; Armansperg to Küster, March 22, 1831.

character, silent and thoughtful; and in the days when he had been in Prussian service he had been intimately acquainted with Ludwig Kühne. He soon abandoned the idea at first suggested by Dresden that the whole tariff should be revised, but he was not able to come to terms with Maassen. Alarmed by the warnings of her manufacturers, Prussia wished to introduce a provisional protective tariff in favour of certain manufactured articles, to give persons engaged in these branches of industry time to arm themselves against the competition of the Erzgebirge. Compensation for the threatened extensive losses on account of transit dues was likewise demanded. In Kühne's view these claims were excessive. He had been born in the Magdeburg region, so that he considered the Electoral Saxons almost as fellow-countrymen in the more intimate sense, and he represented to the minister that after the partition of Saxony it must be a point of honour with Prussia to show special benevolence to her neighbour. When Maassen had at length given way about these points, a new obstacle promptly intervened, the matter of the fairs. Frankfort-on-the-Oder had hitherto been privileged by a rebate of duty for its fair, recently reduced to twenty per cent.; now, when the entry of Leipzig into the union was in prospect, Prussia was unwilling that her menaced little trading centre should be placed in a position less favourable than heretofore. But the commercial classes of Leipzig prophesied the inevitable ruin of the Leipzig fairs should Frankfort-on-the-Oder continue to receive any kind of preferential treatment. "No government, least of all a constitutional government," wrote Wietersheim, the Saxon plenipotentiary, "can disregard so express a declaration on the part of the representatives of a threatened national interest." The Altenburg privy ministry also sent an urgent remonstrance to Berlin, doing this, as it naively declared, "quite spontaneously," and describing in piteous terms the terrible fate that threatened the unhappy Leipzig.[1]

Since the course of the negotiations was thus unfavourable, the Saxon court, alarmed by the increasing ferment in the country, wished at least to secure certain trading privileges should the complete union prove impossible of attainment. The prince co-regent advanced this request in an autograph despatch to the king of Prussia, writing as follows: "With

[1] Wietersheim to Eichhorn, August 16; Despatch of the Altenburg privy ministry, September 30, 1831.

the complete failure of these negotiations, the carrying out of the great design entertained by your majesty to promote the safety and tranquillity of Germany by uniting the interests of trade and traffic in different German states and thus simultaneously strengthening the political tie, becomes endangered, or at least runs the risk of postponement. Nor can I neglect to point out to you that at the present juncture a fruitless negotiation may produce a very unfavourable impression in Saxony."[1] A middle course of this kind seemed petty and futile to the leading minds in the Prussian government. Eichhorn wrote a detailed opinion showing that immediate privileges granted to Saxony must, from the very nature of the case, impose uncompensated sacrifices upon the Prussian state. If, on the other hand, Saxony desired to enter into a similar relationship towards Prussia to that hitherto occupied by Bavaria and Würtemberg, a complete remodelling of the Saxon customs system was essential. Why, therefore, should not Saxony at once pursue the highest aim, the customs union? Beuth sadly declared, "Were the times less unfavourable, the affair could be dealt with in a more magnanimous spirit." The last personal discussions took place in July, and not long afterwards the exchange of despatches relative to this matter likewise terminated. The German cabinets began to fear that Saxony had abandoned the plan, and towards the new year the court of Dresden found it necessary to issue a long memorial to the High German kings justifying Saxon commercial policy.

Dresden did not pluck up heart to resume the enterprise until Bavaria and Würtemberg began their negotiations in Berlin. In March, 1832, Zeschau came a second time to the Prussian capital. Another good step forward was taken, for Saxony declared herself ready to adopt the Prussian system of indirect taxes. The question of the fairs, however, still proved a stumbling block. Moreover, the political wisdom of Moritz Mohl now exercised a paralysing influence upon Saxony, for, as can readily be understood, the Dresden cabinet would go no further unless the South German courts joined the union, and these latter courts at this stage broke off negotiations. The last discussion took place in May, and the summer passed amid painful embarrassments. The official *Leipziger Zeitung* now adopted the unctuous tone which is an

[1] Prince Frederick Augustus to King Frederick William, April 11, 1831.

invariable symptom of perplexity, writing as follows: "Sacred to every subject will be the decision to which the government comes in cooperation with the estates."

Meanwhile the Saxon court committed a grave political error, one that seemed to justify the worst suspicions. At the Bundestag Hanover had once again demanded the carrying out of the immortal article 19, and did not attempt to conceal that its aim was to disturb the course of Prussia's commercial policy. Without consulting Prussia, and without even awaiting the report of the federal committee, Saxony was the first of the German governments to vote for the foolish proposal, declaring that the highest aim of the Federation in customs affairs was to secure by joint enactment that which it would be difficult to effect by individual negotiations, and saying that if transit dues were to exist in Germany at all, the system should be some other than the Prussian! The financial group among the Berlinese statesmen complained loudly of this manifest duplicity. In a sharply worded memorial, Privy Councillor Michaelis enquired whether the utterances of the Saxon federal envoy were perhaps designed to court public opinion in Saxony on behalf of the Prussian customs union. Who could possibly be convinced by the futile excuses which Minister Minckwitz sent from Saxony to Watzdorf, Saxon envoy in Berlin (November 29, 1832)? He innocently protested that the proceedings in Frankfort ought not to prejudice in any way the negotiations in Berlin! Eichhorn, who was intimately acquainted with the peculiarities of the lesser courts, urged forbearance upon his indignant colleagues, saying that they must give the gentlemen in the Eschenheimer Gasse a free hand to continue harmless exercises in literary composition; that the Dresden court honestly desired to enter the union despite these occasional backslidings; that if a brief respite were allowed, matters would turn out all right in the end.

So the event proved. In January, 1833, Mieg had a talk with Zeschau in Dresden; and when subsequently the negotiations between Prussia and Bavaria came to a successful issue, on March 24th the Saxon minister for finance journeyed for the third time to Berlin. A week later (March 30, 1833), Eichhorn, Maassen, Zeschau, and Watzdorf agreed upon the customs union treaty, which was identical word for word with that just concluded between Prussia and Bavaria, the question

of the fairs being dealt with in a few additional articles. The rebate for Frankfort-on-the-Oder persisted on a reduced scale, and Saxony was entitled to give similar privileges to Leipzig. The trade of the fairs was greatly facilitated by the institution of a special banking system connected therewith. In the case of Leipzig wholesalers of established reputation, tax credits were even opened, to continue beyond the actual time of the fair—a notable concession which was to lead to many abuses. Agreement was also secured for the reduction of certain duties, especially those upon woollens and cottons. Prussia pledged herself to extend to Saxon trade the mitigation of the Elbe navigation dues which Anhalt had conceded to Prussian commerce on the Elbe, but this excellent idea was frustrated by the pettiness of Anhalt.

It was not without hesitation that Maassen subscribed the treaty which opened the Prussian market to the factories of the Erzgebirge; and among all his advisers, Kühne was the only one to give unconditional support. "This is a weighty treaty," said Maassen to Kühne, poising the document in his hand; "not everyone would have signed it." Economic interests had been compelled to give place to political aspirations. Saxony was now passing through the honeymoon of her constitutional life, and the entry of this state into the union could not fail to produce a favourable impression upon public opinion. But unfortunately a considerable interval elapsed before the German world became reconciled to the accomplished fact. The Prussian manufacturers complained loudly, whilst the good town of Leipzig surrendered to a mood of absolute despair. A petition, busily hawked round for signature by Berck, the Austrian consul, conveyed a warning to the government, whilst the municipal council despatched an urgent representation to Dresden. One morning a notice was found pasted on Zeschau's door: "Here dwells a parvenu, a Prussian Landrat, now Saxon minister of finance, who has sold the country to Prussia for money and orders." The frenzy seized persons of all classes and of all ages. Leipzig school boys laid in a stock of English paint boxes, fearing (with precocious commercial foresight) that their favourite toy would in future be too costly for bourgeois purses. A year later there began for the town on the Pleisse a new epoch of brilliant commercial success. Little Frankfort-on-the-Oder was quite overshadowed by its more powerful rival, for the great

firms of Leipzig had soon learned the advantages of the rebate. The complaints of the Prussian manufacturers had also been stilled, and no one would admit having signed the dolorous petitions. But Zeschau, the benefactor of Leipzig, never received any atonement from the proud merchants of the city for the abuse they had showered upon him.

Whilst this complicated double negotiation progressed through its stages, Eichhorn, with inexhaustible patience, was simultaneously conducting a third difficult undertaking, to secure a settlement with the Thuringian states. In Thuringia, as in Saxony and Electoral Hesse, the change of spirit was favoured by the unquiet summer of 1830, by fear of the discontented masses. Here, as in Saxony, it was at first hoped that certain uncompensated trading privileges would be promptly granted by Prussia. Gersdorff, the Weimar minister, came to Berlin in January, 1831, simultaneously with Lindenau, bearing a holograph despatch from the grand duke which conveyed a request for such privileges: "In a period when excitement is rife, this concession would deprive ill-disposed persons of an excuse for exercising a bad influence." To repeated enquiries from the small Thuringian courts, the Berlin cabinet replied on July 5, 1831, that Prussia was prepared to treat about a customs union, but only with all the Thuringian states in conjunction, and only if the courts no longer considered themselves bound to the Mid-German union. Not until Electoral Hesse had entered the Prussian customs union did the Ernestine courts declare that the Mid-German union was in fact dissolved.

General Lestocq, the much-harassed envoy, whom the Thuringians and some of the other lesser dynasties maintained in Berlin at their joint cost, handed in a verbal note on January 15, 1832, to the effect that Prussia might take the initiative, seeing that the older obligations had lapsed. Weimar was especially urgent. In Gersdorff and Thon, the grand duchy possessed two excellent administrators, who doubtless perceived the cause of the unending financial distresses. Gotha was less forward in the matter, for here smuggling was traditional and was universally regarded as a leading national asset. Maassen and Eichhorn now developed in fuller detail the simple idea they had so often previously expressed. The detached Thuringian states were in the first instance to form a union with joint customs administration, and were then to enter

the larger customs union as a unit. Prussia would allot the circles of Erfurt, Suhl, and Ziegenrück to this Thuringian union, and would see to it that the Schmalkaldian territory of Electoral Hesse should also be added. The stage of formal negotiations was not yet entered upon, for Eichhorn hoped to conclude arrangements first with Bavaria and Würtemberg. These two courts had been rendered uneasy by the Ernestine advances, holding that if Thuringia joined before themselves, the south would be entirely at Prussia's mercy. On November 15, 1832, therefore, they went so far as to address a protest to the court of Berlin, saying that Prussia ought not to accept the Thuringians without the prior consent of Bavaria and Würtemberg. The court of Dresden, which continued to feel itself the hereditary suzerain of the Ernestines, insisted that it should be a party to all negotiations with its cousins. Prussia rejoined that she would pay every attention to the interests of Saxony, but that the collaboration of a Saxon plenipotentiary would serve only to render the negotiations more difficult. Nevertheless the objections raised by the three lesser monarchies postponed the opening of the discussions.

The conferences with the Thuringians did not begin until December, 1832. The Prussian statesmen proposed the constitution of a central board for the Thuringian customs system. Great was the consternation, for not one of the pygmies could endure such a limitation of sovereignty. Prussia, therefore, anxious to conciliate, said that it would suffice to appoint an inspector general; he must live in Erfurt, indeed, as the centre of the region concerned, but should be appointed, not by Prussia, but by Weimar, the leading Thuringian power. It seemed as if this would disarm opposition. If Prussia were willing to subject her customs affairs to the supervision of a Weimar official, surely no complaint need be expected even from Reuss pride or Gotha arrogance. Nevertheless, Altenburg and Meiningen raised fresh objections, saying it was impossible that they should consent to foreign supervision of their administration. It seemed almost as if a union must be formed without Meiningen, but at this stage Kühne made a timely threat, saying that if the Prussian officials were to be regarded as spies, Prussia would be compelled to enforce her dreaded enclave system against her lesser neighbours. The menace worked. On May 10, 1833, there was formed the "customs and commercial union of the Thuringian states." Next day

the new union, which adopted the Prussian system of indirect taxation in its entirety, announced its accession to the German customs union. A Weimar general plenipotentiary represented the Thuringians at the conferences of the customs union, and in tariff questions was entitled only to a single joint vote; in certain other respects he was to voice the separate opinions of the respective Thuringian states. This league within the league, for whose formation Prussian statesmen had been striving since the year 1819, proved so simple and natural that even in the most critical days of the customs union there was never a thought of dissolving the Thuringian union.

The hardest part of the great work had now been accomplished. The loyal labours of the officialdom were crowned by the blessing of unprecedented order. The published annals of German legislation were swollen to tomes of colossal bulk through all the new treaties and laws. Then came the momentous new year's eve of 1834, which announced even to the masses the dawning of a better day. On all the high roads of Central Germany, long strings of heavily laden freight wagons were waiting in front of the custom houses, surrounded by jubilating crowds. With the last stroke of twelve and the close of the old year, the toll gates were thrown wide. The traces tightened, and amid shouts of exultation and the cracking of many whips the trains of goods moved forward across the enfranchised land. A new link, strong though inconspicuous, had been welded into the long chain of events leading the margravate of the Hohenzollerns onward towards the imperial crown. The eagle eye of the great king looked down from the clouds, and from a remote distance could already be heard the thunder of the guns of Königgrätz. Happier than his impassioned friend, Maassen lived long enough to enjoy the hour of fulfilment, but died on November 4, 1834. No worthy successor could be found, and the great traditions of 1818 survived only in Eichhorn and the privy councillors of the ministry for finance.

The enlarged commercial union now took the name of the German customs union. Amid the thick vapours of the Germanic Federation there could already be discerned the contours of that lesser Germany which was one day to outshine the glory and the power of the Holy Roman Empire.

§ 4. STRUGGLE WITH AUSTRIA AND HANOVER. THE HANOVERIAN TAX UNION.

Prussia's successes in the field of commercial policy were effected by the monarchy in opposition to German liberalism, and only because that monarchy was not hampered by the existence of a representative body was it able to attain its goal. Just as little as the South German opposition parties had Czar Nicholas any premonition of what this commencing growth of the Prusso-German power was to signify. Since he continued to hope for a great war against the revolution, in all matters where Russia's interests did not seem directly threatened he endeavoured to meet his father-in-law in a friendly spirit, carefully avoiding any step that might have interfered with the progress of the customs union. The unconcealed hostility displayed by France and England towards the growing commercial league could not but fortify the czar in his attitude in this matter. How arrogantly, heretofore, had the western powers looked down upon disintegrated Germany as a land of no account in the rivalries of the trading nations. Powerful, therefore, was the impression when the new greatness of the German commercial league made itself apparent, when the total value of imports and exports from the customs union amounted during the first year (1834) to 249,500,000 thalers, being equivalent to 10 thalers per head of the population. Doubtless the figures seemed modest enough when compared with the 1,365,000,000 francs of French trade (the average annual figure for the decade 1827 to 1836); or when compared with £116,000,000, which represented the import and export trade for England in the year 1830. But the trade of the customs union continued steadily to increase, until after ten years, in 1844, it had attained the figure of 385,000,000 thalers, being 13½ thalers per head of the population. Moreover, the manufacturing energy of the union was conspicuously on the increase, and during the first thirty years of the customs union the total export of German manufactures increased by 52%. And yet this union was still far from comprising the whole of Germany; the entire North Sea coast and the largest German harbours were outside its domain. Rouen and St. Etienne, London and Manchester, had to meet a new competitor.

The government of Louis Philippe, petty, envious, and

hopelessly mediocre, born enemy of creative and novel ideas, and eagerly desirous to keep a finger in the German political pie, availed itself of a hundred little artifices to counteract the designs of Prussia. Its envoys, Bresson in Berlin, Alleye in Frankfort, Mornay in Carlsruhe, and above all the notorious Consul Engelhardt in Mainz, busily interviewed one German diplomatist after another, and often enjoyed the secret support of Austrian agents. They uttered warnings against Prussia's lust of dominion, and offered commercial treaties with liberal-minded France. Fortunately the rigid French prohibitive system was in no position to offer alluring advantages to any neighbour. When, for all France could do, the customs union came into existence, de Bussières, chargé d'affaires in Darmstadt, declared that his chief, the duc de Broglie, proposed the enactment of a liberal customs law, offering great advantages to Germany's exports of cattle and woollen goods; but compensatory advantages would be expected, and in especial the preferential treatment of French wines, "unless this should be prevented by the direction which Prussia has given to the customs union she has founded." In response to an enquiry from the Hessian government, Eichhorn seized the opportunity to give a rebuff to the bourgeois king's commercial policy. He rejoined that France was not yet in a position to treat on equal terms with the more liberal legislation of the customs union; before this could be done, the prohibitive system must be abolished in France. Prussia, he said, did not assume the leading role in the customs union ascribed to her by the Tuileries. The union had not been founded by Prussia, but had grown up as a natural product, as the outcome of the harmonious will of all the participating sovereigns.[1] Thus anxiously did the court of Berlin avoid all semblance of hegemony. The commercial union was still in its initial stages, and there was no desire to challenge more than was inevitable the antagonism of Austria and the foreign world.

England likewise endeavoured to enter into commercial treaties with the minor states in the hope of destroying the national work. Lord Minto, envoy in Berlin, detested the two great federal powers with all the hatred of a radical; and just as he loudly and relentlessly opposed the decrees of the Bundestag, so also did he regard it as his duty to preserve

[1] Bussières to du Thil, January 21; Eichhorn, Instruction to the embassy in Darmstadt, February 7, 1834.

the lesser states from the Prussian yoke. In the British parliament free expression was given to that English commercial morality which, with the Bible in the right hand and the opium pipe in the left, aspires to diffuse the blessings of civilisation over the surface of the globe. "You have no right," such was in effect the complaint addressed to the Prussian statesmen, "you have no right to make treaties with other German states when such treaties may be disadvantageous to English trade." But at this time England, a country with high protection, was as little able as France to offer the Germans attractive advantages, and after the days of the Rhine navigation act, so advantageous to British merchants, English participation in our commercial struggles began gradually to decline. The ability of Bülow, Prussian envoy in London, might perhaps have enabled him to assuage the anxieties of British statesmen had not the prussophobe Guelph politicians in Hanover once again incited England to commercial envy.

The light in which the Prussian commercial union appeared to the Austrian party at the Bundestag is glaringly displayed by some of Blittersdorff's despatches. In March, 1833, when matters still hung in the balance, he wrote scornfully: "Time will show whether Prussian finances are to be sacrificed to the political system of Herr Eichhorn." When the question had been settled, he travelled through central Germany, conversed with a number of Saxon and Thuringian statesmen, and gloomily reported: "The customs unification simultaneously gives the coup de grâce to the federal system." The mutual protection which the lesser states had hitherto secured through the Federation, these states would now secure through the customs union. In other political concerns they would also have to rely upon Prussia. "All the Mid-German statesmen with whom I conversed assured me that no other course had been open to them. Austria had abandoned them. Prussia has been as ready as she was obstinate, and had disarmed objection by the concession of equal voting power." The only thing left to do (thus he continued his lament) was that Austria should also enter the customs union. "But this, I fear, will prove impossible, for here Ancillon, who is well disposed towards us, will be able to effect nothing against Herr Eichhorn!" Still more melancholy were his reports in December, 1833: "The customs union is one of the chief nails in the coffin of the Germanic Federation. . . . Herr

Eichhorn wants to bring about the unity of Germany by means of separate treaties, with the exclusion of Austria, for Austria, according to the view that ever prevails in Berlin, only imposes sacrifices. Prussia is now taking over the actual leadership of Germany's policy, Austria's leadership being merely formal. Perhaps new life can be infused into the Germanic Federation in no other way than by Prussia's becoming chief, whilst Austria contents herself with an offensive and defensive alliance—but of this I see little prospect. . . . It may be that through this turn of affairs the representative constitutions will cease to possess importance for federal policy, and that very different questions will now move into the foreground those questions of predominant power which already emerged at the Vienna congress!" [1] Yet the very man who was able with so much penetration to pierce the obscurity of the future, devoted all his energies to resisting the oncoming destiny. As late as November, 1847, he proposed that since the Hofburg was certainly unable to take over the economic leadership of the customs union, it should at least assume the political leadership of that body!

Austria, too, was moved by similar anxieties. The rigid regime of old men that now prevailed in Vienna was at length beginning to perceive the momentous importance of Prussian commercial policy, a policy whose progress the Hofburg had certainly attempted to arrest, but without daring to attack it with all possible energy. Yet even now the Nestor of European diplomacy, so astounding was his poverty of ideas, could rise no higher than exhortations, tentative appeals, and petty intrigues. Practical plans of opposition were beyond his scope. For nearly twenty years Bavaria and Austria had been negotiating about facilitations of trade, but ever in vain. Nothing could knock into the heads of the Austrian privy councillors the idea that concessions must be mutual. Austria's agents in Munich were accustomed to make their most lively appeals to Bavaria's friendly consideration at times when the Austrian prohibitive system had been especially injurious to the good neighbours. For example, in the year 1829, a heavier tariff was imposed upon the import of grain from Bavaria, indispensable to the Tyrolese, whilst simultaneously a request was addressed to Munich for the lowering of the Bavarian tariff. In the year 1832, when the customs negotiations

[1] Blittersdorff's Reports, August 23, 1833, and subsequent dates.

hung in the balance, Councillor von Münch, brother of the federal envoy, came to Munich to watch the course of affairs and to do his best to prevent the conclusion of the Berlin treaties by offering a Bavario-Austrian commercial treaty. He urgently recommended that Bavaria should content herself with the commercial treaty by which since 1829 the south had been associated with Prussia. All the advantages of a Russian customs union would be outdone by a commercial treaty with Austria. When asked for details, he demanded important privileges for Austria, such as a reduction of the duty upon Bohemian iron; but he had no compensatory advantages to offer.

A private memorial handed by Münch to the king of Bavaria displayed all the characteristics of Austrian commercial policy, unfathomable ignorance of economics, and an entire lack of positive ideas; but it exhibited therewith an impudent cunning calculated with some adroitness to play upon the personal weaknesses of King Louis. The writer adduced demonstration that Bavarian manufacturing industry and the shipping trade of the Main would inevitably be ruined by the customs union—and this although Bavaria's manufactures had begun to flourish anew after the Berlin treaty of 1829. He showed further that as a matter of common knowledge South Germany was a much more vigorous consumer than North Germany, so that in a customs union Bavaria would continually be having to make payments to Prussia. Moreover, in the lands where the gulden was current, lands where prices were so low, a terrible rise in the cost of living might be expected as soon as there was free intercourse with the thaler countries. List's old associate, Miller of Immenstadt, whose opinion concerning the memorial was asked by the High German crowns, remarked apropos of the last-mentioned proposition: "Nothing could show more strikingly how little people trouble about means when their primary object is to produce a false impression." Münch further insisted that Prussia had no trade worthy of the name, for such a tariff as the Prussian was incompatible with flourishing commerce, whereas Bavaria would soon be enabled by means of the Danube-Main canal to get into her own hands all the transit trade between England and the Black Sea and to become the only middleman handling the important Greek commerce with the west. It must be noted that at this very time the Hellenist dreams of King

Louis were in full flower. It was impossible that the sovereign who, as happy successor of Charlemagne, was constructing the important canal between the Main and the Danube, could fail to recognise the enormous significance of Bavario-Greek trade. It is true that the construction of the Ludwigskanal was not completed for another decade, whilst the Danube in its course through Austria was by no means entirely free or really navigable. For these reasons the alluring prospects held out by Münch seemed after all too uncertain to the king of Bavaria, so that while continuing to treat with the Austrian he was careful not to break off negotiations in Berlin. The political warnings, finally, of the Austrian memorial could not fail to induce amazed head-shakings in Munich and in Stuttgart. Münch insisted that the customs union played into the hands of the demagogues and was "the best means to make the government superfluous"—writing this almost at the very moment when the liberals at Pforzheim were invoking imprecations against the commercial policy of Prussian absolutism.[1] Directly tidings arrived that Mieg had settled matters in Berlin, the Austrian negotiator, in great consternation, hastened back to Vienna. Later in the year he revisited the Bavarian capital, fruitlessly once more, for he had nothing important to offer.

Now at length Prince Metternich awakened from his inert slumbers. As late as 1832 he had written to the Berlin cabinet: "It does not devolve upon the federal assembly to exercise a decisive influence in certain affairs of great importance, notably in commercial matters and in those relating to the estates." Obviously this assertion was disingenuous, but that it was made at all shows how completely the chancellor deceived himself at this time as to the seriousness of the situation, and how confidently he counted upon the failure of the Berlin negotiations. But now, when these negotiations had been brought to a successful issue, light broke in upon him, and he poured forth his sorrows in a long memorial (June 24, 1833) to which his admirers often pointed as a proof of splendid political foresight. To an unprejudiced judgment this compilation seems rather to give a terrible demonstration of the incapacity of the man who was the

[1] Münch, Memorial concerning a Bavario-Austrian commercial treaty; "Observations" thereanent by Councillor von Miller (communicated by Fahnenberg to the court of Carlsruhe, March 1, 1833).

cynosure of the courts and whom the liberals dreaded on account of his demoniacal wisdom. The memorial in question was likewise Austria's answer to the important writing issued by Motz in June, 1829,[1] and no one who compares the two works can fail to understand why the court of Vienna was fated to lose dominion over Germany.

At the outset Metternich recounts the origin of the customs union in words whose accumulated errors show once again with what superficial levity during fifteen years the Hofburg had been watching her rival's commercial policy. Through the treaty of Bavaria-Würtemberg, said the chancellor, the Prussian commercial league had recently become a power. "For the Germanic Federation as such, and above all for Austria, the Prussian customs union is unquestionably a most disadvantageous and sinister phenomenon. . . . It threatens our trade, because Austria is now hemmed in on the west and on the north by a power that competes with our manufacturing industry. Still more does it threaten German federal policy, for the essential character of the Federation is equivalence of the rights and duties of its members. Any preponderance, any special privilege accruing to a single power (and the purely formal presidency of Austria at the Bundestag can in no sense be regarded as such a privilege), is wholly foreign to the federal union as created by the Vienna congress act. . . . But to-day there has sprung to life a lesser accessory federation, which is in the fullest sense a *status in statu*. . . . Of the seventeen votes of the inner council in Frankfort, no more than seven are fully independent of the Prussian union. There can be no doubt that the relations of Austria to the other federal states, in view of the existence of this area closed to mutual trade and in view of the artificial endeavours being made to give this material separateness a political and moral stamp, must tend in the long run to be weakened, and ultimately to be entirely severed.

"The Prussian customs union is beyond question a deliberately planned and powerful tool in the hands of the party of action in Prussia, employed to further reciprocal influences favouring the growth of trade between Prussia and the rest of Germany. From the moment in which the idea, the plans, of the Prussian financiers originated and began to live, the factionaries in that country were not slow to perceive

[1] Vide supra, vol. IV, p. 516 et seq.

the advantage which might thereby accrue to them. Should their plans be realised, the party would achieve its true aim, for Prussia, equipped with a new representative constitution, would become leader of constitutionalist Germany. In Prussia, recently, the straightforward and convinced supporters of the customs union have been mainly derived from the party of movement. But these men have coupled their cause so adroitly with the cause of the state, and have been so clever in interweaving the latter cause with the new system, that it will be impossible for a modified Prussian administration to come into existence without compromises, and it will prove more or less indispensable to devote the colours of Prussia to the advancement of ideas which are essentially opposed to the ideas of the Federation. . . . The monarchical interest of the Prussian throne is conjoined with that of Austria and of the Germanic Federation. . . . against so objectionable and so unnatural a work." It will be seen that the affinity between "the excessively dangerous doctrine of German unity" and the customs union, an affinity to which the alarmed Marschall had drawn his patron's attention as far back as the year 1820, had at length become plain to the chancellor. Now, therefore, for the first time in fifteen years, it occurred to Metternich to ask whether Austria might not be able to do something on behalf of German commerce.

But what steps were possible? The Federation, unfortunately, had no right to interfere. An open breach with Prussia was "not within the designs nor accordant with the policy of Austria." Since, alas, the Mid-German union had perished, the only course left open was at this late date to carry out article 19 of the federal act, which promised that the Bundestag should discuss commercial questions! "In no other way than by a general agreement can the means be discovered which will render it possible to paralyse the partial and selfish designs of individual members of the Federation." Does not this sound like a fairy tale, that the Austrian chancellor, when his state's position of power was threatened by a terrible danger, could find no better resource than the pitiful proposal to trot out once more the poor old hobby-horse which thirteen years before the political sages of the Vienna conferences had exercised in lunge until it had been completely worn out. "Hanover," continued Metternich, "whose government is animated by so admirable a federative

spirit, has already made proposals to the Federation in this sense. The Bundestag must decree freedom of transit trade. This will offer few difficulties to Austria, for Herr Klebelsberg, president of the privy exchequer, has assured me that our laws regarding transit trade are extremely liberal. It is true that we cannot expect any striking success against Prussia to issue from such a decree. A more efficient weapon, therefore, for the attack upon the Prussian customs system is offered by the second Hanoverian proposal for the freeing of trade between the federal states. Were the Bundestag to decree that in all German states imports from other federal states are to receive preferential treatment as compared with imports from states foreign to the Federation, the Prussian customs system would be hit in its most vital part. But that this may be possible it will be necessary to moderate the Austrian customs system to such a point that we shall be enabled by the offer of reciprocity to negotiate with the other German federal states for the carrying out of article 19."

Thus little did Vienna understand the true nature of our commercio-political struggles! That the whole value of the customs union consisted in the abolition of internal tolls; that the Mid-German union had perished precisely because it had not dared to undertake this freeing of the German market; that the Prussian commercial union could be outbid only by a yet more comprehensive customs union—all these truths, now plain to the pettiest Thuringian cabinets, were still beyond the grasp of Austrian statesmanship. Metternich hoped that the German states would surrender the immeasurable advantages of a free German market for the paltry prospect that at the customs barriers of thirty German states their wares should receive preferential treatment over foreign imports. Even this feeble thought of the Austrian chancellor failed to secure adoption in Vienna, not because half-measures were spurned, but because to the dulness of the court the plan seemed to err on the side of boldness. President Krieg had recommended a lowering of the tariff on the Prussian model, and since May, 1833, Binder, the Austrian privy councillor, had been in Berlin discussing the possibility of a commercial treaty. Emperor Francis, however, gave attentive ear to the plaints of his manufacturers; he dreaded more lively intercourse with the corrupt foreign world; and he detested innovations. In the summer of 1834 he decided that abatement of the Austrian

tariff should be effected only in return for concessions made by the customs union—and this at a time when Austria, owing to her rigid prohibitive system, was even less in a position than France to treat with Prussia on an equal footing. The Austrian negotiator left Berlin without having achieved any result.

Incapable of effective action, the Hofburg was all the busier in its attempts at indirect interference. Day after day its newspapers voiced their suspicions of Prussia's commercial policy. The faithful house of Thurn and Taxis despatched the mails from Frankfort to Switzerland by way of Alsace, in order to spite Baden, Prussia's protégé. But the main blow was delivered by the Guelphs. In the summer of 1832, Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Nassau, Bremen, and Frankfort lodged before the Bundestag a complaint against Electoral Hesse for infringing the Mid-German and the Eimbeck treaties. They demanded the annulment of the customs union with Prussia and the reinstitution of the Electoral Hessian transit dues upon the old basis. The hour was cunningly chosen. At this precise moment, Moritz Mohl's obstinacy had almost succeeded in ruining the negotiations between Prussia and Bavaria-Würtemberg. The court of Dresden, in a temporary relapse of prussophobia, virtuously declared to the Bundestag that no state was entitled to misuse the fortuitous advantage of geographical situation to impose difficulties upon the free commerce of its neighbours. In addition, the English envoys at all the lesser courts issued warnings and fanned the flames of discontent. Never before had the union between England and Hanover led to such shameful consequences. Just as, at English instigation, the Hanoverian government had refused to fulfil its federal duties in Luxemburg, so now did that government request the London court to render assistance against Prussia, so that the transit dues between Bremen and Frankfort and between Hamburg and Leipzig, dues so harmful to British trade, might be done away with. A private Hanoverian memorial stated in plain terms: "Such an intervention on England's part would seem to be all the more desirable, seeing that Hanover, without England's assistance, and should the proposal now made not be adopted by the Bundestag, might not long be able to make head against the great commercial superiority of Prussia, and might also be compelled (to the detriment of English commerce)

to adopt the Prussian customs system." [1] Thus did a German government warn the British against German unity, and Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to transmit this Hanoverian memorial as an instruction to his envoys in Germany.

Inasmuch as the letter of the law was manifestly against Electoral Hesse, for a brief period, by threats and flatteries, Münch-Bellinghausen was able to shark up a majority favourable to the Hanoverian government, receiving Metternich's most cordial praises for his holy zeal. The spectacle was painful—on the one hand the unquestionable guilt of the defendants, who had broken treaty, and on the other the no less unquestionable hypocrisy of the plaintiffs! Now that the petrified Holy Roman Empire had passed away, the most deplorable moral evil, the most profound inveracity of our constitution, lay in this, that it permitted the German states to misuse the sacred forms of law for the settlement of conflicting political interests. Just as in former days the Ratisbon Reichstag had endeavoured to solve the difficult problems of power which found expression in the Seven Years War, by instituting criminal proceedings against Frederick, the disturber of the peace, so now did Hanover and her Mid-German associates endeavour, by the judgment of an arbitral court, not so much to punish Electoral Hesse for the breach of treaty, as to hinder the commencing commercial unity of Germany.

The defence put forward by the Electoral Hessian government was clumsy. Its envoy justly pointed out that the Mid-German customs union had never come into effective existence; and he showed that by adhering to the Prussian union Electoral Hesse had manifestly acted in the sense of article 19, for free trade now prevailed from the French to the Russian frontier. But he weakened the force of these arguments by sophistical excuses. Further, he made a violent attack on Hanover, declaring that his own government would never (like that of Hanover) defend foreign commercial interests in the heart of Germany, and in this way he aroused the anger of the majority, who felt that the cap fitted them also Nagler openly espoused Hesse's cause, pointing out that arbitral courts were competent merely to decide upon points of law.

[1] Hanoverian Promemoria, issued as an Instruction to the English envoys in Germany and Switzerland (communicated to Lottum by Eichhorn, December 14, 1832).

and had no title to deal with conflicting interests. Twelve years earlier, during the Coethen customs dispute, the same idea had been defended by Prussia; and since that date, for the very reason that the doctrine gave expression to the living forces of history, it had been denounced with intense moral indignation from all the professorial chairs devoted to the formal exposition of the federal law. In addition to the two Hesses, Bavaria alone rallied loyally to Prussia's support. Whilst Hanover expressed esteem for the fidelity to the federal constitution displayed by Austria, the presidential court, King Louis instructed his envoy in Frankfort to declare that the Prussian government merited the thanks of the Federation for endeavouring by its customs treaties to secure the fulfilment of article 19.

Nagler desired to postpone the decision until the customs treaties had all been signed in Berlin and until the question had thus been spontaneously settled. But the Austrian majority pressed forward without even waiting for instructions from home, for to the federal envoys it seemed that their official dignity was wounded by Prussia's independent line of action. Three sworn enemies of Prussian commercial policy, Austria, Denmark, and Mecklenburg, were commissioned to act as referendaries. Upon their proposal it was agreed that Austria, Denmark, and Baden should mediate in the name of the Germanic Federation. Since the attempt at reconciliation proved fruitless, the arbitral proceedings were pushed on with a celerity unprecedented in Frankfort. Electoral Hesse having refused to propose to the plaintiff the names of three "impartial" federal states, the right of nomination now devolved upon the federal assembly. The majority decided to offer the plaintiff the choice between Austria, Baden, and Schwerin. As was to be expected, Hanover's selection fell upon the sublime house of Austria, and the documents were sent to the supreme court of Vienna. Thus was Austria appointed "impartial" judge in the affairs of the Mid-German customs union, a body which had been formed under the Austrian banner! A dispute which in ultimate analysis resolved itself into a struggle for power between England, Austria, and Prussia, was to be decided by an Austrian law-court and in accordance with the principles of civil law! Moreover, the real plaintiff, the Mid-German commercial union, had absolutely ceased to exist in the spring of 1833, when the

documents went forward to Vienna; for the secession of Saxony and Thuringia had detached the last stones from the crazy structure of the sonderbund. It would have been impossible to provide a plainer demonstration of the inveracity of the federal constitution.

The Prussian government was only too well acquainted with the pitifulness of the arbitral courts. Involved in innumerable disputes with her neighbours, she had at this time five such actions on her hands, a fate from which Austria was preserved precisely because Austria was not a German state. Prussia now endeavoured to induce the Hanoverian cabinet to drop the preposterous legal proceedings. The other federal states, those which had in the interim come to terms with Berlin, were beginning to recognise how absurd the whole affair was. Thuringia, Würtemberg, and Saxony changed their minds, and Metternich wrote savagely: "Were we to take another vote in Frankfort, we should be in the minority!" The Badenese court vacillated long between the great cause of German unity and the formal sanctity of law (in this instance involving gross injustice), but came over in the end to Prussia's side. Electoral Hesse, in understanding with Prussia, now agreed to lower her transit dues, thus removing the principal ground for complaint. Austria needed Prussia's help at the new Vienna conferences, and the chancellor thought it inadvisable to irritate the North German rival any further. Consequently this frivolous law-case was entombed in the archives of the Austrian supreme court, and the attempt to decide the problems of the German future by the judgment of an Austrian law-court had proved a lamentable failure.

Simultaneously with the complaint against Electoral Hesse, Hanover made a proposal to the Bundestag which showed unambiguously that the aim of the Guelph crown was, not the maintenance of its treaty rights, but the conduct of a customs war against Prussia. The famous article 19 must at length be carried out by the Federation. Pending the possibility of complete free trade, Hanover proposed to facilitate transit trade by the introduction of a tariff for transit dues graduated according to weight and distance, with a maximum of thirty kreutzers, on the ground that the freedom of the rivers promised by the Vienna congress should apply also to the high roads. In addition, commerce in German products

should be facilitated, and joint measures should be taken against smuggling. The aim of these proposals, which were couched in the usual high-sounding phrases about liberty, was obvious. The sonderbund having spontaneously collapsed, the commercial policy of the Mid-German union, the struggle against Prussia's transit dues, was to be taken over by the Germanic Federation, and by a federal decree free import of English goods to the Frankfort emporium was to be ensured. It was for this reason the sophistical plea was put forward that freedom of the rivers involved also freedom of the high roads—an assertion positively shameless in the mouth of Hanover. For who hindered the freedom of navigation on the Elbe? The Guelph crown by its "marine dues" at Stade! It was for this reason the assurance generated in the grossest ignorance was made that the Federation could seize some isolated details from the German customs system, could reorganise the transit dues and the taxation levied upon German products, without affecting the customs system as a whole.

Münch-Bellinghausen hastened to push the proposal with great zeal. In private conversation he did not hesitate to admit that Hanover's suggestion was merely a move in the game against the German customs union. "We cannot," he said to Blittersdorff, "look on supinely whilst certain federal states establish institutions which leave the remaining federal states with no resource beyond submitting to gradual destruction, or else, at the cost of their independence, accepting subordination to the right of the stronger." [1]

At the outset, as on a former occasion at the Vienna ministerial conferences, Prussia stood almost alone. Hope for the destruction of the burdensome Prussian transit dues had driven even the Saxon court into the Austrian camp. To win over the High German kings, Hanover had proposed that the Federation should organise the transit dues in accordance with the principles of the Bavario-Würtemberg tariff. This lure, and the persuasion of the unresting Stralenheim, the Hanoverian envoy, had made the courts of Stuttgart and Munich favourable to the Guelph proposal. The Hamburg senate, which had hitherto exhibited a prudent reserve towards the intrigues of the Mid-German union, now changed its tune, and issued a long memorial to demonstrate that German commerce should by rights accommodate itself to the interests

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, December 18.

of Hanseatic transit trade. Not in vain had the learned Böhmer written his ardent book against Prussia, the disturber of the peace. Obviously enlightened by Böhmer's historical researches, the Hamburg merchants appealed to the Golden Bull. When two federal states were separated by the customs barriers of an intervening federal state, they had a right to completely unrestricted commercial intercourse, and this right must be protected by the Bundestag. The Elbe and the Weser, the only two purely German routes of world commerce, would not become perfectly free in the sense of the Vienna congress act until the roads in their respective basins had been entirely liberated from transit dues. Consequently the transit dues must be restored to the status of 1815. These empty phrases of mercantile cunning, whose sole aim was manifestly to safeguard the passage of English wares between Hamburg and Frankfort and to open the interior of Germany to contraband on the grand scale, were seriously defended as late as fifteen years after this time by the Swabian writer, C. F. Wurm, one of our most talented publicists ! [1]

In Frankfort, Nagler now fought the hypocrisy of the federal patriots no less confidently and with no less assured a touch than had been exhibited by Bernstorff at an earlier date in Vienna. He showed once more that the Federation could do nothing on behalf of this cause, seeing that among the states represented at the Bundestag, there were some which were unwilling to participate in genuine customs unity.[2] The Berlin cabinet referred proudly to its past successes. All previous attempts had miscarried, and to this miscarriage alone was it to be ascribed that Hanover had again applied to the Bundestag. What was to be gained by reducing the transit dues ? Not a single tariff hindrance to German commerce would thereby be removed. In the Prussian customs union, on the other hand, for the members of that union, transit dues had not been moderated merely, but abolished. Electoral Hesse likewise protested against sterile half measures. Nothing would be of any avail but the amalgamation of the customs systems. Were this done, "no demagogue would be in a position to lead the trusty German people astray." A new Prussian memorial was issued to refute the contention of the

[1] Wurm, Report on the Function of the Hansa Towns, 1847.

[2] Eichhorn, Memorial concerning Article 19 of the Federal Act, October 25, 1832.

Hamburg senate. This writing demonstrated how inseparable was the connection between transit dues and import dues. It was absurd to say that Hamburg's proposals would not tend to the advantage of the foreign world! Of the "Hansa goods" which Hamburg desired to send duty-free into the interior of Germany, nine-tenths would be of foreign origin.

According to Blittersdorff's reports, almost all the federal envoys were greatly incensed by these "anti-federal" declarations. Münch complained, "Prussia is to-day defending the very principles of the revolution which in the field of high politics she is fighting in conjunction with Austria. The federal laws are no longer to be interpreted in accordance with the rights of the case and in accordance with the spirit of the federal system, but in accordance with administrative and financial considerations." In a letter to Münch, Metternich censured in vigorous terms "Herr von Nagler's declaration, which is foolish to the point of absurdity."[1] But Prussian folly remained victorious on the field. The customs union treaties were signed, and since they all contained the proviso of federal loyalty that the customs union would be dissolved as soon as article 19 should be carried into effect, the Bundestag was unable to affect the accomplished fact by any sophistical phrase-making. Henceforward Prussia was sure of a majority, and Münch did not venture to put the Hanoverian proposals to the vote. The dispute was shelved, and yet another time had the Bundestag proved its utter ineffectiveness.

Nevertheless, during the Vienna conferences of 1834, the irreconcilable Guelph court again attempted to use this lamentable article 19 as a weapon against the customs union. Again, too, did the Hansa towns rally to the side of the Guelphs. No less a man than Smidt of Bremen was the author of a memorial which Ompteda the Hanoverian minister handed to the conferences. Here were embodied in new guise the old stupidities which had so recently and successfully been quashed at the Bundestag. "An organism foreign to the Federation" had taken charge of the commercial problem, and had already won more popular support than the Federation itself! For these reasons there must promptly be established a permanent committee of the Bundestag to maintain the legal status of the Federation and to promote commerce, transit

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, February 11, 1833.

trade in especial. But now that the great customs union was already in existence, the old siren's songs had ceased to charm. The assembly remained cold, Austria and Mecklenburg being the only supporters of the Guelph and Hanseatic visionaries. Even the smooth-tongued Ancillon plucked up heart to declare that there was absolutely no prospect of any efficient commercio-political activity on the part of the Bundestag. Mieg, Bavaria's representative, now restored to favour by his capricious master, expressed his opposition to the proposals in yet more incisive and energetic terms. In the end, to avoid offending the Guelphs by a curt negative, it was decided that the federal envoys should receive instructions, so that the Bundestag might appoint a committee and occupy itself with commercial questions. Fourteen years earlier, at the first Vienna conferences, almost exactly the same resolution had been adopted, amid the Homeric laughter of the assembly.[1] Thus did German diplomacy run in a circle under the wise leadership of Metternich. The perturbed spirit of article 19 at length found rest in the tomb.

The Guelph crown was unteachable. In this same year it formed with Brunswick the tax union (May 1, 1834), which was subsequently joined by Oldenburg and Bückeburg. This was the ultimate vestige of the wrecked Mid-German sonderbund, but there could no longer be any thought of hostilities. On the contrary, the relationships between the two unions soon became quite friendly. They supported one another by a tariff cartel and by the exchange of enclaves. The tax union, like the great customs union, pledged its members to complete tariff community and distributed its revenues proportionally to population. A very low tariff was to facilitate the import trade of the English and of the Hanseats, providing the well-to-do population with cheap coffee and wine. Thus it came to pass that the tax union was extolled by the Hanoverian diet no less vigorously than the great customs union was opposed by the South German liberals. These German Britons considered it a token of superior civilisation that in their case the hundredweight of silk goods was taxed almost ninety-eight thalers less, wine five thalers less, and sugar seven thalers less, than in the customs union. Public opinion in the inland regions, being prone to regard the state as an exacting enemy, considered at the outset that this self-satisfaction was quite

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 342.

justifiable. The yield of the import duties was considerable, higher by nearly a third than in the customs union. Only by degrees did it become apparent that this sonderbund artificially interfered with the growth of German manufacturing industry for the advantage of England and the Hanseats, and that economic prosperity advanced far more rapidly in the neighbouring domains of the customs union than it advanced in Hanover. But after these lamentable defeats, the Austrian statesmen soon relapsed into their old and sublime self-deception. The great customs union had had hardly celebrated its first birthday when Münch exclaimed to Blittersdorff with malicious delight: "The accession of so many states will strengthen separatist interests, and will lead before long to the dissolution of the union!" [1]

§ 5. THE STRAGGLERS: BADEN, NASSAU, FRANKFORT.

At the time when the presidential envoy expressed this patriotic hope, the youthful commercial union had manifested its vitality by unambiguous indications, and was on the point of extending its conquests over the last minor states of southern and central Germany. Baden, though on terms of close friendship with Prussia, had not yet adhered to the customs union, thus affording striking proof of the enormous difficulties involved in these complicated negotiations. Twice, in 1829 and in 1830-31, Prussia had endeavoured to bring about a commercial understanding between Baden and the High German kings. On each occasion, however, the unhappy Sponheim dispute had proved an insuperable obstacle—to the profound regret of King Frederick William, who considered it a point of honour to establish good relationships between the German states. The court of Carlsruhe, notwithstanding its gratitude towards Prussia, had as yet no serious inclination to risk an inconvenient alteration in the existing state of affairs for the sake of German commercial unity. It was still guided by the old principle of Berstett, who had said: "Our maxim is that, whilst we gladly show deference towards greater powers and admit their preponderance, we consider those among them to be magnanimous which incline to grant advantages to their lesser neighbours, just because these are lesser, and because they are dependent upon the great ones." [2] The government

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, January 22, 1835.
[2] Berstett, Instruction to Frankenberg, December, 1826.

contemplated with pride its "free trade system" and its important position in Europe between Germany, France, and Switzerland. The customs revenue amounted to 13¼ silbergroschen per head of population, a far smaller return than that of Prussia, but enough nevertheless to prevent any loudly expressed desire for innovation. The material disadvantages of the contraband traffic that was carried on with so much vigour in Baden, devolved exclusively upon her neighbours; whilst neither the government nor the inhabitants in general had any eye for the grave moral drawbacks of the practice. Even Nebenius, in his work upon *Baden's Accession*, wrote as if from a standpoint of elevation, as if Baden had little to gain from the customs union, and would join only for the sake of Germany.

For these reasons the Badenese government displayed at the outset little inclination to abandon its isolated position. Not until Bavaria and Würtemberg had determined upon complete customs unification with Prussia did Carlsruhe become concerned, and think it expedient to make similar proposals to Berlin (May, 1832), considering that "the last states to adhere are likely to secure less favourable terms."[1] But Prussia, fully occupied in the negotiations with Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Thuringia, was unwilling at this juncture to open the Badenese question, which would inevitably reawaken the anger of the Wittelsbach ruler. Consequently the court of Carlsruhe again remained inactive. For a time it continued to cherish the hope that Hanover's proposal to the Bundestag might open a new path, and might save the little territory the pain of having to abolish its "free trade system." This expectation having proved illusory, the recognition at length began to gain ground that Baden no longer had any choice. But the declared reluctance of its subjects imposed caution on the court, and it was considered advisable in the first instance to summon a meeting of Badenese agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers. During the winter of 1833-34 Böchk, minister for finance, discussed matters with these notables without securing an agreement; the agriculturists and the merchants were decisively against adhesion to the union, and even of the manufacturers some only favoured the proposal.

Prussian statesmen, on the other hand, now first began

[1] Opinion of the Badenese, minister for foreign affairs, May 3, 1832.

to feel the chains of the renowned "federalism," and realised that their diplomatic activities were hampered on all hands by their lesser allies. Even Eichhorn admitted to the court of Carlsruhe that Bavaria and Würtemberg harboured an invincible mistrust of Baden owing to the organised and officially favoured smuggling traffic.[1] The court of Stuttgart, in especial, was extremely morose. King William angrily asked why this state, situate within the Würtemberg sphere of influence, should have made approaches to Berlin instead of to Stuttgart. It was still quite uncertain whether Würtemberg would agree to grant Baden's "request for admission." The Swabian scriveners, in ill repute among the associates of the customs union on account of their pedantic respect for formalities, were ever hostile to innovations. Hitherto they had independently supervised an extended customs frontier, but should Baden join the union, Swabia would be reduced to the position of an "inland territory," and would be shamefully dependent upon her allies. Who was going to pay the pensions for the Würtemberg customs officials in the Black Forest, about to become superfluous? Baden demanded duties on the Neckar at the rate of from five to six kreutzer; Würtemberg and Darmstadt would agree to no more than four kreutzer; the court of Stuttgart had already lodged a complaint with the Federation. German diplomacy shuddered when talking of this "kreutzer question"; the indefatigable Moritz Mohl wrote a memorial upon the subject, extending to two thousand foolscap folios. The Würtemberg envoy in Carlsruhe, General Bismarck, the well-known Bonapartist, stimulated friction between the two courts by intrigue and gossip. Count Mornay, the French envoy, likewise endeavoured once more to promote dissension. The Bavarian court was comparatively friendly, especially since Prussia had declared that the Sponheim dispute had better be ignored for the present, and that an understanding upon this vexed question would be easier to secure when Bavaria and Baden had for a time enjoyed friendly relations as fellow members of the customs union. But even in Munich there was a lively sense of jealousy on account of Prussia's encroaching ambition. Minister Gise privately assured Röntgen, Badenese chargé d'affaires, that the uprightness of the Prussian government was universally recognised. "But," he continued, "it is my duty to warn intending new members of the union

[1] Eichhorn, Instruction to Otterstedt, September 7, 1833.

that there is a risk lest their position should become one of distressing dependence. No one can now fail to recognise Prussia's secret aims. Bavaria will counteract these in every possible way, and will endeavour to bring about, on the part of all the other states in the union, a firm cooperation against Prussia. Bavaria likewise hopes that Baden will recognise how completely her interests harmonise with those of Bavaria and Würtemberg."[1]

Amid such a medley of intrigues, suspicions, and hidden designs, the utmost publicity was the utmost wisdom. To Baden's renewed enquiries, King Frederick William responded as follows at new year, 1834: "We will not, as Baden desires, despatch a Prussian financier to Carlsruhe, for this would arouse the suspicion of the South German crowns. The court of Carlsruhe would do well, in the first instance, to discuss matters confidentially with Hoffmann of Darmstadt, who is one of the most vigorous supporters of the union. Then it will be possible to begin actual negotiations, but they must take place in Berlin, and must be conducted by statesmen of high position, not by subordinates."[2] The king subsequently had the instructions issued to the embassies in the states of the customs union read to the Badenese representative, and Frankenberg found them to be "all composed in the spirit of correctness and openness which characterises the Prussian cabinet."

At length, in the summer of 1834, Böckh came to Berlin. The conferences lasted through June and July, but so many difficulties had to be overcome that negotiations continued between the cabinets down to the close of the year. The court of Carlsruhe still cherished the illusion that for the sake of Baden the customs union would concede a notable reduction of tariff, and it was long before this fancy could be dispelled. An additional obstacle existed in the dispute about the Neckar dues. As late as December the king urgently begged the grand duke to give way on this matter, saying: "Prussia has but a single interest, and it is one of primary importance, namely, the desire to see satisfactory relations established between the German governments, and all occasion for quarrels removed." In the end, however, this contentious question had to be eliminated from the negotiations, its settlement

[1] Röntgen's Reports, April 23 and May 10, 1834.
[2] Frankenberg's Report, January 1, 1834.

being postponed until happier days. The greatest difficulty arose from the narrow and extended configuration of Badenese territory. Were the laws of the customs union to be strictly enforced, almost the whole of Baden would become a frontier area. Baden therefore demanded that along the Rhenish frontier, where supervision was comparatively easy, the frontier area should be no more than a league in width. Unless this were done, almost all the trade of the territory would be subjected to the burdensome restrictions enforced in frontier areas. Saxony promptly demanded the like privilege for her frontier in the Erzgebirge. The treaty was not signed until May 12, 1835. The narrow frontier area was conceded to Baden, and at the eleventh hour yet another concession was wrung from the reluctant financiers in Berlin, it being agreed that the Badenese tobacco cultivators were to be reimbursed on account of raw tobacco exported to Switzerland. Since in Saxony and Thuringia the results of attempts at a subsequent collection of the customs dues had proved unsatisfactory, it was decided on this occasion to take the merchants by surprise. On the night of May 17-18 the enforcement of the new tariff began at the Badenese frontier posts, at a time when the populace were hardly aware of the Berlin treaty, the government undertaking to refund the duties should the diet fail to approve the treaty.

This determined step served not merely to secure considerable sums for the customs revenue, but it ensured in addition the approval of the treaty. Nothing could overcome liberal resistance but the might of an accomplished fact. Rotteck declaimed against the "economic enslavement of the nation," and said "the vortex of the customs union will engulf us all in the abyss of absolutism!" Another member of the parliamentary opposition prophesied that the Prussian thalers would inundate the country—to which the ministerial rejoinder was that the more copious the suggested inundation, the better. But the government was in a most embarrassing situation, for Badenese free trade, which it had so often defended, had now to be publicly condemned as a systematic favouring of contraband. The aristocracy in the upper house took a view more liberal than that of the professed liberals. Prince Löwenstein-Wertheim extolled "the noble self-denial of Prussia, and the great national work which will secure for the Prussian government imperishable renown." In addition

to Nebenius, two other experienced economists advocated accession to the union: Rau, the celebrated Heidelberg professor; and Mathy, Rau's pupil, a converted opponent of Prussian commercial policy, who manifested once more on this occasion the depth and independence of his judgment, even going so far as to hold up Prussian freedom of occupation as a model for Badenese liberalism. The cautious tone of Mathy's pamphlet shows how difficult it still was to run counter to the prejudices of the liberal world. The chambers approved the treaty by a small majority, and the other customs allies now gave their assent, though the diet committee of Electoral Hesse objected at first, and had to be reduced to silence by a sharp note from Prussia. There followed another profuse distribution of orders of distinction, and in the end a further acrimonious correspondence between Cassel and Carlsruhe. The Electoral Hessian officials had taken offence because the order of the Zähringen Lion which had been bestowed on them bore no oak-leaves. But the storm blew over when it transpired that this particular lion was still in the first bloom of youth, and did not as yet possess any oak-leaves.

Shortly after the accession of these friendly states, one of the fiercest opponents of Prussia, the court of Nassau, had to make peace, but not until it had given an unforgettable example of dishonourable sentiments. Even in Vienna the indignation aroused by the tidings of Prussia's success was hardly so savage as in Biebrich. Marschall fumed and raged. Never, he wrote to Fabricius the envoy, would Nassau join a foreign customs system. "We are for centralisation in matters concerning the maintenance of tranquillity; but in customs and commercial affairs we are opposed to centralisation, which is here incompatible with sovereignty. We have, therefore, rejected all proposals to this end. Other governments, which in the sense of the revolutionary party have strongly maintained their sovereignty against the Bundestag, have unfortunately yielded to such allurements." [1] The boaster was deliberately lying, being well aware that neither to Nassau nor to any other court had Prussia made advances. But the local situation was becoming more intolerable day by day. The little territory was now surrounded by the domains of the customs union, and the increasing savagery of the inhabi-

[1] Marschall to Fabricius, September 25, 1833.

tants owing to the impudent smuggling trade was beginning to arouse concern in Biebrich. Marschall often said proudly that Nassau's position upon the free Rhine guaranteed to the realm the perpetual independence of its commercial policy. But this, too, was a deliberate faslehood. Nothing but Prussia's tolerance now permitted the Nassau despot an independent commercial policy, for as soon as she desired Prussia could apply the enclave system to Nassau, and the position of the Biebrich court would then become as desperate as had formerly been that of Coethen.

Was there any way of escaping the otherwise inevitable subjugation? The only resource was obviously to make common cause with a foreign power, to turn for assistance to the tried and trusty protector of particularism. For some years Count Fénelon had been reiterating assurances that France was prepared to conclude favourable commercial treaties with the minor states if only these would hold aloof from the Prussian commercial union. But the duke of Nassau was a strict legitimist, and would hear nothing at first of an alliance with the bourgeois king. Trouble in his domain treasury came to the assistance of the alluring appeals made by the French envoy. The revenue from the domain, in whose interest the commercial policy of Nassau was solely directed, had as its leading item the returns from the mineral water trade. Nassau economists were talking of a mineral water monopoly, in virtue of which the yield of these precious springs would belong by right to the sovereign. Now some years earlier France had raised the tariff upon foreign mineral waters, thus severely affecting the ducal springs. Not in vain, however, was Marschall the friend of Rothschild, and he conceived the cunning mercantile notion that Nassau might request France to lower this duty, promising in return for a certain term of years to have nothing to do with any customs union. The agreeable prospect of increased revenue overcame the legitimist duke's objections. The minister hoped to secure a powerful standing ground in the struggle against Prussia. He would be able for years to come to refuse to join the customs union, pleading his treaty obligations with France.

In the summer of 1833 Privy Councillor Fabricius discussed this plan in Paris. On September 19th was signed the commercial treaty between France and Nassau, the most sordid of all the treaties in the history of the customs union, and

for this reason kept profoundly secret. Carl Braun was the first to publish the document (in the year 1866). As is usual with pieces of knavery, the wording sounded harmless enough. France promised preferential treatment of mineral waters from Nassau; Nassau undertook that the duty on French wines and silks should not be increased during the next five years. Thus the disgraceful purport of the treaty was concealed by cautious circumlocution. The lowering of the Nassau duties on wines and silks was a mere pretext, for Nassau, a wine-growing country, did not import more than three thousand bottles of French wine per annum, whilst the yearly import of French silk amounted to about ten hundredweight. All that the Orleans ruler cared about was that the petty German state should in one way or another be pledged for five years against joining the customs union. The duke ratified the treaty; he tolerated the bourgeois king's refusing him the *Alternat* in the matter of the signatures; he even put up with the offensive tricolored cords with which the French documents were fastened. No sacrifices could be too great if they enabled him to satisfy his avarice and to gratify his hatred of Prussia.

By degrees, however, the duke became ashamed. He visited Berlin in the autumn of 1833, learning much there, and being assured by his good friend Wittgenstein that in commercial matters Eichhorn was unfortunately all-powerful. Marschall died shortly afterwards; the French treaty formed the worthy crown of his political career. The Austrian policy of the petty court now began to vacillate, for Magdeburg, minister for finance, urgently advised that the hopeless resistance should be abandoned. But how was Nassau to get out of the treaty obligations which had so recently been accepted? A legal artifice was to help the Nassau court over its difficulties, in the way in which so many other members of the Mid-German sonderbund had been helped in similar circumstances. The treaty was to lapse should the French chambers fail to approve it in their next session. Owing to press of business and amid the excitement of the parliamentary struggle, the carrying out of this article had been forgotten in Paris. The French government had promptly atoned for the oversight, introducing the preference upon Nassau mineral waters by royal decree, and expressly promising to submit this decree to the chambers as soon as they reassembled. There could

be no doubt that the chambers would approve, seeing that the treaty secured such advantages for the Orleans commercial policy. France had consequently fulfilled her pledges quite satisfactorily except for a trifling error of form. But this insignificant oversight gave the Nassau court the desired pretext to break the treaty. In July, 1834, Fabricius notified Paris that the treaty was null. The French court, justly incensed at this manifestation of German faith, rejoined: "French honour spurns any such suspicion." A fierce article in the *Moniteur* said that the court of Nassau had availed itself of a technicality in order to evade fulfilment of the treaty. Fabricius grasped the liar's last resort, proudly declaring that it was beneath his government's dignity to answer such accusations.

Whilst Marschall's final work was thus being undone by manifest roguery, Nassau was endeavouring to come to terms with the customs union. On March 5, 1834, Blittersdorff, an old confidant of the duke, reported that in Biebrich the necessity for joining the union was now recognised, but that the duke had gone too far in the struggle against Prussia, could not expose himself by making requests, and would wait until offers came from the other side. But the offers were not forthcoming. The petty despot, whose hatred of the foreign customs system had made him humble himself before France, had in the end to abase himself before Prussia. On October 8th Lestocq, collective envoy in Berlin, requested the opening of negotiations. The Prussian statesmen dallied for a while, desiring the prior settlement of the Badenese question. The discussions did not begin until July, 1835. Eichhorn, desiring to punish the Nassau court for its dishonourable conduct, wished to concede only a restricted voting right. Moreover, the Thuringian states were affronted at the idea that Nassau should be granted more extensive rights than themselves. But Wittgenstein warmly espoused his old friend's cause, and Frederick William's inexhaustible good nature secured a full pardon for the repentant sinner. For the rest, while the negotiations were in progress, Nassau displayed astounding impudence. Her plenipotentiary demanded, not merely the continuance of the navigation taxes upon the Main and the Rhine and of the monopoly rights of the ducal mills; he demanded also that the Nassau spas should have the privileges of fair towns; and he demanded finally a preference for the duchy in the distribution of the customs revenue, on the

ground that Ems, Wiesbaden, and Schwalbach, health resorts largely attended by foreign visitors, must certainly consume more than other towns of the union! In the end, however, Nassau joined the customs union on December 10, 1835, with equal voting power and an equal share in the revenue. Ten years later it appeared that the actual receipts from the Nassau customs had been barely half a million thalers, whilst the share of the general revenue allotted to the little state had been two and a half million thalers. Yet Nassau had demanded preferential treatment!

Just as Nassau conspired with France against the customs union, so did the free city of Frankfort endeavour with English aid to escape Prussian fetters. The trading institutions of the towns were arranged, as in the case of the Hansa towns, to suit the needs of transit trade; all classes of the population regarded as natural enemies the foreign customs officials just outside their gates. The smuggler was a well-loved figure, and was a welcome guest in the merchants' offices. For the Frankfort merchant, like the Leipzig merchant hitherto, was firmly convinced that his business could never endure the "petty tyrannies" of the custom house officials, declaring, "the customs union would destroy our commercial existence."

In the senate, where Austrian influence was predominant, there now originated the idea of continuing on independent lines the policy of the Mid-German sonderbund, and of opposing the customs union by means of an alliance with England. On May 13, 1832, a treaty was signed in London by Senator Harnier and Lords Palmerston and Auckland, "a treaty of commerce and navigation" to run for ten years, by which the flags of the two powers were placed on an equivalence, and by which it was agreed that in customs matters no third state should be given a preference by either of the high contracting parties. The manifest aim of this agreement was to allow goods to be conveyed freely up the Rhine in English bottoms to Frankfort, whence the wares would be forwarded to their destination by smugglers; in return the German town was to hold aloof for ten years from the Prussian commercial league, and was to cherish the hope that some day a ship might sail to England under Frankfort colours. Thus did Frankfort show her thanks for the liberation of Rhenish navigation, secured at length by Prussia after long years of

hard work. The journals of the customs union gave utterance to their rage, the old hatred for England broke out anew, the Darmstadt diet expressed its indignation at this sacrifice of the national honour. Despite the denials of the Frankfort senate it appears incontestable that the German city and not England had taken the initiative in this unsavoury deal, just as Nassau had taken the initiative in the negotiations leading up to the French treaty. The *Times* and other English journals of good standing railed at the greedy commercial spirit displayed by the British cabinet, laughing at this navigation treaty with an inland town, whose commercial policy could not possibly be detached in the long run from that of the German nation!

Discontent was on the increase in Frankfort. Bitter experience had shown that the favourite comparison between Frankfort and the other "free cities" limped with both feet. Whereas the foreign commerce of Scandinavia was largely centred in Hamburg, Frankfort, in the interior of Germany, had to rely upon German trade almost exclusively. For one firm dealing in English and French goods, there were twenty handling German products alone The forwarding trade had been reduced by one-half through Electoral Hesse's joining the customs union, and the business in leather and wines, once flourishing, had recently been at a standstill. The few English vessels which ascended the Main offered no adequate compensation for the restriction of intercourse with German neighbours. Adjoining towns were rapidly growing, such places as Hanau, Vilbel, and the flourishing fair town of Offenbach. Mainz, Frankfort's old rival, exulted with neighbourly delight. Frankfort merchants whose warehouses in that city were empty, were being compelled at great cost to rent cellars and warehouses in Offenbach. How long was the disgraceful contraband traffic to continue? Might not Prussia lose patience in the end, and apply to the refractory town the terrible enclave system? The desperate situation was depicted in eloquent pamphlets. In February, 1834, the chamber of commerce, which had long been divided on the issue, at length determined to demand accession to the Prussian customs union.

After tedious preliminary conversations with Hoffmann of Darmstadt, in the autumn of 1834 the senate requested the crown of Prussia to open formal negotiations. In January, 1835, Senator Guaita, the man who had played so odious a part in the Mid-German union, went to Berlin. A year passed

before an understanding could be secured. At the outset Frankfort expected extensive privileges for her trading classes, until Guaita at length perceived that preferential treatment conflicted with the very nature of the union. "Equality of rights," said the convert, "is the best protection for the minor states. If we demand privileges, Prussia will grant the same privileges to her cities, and the favouring of Cologne would involve the ruin of Frankfort.[1] Prussia wished the republic to adopt the Prussian system of freedom of occupation simultaneously with her accession to the Prussian customs union, for neighbours were loud in their complaints, and the Darmstadt diet had bitter things to say about the antiquated guild system. But the free city would not lay a profane hand upon this sacred relic of the bourgeoisie, and after prolonged disputes the old order was left intact. It was generally admitted that the wealthy trading centre had a comparatively high scale of consumption, and it was agreed to pay a lump sum of 4·4 florins per head of the city population, nearly four times as much as Frankfort was entitled to pro rata. The trade of the fair received the same privileges as had been granted to Leipzig. Prussia, however, refused to concede complete political equality to the petty state. After extremely complicated negotiations it was agreed that a joint customs board should be established in Frankfort. One member of this body was appointed by the senate whilst the others were nominated by the two Hesses, but Prussia retained supreme supervision of the customs administration. In other respects, through the king's indulgence, the city was granted all the rights accruing to other members of the customs union except that she had no power to offer objection to commercial treaties, and that at the customs conferences her vote was usually to be represented by the Nassau plenipotentiary.

These discussions could not take practical effect so long as the treaty with England was still in force. Inspired by a keener sense of honour than the duke of Nassau, the senate, however reluctantly, despatched a plenipotentiary to London to request that the treaty should be annulled. Not until England had agreed did Frankfort join the customs union, on January 2, 1836. There were still some difficult times ahead. The enormous accumulation of goods in the town had to be subjected to a retrospective taxation, which yielded a

[1] Blittersdorff's Report, February 4, 1835.

total of 1,680,000 florins. For several days all transport of goods was prohibited, intense excitement prevailed among the merchants, and the bourgeoisie began to regret its decision. But order was soon restored; the next fair proved extremely lucrative; to Frankfort, as to Leipzig, the customs union brought renewed prosperity. But Hanseatic conceit uttered complaints of the sister city which had "sold its birthright for a mess of pottage"—the phrase was used by Wurm so late as 1847, in his report on the Hansa towns.

With the accession of this last fragment of central Germany, the domain of the commercial league was temporarily completed. The customs union now comprised a territory of 8,253 square miles [German], with more than twenty-five million inhabitants; the frontier of this area was 1,064 miles in length, nine miles less than that which Prussia had had to supervise singlehanded in the year 1819. The work was continued with the same caution that had been displayed in its foundation, with the same respect for all economic interests, and some years now elapsed before the accession of any new members.

Formal equality between the allies was carefully maintained. Of the four first general conferences of the customs union, one only was held in Berlin (1839). The loose federal structure of the union soon exhibited its deleterious influence, imposing obstacles in the way of the development of the tariff. Financial results lagged far behind expectations; the costs of administration remained high, being from 10 to 12% of the revenue. But no defects could outweigh the enormous advantages of the great union. The economic development of Germany had hitherto been much in arrear of that of her western neighbours, but it now made such rapid progress as to enable the Germans to take their places as equal competitors in the world market. By the close of the first decade of the history of the customs union, the sins of centuries had been atoned for. The prosperity our fatherland had known before the Thirty Years' War had at length been regained.

Owing to the incomparable cumbrousness of the German state system, the political consequences of the customs union were less speedily and less directly secured than many bold intelligences had anticipated. At the beginning of the thirties Hansemann had hoped for a parliament of the customs union, out of which a German Reichstag might perhaps originate;

and doubtless many other well-meaning patriots based similar aspirations upon the German "customs state." But the commercial league was not a state, it offered no compensation for defective political unity, and existed for decades without destroying the lie of the federal constitution. In the year 1827, when du Thil had advised the grand duke to take the decisive step in Berlin, the minister had frankly declared: "Let us be under no illusions. By joining the commercial league we renounce an independent foreign policy. Should war break out between Austria and Prussia, Hesse is committed to the Prussian colours." Similarly Dahlmann, who in his grand and profound manner promptly acclaimed the customs union as the one German success since the wars of liberation, confidently declared that the commercial league would safeguard us against the recurrence of civil war. These prophesies were not literally fulfilled. The customs union did not prevent the High German states from taking up arms against Prussia. Nevertheless the year 1866 was destined to display the enormous vitality of this commercial league. The rapid victory of Prussian arms saved our state the trouble of brandishing its mightiest weapon, of promptly converting the High German courts by annulling the customs community.

The consciousness of mutual dependence, the recognition that there could no longer be any separation from the great fatherland, were impressed upon all the life habits of the nation by the petty experiences of everyday life; and in this indirect political influence lies the historical significance of the customs union. The schools of the Albertines and the Guelphs might continue to inculcate upon the mind of youth the fables of intertribal hatred and of particularist self-conceit, but nevertheless there had come an end to the philistinism of old days, to the childish belief in the glories of the system of petty states. The man of business followed with his mind's eye the bales of goods which he had despatched upon their free passage across German territories. He became accustomed, as the man of learning had long been accustomed, to look beyond the frontiers of his little native state. His vision, now adapted to wider relationships, glanced back with ironic indifference upon the pettiness of the narrower fatherland. The very idea that the old barriers of separation could ever be reestablished became strange to our people, and whoever entered the commercial league belonged to it for all time.

After every crisis, inexorable necessity refashioned the old limits of the customs union. Men endowed with cool political intelligence could with mathematical certainty foresee the course of the dispute.

The foreign world speedily abandoned the hopeless struggle against our commercial unity. French statesmen, shrugging their shoulders, regretfully admitted that France had nothing to offer the German states which could counterbalance the advantages of the Prussian customs union. It was through Bowring's reports (1839) that the British public first acquired a definite conception of the nature of the customs union, and was wont henceforward to regard Prussia as the representative of German commerce. Austria, after her repeated and futile attempts to disturb the course of events, was invariably forced in the end to leave her rival a free hand in German commercial affairs, and nothing but a tacit agreement to this effect between the two great powers served to secure the maintenance of the Germanic Federation. For Prussia the paths of her commercial policy were now so clearly indicated that even faint-heartedness could not have induced her to forsake them. Her task was to extend the commercial union until it embraced all the German states, but to extend it no further. As early as 1834 the idea was mooted in Brussels (where French lust of conquest was arousing anxiety) whether Belgium should not join the German customs union. Prussia rejected the idea; and at a later date, when the immaturity which then characterised the national sentiments of German publicists again and again induced them to advocate a commercial league with Switzerland or Holland, Prussia unerringly preserved the national character of the customs union. Thus there had come into existence two organisations within the Germanic Federation: a fictitious Germany centred in Frankfort, and a Germany of honest work centred in Berlin. The Prussian state, by its guidance of Germany's commercial policy, fulfilled part of the duties which properly devolved upon the Germanic Federation, just as Prussia alone, by her army, safeguarded the frontiers of the fatherland. Thus it came to pass that by straightforward industry Prussia grew by degrees to become the leading power of the fatherland; and only because the European world did not think it worth while to acquire a serious knowledge of Prussia's military system and of Prussia's commercial policy, did Europe fail

to note the quiet strengthening of the centre of the continent.

There is a remarkable kinship between the history of the economic unification of Germany and the history of her political unification. Both movements resemble a great dialectical process. Prussian hegemony did not prove victorious until repeated and futile attempts had indisputably proved the impracticability of any other form of unity. A rich heritage of monarchical traditions and of traditions that were federalistic in the best sense of the term was transmitted from the experiences of the customs union to the North German union and to the German empire. In the customs union Prussia became practised in the monarchical leadership of a many-headed and almost amorphous league which would not fit into any known category of constitutional law, this leadership being acquired rather by insight and goodwill and by natural preponderance of power than by any formal privilege. From the thirties onwards there existed two fundamentally diverse schools of German statesmanship. On the one hand were the politicians of the Bundestag, lamentable creatures, in whom the original sin of diplomacy, the interchange of business and chatter, had become second nature; these men were political children, laboriously kept alive upon the condensed milk of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Augsburg and the *Frankfurter Oberpostamtszeitung*, men who knew how to make a solemn and serious use of the forms and the formulas of the vain federal law. On the other hand were the sober minded and practical men of the customs union, accustomed to the cautious consideration of grave interests, accustomed to make just and benevolent allowance for the wishes and needs of their neighbours. At the high school of the customs conferences and in the manifold deliberations concerning commercial questions, Prussian statesmen became familiar with the methods of modern German policy; acquired the art of guiding irritable minor allies without arousing ill feeling and without the display of force; and learned how to maintain the essence of monarchy under federal forms.

The idea of the customs union was not the property of any single man. It originated simultaneously in many minds under the pressure of German needs. But the clothing of the idea in flesh and blood was due to Prussia alone, was due to Eichhorn, Motz, and Maassen; and last not least

was due to the king. It is no mere respect for monarchical institutions as such, but the obligation of historical justice, which compels us to maintain that nothing but a firm confidence in Frederick William's inviolable loyalty could have induced the German princes to agree voluntarily to the restriction of their sovereignty. The unpretentious simplicity of his nature, which during the wild Napoleonic days had often made this Hohenzollern appear pusillanimous, enabled him in a more tranquil epoch to sow the seed of a great future.

CHAPTER VII.

YOUNG GERMANY

§ 1. DEATH OF GOETHE.

EVERY great nation has from time to time had to experience changes in its territorial possessions, but for the Germans alone has it been decreed by a destiny full of vicissitudes that the marches of their fatherland should vary incessantly from century to century, until no one knew to what domains the great name of Germany might properly be attached. Whilst the old empire was losing its foreign outliers in the south and the west, was abandoning Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands to separate existence, it was acquiring precious compensation in the colonies beyond the Elbe; and from these lands of the north-east, a great part of which never belonged to the imperial union, issued the state-constructive energies of our modern history. The Germanic Federation, like the Holy Empire, was still an inchoate political structure, lacking definite boundaries, half cosmopolitan and half national, at once too wide and too narrow, marvellously linked with Austria, and with three non-German powers, and yet failing to embrace the totality of the Prussian dominion. Only with the formation of the customs union did it begin to become apparent what portions of the ever-changing territorial areas of Central Europe were henceforward to constitute the political Germany of the new epoch. Stretching round Austria in a wide curve, this area comprised all the German lands from the Memel to the lake of Constance—for, since the coast always belongs to the inland regions, the accession of the states of the Hanoverian customs union was but a question of time. It did not include all the domains on which of old had rested the glory of the German name, but it included their splendid nucleus, the genial home of German art on the south-west and the warrior lands of the eagle in the north, glorious forces which, in loyal

association, might one day inaugurate a new age of patriotic renown. Hitherto, the nation had nourished its consciousness of greatness upon the ideal powers of language and civilisation, of a law-constructing communal spirit, of hopes and memories; it now acquired in addition that kinship of economic life, that natural foundation of political unity, which had heretofore been lacking. During those momentous January days of the year 1834, when for the last time the court of Vienna cited to fruitless negotiations the high council of the German federal police, there originated in the west and in the north a Germany newly united in working cooperation, and sharply severed at once from Austria and from the foreign world. The ultimate aim of Frederician policy, the destruction of German dualism, no longer seemed unattainable. Carl Mathy declared in sanguine mood: "Never has Germany been so perfectly at one as since the foundation of the customs union."

The dawn of the new day for Germany was manifest to no more than a few far-sighted individuals; the rising sun was hidden behind the clouds of wearisome and unpleasant diplomatic disputes. How often had patriots looked forward in song and story to the hour of deliverance when the ravens would no longer circle round the Kaiserberg; when the pear tree would burgeon once more on the Walserfeld; when Barbarossa, brandishing his broadsword, would summon the Reichstag of the free German nation—an idea hardly more intelligible than the old prophecies of Simplicissimus in Grimmelshausen's romance concerning the "German hero" and his parliament men. When compared with these radiant dream pictures of a nation which, in fierce impatience, had already become aware of its artificially repressed energies, the new economic kinship of the nation seemed plain and trivial in its working dress. The Germans had little gratitude to bestow upon the officials for their arduous labours. It is invariably the tragic fortune of new political ideas that at the outset they are opposed by the unthinking world, and that subsequently, when justified by experience, they are despised as obvious commonplaces. In the very days when Prussia's German policy had secured another magnificent success, public opinion passed into the state of exhaustion and depression that had characterised it ten years earlier. The political impetus of the day, still fettered, was displayed almost exclusively in the struggles of literary life.

Not until after the death of Goethe, on March 22, 1832, did the newer radical literature, which had been first heralded by the writings of Börne and Heine, attain for a brief period to unrestricted dominance. Goethe's very existence was an eloquent protest against impudent partiality, and however much the pygmies, enrolled in a mutual admiration society, might extol one another as youthful titans, no self-praise, however fulsome, could enable them to measure themselves with his greatness. Nothing arouses so irresistibly the pious anticipation of a better world than the spectacle of a divinely endowed old man who, approaching the extreme limit of human life and having outlived all the petty cares of earth, continues to labour on behalf of his life's ideals, and then departs in the enlightenment of a second blossoming of youth. The serious old age of Frederick might arouse timid admiration, but its contemplation could not inspire joy; it was only in the evening of Goethe's life that the Germans became acquainted with the happy completion of a great human existence, an existence at once self-contained and sympathetically embracing all the life of the world. "Contemplate life!" Such was the last word of wisdom in *Wilhelm Meister*, a profounder and more moral saying than the monkish "Memento mori!" To his last breath the poet remained faithful to his own rede, cheerful in renunciation, gratefully enjoying every flower of summer and every fruit of autumn, calm in the recognition that vexations are also a part of life, and that the highest earthly happiness, joy of the spirit, is a common human heritage.

The homage paid him by Walter Scott and by many other foreigners, he accepted as no more than his due. He recognised that Germany now took the lead in world literature, saying frankly to his foreign admirers: "Whoever understands the German tongue plays the dragoman, and enriches himself in the process. With this tranquil self-complacency there was associated a wonderful humility, disarming envy. He was nearly seventy years old when, contemplating an edition of his writings, he penned the verses:

> The masters' works when I behold,
> I see achievements manifold.
> But when my own work I review,
> I see what I have failed to do.

What delight did it give him to recognise in the young Scottish

writer, Thomas Carlyle, translator and critic of German classical literature, the first foreigner to reach the highest levels of German thought. Carlyle, shaming the partisans of orthodoxy no less than the fanatics of liberalism, declared that generations yet to come would bless Goethe for that he had taught them to replace suspicion and lying by faith and knowledge. Goethe realised how much Germany owed to the most cordial and most loyal of her foreign appreciators. He was never weary of sending some token to this youthful admirer, despatching now his latest work, now a medal, and now some simple German gift for Carlyle's young wife, a bracelet or necklace of fine wrought ironwork. "As always, Goethe," was the usual signature to his patriarchal epistles.

He had ever been accustomed to find the essence of beauty in this, that "when we contemplate the world of orderly existence we ourselves feel vivified and impelled towards high activities." All receptivity stimulated him forthwith to creative work, and now, when in the tranquil concentration of advanced age he could avoid all dispersal of energy, the whole of his life was devoted to uninterrupted and joyous labour. Whether he was writing and thinking, or listening with delight to the voice of "great, gently speaking nature," or rejoining in the new data of art and research which flowed in upon him from all the ends of the earth, he marched ever onwards, continuing the elaboration of that comprehensive picture of the world which presented itself to his mind in luminous outline, becoming, as the years passed, continually freer, clearer, and grander in its lineaments. As he stood on the very edge of the grave, there surged up in his mind "thoughts hitherto unthinkable, like happy spirits that have alighted upon the mountain summits of the past." Characteristic of him to the end was the attitude of "live and let live," which Merck had long ago found so puzzling in his young friend. More free from envy, perhaps, than any artist had ever been before him, the creative works of his fellows were invariably welcome provided they were not utterly alien to his nature. Such was his mood when Christian Rauch visited him, and designed the statuette of the veteran poet, showing him dictating as he paced his study, head erect, hands clasped behind his back, and the one defect of his fine presence, the shortness of his legs, happily concealed by a flowing dressing-gown—an image of peaceful majesty and kindness, sublimer in its simplicity than

the theatrical bust by David d'Angers, in which, after the French manner, the prince of German poets is presented as a thundering Zeus.

There was still much in contemporary activities which could not fail to be repulsive to the poet. In the July Revolution he plainly recognised the oncoming decomposition of the old order of society, but the favourable aspects of the new movement were hidden from him, and he turned contemptuously away from the terrorism of opinion exercised by the champions of liberty, of those who said:

> Let us extend our sway,
> In broadening rule rejoice.
> No man a word shall say
> Who speaks not with our voice.

Whilst all the world was devoting itself to the political struggle, and whilst people were neglecting their own affairs in order to attend to those of the universe, Goethe adhered more strongly than ever to his old conviction that the moral ordering of the world depends chiefly upon the loyal fulfilment of the duties that lie next to hand. Shortly before his death he wrote in a young friend's album (they were probably his last verses): Let each man sweep his own demesne, the town's in every quarter clean! The profound solitude which is the inevitable lot of the master was at times painful to him. Rarely, he felt, did he enjoy "the gentle echo and the pure reflex from the mind of another." Gently revolted was he by the boundless audacity of the young fellows who imagined that their baptismal day had been the day of creation. Still more revolted was he by the failure of the younger writers to display, amid their arrogance, any appreciable youthful freshness, or to manifest in the crude and odious forms of their "hospital poetry" any notable amount of virile energy. Their laboured intellectual activities seemed to him to exhibit no more than the premature senescence of a generation lost to all frankness and to all sense of reverence. He prostrated himself in contemplation of "the eternally one, multiplex in its manifestations"; and could only shrug his shoulders at the empty impudence of the new atheists, with their: "The professor is at least one person, but God is no person at all!"

Still, during the closing years of his life, Goethe was far less estranged from the surrounding world than he had been

in the days of the wars of liberation and of the Christo-Germanic movement. At that time onlookers from a distance might readily have taken him for a reactionary, for one who, out of humour with his contemporaries, was yearning for the cosmopolitanism of the good old days. But now he spoke once more with detestation of the enlightenment of the eighteenth century "wise in its own conceit." He felt anew that it was he who had freed the Germans from the yoke of philistinism, that he had been the pioneer in demonstrating the non-utilitarian beauty of nature and history, in elucidating their eternal process of development. The influences now opposed to Goethe in the literary market place were but a refurbishing of the old enlightenment, of the old doctrine of natural law, of the old utilitarianism, whose one question addressed to all that existed was, what use could be made of it? When Menzel and Börne fulminated against him with liberal catchwords, the old man's thoughts involuntarily turned to those distant days when Nicolai paid his devotions at the tomb of the youthful Werther. This affinity did not escape the attention of Goethe's young friend Carlyle, who wrote: "I find your German philistines, Adelung and Nicolai, most astonishing; here we term them utilitarians; they are for the most part politicians, radical or republican."

The arid and ready-made formulas of the fashionable doctrines of liberty served only to strengthen Goethe's conviction that his own outlook on the world was freer. He conceived himself once more to be the Lucifer of a new age, and with pleasure did he note how all the creative works of art and science exhibited unmistakably the imprint of his own spirit. He knew that this great century, which in former days he had himself helped to usher in, had not yet said its last word; and although he could hardly expect to have personal experience of the oncoming future, he could foresee with the seer's vision how soon the petty disputes of his contemporaries would become antiquated, how in a more fertile epoch the human horizon would be immeasurably widened, how tasks of an entirely new order would be imposed upon civilisation. In *Meisters Wanderjahre* he demanded increased activities on the part of the state, such activities as only the present is beginning to realise. He unfolded the design of a system of national education conducted exclusively by the state—a Platonist ideal which was no less remote from the mentality of the privately

living man of the eighteenth century than it was from the radicalism of the thirties, permeated with hostility to the state. In the weak beginnings of German emigration he recognised the precursors of that expansive civilisation which during the latter half of the nineteenth century was to make its victorious progress round the world:

> In that throughout the world we scatter,
> Thereby becomes the world so great!

At the opening of the Weimar library, which took place during the last year of his life, Goethe gave it as his frank opinion that the world was in process of transformation, that social culture was being universalised, that all educated circles, hitherto in contact only at their margins, were now coalescing, and that it would soon be necessary for everyone "to gain instruction both in the real and in the ideal sense regarding the conditions obtaining in the contemporary world."

Yet more powerfully was this keen sense of the future manifested in his last great work, a prophetic poem whose depth was hardly fathomed by the inert and undisciplined world of that day, but which is gradually becoming comprehensible to a generation richer in heroic strength and consequently better endowed with sentiments of pious veneration. Seldom does an aging master take his departure before he has completed his favourite work; it seems as if in a task that calls for the tense devotion of all the powers of body and soul, there must be involved some secret and mysterious energising principle which prevents the severance of the vital threads. For more than twenty years men's minds had been busied about the figure of Faust as they had never been busied about that of any historical hero. Philosophers and poets endeavoured to complete the fragment; every sympathetic reader involuntarily asked himself what was going to be the end of this lofty human being in whom were incorporated all the most characteristic traits of the German spirit. Goethe, quietly at work upon his poem during every happy moment, entering as if in a great diary all the treasures of his incomparable experience of life, knew that the eyes of the best of his fellow countrymen were upon him. A few weeks before his death, and nearly sixty years after he had conceived the first bold design, he concluded the work (in so

far as it was possible to use up the inexhaustible material), and stated that whatever of life remained to him would be welcomed as a free gift from God. The second part of the poem, thus continually elaborated and enlarged during two generations, necessarily lost in respect of primitive freshness and artistic finish quite as much as it had gained in richness of intellectual content.

Faust was the true child of the poetic epoch of *Sturm und Drang*. Only youth, which promises all and demands all, could rediscover its own heart in the picture of the impatient titan, struggling against all the limitations imposed by life on earth. When he came to publish the first parts, the poet already perceived at times how remote from him now was the heaven-storming defiance of his younger days, and he complained: "Do but restore to me the days when I was still in process of growth." To spare the sensitive nerves of the reader he elided from the first drafts many of the fine and bold features properly belonging to the mythos, cutting out even the fine but awe-inspiring blood song of the fiends: "Where flows the warm red human blood, the odour for all charms is good," whilst under his transforming hands the humorous devilry of the Walpurgisnacht on the Blocksberg was toned down. Since then, another twenty years of rich experience had passed over his head. So estranged from the figures of his poem did he now feel that he did not shrink from modifying the charmingly naive garden scene of the first part to adapt it to the needs of a frigid operatic quartette composed by Prince Radziwill. Not without self-constraint could he abandon the contemplative mood of old age in order to resume a work which had sprung from the fervent enthusiasm of youth, saying to Wilhelm Humboldt: "I must secure by design and by character what should properly be the outcome of spontaneous and natural voluntary activity." Thus the second part of Faust lacks the charm of direct personal avowal which clings to all Goethe's earlier works like the delicate aroma of summer. The poet's own mind speaks through the mouth of every hero, through that of Weislingen, Werther, Egmont, Tasso, Meister, and above all through that of the Faust of the first part. In the figure of Faust were reassembled all that he had ever enjoyed, thought, and suffered; in the closing scene of the drama, remorse for the betrayal of Friederike is echoed with all the power of a personally

experienced passion. The second part of the poem, on the other hand, is treated with strict objectivity; the characters of Faust and Mephistopheles recede into the background; the drama is no longer centred in the inner development of the hero, but in the varied interplay of the circumstances through which his figure passes.

The result is a maladaptation of form and content. Schiller had prophesied that his friend would experience great difficulty in the treatment of material wherein fantasy and seriousness were so intimately combined, that it would be hard "to steer a straight course betwixt jest and earnest." In the first part Goethe fully overcame the difficulty, displaying that sportive mastery which makes a completed work of art seem as if it were a natural product. The hero's fate enthrals the reader's attention so irresistibly, that the crude contrast between satanic humour and tragic sublimity induce no sense of disturbance; the short rhymed verses adapt themselves to every varying mood almost more readily than dramatic iambics could have done; the speech of the sixteenth century, at once sensually gross and pregnant with thought, but cleverly idealised for the purposes of the drama, could not fail to strike home to the minds of a generation that felt akin to the epoch of Luther and of Dürer. The second part lacks this unity of tone, which makes even the miraculous credible; it seems too serious for a mythos, too spookish for a drama. Closely following the old popular tale of *Doctor Faustus*, the poet leads his hero through a world of fanciful adventures, but all his dream figures conceal profound meanings; and if the reader undertook to probe the mysterious significance of these symbols, it was impossible for him to retain the mood of innocent credulity in which it is necessary to approach the miraculous. Despite its brilliant theatrical effects, the poem, packed with ideas and overburdened with all kinds of allusions and references, was far too cumbrous, when staged as a magical show-piece, to attract the interest of the crowd. Written fragmentarily, it must be fragmentarily enjoyed. Those only who have lovingly immersed their minds in the abundance of beautiful details, can pass step by step to the enjoyment of the whole.

In his correspondence with Schiller, Goethe invariably maintained that to achieve the unity of a self-explanatory work of art was the highest task of the poet. In old age, however, he passed beyond this artistic ideal to attain one

that was more widely human, too comprehensive for incorporation in any strictly artistic form, and too profound for universal understanding. Whoever ventured to follow this final flight of Goethe's genius, whoever (freeing his mind from prepossessions) could bring himself to accept the poet's heritage as a work sui generis, was enriched by the stores from a treasury of life's wisdom. Except the Bible, no work has contributed to the same extent as *Faust* to the quoted phrases of everyday speech, and this statement applies almost more to the second part of *Faust* than to the first. The sequel to the drama, too, displays a marvellous power of expression, for though at times it declines for a moment into the mannerisms of old age, it speedily revives from these temporary lapses to charm us with the perfect euphonies of the most varied verse-forms, whilst with youthful audacity giving expression to that which has never before been said and hardly even imagined.

The second part supplied the answers to the difficult questions propounded in the first. Whereas the Faust of the old puppet-show perished amid the intoxication of sensual delights, Goethe raised his hero from the narrow world of personal passion to higher levels, to worthier relationships, making him (in accordance with the saying "in the beginning was the deed") find salvation through creative activity—thus furnishing an emblem of inward enfranchisement and illumination, more suitable, indeed, for romance than for drama, but in its broad epic conception enabling the poet to furnish a symbolical presentation of the entire history of his epoch. From the turmoil and resplendence of the imperial court, Faust ascends into the world of the beautiful, experiencing in a dream the liberation of Helen, the wedding of the classical to the Germanic spirit, until at length active humanism manifests itself in works of value to the common weal, while the struggle wherein old Faust is victorious over the sea has its reference to King Frederick's peaceful conquest of West Prussia, and directs our gaze far into the future of New Germany, delighting in labour, and to which the free sea will one day bring spiritual enfranchisement.

> In unceasing advance are his torment and bliss,
> Unsatisfied aye with to-day's passing kiss—

the highest thought of modern German philosophy, the recognition of the idea that never on earth is fully realised

and yet is perpetually achieving partial realisation from hour to hour, is found in these lines. Not this, however, the last word of a poem which necessarily reaches out towards the beyond. Neither in the prose of labour, nor yet in the sober vaticination "to the man of action this world is not dumb," could a work voicing the ultimate depths of poetic expression and a work definitely hostile to precocious enlightenment, secure its final expression. Almighty love first completes Faust's deliverance, and just as the poet gives a comprehensible existence to heaven through his boldly sketched figures of sacred history, so is he able by re-introducing the character of Gretchen to effect the artistic portrayal of the idea of love. In the reunion of the two lovers is realised the blissful dream which has continually recurred in Christian poesy since the days of Dante—the purification of earthly love to become heavenly love. Faust's immortal part is borne to heaven, and the angels sing:

From evil now is saved alive
The spirit's noble part,
For he who's never ceased to strive
Escapes destruction's dart;
And since in him, without alloy,
Love now fulfils its role,
Great is the holy angels' joy
In welcoming his soul.

Thus in its ultimate manifestation did our classical poetry reiterate the two fundamental truths of the reformation. In more liberal and gentler guise, Goethe repeated the bold and yet crushingly severe saying of Martin Luther, "Good works never make a good man, but a good man does good works," whilst simultaneously recognising as an article of faith the saving power of divine compassion.

The younger generation lived from hour to hour; it lacked the concentration of spirit requisite for the appreciation of a work whose outlook so widely transcended "this our day" so dear to the journalists. Young men of the period were long firmly convinced that the crude wit of Heine's *Harzreise* was of greater importance than Goethe's *Italienische Reise*, and that the first novel that came to hand devoted to the glorification of the free woman was a greater work than *Wilhelm Meister*. To radical poets, the mystical sequel of

Faust seemed nothing but a cold allegory. So corroded already were their minds by the evil influences of French culture, that the most outstanding product of Protestant Germany, the reconciliation of liberty with piety, was now altogether beyond their understanding, and they simply could not grasp how a strong spirit can think along religious lines. As ill luck would have it, at this precise moment the guild of the Goetheites began their pedantic labours, a new and lamentable variety of German professorial philistinism. Göschel, Hinrichs, Rötscher, and other Hegelians, followed by a long series of philologians and historians of literature, seized upon *Faust*, hastening to display their interpretative powers in commentaries upon the Alexandrian scale. With especial zeal they hurled themselves upon the weakest and most obscure passages in the work, endeavouring to ascertain all the esotery which the old poet might be supposed to have incorporated into his symbolical utterances. Thus the younger generation's pleasure in the poem was utterly marred, and the world long continued to hold that in this book Goethe had paid his tribute to old age.

The creative minds of German art never accepted any such view. How often did Schinkel sit in Rauch's studio, *Faust* in hand, pointing out to his grateful friend the wellsprings of new artistic ideas. As the nervous irritability of the age began to abate, the circle of devotees widened, devotees who, troubling themselves little about the sophistical interpretations of so many confused allegories, approached *Faust* in a spirit of simple contemplation, discovering at each fresh perusal new aspects of the poem, and recognising ever more clearly the intimate connection between the two parts, notwithstanding many differences in point of style and artistic merit. Despite all the cavilling of detractors and all the subtleties of admirers, *Faust* remained the tragedy of the new century, just as Dante's poem had been the confession of the departing middle age; and neither of these works could have originated anywhere but in the heart of Europe, among the two peoples who have from the first been most fully representative of the idealism of Christian civilisation. How pale in comparison seemed the writings by other poets concerning the uncontrollable craving for knowledge characteristic of modern humanity; how petty and morbid in comparison seemed the poem which stood nearest to *Faust*, Byron's *Manfred*—self-tormenting and purposeless

weltschmerz contrasted with the genuine titanic pride of Goethe's hero :

> The imprint of my days on earth
> For untold ages shall endure.

When, as time passed, the poem gradually made its way across our frontiers, many foreign men of genius believed themselves able to discover in it the sentiments of their respective nations, and thirteen years after the death of Goethe Turgenieff maintained that *Faust* was perhaps more comprehensible to the Russians than to any other people. No clearer expression could be given to the fact that German poesy holds by right the central position in modern civilisation. The lofty humanist sentiment which spoke so confidently to the heart of foreigners was nothing other than the finest blossom of our national culture and was fully comprehensible to the writer's fellow countrymen alone ; for in *Faust* more plainly than in any other of Goethe's works can one perceive the very pulse of German history, nor is it by chance that in this poem the writer has inscribed the exhortation, that actively, not passively, must we enter into the heritage of our ancestors.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of *Faust* Goethe finished the fourth part of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, the moving chronicle of the profoundest passions of his youth. So cordial, so tender, so keenly alive was the relation of this octogenarian that he could venture to introduce the old *Lilli-Lieder* now half forgotten, their sweet tones sounding as fresh as if they had been penned but yesterday. Thus did the ecstasy of the love of women gild for him the closing visions of his life. Through a long career passed in virile labour this love had never ceased to accompany him, from those remote days when the youth awakening to the joys of the senses sang Amor, who in roguish modesty keeps his eyes fast closed, down to those last hours when the old man wrote his ardent parting plaint :

> A myriad kisses leave me longing still,
> Who with one kiss must bid farewell at last !

It was for this reason that women remained ever faithful to the singer of the eternal feminine. Just as of old, for the generation that had grown savage during the Thirty Years War, women continued to preserve an ultimate treasure of

morality and domestic kindliness, so at this later epoch, when literature underwent a new degeneration, did they quietly maintain the prestige of our greatest poet. Nor was it the learned women, much hated of Goethe, who kept his reputation alive; it was unpretentious women, active in secret, those whom nobody marked. When the simple German housewife, having discharged her domestic duties, wished to refresh her mind with a glimpse of the beautiful, she turned to some passage in the forty volumes which was congenial to her mind, and had experience of the undying kinship between genius and woman—for what could Börne or Heine offer to a woman of noble mind? Whilst poesy turned away from Goethe, his spirit remained active in the plastic and graphic arts and in science, and among the notable new figures in the learned world there was not one who did not owe something to Goethe. Not until a much later day, when our nation had done great and difficult things, did the more gifted poets and all men of wide experience return to the darling of women, and since then the quiet influence of his genius has continually increased. Not even yet is the day of his greatest reputation come. Schiller's thoughts, however grand and lofty, were concerned none the less with a restricted epoch. What he foreshadowed of human rights and national liberty has already been realised by history under our own eyes, and we begin to recognise that his ideals have a merely conditional value. Inexperienced youth alone can feel a wholehearted enthusiasm for Schiller. Emil Devrient was the last genuine Marquis Posa of our offhand generation. Goethe's figures belong to all time; they are type, not individuals, thus fulfilling the highest demands of art. They never become antiquated, for they must be continually relieved in experience. They grow instinct with life only under the eyes of the divinely inspired artist, of the loving woman or the steadfast man, led back through the fulness of culture to the simplicity of nature.

The first fine memorial to the poet was constructed by a woman's hands. Three years after his death, Bettina von Arnim issued *Goethe's Correspondence with a Child*, a profound, grandly conceived, and thoughtfully poetical work, dealing as freely with historical facts as Goethe had dealt with his Wetzlar experiences in *The Sorrows of Werther*, and containing more truth, making manifest more of the mysterious life of the man of genius, than works of learned Goethe-research running

into many volumes. With all the ardour of the metaphorical Rhineland speech, the book relates how Goethe's nature was reflected in the passionate heart of a child; the gentle serenity of the poet is majestically contrasted with the bacchantic and sometimes importunate enthusiasm of the girl; whilst upon this richly coloured spiritual canvas there falls the light from the clear sky of the beautiful German west. The little girls in the convent school in Fritzlar, the boatmen singing in the sun-kissed valley of the Rhine, the wayfarers on the rocks of St. Goar, come and go upon the scene, whilst in her turret chamber in Frankfort, even happier than the young people, we see the old mother "who radiates joy because she herself so heartily enjoys." Philistines might shake their heads when this fifty year old child, with the blood of the Brentanos coursing madly through her veins, would turn cart-wheels at times, or flit about like a will-o'-the-wisp. Reflective men delighted in the book precisely because it was so womanly, far more womanly than many a prim romance penned by a prudish bluestocking. Bettina's strength was found where woman's genius is ever found, in the power of understanding and of receptivity; she knew this herself, and remained always the ivy clinging to the firm tree-trunk. She never had the audacity to attempt man's work. Her subsequent writings made no claim to rank as independent creations, for they originated either in an intelligently used memory or in the active affections of a warm heart. Her very weaknesses were feminine and therefore pardonable. She was not free from the half-unconscious coquetry of her sex; and in her pose of "the child which does not ask what is good or what is bad" she overacted the part of natural simplicity.

Her contemporaries love to compare her with Rahel Varnhagen, and there was in truth much resemblance between the two most talented women in the German society of that day. Both possessed a keen sentiment for greatness in others; both were brilliant conversationalists; and both were prone to excessive enthusiasm. Nevertheless the difference between these two women was as great as the difference between the Rhine and the Spree. In the lady of the Berlin salon, however keen her feelings, the powers of an incisive reason, quietly pursuing the threads of all ideas, remained dominant. The life of this childless and much experienced woman, wedded to a man many years younger than herself, a man vain and

falsehearted and greatly inferior to his wife in mental capacity, her life among a crowd of jaded men of the world, remained estranged from nature. Rahel's language, therefore, was always inflated, and suffered from the elaborate artificiality of metropolitan hyperculture. Bettina, on the other hand, was a child of the sunlight, half French by blood. She had grown to womanhood in the free air of the green Rhine. Her husband was a poet of genius and a man of noble mind. The beautiful mother of beautiful children, with a talent for all the arts, intensely imaginative and sensitive—moving phrases and richly coloured images were the spontaneous products of her active mind. Yet with all this, and despite her strange and elfin caprices, she remained an affectionate, well-disposed, and gentle woman, one in whom the cholera could arouse no terror and in whom poverty could inspire no disgust. When quite advanced in years she was still attractive to young men, and knew how to strike from them the divine spark. She was touched by many of the sins of her day, but her work was entirely free from the measureless futility of fashionable verse writing. Her great nature exercised a strong influence upon the crown prince of Prussia, and unfortunately the influence was not favourable. Himself lacking clearness of thought, he had nothing to gain from the turgid oracular utterances of this high priestess of romanticism; and when she enthusiastically declared, "Nothing is sinful that does not conflict with genius," what could that profit him who, reaching out towards all things but fully master of none, never discovered the guiding star of his genius.

§ 2. DOMINION OF THE FEUILLETON.

The noisy activities of the new generation that gathered round the banner of Heine were pursued in fields remote from there luminous hilltops of poesy. Since Heine had taken up his residence in Paris his lyrical talent had undergone a speedy decay; and in a dissolute life, one devoid of concentration, his mind became empty, his feelings blunted. In any case he could not venture the creation of comprehensive works, for as a rule the massive energy of the Aryan is alone competent to produce artistic composition in the grand style. Even the marvellous products of oriental art, even the forest

of pillars in the Mezquita at Cordova, or the scintillating arches of the Alhambra, fail, for all their magnificence, to produce the impression of a coherent whole. Apart from a few songs and the fragment of an unsavoury tale entitled *Schnabelewopski*, in this decade Heine wrote no notable imaginative work. His energies were monopolised by the day's gifts and the day's demands. He elaborated his fugitive impressions into all kinds of literary capriccios, the fragments being then assembled under such titles at *Zustände*, *Zeitbilder*, and *Reisebilder*—new names for which he secured the freedom of the city among the German feuilleton writers. To excuse these dispersed activities, he boastfully announced to the world that he felt it to be his vocation to mediate between the civilisations of the two neighbour nations, and the German liberals loyally accepted his assurance.

The French took his measure more accurately. They speedily perceived that he knew nothing whatever about French politics, whilst for their part they could learn nothing about German literature from Heine's jocular comments. The most perspicacious of his Parisian friends considered that he was forsaking his poetic calling when he imagined himself predestined to play the part of teacher to the nations. They were, however, adroit enough to encourage by their flatteries "France's new ally," for never before had any foreigner so servilely licked the dust from their boots. Englishmen and Frenchmen, visiting Germany, were accustomed to express their astonishment that the Germans did not talk English or French; but the goodnatured German was filled with shy veneration when he discovered that in France every dull-witted peasant could actually talk French. Even this talented Jew was awestruck like the simple German philistine. Everything in France seemed to him more refined, more beautiful, more distinguished, than what he had seen at home; and he expressed his astonishment (writing as his manner was half in jest and half in earnest) that a "Dame de la Halle speaks better French than a German canoness with sixty-four ancestors. In his *Französische Zustände* he could find no words adequate for the expression of his antipatriotic enthusiasm. "The French are the chosen people of the new religion, Paris is the new Jerusalem, and the Rhine is the Jordan separating the sacred land of freedom from the land of the philistines." Indefatigably did he sing the praises of the new "bourgeois

king without court etiquette, without pages, without courtesans, without pimps, without diamond trinkets and similar splendours." He sang the praises likewise of the men of the mountain who from the highest benches of the national convention in Paris had preached their tricolored gospel, in harmony with the gospel of him who of old delivered the sermon on the mount. He sang the praises likewise of the great Napoleon, overthrown in the War of Liberation solely by the might of stupidity, after all a matter of small importance seeing that "through their very defeats the French are able to put their opponents in the shade." When the Paris mob was shouting beneath his windows "Warsaw has fallen, death to the Russians, war against Prussia!" he impudently declared that none but the foes of democracy would stimulate national prejudice, that French patriotism embraced with its love the entire territory of civilisation, whereas German patriotism constricted the heart as with leathern thongs.

At the same time he posed as a political refugee, speaking tearfully of his exile when in reality nothing kept him in Paris but love of pleasure and his French leanings. Declining soon to lower depths, he sold himself to the French court, begging for and accepting for many years in succession a state pension. He displayed his gratitude by continuing to slander his native land, whilst ceasing to pen the mocking sallies against Louis Philippe which hitherto he had from time to time permitted himself. Then, desiring to found a periodical intended to circulate in Prussia, through the mediation of Varnhagen he applied to the Prussian government, giving solemn assurance of his thankfulness to Prussia for her services to the bastard population of his Rhenish home. The Rhinelanders, he said, these Belgians endowed with all the faults of the Germans and possessing none of the virtues of the French, had through Prussia's instrumentality been made German once more. In the ministry at Berlin his asseverations were taken for what they were worth, and directly Heine learned that his application had been fruitless, he hastened to resume his invectives, speaking of the "ukasuists and knoutologists of Berlin," and appealing to the Rhenish bowmen to shoot the detestable black eagle from its perch. Yet the admiration felt by the German liberals was unaffected when in the year 1848 the secret dealings between Guizot and Heine at length came to light. In their eyes the unmasked mercenary of

France was still an apostle of German freedom, and anyone who timidly ventured to maintain that even for Heine the principles of honour and uprightness ought to be valid was dismissed as a man without understanding by the protagonists of the dominant literary school.

A trifle more solid was the small talk with which Heine attempted to enlighten the Parisians upon the history of German religion, philosophy, and literature, for in this department the pupil of Hegel was not quite so rudderless as upon the high seas of politics. Even here, it is true, the core of things eluded him, for what could a man hostile to all deep religious sentiment find to say about religion? Following the usual method of the dilettantist, he helped himself out with a rigid formula, reducing the entire multifarious struggle of ideas in history to the simple opposition between sensualism and spiritualism, between acceptance and renunciation of the world, and dividing the entire human race into well-fed Greeks and hungry Nazarenes. Everything now turned to uncleanness in his hands. In the rare moments in which he was still poet he endeavoured to justify "religious transfiguration, the rehabilitation of matter" as a cult of beauty; but as soon as he was launched in this direction, he prayed no longer to the Olympian gods of the Hellenes, but to Astarte and to the golden calf of the Semites. Too able and too widely experienced to venture upon the open display of his fierce hatred of Christianity, he passed from contradiction to contradiction, in one breath comparing Christianity to a contagious disease, and in the next referring to it as a benefit to suffering humanity. In Luther he could only see the champion of rigid spiritualism—Luther, the very man who revived acceptance of the world upon the soil of Christendom, the very man who reestablished the moral justification of the state, of the household, of all honest mundane labour. With equal superficiality did he regard German philosophy solely as a force of destruction and decomposition, and in this way he had no difficulty in attaining to the desired conclusion that pantheism is the esoteric religion of our nation, and that the Germans, as soon as their philosophy was complete, would be the first to follow the French example and "to elaborate their revolution." He had just as little understanding for the moral severity of the Kantian doctrine of duty as he had for the conservative and constructive ideas of the Schelling-Hegel

philosophy of history, and utterly beyond his grasp was the quiet growth of religious piety which arises as a necessary reaction against the arrogance of philosophic radicalism. How empty, how arid, how tedious, seemed this new form of unbelief. The old enlightenment retained faith in the eternal progress of mankind, and continued to hope for a day of light; the modern doctrine of fleshly transfiguration scorned everything which binds men together in human bonds, and ultimately nothing was left for the disciples of that transfiguration beyond the sovereign individual, able to devote himself at will to the enjoyment of countless grisettes and unnumbered truffle pasties.

In his artistic criticism Heine described the Paris Salons with fine understanding, being the first to direct the Germans' attention to the richly coloured canvases of the French school, and many of his appreciations of the newer paintings were inspired with splendid poetical enthusiasm. Yet his pretentious ego, continually craving for admiration, never failed to manifest itself. His best works were spoiled by obscenities or personal invectives, by political tirades, or coarse attacks upon his literary antagonists, whom, with all the insatiability of Judaic hatred, he continued to assail even when they had entered the shelter of the tomb. At this particular epoch, French literature was in a state of distressing ferment, for the brief and beautiful blossoming of the restoration had been succeeded by a lamentable decay. All the best intelligences of the day were drawn within the whirlpool of this struggle. In the universal haste, hardly anyone found it impossible to collect his energies for purely artistic creation, and amid numberless noisy mediocrities the new time produced but one figure endowed with a vigorous imaginative gift, the figure of George Sand. The classical beauty of form characteristic of the age of Louis XIV was deeply rooted in the sentiments and traditions of the nation. Hence the struggle against academic rules did not lead here, as it had led formerly in Germany, to a new and freer idealism, but resulted in the dissolution of all artistic forms, in the decomposition of all ideals. French romanticism perished amid a desolate social radicalism. The obscene and the horrible—sensual, obscure, and futile—replaced passion; attacking the state, society, and marriage; revelling in blood and filth; luxuriating now in avaricious dreams, and now in the weltschmerz of satiety; but ever incapable of any new creative effort. The arbitrariness of this unbridled subjectivism

found its only definite standing ground in an attack upon the existing order; now that Béranger and Chateaubriand had struck up a new friendship, the men of literary talent belonged without exception to the opposition.

Heine, whose mind was eminently receptive and utterly lacking in independence, surrendered himself unresistingly to all the confused ideas issuing from this peculiar literature which, for all its febrile excitement, was decadent and affected with the palsy of old age. He greedily swallowed the foam of every fiery drink offered him in Paris. For a time he was even inspired with enthusiasm for the socialistic cobwebs spun from the brain of Père Enfantin, until the æsthetic repugnance of the poet and man of the world made him draw away from "crude and naked communism." All this desultory scribbling left nothing of permanent value beyond a few fine poems and a mass of witticisms, good, bad, and indifferent; but its momentary influence was enormous. Heine, outsoaring even the French themselves, became master of the European feuilleton style, the banner bearer of that journalistic impudence which disposed of the heights and depths of human life wth a few fugitive comments. His internationalist fellows, who were now everywhere, though cautiously at first, engaged in newspaper enterprises, overwhelmed him with admiration. They spoke of him as a second Aristophanes, the naughty darling of the Graces, forgetting the obvious difference that the unrestraint of Aristophanes resulted from the excessive energy of creative genius, whereas Heine's naughtiness was due to the artistic incapacity of a pygmy spirit, incapable of great things, and forced to console itself by mocking exuberance.

Heine befooled his forsaken fellow countrymen by that charm of the exotic which the broadminded German nature is so rarely able to withstand. Ever since the Germans had first poetised, beauty of form had for them invariably been a sequel to richness of content, and of how many of our great poets could it be said that they had never succeeded in discovering the true artistic form for the clothing of their lofty thoughts. In Heine there appeared among us for the first time a virtuoso of form who was utterly indifferent to the content of his words. He boasted of his "divine prose," a prose which, indeed, ever striving after effect, became with the progress of the years more and more a prey to mannerism, yet never lacked careful polish. By this affected, careless,

iridescent, and pretentious style, he endeavoured to make everything, no matter what, palatable to his readers. He possessed what the Jews have in common with the French, the gracefulness of vice which makes even the base and the odious seem alluring for a moment; he had the trick of turning out a fine-sounding sentence about a pretty trifle; and above all he was endowed with what Goethe had so often condemned as sterile, wit which can play over the surface of things without mastering them. All this was utterly ungerman. The language of Martin Luther, born in the struggles of conscience, had at all times remained the language of candour and truth; in this tongue sin was termed sin, nothing, nothing, and once again did Goethe speak from the very heart of the nation when he declared: "When we speak German, we lie when we are polite." But for the very reason that the Germans felt unable to vie with this clever Jew in the artifices of piquancy and charm, they allowed themselves to be dazzled by him, mistaking for the magic of art what was in reality no more than the stimulus of novelty.

Slowly, very slowly, did the understanding gain ground that Heine's witticisms could never be truly congenial to German minds. Of all our lyric poets he was the only one who never wrote a drinking song; to him heaven seemed full of almond cakes, purses of gold, and street wenches, for the oriental was incompetent to carouse after the German manner. It was long before people realised that Heine's "esprit" was far from being "Geist" in the German sense. Whenever he had spoken in earnest, he proved a false prophet; what he regarded as dead lived on, and what he spoke of as living was dead. Heine could not read the true signs of the times, which had already been clearly recognised by Thomas Carlyle in his profound work on the French revolution; Heine could not recognise the decay of France and the quiet strengthening of Prussian Germany. Years were to elapse before ephemeral journalistic literature was appraised at its true value; but Heine's reputation collapsed as soon as the world became accustomed merely to skim the feuilleton, and to forget in a day the thoughts conceived in a day.

Upon contemporary imaginative writers, however, the example of the widely acclaimed Parisian feuilletonist exercised a disastrous influence. Lord Byron, by the brilliant arbitrariness of his digressions and incidental descriptions, had often

endangered the purity of artistic forms; but he wrote in verse, and in verse of marvellous beauty, so that the nobility of poesy was never utterly lacking. Heine, with his feuilleton style, was the first to throw down the barriers which must ever separate poetry from prose. His judgments on art, his notes on opinion, his literary and political disquisitions, meagre in content, were decked out with tinsel and with flowers of rhetoric which were not genuinely poetic but were intended to exercise a poetic influence. Hence his admirer Arnold Ruge honoured him with the ridiculous name of "critical poet." His prose did not march straight forward towards its goal, but sauntered along, continually straying from the path in search of flowers. In earlier days, when academic rules were dominant, poetry was in bondage to prose, and was termed by the French "the finest species of prose." But in Germany poetry had long ere this learned to stand on its own feet; and even prose had now acquired such constructive energy that, on occasions, it could allow itself unheard of liberties. Heine's writing, however, was not the permissible poetic prose of the romance or the novel, but a morbid mongrel style that was neither fish nor flesh. Prosaic matter appeared in prosaic form, and yet entered a claim to be enjoyed as a free work of art. It is not surprising that the critical poet, who in his own vein was after all incomparable, should be succeeded by a long series of poetic critics, who imagined themselves artists because they interwove into their judgments a few fragments of plunder from the imaginative treasure-house of German poesy. Many writers of real talent misapplied their powers to the production of this iridescent prose, wandering far aloof from poetic euphony.

Whilst Heine utilised the changing impressions of Parisian life for the production of these elegant trifles, Börne, in his *Parisian Letters,* lapsed into sheer fanaticism. He could not mention a new opera or one of Paul de Kock's frivolous romances without a discharge of stage thunder. If Heine represented social radicalism, Börne was the advocate of political radicalism. He, too, had no definite aim, being concerned merely to rail at everything that existed in Germany, and to manifest his enthusiasm for "the rights of man" which were to be above every law. Should he occasionally go so far as to offer his readers any morsel of fact, he showed a childlike lack of critical faculty; and several of the apocryphal

documents from the archives of the Bundestag upon which the liberal legend was nourished for many subsequent years, were first published in his *Paris Letters*. Since he was incapable of development, and could never find anything new to say, he was reduced to screaming. "Turks, Spaniards, and Jews," he exclaimed, "are much nearer freedom than the Germans. They are slaves, but one day they will break their chains and will then become free. The German, however, is a born servant; he could be free but will not." His old hatred for Goethe became a positive fury, and he wrote: "Kotzebue's tepid tear-soup is a thousand times better than Goethe's frozen wine." To such an extreme did he go with these invectives that Carl Simrock, though a liberal, felt impelled to ask Börne whether he hoped to annihilate the German nation by this abuse of its leading mind.

Börne accepted the new doctrine regarded by the radicals as essential to salvation, that in this enlightened century history had suddenly changed its character, and no longer fulfilled its ends through the instrumentality of great men, but through the reason of the masses. He consequently spoke of modern France, a country whose culture was produced by rule of thumb, as "the school of the world, the great railway of freedom and morality"; whilst Germany, with its wealth of individual energies, its manifold and yet unified civilisation, became ever more unintelligible to him. Since all true culture is aristocratic, he was opposed to German science as an enemy to liberty, contending: "Every university makes the whole country stupid for fifty miles round; a few are to know everything in order that all may know nothing." Refined sophistical images, which in truth had always been the outcome of mere wit, never of reflection, gradually became rarer in his writings. They were replaced by unmeaning demagogic catchwords, by references to "the horny hand of the honest man, the sugary leaden hearts and lecherous lavender souls" of the servants of princes. His revolutionary spleen could find pleasure in roughness alone. When his watch was stolen amid the press at the Hambach festival he wrote maliciously: "At length the Germans are awakening to action; tremble, tyrants, for we also have learned how to steal!" At times his rage overmastered him so completely that he lost all sense of the respectable, and would lapse into the modes of expression which in his Frankfort home were denoted by the term "mauscheln."

"I have no freedom to look back upon and have consequently no freedom to look forward to. I drive others because I am myself driven, I exasperate because I am exasperated. The wind is violent and shakes me. Is the violence mine? Did I make the wind? Can I say 'Peace, be still." In the clubs of the German handicraftsmen and refugees he was ever busily engaged, and although these heroes manifested their lust of battle mainly in threatening phrases and in the display of black-red-and-gold flags, it was not without bearing on the future that in every German town of moderate size there were before long to be found a few individuals who had graduated at the high school of demagogy on the Seine.

Through this continuous railing and mocking, his German national sentiment, which had never been characterized by vigorous and spontaneous development, underwent utter decay, and he sank into a radical cosmopolitanism akin to treason. He founded a French journal, *La Balance*, openly declaring in its columns: "I am as much Frenchman as German. God be thanked, I was never a devotee of patriotism." In the French tongue he poured forth scorn upon the Germans for their "national vanity," asking: "Is egoism less a vice in a country than in a private individual?" He assured the French that in three days they had done the work of a century, whereas in three centuries the Germans had done nothing at all. In Voltaire and Rousseau they possessed men of genius whose like was unknown in Germany. As if he wished to incite his hosts to engage in a war of revenge against the land of his birth, he solemnly assured them that the German courts had not only brought about the execution of Louis XVI by the coalition war, but had also, through their secret advice, been responsible for the July ordinances of Charles X—an impudent calumny, recognized as such even in France. He continued to revile his political opponents as servile souls with no more spirit than dogs. Since the liberal press docilely followed the example of this terrorism in the field of ideas, public opinion soon came to regard the holding of conservative principles as the sign of a weak character, and a German writer needed to be a man of considerable courage to give frank expression to monarchical sentiments.

Just as in France all the opposition parties made common cause, so did Börne extend the hand of fellowship to everyone who attacked monarchy. Lamennais had just been doing

penance in Rome for the democratic sins of his journal *L'Avenir*, and had humbly accepted the fierce papal encyclical of August 15, 1832, which first announced with perfect clearness to an unsuspecting world that the pugnacious spirit of the counter-reformation had reawakened in the Vatican. In the encyclical we read: "From this stinking source of indifference flows the equally erroneous opinion, or rather the delusion, that to every man must be assured freedom of conscience." A year after his submission, the hotblooded Breton was no longer able to control himself, and (to the horror of his milder tempered friend Montalembert) he wrote *Paroles d'un croyant*, a book full of apocalyptic images, which in words of flame attacked kings as children of Satan: "They blaspheme the Saviour, who brought freedom to earth, who will tolerate no rulership in the city of God, but desires only the mutual obligations of all." The writing never departed from the Catholic outlook, for it was merely a restatement, in fantastic and exaggerated terms, of Augustine's doctrine of the city of God, and had no more in common with the ideas of unbelieving German radicalism than the works of Mariana and the Jesuit monarchomachists had in common with the political doctrines of the Huguenots. Börne, however, translated the book and recommended it to the Germans, for his political culture was too slight to enable him to penetrate the essentially religious ideas of the French radical.

Sinister was the patience with which many of the German liberals endured Börne's invectives against their fatherland, and since he said the same thing over and over again in varying forms, he won the approval of all those simple souls who ask no more of the politician than that he should hold immutably to his confession of faith. Even Rotteck magnanimously forgave him for his personal attacks, and never ceased to admire the Paris tribune's fidelity to conviction. But the liberal camp contained a few men whose national pride was of tougher fibre, and who found the Jewish self-mockery as contemptible as the perpetual rain of abuse. C. F. Wurm of Hamburg, Wilibald Alexis, the young poet of Berlin, and subsequently Gervinus and other serious publicists, entered the lists against Börne, and showed that he was a man utterly without original ideas, "rioting in commonplaces." In witty poems Carl Simrock made fun of the cheap heroism of the apostle of freedom who shot his poisoned arrows from a safe

distance, and had not even to suffer pecuniarily in the cause, seeing that the Germans, "good natured fools," bought his books just the same. To the allurements of revolutionary propaganda, the Rhenish poet proudly rejoined that the Germans would build no altars to idols, and that they would merely expose themselves to the foreigner were they to strive for freedom without a fatherland.

Less vociferously than Heine and Börne, but with almost equal success, did the circle of Rahel Varnhagen strive to diffuse neofrench ideas. In his books the language used by Varnhagen was invariably cautious. With great industry, but quite uncritically, he collected from Prussian history materials for his *Biographical Monuments*, giving in well-rounded and monotonous periods a solemn narration of mingled truth and fiction, of fact and anecdote. If he had to describe an elegant courtier, a Besser or a Canitz, he could produce a neat picture, almost as graceful as the black paper figures he was wont to cut with scissors in his drawing-room. But his hand lacked the strength requisite to carve the oak of which heroic characters are made. The figures of Blucher and of the Old Dessauer, which are quite unmeaning without an atmosphere of passion and rough humour, appear lifeless and even silly in Varnhagen's smooth, spruce presentation. To high society this cool mannerism was agreeable, and Metternich extolled the shipwrecked diplomatist as a master of historical style, doubtless tacitly intending to frighten the inconvenient man away from political activities. Varnhagen's liberal views found somewhat more definite expression in the Hegelian *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, to which he contributed almost as indefatigably as the editor, Eduard Gans.

But he was entirely himself only at his Rahel's tea table. Here, amid authors, men of the world, and diplomatists not in active service, he gave free rein to his malicious tongue, and, knowing everybody, always ready to do a service, he played the patron to young men of talent. It was here that Gans, among a number of new political ideas, discovered also the great æsthetic truth: "The Taglioni dances Goethe." Here everyone was called upon to contribute brilliant impressions, and everyone was expected to know better than other people (the crown of life to the true Berliner). Then Rahel, "thyrsus-swinger to the thought of the time," would send the

lightnings of her spirit across the wide world, inspiring initiates to smiles of intimate comprehension. Everything about her breathed the restless weltschmerz of a noble but profoundly unsatisfied feminine nature. To quote her own words, she was affected with "a peculiar melancholy, an impulse to advance, a claim, a desire for something to happen." Something new and unprecedented was to take place. With dialectical audacity she disregarded all the limits which nature and history have imposed upon humanity; fatherland and church, marriage and property, everything was subjected to her disintegrating criticism. Why should not water burn; why should not fire flow; why should not a man bear children? "Had Fichte's wife written Fichte's works, would they have been any less worthy of attention?" In such a phrase she would victoriously proclaim the mental equality of the sexes. In the moral world the only thing that seemed to her of account was the arbitrary choice of personal feeling. She considered it "dreadful" that in wedlock many children should be procreated whose parents were not inspired by genuine mutual love. Her blunt conclusion was: "Jesus had only a mother. All children should have an ideal father, and all mothers should be held as blameless and honourable as was Mary." Such expressions of opinion could be tolerated when the kindly and brilliant woman used them to enliven casual conversation; but they acquired undeserved importance in the minds of youthful listeners, who had already learned from Hegel to discard all moral laws as obsolete, and who now turned to account in their writings the oracular utterances of the "mother of young literature."

Wilhelm Humboldt, who succumbed for a time to the charm of these conversations, soon came to recognize that the only note here was that of an arrogant egotism incapable of any sacrifice for the common weal, and he wrote to his friend:

> Entwined thy heart with every earthly feeling,
> With every mundane action and enjoyment—
> This know'st thou not, the links that bind in heaven.

In 1834, after Rahel's death, Varnhagen published her letters and conversations in a volume of *Souvenirs*. Here we find a strange medley of profound thoughts and cordial admiration for true human greatness, intermingled with sparkling nonsense, hysterical lamentations, and empty witticisms, which can only

impose upon the reader for a time owing to the grace with which they are expressed. For many years the unhappy work remained a storehouse of aphoristic half-thoughts for the feuilleton writers.

From these sources in Paris and Berlin there was nourished a new school of literature, to which Wienbarg, one of its members, gave the name of Young Germany, although it was neither young nor German. All its associates belonged to North Germany, the cultured but unimaginative section of the fatherland, as Goethe used to term it; and in all of them the reason was enormously stronger than the imagination. Every previous revolution in our literature had, like the present one, proceeded from the more active north, and invariably the new ideals had first been perfected by the superior imaginative energy of the High Germans, the classical ideal by Schiller and Goethe, the romantic by Uhland and Rückert. On this occasion, however, at the outset, South and Central Germany were indifferent, and were subsequently hostile; for in the warm and lovable nest of German fancy, in the original home of the German tongue, it was speedily recognized that the new literary movement was of Judaic and French origin, and was consequently predestined to infertility.

Since these younger writers were all lacking in lyrical faculty, making a virtue of necessity they maintained that prose alone contains "literary germs." The creation of figures instinct with life, the expression of the enduring sentiments of the human heart, they left to those soulless handicraftsmen who before their day had been known as artists. Desiring to expound the tendencies of the zeitgeist, they cared little whether they incorporated their topical reflections in the form of a novel, a description of travel, or a feuilleton causerie—the last being the most suitable form of all. No longer was poesy to illumine life by its ideals; but life, with its finite aims and ephemeral caprices, was to dominate poesy. Consequently the writings of Young Germany passed into utter oblivion as soon as history outgrew the tendencies of the thirties. The men of the new Sturm und Drang loved to compare themselves with Lenz, Heinse, and the other brilliant spirits of the days of *Werther*. They never noticed that they were merely breaking down doors already opened, that the regime of philistinism had been destroyed by

Goethe long before their day, and that the society of the new age, although not invariably free from accesses of demure sanctimoniousness, exhibited on the whole tolerant consideration for the hot blood of youth. They imagined that their "young criticism" would exercise an influence no less creative than had been exercised by the critical writings of Lessing, whereas the German imagination, now proudly independent, had long ceased to need a liberator. Their radicalism was artificial, devoid of seriousness, and uninspired by lasting passion. Many of their catchwords were merely a background for the better display of the greatness of their own detached egos.

Theodor Mundt, the Berlin journalist, acted as herald of their renown. In Rahel's salon he garnered the new ideas; in the *Dioskuren* and other short-lived journals he described the labours of the youthful titans; in *Madonna* he acclaimed the right of free love; in *Moderne Lebenswirren* he revived Börne's old witticisms about the "highly well born," about the "polypi of the age," and so on; and in a tedious work upon the unity of Germany he showed that henceforward great monarchs would be neither possible nor necessary, for constitutional monarchy merely made kingship "devoid of physiognomy," and could consequently be no more than a transitional stage on the way to republicanism. More noteworthy were the *Æsthetischen Feldzüge* and other minor critical essays by Ludolf Wienbarg, the Holsteiner. Sensation and reason were, in his opinion, the forces of the new age; Luther had freed the understanding, and now the senses must come into their rights. It was therefore reserved for the modern "writers of destiny" to fulfil poetry with reality. "Poesy and life are inseparables; the female frets to death when severed from the male." Add to this an overplus of enlightenment and cosmopolitanism, for "pantheism and pancivism spring from the same root." Neither Mundt nor Wienbarg was capable of continued growth, for the former lacked talent, the latter industry.

Heinrich Laube was endowed with a larger share of vital energy, and brought with him a breath of Silesian cheerfulness into the blasé world of Berlin authorship. Unfortunately he carried his wares too early to the literary market, and having at this time nothing original to say, he was compelled to claim notice for himself by whip-crackings and bombast. In *Das neue Jahrhundert* he endeavoured (to quote what he himself said in maturer years) "to judge everything possible

and impossible by the standard of liberalism." He extolled Rotteck as the German Lafayette; declared reason to be the foundation of liberalism and the supreme source of all rights; and admired Polish freedom with a naivety truly remarkable in a Silesian. *Das junge Europa*, too, contained nothing profounder than feuilleton comments, but to these comments, as he himself phrased it, he gave "the physiognomy of a novel," and youthful readers of his descriptions of free love, characterised rather by truth than by charm, might well think that they had to do with a work of imagination. It was devoid of artistic beauty, but from the occasional gleams of a sound human understanding it might be inferred that the young poet would soon weary of these unripe boastings. Laube spoke of Goethe in admiring terms, but he was not free from a sense of superiority, for Young Germany was firmly convinced that the newer literature was advancing with giant strides far beyond anything that had been attainable by the old pleasure-seeking prince's servant. "As long as Goethe lived in a petty time, Goethe was great; but when the time became great, Goethe was small. It may be that freedom will rise from his tomb. With other maidens has he dallied, but never with the most beautiful of them all."

Even earlier than Laube, when no more than twenty-one years of age, Carl Gutzkow made his first essays in authorship. A typical Berliner, quite estranged from nature, he was all understanding, all culture, so that even his passions had a doctrinaire flavour. However earnestly in later years he might endeavour to contemplate, to experience, to feel, throughout life there clung to him the influences resulting from his having grown up in this metropolis, where even the mob knew no stronger term of abuse than "uncultured man," where the children in their earliest years became acquainted at menageries with their own resemblance to monkeys, but seldom or never caught sight of a herd of German cattle. Gutzkow invariably aspired towards intellectualism, and it was impossible for him to express a simple thought in simple words. Ardently desirous of fame, the successes of others preyed upon his mind, and distant observers could readily regard this man who, though irritable, was essentially good-natured, as a person of malicious and envious disposition. In rapid succession he published a number of short stories, all defective in point of character drawing, and overloaded with weltchmerz. Next came *Briefe*

cines Narren an eine Närrin, a sentimental sketch in the inflated style of Jean Paul, but devoid of the latter's geniality. This was followed by *Nero*, a shapeless drama, ostensibly intended to represent "the struggle of the beautiful with the good, a struggle still undecided"; but the work achieved nothing more than confused freethinking utterances and tepid witticisms, failing even to arouse a sentiment of awe by its delineation of the mania of Caesarism.

It was through a great literary scandal that Gutzkow's name first became known to wider circles. The sultry vintage years of 1834 and 1835 were to involve our literature in severe storms. In the autumn of 1834 occurred the death of Schleiermacher. The church mourned for its great teacher, and whoever was competent to understand the hidden tragedy of the life of the thinker was profoundly moved in contemplating the career of this man who had only attained his splendid power of bringing consolation to heavy laden hearts because he had himself suffered so greatly, because he himself had come into such intimate contact with the great forces of destiny. How marvellously had God guided him! How many were the struggles through which this shy spirit had at length fought down the repugnance towards all public activities, to wield in the end a mighty influence over the nation. How many aberrations of sentiment, how many disillusionments elaborately concealed by a keen wit, had to be endured, before this richly endowed heart, stretching all its roots and leaves towards love, could come to terms with the weakly and misshapen body, and could at length find peace in work of pure inclination. How many doubts must be surmounted before the feeling of dependence upon God became elevated into a joyful consciousness of appurtenancy, of sonship to the Father, until the bold investigator felt himself in perfect harmony with his church, and on his deathbed, as was his Protestant right, administered the sacrament to himself and his family.

Yet this tomb, contemplated with veneration even by Varnhagen, was one which Gutzkow, with youthful impudence, ventured to desecrate. To make fun of the unctuous laments of the theologians, suddenly, quite without authorisation, he republished the dead man's long forgotten and weakest work, the only one unworthy of its author, *Vertraute Briefe über Friedrich Schlegels Lucinde*, published in the year 1800.[1]

[1] Vide supra, vol. I, p 239.

These letters had been penned by Schleiermacher in the desire to assist his friend Schlegel against the attacks of the conventional moralists, and whilst actually engaged in writing them he had been uneasy about his own work. The mysticism of love, which doubtless unriddled many a fine secret, but likewise coarsely desecrated many another, did not arise from the natural force of a strong passion, but from the half unconscious sophistry of a hypercultured sentiment influenced by external suggestions. At a later date, when Schleiermacher outgrew romanticism, he recognised how impossible it is to deduce the moral laws of society solely from the idea of individuality. But this subjectivism of the youthful romanticist was the very thing which pleased the Young Germans, whose principal talent it was to trot out old errors in a new dress. His cordial defence of sensual delights was a dainty morsel for their lustful palates, and in Gutzkow's hands it was accentuated to become the "soulless and unworthy libertinage" which the young Schleiermacher had expressly repudiated. Gutzkow took the theologian's name in vain, writing a lengthy introduction in which he bluntly preached unchastity and godlessness. "Is it not true, Rosalie? Only since you have worn spurs on your little silken boots have you known the meaning of the words, 'I love you' . . . Come here, Franz! Who is God? You don't know? Innocent atheist, philosophical child! Had the world never known of God, it would have been much happier!" The writer really imagined that with this foolish chatter he was performing a great act of spiritual enfranchisement. "I believe," he wrote, "in the reformation of love, as I believe in every social problem of the century"—and his associates acclaimed this remarkable reformer, who believed in all problems. Wienbarg wrote with delight: "The most beautiful and the most talented of Schleiermacher's children has hitherto been disowned and calumniated because it was a love child and did not bear its father's name."

The Young German writings were but little read, but they were much talked of, and this was already success, for modern society believes it to be its duty to discuss everything, whether this be understood or not, and thus is apt credulously to accept any established reputation. With the ideas of the newer Parisian literature, the industrious business habits characteristic of that literature and all the evil arts of

log-rolling had crossed the Rhine. It was fruitless for Scribe to make mock of these abuses in his clever comedy *La Camaraderie*; they had become indispensable to the French, especially since the newspapers, following the example of Girardin's daily, *La Presse*, had assumed purely democratic forms, and had learned how to secure extensive circulation by low prices and numerous business advertisements. As far as was possible in our modest conditions, Young Germany, too, knew how to promote the ephemeral reputation of its adherents. Gutzkow was presented to the nation by Wienbarg with drums and trumpets. He was "the talented author of *Maha Guru*, the writer of the epoch-making literary supplement of *Phœnix*, the youthful templar, the boldest soldier of liberty and the most charming priest of love on German soil." Hardly less ludicrous did it sound when Heine sang the praises of blusterous young Laube on account of his "notable tranquillity and self-realised greatness." In this fertilising rain of mutual admiration, many of the mere camp-followers of Young Germany suddenly found themselves on the way to become literary giants. In Leipzig lived Gustav Kühne, editor of *Europa*, a man of no account, and so dull a writer that a Leipzig student suffering from boredom was wont to say: "Es kühnelt mich." But in his well-ordered house the younger literati were sure of a hospitable welcome, so they praised him as a German man of letters, and his name is still copied from one history of literature to another although no one ever reads him.

What a gulf between the Teutonist followers of Jahn and the new literary apostles. The former displayed energy pushed to the point of roughness, the latter's work was artificialised and over-adorned; the Teutonists displayed faith, the Young Germans mockery; whilst instead of the overstrained patriotic zeal of the purifiers of German speech, we find in the Young Germans an unceasing parade of foreign locutions, in which they outdo even the South German parliamentarians. The notable adaptability of our tongue has ever been a sign of strength, for the Teuton, a born conqueror, takes his property where he finds it; but, like every great talent, it is liable to misuse, and never was it more grossly misused than in these days. Simply from vanity, because they considered everything French especially distinguished, and because they wished to suggest that they themselves were quite at home in

Paris, the writers of the Young German school loaded their style, even without this unduly artificial, with a mass of foolish French words and phrases. When Wienbarg published a new volume, he sublimely announced that he was placing "his critical effort under the reverbère of the book trade."

The evil example was all the more disastrous to German journalistic style because the younger writers on the daily press were many of them Jews, almost invariably devoid of a feeling for the niceties of language. How great had become the power of Jewry during these few years! Börne and Heine, Eduard Gans and Rahel, set the tone for Young Germany, whilst a fifth in the company was Zacharias Löwenthal, the busy publisher of Mannheim. Cosmopolitanism and hatred of Christianity, bitter mockery and corruption of speech, utter indifference towards the greatness of national history—everything in the movement was Jewish, although the Young Germans never constituted a definitely circumscribed school, although Börne did not even correspond with most of his German imitators, whilst Gutzkow at least was no lover of the Jews. It is true that the Hebraic choir-masters were few in number, but the Jew's mysterious faculty for multiplying himself is familiar to all, and any one who in a narrow alley sees twenty Jews standing at their thresholds is prepared to take his oath that there must have been hundreds there. Moreover, since the five leaders were really of much greater intellectual force than the members of their Germanic following, the Judaic spirit exercised for a brief period an influence upon German literature such as has never since been paralleled. It is true that the number of Jewish authors is now much larger than in those days, but they do not gain the respect of the nation unless they are fully Germanised. Such a reputation as Heine's was possible only in a generation whose cosmopolitan dreams had expunged for a time the memory of the primeval contrast between Aryan and Semitic sensibilities. This semi-Jewish radicalism had no creative faculty whatever, but it assisted in undermining the foundations of state, church, and society, thus contributing to the revolution of 1848. For this reason alone does the movement find a place in history.

The hopeless confusion of all moral ideas in Young German circles was manifested with cynical impudence in Georg Büchner's drama *Danton's Death*. When the police were

already on his heels owing to his intrigues in Upper Hesse,[1] with feverish zeal the young poet was studying the newspapers of the revolutionary epoch. In a number of loosely threaded dramatic scenes, a faithful chronicler, he described to the life the doings of the men of blood who sat in the national convention—described this unadulterated revival of the Celtism of druid days, with its blood drinking, its voluptuousness, its gloomy misconceptions, and its nauseating superaddition of modern boredom. No contemporary writer except Carlyle reproduced the horrors of the revolution with such terrible truth, but whereas the Scottish author gave passionate expression to his moral reprobation, the German seriously undertook to glorify the revolution in a work that can only arouse our loathing. Who can tell whether this most gifted of all the Young German poets might not one day have outgrown his deplorable materialism? Büchner aspired towards artistic truth; he detested phrase-making, even going so far as to dislike the emotional note of Schiller's writing; and would give his full approval only to the profound simplicity, the repressed passion, of the folk-song. In his novel *Springtime*, dealing with the favourite epoch of the Young Germans, the age of Sturm und Drang, he eschewed all bias, relating with pitiless veracity and a sinister sympathetic comprehension how illusion gradually mastered the friend of Goethe's youth. Ere the work was completed, Büchner died suddenly, in February, 1837, a few days after Börne's death, and German radicalism, so poor in men of talent, did not hesitate to glory in this name. Young Herwegh sang Büchner and Börne as the German Dioscuri.

Prince Pückler-Muskau, like Büchner, had no more than an indirect connection with Young Germany, the association being not so much personal as due to kinship of views. But in Rahel's salon he had developed his gift for amiable small-talk into a fine art, and upon Varnhagen's advice he published *Letters from a Deceased Person*, an able description of travel, far superior to the youthful writings of Gutzkow or Laube. The distinguished man of the world had had real experience, whereas the others drew upon specious imaginings. He said many an apt word upon the hypocrisy of English morals; the quiet humour of his narrative was in correspondence with his personal character; and the infusion of foreign idioms,

[1] Vide supra, pp. 376, 377.

which he carried to an extreme, did not in his case sound so unnatural as it did in that of the Young German plebeians, seeing that aristocratic society was still in the habit of talking such semifrench gibberish. As an unprejudiced cosmopolitan, and as one who despised the smug middle classes and above all the Prussian officialdom, the prince was at first given a kindly reception by the critics of Young Germany. In the long run, however, he could not escape the curse of amateurishness. His attitude towards penmanship was merely one of indulgent contempt, and he soon wrote himself out. For a brief period his marvellous adventures, some true and some fictitious, in every country under the sun, procured for him a world-wide reputation. In the end, however, readers began to weary of Semilasso's peregrinations and his increasing pose of nil admirari. Such creative artistic faculty as he possessed was displayed in his remarkable work as landscape gardener on his estates of Muskau and Branitz.

The dissensions over the tomb of Schleiermacher had not yet ceased when another death incited the champions of Young Germany to fresh deeds of glory. In December, 1834, Charlotte, the beautiful and high-minded wife of the young poet Heinrich Stieglitz, stabbed herself. In a few lines written just before the suicide, she expressed the wish that her husband might "become happier in genuine unhappiness," her hope apparently being that the intensity of his sufferings would heighten his poetic faculty and would increase his power of tragic passion. To one who knew the female heart, there could hardly be anything enigmatic about this act of self-destruction. Heinrich Stieglitz was one of those pitiable mediocrities in whom unjustifiable ambition has been induced by brilliant success in examinations, and his artistic aims were quite beyond his power. His proud young wife shared these sterile torments for a few years, but when it became clear to her that the man of her choice could not fulfil her ideals, she was unable to survive the disillusionment. To spare her beloved, and it may be also because her mind was deranged, she endeavoured to wrap her woman's motives in freethinking phraseology. Like most suicides, this also was the outcome of weakness, of pusillanimity. But it was impossible that so simple an explanation should content an epoch avid of sensation. All Berlin looked upon Charlotte Stieglitz as a heroine, regarding an act which deserved nothing more than humane sympathy as the manifestation of an

unprecedented spirit of self-sacrifice, as a literary matryrdom comparable with the martyrdom of the saints of the church. Even Rauch and other serious-minded men were carried away by the wave of universal admiration. Böckh, in Greek distichs, extolled the new Alcestis, "who had voluntarily gone down to Hades for the good of her spouse." Theodor Mundt, a family friend, did not hesitate to turn the horrible incident to business account; he promptly erected a biographical "monument" to the deceased, roughly withdrawing the veil from the hidden sorrows of this profoundly unhappy marriage. Then the widower made a journey through Germany, carrying with him his wife's dagger, and boasting of his own shame. In his *Memories of Charlotte*, which was not published until some years after his death, he says: "Her last lines are henceforward my diploma, my promotion to a higher rank." It was impossible that sorrow should awaken profound thoughts in this weakling. In 1849 he died of cholera in Italy, a commonplace writer of travels. Not the desperate deed itself, but the echoes it awakened, was a tragical sign of the times, a sign of sensibilities perverted by hyperculture.

By the death of Charlotte, Gutzkow was stimulated to write his romance *Wally*. With this work (such was the announcement promptly made by the chorus of Young German criticism) the men of the new Sturm und Drang ventured their boldest cast, as those of the earlier movement had ventured it with Heinze's *Ardinghello*. But how shameful was the decline. In Heinze's work are displayed naked and unfalsified nature, blazing sensuality, vigorous portraiture, and a charming art of narration, by which the reader is readily induced to overlook the infamous character of the contents. Moreover, in the interwoven observations on art are to be found many excellent ideas, worthy of a time which still possessed enthusiastic faith in beauty. But in Gutzkow we find nothing but a desert of reflections, of immature and precocious utterances concerning the rights of the flesh, the unnaturalness of marriage, the folly of Christianity. We are shown a bored and impotent hero, and an equally stupid and world-weary heroine, who is ashamed of her feminine modesty as a prejudice, who exhibits herself nude to her lover in order to wed him symbolically, whilst contracting marriage with a man whom she does not love. Naturally the work closes with a suicide. This detestable piece of obscenity does

not contain a trace of vigorous passion or a single natural word.

It was impossible that in a moral nation such an overplus of uncleanly impudence should be allowed to pass unchallenged. In September, 1835, Wolfgang Menzel opened a campaign against Young Germany in the columns of the Stuttgart *Literaturblatt*, of which he was editor. One of the most zealous members of the Würtemberg opposition, on intimate terms with Welcker and many others among the South German parliamentarians, he had been an eager participant in the petition issued from Boll by the Swabian liberals,[1] and had on many occasions warmly espoused the cause of the ill-treated Jews; but he remained a firm adherent of the Protestant faith, and would not allow the wisdom of the newspapers to shake his conviction that France was on the decline, Germany in the ascendant. When the ungerman and unchristian tendencies of Young Germany had been plainly demonstrated in Gutzkow's *Wally*, he gave vent to his feelings in his rough, arrogant, and blustering manner, but with honest courage. He must have known that the majority of his liberal associates were half estranged from the church, and that they would be likely to look askance at his defence of Christianity. In the course of the prolonged dispute, in which retort was perpetually followed by counter retort, he at length openly declared that sanspatrie Judaism was disintegrating all our ideas of shame and morality, and that whilst the mob frenzy of the middle ages had falsely accused the Jews of poisoning springs, the old accusation might now be justly revived in reference to the domain of literature.

The aberrations of art cannot be fought with moral indignation alone. More dangerous to Young Germany than Menzel's essentially prosaic moral sermons was the aesthetic opposition voiced by the circle of Swabian singers. With well-grounded pride Justinus Kerner had written:

> Among the hills and o'er the lea, where songs of harvesters are heard,
> The school of Swabia's bards is held, where Nature speaks the master-word.

As the Swabians had in former days stoutly upheld the clarity of Protestant reason against the fantastic extravagances of

[1] Vide supra, p. 291.

Schlegelian romanticism, so now with no less stoutness did they reject the artificialities of the new feuilleton style, preserving rhymed euphony, the nobility of lyrical form, and the natural innocence of the uncorrupted pleasures of the senses. Their muse

> Sang a song not free from error,
> But yet untouched by earthly stain—

as Gustav Schwab expressed it with amiable modesty. Among the young men who now sat at the feet of the two patriarchs Uhland and Kerner, one only, Eduard Mörike, was endowed with a wonderful gift of illuminating everything with poetic light. But in fortunate hours the two Pfizers, Schwab, and Carl Mayer, would sometimes produce a vigorous ballad, a well-turned epigram, or a pretty nature poem; and whereas the Young Germans, luxuriating in weltschmerz, looked upon poesy as a ruthless fate, to the Swabians it seemed a splendid gift from heaven which was to fill the poet with joy, thus rendering him capable of lifting others to heights of happiness above the confusion of daily life. Merry were the hours when the Swabian poets sat over their tankards, and when Lenau and Auersperg, the two young Austrian poets, paid them a visit, or the brothers Adolf and August Stöber came over from Strasburg, where, in the Frenchified western march, they were the trusty champions of the German tongue and German poetry. This was German life, German art and fancy. How prosaic in comparison seemed the activities of the thought-choppers round Rahel's tea table, or the foolish chatter of the grisettes at Heine's little dinner-parties.

Gustav Pfizer therefore considered himself justified, in the name of German art, in taking the field against Heine and his followers. Pfizer's poetical creations were extremely unequal. The prim forms he employed were not always well adapted to the rich content of his verses, most of which were contemplative; a few only of his characters, like that of Hermes Psychopompos, stand out clearly before the reader's eyes, "always beautiful and always serene"; but he possessed a sure and highly cultured understanding of the beautiful. His brother, again, Paul Pfizer, a declared liberal, could not possibly be accused of partisan fanaticism when in the year 1838, in Cotta's recently founded *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, he pointed out the æsthetic errors of Young Germany in unsparing but

worthy and measured language. Was the widely trumpeted and stimulating confusion of the feuilleton style anything more, he asked, than a foolish attempt to break down the lines of demarcation long since established by Lessing between poetry and prose? What could result but the destruction of all beauty if the younger poets were to vie with one another in brushing back their hair in order to display their faun's ears and satyr's horns? All Swabia agreed with him. Even Vischer, the young writer on æsthetics, a strong radical in politics and religion, under the spell of the sound sense of beauty characteristic of the Swabian stock, straightforwardly declared that such works of reflection as the novels of Gutzkow or Laube could not properly be classed as works of imagination. We owe it to the Swabians that the Young German movement never made its way into the highlands, the rank growth being confined to the great towns of the north. The victorious resistance of national sentiment to the Judaico-French hybrid literature originated in the liberal south, which in the political field had proved so willing to accept the doctrines of salvation made in France. The consoling conclusion might be drawn that even the process of political Frenchification had merely touched the surface of things among these people who were German to the core, and that the German spirit would one day remodel its constitutionalist ideas. But who at that time would have ventured to express such hopes? All the world still sought the strength of the South Germans where their weakness lay, in the Gallic verbal displays of the chambers.

Since Menzel's *Literaturblatt* was much read in conservative circles on account of its high church tendencies, his attack attracted attention at the courts, and accelerated the long pending intervention of the Bundestag. Wienbarg, when he introduced the name of Young Germany, had unfortunately been unaware or had ignored that there already existed another Young Germany, the revolutionary secret society of refugees and handicraftsmen which had been founded in Switzerland under Mazzini's leadership.[1] This Young Germany was but too well known to the demagogue hunters in Frankfort, and obvious, though quite unfounded, was the suspicion that there must be some sort of connection between the two associations. The most savage of the numerous attempts to assassinate Louis Philippe had just miscarried. Fieschi's infernal machine

[1] Vide supra, p. 359.

struck terror throughout Europe, and demagogic intrigues were supervised more closely than ever. At this juncture Wienbarg and Gutzkow issued a bombastic manifesto inviting all German freethinkers to cooperate in founding a German review which was to outdo Schiller's *Horen* and the *Revue des deux mondes*. It was impossible that the Germanic Federation, in view of all it had said against the political press, should tolerate the undertaking. General von Schöler, the new Prussian federal envoy, an acknowledged connoisseur, gave the Bundestag an unflattering but just description of the character of this new literature. In essentials it was, he said, no more than a revival of the doctrines of the Encyclopædists; but it was able "to make up for deficiency in genuine wit and novelty of ideas by smartness of expression and by impudent mockery of sacred things." On December 11, 1835, upon the proposal of Austria, all the governments undertook to check the diffusion of Young German writings by every legal means.[1] In accordance with federal custom, the resolution was so indefinitely worded that after the lapse of several months Hanover enquired whether all the writings of the Young Germans, even the earlier ones, were really to be suppressed. Schöler rejoined that the resolution had not intended anything so drastic as this, but no further resolution was adopted to throw light upon the precise meaning of the one previously carried.[2]

Everything was therefore left to the individual states, and these took action as pleased them best, for the most part with notable lenity. Here and there proceedings were taken against particular books written by the Young Germans. In Prussia, the import of all publications of the Hamburg firm Hoffmann and Campe, which issued Heine's writings, was actually prohibited for several years. Speaking generally, however, the prohibition was very ineffectually enforced, and in the end lapsed entirely. The only writings of the Young German school for which there was a real demand among the reading public, the works of Heine and Börne, were obtainable almost without hindrance. There could be no talk of any serious persecution; the Young German literati got off far more easily than the editors of the suppressed political journals. Nevertheless, Heine continued to assume the role of the unhappy

[1] Schöler's Reports, November 3, 1835, and subsequent dates.
[2] Schöler's Report, April 18, 1836.

exile, comparing himself with Dante, who had likewise had to eat the bitter bread of the stranger. Gutzkow was the only one who had to pay a somewhat higher penalty. His *Wally* indisputably contained a "despiteful description of the Christian religion," and on this account he was condemned by the Mannheim law court to a brief term of imprisonment.

Trivial as were these troubles, they sufficed to adorn with the halo of martyrdom the heads of the Young German leaders. In the public eye everyone was right who had a quarrel with the Bundestag. Besides, was it not shameful that belletristic literature, which in Germany had always enjoyed unrestricted liberty, should now be subjected to the arbitrary control of the police? Influenced by these considerations, Paulus of Heidelberg, advocate for the defence in all such cases, entered the lists on behalf of Gutzkow's *Wally*. His involved sentences showed, indeed, how much self-constraint the old rationalist had been forced to exercise before he conld undertake to champion this thoroughly atheistical book. Other defenders of Gutzkow contented themselves with the flattering opinion that this novel could not possibly lead anyone from the paths of virtue. Most of those who were attacked displayed very little heroism vis-à-vis the government. Not long ago they had boastfully undertaken to shake bourgeois society to its foundations; now they humbly protested that their sentiments were harmless, and that their influence had been extremely restricted. Heine despatched a missive to the Federation which among friends he himself described as a "childlike, syrupy, and submissive letter." Referring "to the example of the Master, that inestimable man Martin Luther," he declared "with the profoundest respect" that he would never cease to obey the laws of his fatherland. But the Bundestag knew its man, and shelved the address as irrelevant.[1] Heine wrote also to Metternich, with no better success, humbly begging that victorious Austria would be magnanimous enough to rescue him from his afflictions.[2]

Fainthearted before the authorities, the Young Germans reserved all their anger for Menzel. He alone, they held, was responsible for the prosecution, although he had merely done his duty as critic, and had employed the honest weapon of literary polemic. He was far from approving the measures taken by the Bundestag, and his rough language was more

[1] Schöler's Report, May 24, 1836. [2] Maltzan's Report, July 1, 1836.

reputable than were the malicious suspicions wherewith the Young German writers aspersed their opponents. But for five years thenceforward he remained the target of the radical writers. Börne twisted the sense of his words and wrote a booklet entitled *Menzel the Devourer of Frenchmen*, although Menzel had made no attack on the French, having merely visited upon the German Jews, men without a country, the well-deserved reproof that no Frenchman would ever sink so low as to attack his own people before strangers and in a foreign tongue. This writing was Börne's swan song. For several years it was extolled even in the schools as a masterpiece. Yet it merely proved that his radicalism had no better foundation than arid negation and rage against all those who held different opinions. "What," he asks, "are we to think of the man who sells his opinions for an Austrian smile, a Prussian flattery, a Bavarian shrug, or a Jesuitical commendation?" Again: "For these reasons, the man who hates France or reviles that country for sordid lust for gain, is a foe to God, humanity, right, freedom, and love." This fanatic was unable to see that a German might have other reasons for resenting the avaricious war clamour of the Parisians. Nor was there lacking a lament for free Frankfort, now enslaved by federal troops; the Frankforters were Jews who had to do with Christian Austria and Prussia, and must be made to mind their manners!

Heine's conduct was yet more equivocal. In earlier days he had been a fellow member of the Bonn Burschenschaft with Menzel and Jarcke, and he was familiar with their strict religious views. It could not escape his perspicacity that the present struggle was inevitable, and that the romanticist and radical elements which had comprised the old Burschenschaft must now part company. He could not fail to know that Menzel's conduct had been perfectly straightforward. Yet he gave his rejoinder the lying title *Against the Informer*. Being himself far out of range, he indulged quite without restraint all the gross inclinations of his Falstaffian nature, referring to his opponent as a mouchard, a blackguard, a recreant, a scoundrel, a ruffian, and a poltroon. He attained his purpose, for in those days, when everyone dreaded the heavy hand of the police, nothing could be more terrible than to be accused of being an informer. Heine's fierce calumny was promptly adopted by the whole liberal press, and despite its obvious

untruth was so obstinately reiterated that it finds a place even to-day in most histories of literature.

In the *Schwabenspiegel* which he launched against Pfizer, Heine made use of a trick no less effective. Since Uhland and Rückert, the two greatest poets of the south, were not personally participating in these struggles, he endeavoured to represent the dispute as if it had been merely due to minor poets, envious in their mediocrity, setting themselves up against his own superior talent, as if the prim bourgeois respectability of the highlands were arraying itself against the free thought of the north. The real truth was that South German poesy was arrayed against Jewish witticism. The Swabians' pens were set in motion, not by sanctimonious censoriousness, which has ever been alien from the temperament of the cheerful German south, but by æsthetic repugnance. One weakness of the Swabians could not, indeed, be overlooked. Whilst the Young German writers were wholly a prey to their prepossessions, the southern poets on the other hand were too remote from the passions of the day, and their refinedly sensuous and peaceable verse was incompetent to give full expression to the ideas of a fermenting and struggling time. Heine knew how to turn this defect to good account, for the art of making a diabolically clever use of half truths was the one quality which he shared with his idol Napoleon. He described the Swabians as a clumsy rout of children at play, and thus brought some of the laughers over to his side. Finally, the younger radicals had had their taste quite corrupted by the mockeries of the new literature; they could laugh when Heine spoke of the diarrhœal flux of the Swabian poets, or when he accused his opponent Pfizer of unnatural vice. Nevertheless the tide of the radical feuilletons was already on the ebb. The lesser men of the Young German movement were quickly forgotten; and the stronger personalities, Gutzkow and Laube, were beginning to collect their forces, and to atone by maturer works for the follies of youth. Whilst still in prison, Gutzkow wrote a brief work on the philosophy of history which, though full of empty phrases, showed that he was beginning to come to his senses.

But the Parisian colony of the Young Germans first showed its true colours to the world when its members began to fall out. Börne and Heine had never got on well together, for no understanding was possible between doctrinaire obstinacy

and unmeaning frivolity. Börne gave frank expression to his views, but Heine evaded a chivalrous combat, and did not discharge his long-retained spleen until Börne died, and Raspail, the French republican, extolled the hero of international democracy in a stirring funeral oration. For the third time, as after the death of Schleiermacher and after that of Charlotte Stieglitz, did Young Germany manifest its humane delicacy beside a freshly made grave. Heine's work on Börne gave utterance, as usual, to a number of brilliant half truths, but the tone was so spiteful and so vulgar that even the liberal press was angered. The liberal Aristophanes might revile conservatives and poets as much as he pleased, but it was unpardonable of him to attack a tribune of the people. The dispute was utterly nauseating, and the notorious feud between Voss and Stolberg seemed in comparison to have been an amiable interchange of ideas. When Börne's friend Frau Wohl now opened her packets of letters and sedulously extracted all Börne's private opinions about Heine, the vapours of the ghetto were wafted across Germany, and many an honest German began at length to recognise the nature of the idols before which he had once bowed the knee.

§ 3. LITERATURE AND THE FINE ARTS.

Epochs of literary struggle are rarely favourable to lyrical poetry. Few understood as Rückert understood how to protect the quiet flower garden of poesy from the keen winds of the day. To the master of verse the shapelessness of the feuilleton style seemed utterly contemptible, just as its spirit of mockery and its "lewd manners" were repellent to his pious soul. He knew that all human life leads "from God to God," that nature is no more than the spirit's fostermother, "nourishing the soul until it can learn that nature is not its true mother." Such were the sentiments that inspired him when, in *The Wisdom of the Brahmans*, he compiled a record of the mysterious world of inner experience. It seemed at times as if the poet had been completely immersed in the contemplative repose of the east, but the liberal world-spirit of the westerner continually broke through, and high above all the wisdom of India stood in his estimation the royal command of Christian love. His oriental excursions did not

estrange him from his home. With his old inexhaustible desire for song he continued to transform his whole life into a work of art, and around every event of the day his imagination spun golden threads. Whatever happened in his experience turned to poetry, were it that he listened to the whispering of the wind, that he told fairy tales to his children, or sent good wishes to his bosom friend Kopp, the Erlangen philologian. He was sometimes annoyed by his fellow countrymen because, behind his oriental allegories, they found it difficult to perceive his all-embracing German heart, to which nothing human was foreign, and also because they considered that even his more distinctively German poems were not tuneful, and therefore were not genuinely popular; but he never abated his artist's pride in order to woo the favour of the crowd. When quite an old man he wrote freely and grandly of the newspaper-made reputations of the idols of the day:

Swallows and starlings
Fly in squadrons,
Cushats amid the foliage
Coo to their mates.
Lonely the eagle
Soars in the blue,
The critics beneath him
Are naught in his sight.

Chamisso, too, belonged to the old nobility of our literature, was one of those who looked down with contempt upon the noisy self-praise of the new generation. When the serious man, with his dark eyes and his flowing white locks, wandered alone through the streets of Berlin, the younger literati regarded him with astonishment as a ghost from vanished days, although he was only just over fifty, and with the publication of his collected poems had now first attained the climax of his artistic renown. A live man among living men as he had ever been, he continued to sing many of the political transformations of the day, uttering in ardent verses his delight at the overthrow of the Bourbon priestly dominion, but he would not degrade his free muse to make of her a handmaiden of party. "Do not accuse the contemporary world before the tribunal of posterity," he warningly exclaimed to the young poets who delighted in invective. How perfectly at home did he feel in his adopted land of Prussia, connected with it by ties of

love; great was his veneration for the king, "who had forged his crown out of the gold of good faith." Dying in 1838, while still comparatively young, he departed with a heart full of gratitude for that life had given him all it can offer in the way of love; and with the words "it is my delight to be loved" he took leave of this beautiful world.

How different was Platen's end (1835). He died, as he had anticipated, "like Ulrich Hutten, forsaken and alone," in one of those luxuriant flower gardens scattered here and there among the abandoned ruins of old Syracuse. But his passing was sad merely, not tragical. Not through the fortune of war, like so many heroes of the sword and of the pen, had he been driven from his home. It was only the barren despondency of his proud heart which impelled him to incessant wanderings in the distant south, although the strict Protestant could never feel genuinely at home in the land of the pope, "the land of antichrist." His life's work was done, though he continued to the close to cherish the bold design of a Hohenstaufen epic. His poetic powers were on the wane. In his last hymns, regarded by himself as his finest poems, the finished art of his versification had degenerated to artifice.

Eduard Mörike, meanwhile, had made his debut as a lyric poet. The most gifted among the younger writers of the Swabian school, a simple spirit, in these days of excessive culture and perpetual dispute he seemed like a child of miracle, and he was in truth a poet for all time, contrasting in every respect with the writers of the Young German school. He was perfectly natural, devoting himself wholly to poetic contemplation, for passion and sentimentality were as far from him as were rhetoric and prepossession. Whilst still a student he would flee from the noise of the world to listen to murmuring springs in distant forest nooks; or assembling a few intimates in a quiet summer house among the vineyards of Oesterberg, he would tell wonderful tales of Orplid, the abandoned city of the gods. After the close of his student days he became pastor in a lowland village where, in the churchyard, Schiller's mother lay buried. This was amid the vineyards of the Neckar valley, in the very centre of Swabian song and saga. Sitting there poring over his beloved classics, or wandering in reverie through the woods and listening to the birds "spinning threads of pure gold and silver" from their throats, he would, at times, feel genius welling up within him, and would realise what

it means "to have God for one's own upon earth." To him applied the saying which he had once inscribed upon a marble lamp of rare beauty:

> That which is beautiful seems blessed in its very existence.

The ultimate impression made upon every one of his readers was the feeling how happy must be the man who could write such poetry. He did not venture into the realm of history, and even political discussion was distasteful to him. His songs and ballads, his idylls and sayings, related solely to the simplest sentiments of the human heart; but how new and characteristic sounded from his mouth the oft-repeated stories of the forsaken maiden, of the boy who had kissed lovely Rohtraut's lips, of the vanished joys of the time of roses. He was master of the tuneful methods of the German folksong; but in addition, like the idyll writers among the Greeks, he was competent to portray firmly outlined figures with epic calm. He was as intimately acquainted with the mysteriously alluring tongue of the elements as had been no writer before him except Goethe in youth, the Goethe who wrote *The Fisher*. Hardly less intimately had he realised the unceasing yearnings of youth the ever-hopeful:

> To boundless realms the eagle wings his way,
> And garners dazzling gold-dust in his eyes.
> He fears not, as the foolish faint-heart might,
> To dash his pinions 'gainst the roof of heaven.

In the cordiality of his mood, in the primitive force of his expressions, and in the serene freedom of his roguish humour, he at times excelled even Uhland. As artist he was inferior to the elder poet, for his muse was a child of the hour. He did not invariably succeed in finishing off his work to perfection. For these reasons, a few only of his songs had a wide vogue among the populace; the sensuous beauty of his versification was too tranquil, too peculiar, for the comprehension of the masses, whose first demand is ever for material stimulus, and the full appreciation of Mörike's work was reserved for a small circle of connoisseurs.

Much greater influence was exercised by the *Rambles of a Viennese Poet*, published by the young Count Auersperg, a scion of the Austrian high nobility, in the year after the

July revolution. Since the wars of liberation and the Wartburg festival our political lyric poetry had been wholly concerned with the foreign world, devoted to the glorification, first of the Spaniards and the Greeks, and subsequently of the French and the Poles; "Anastasius Grün" led the muse back to the homeland. With this writer began the flood of patriotic poems of contemporary reference, and the number of these compositions underwent a great increase when towards the close of the thirties a meeting was held in the Teutoburger Wald on behalf of the Seven of Göttingen and the Arminius memorial, whilst in the following decade they inundated the entire book market. The Viennese poet was not inspired by any profound political ideas. While exhibiting loyal enthusiasm for freedom of thought and expression, he bowed himself, not only before Joseph II, the idol of Austrian liberals, but even before Emperor Francis, his anger being reserved exclusively for Metternich. At the chancellor's door he pictured a "poor suitor" standing:

'Tis Austria's people, frank, straightforward, well-behaved, and refined;
See how courteously he begs: "May I take the liberty of asking for liberty?"

But this vague enthusiasm for freedom harmonised with the mood of the day, and since Metternich was considered the prime cause of all the miseries of Germany, people hardly noticed that Auersperg thought only of Austria and of the city of the larks and of the double eagle, and that in his mind Germany was a mere accessory. The South Germans, in especial, welcomed him as comrade in struggle and in song; for in affectionate terms he placed his poems under Uhland's protection; his vigorous verses, richly imaginative, displayed throughout the influence of the Swabian school; and this language straight from the heart was infinitely more congenial to the highlanders than the mocking note of the Young Germans.

Lyrical poetry had long ceased to suffice for the presentation of the prosaic life of the modern world, of the interests and ideas of a transformed society. The imaginative writer could only give exhaustive expression to the poetic content of the new age by reproducing in prose the struggles and contrasts

of actual life. The æstheticists of the Hegelian school might continue to declare that in the drama alone could the ideals of the day secure complete artistic presentation, but everyday experience gave them the lie. Just as little as the artist's faculty for portraiture, can the æsthetic receptivity of a nation be regulated in accordance with any set theory. For many years in Germany the novel became the most suitable form for imaginative work, as it had been a century earlier in England.

This was made manifest when Carl Immermann, after long wanderings on false paths, at length discovered the true field for the exercise of his creative activities. Brought up by his father strictly in the spirit of the old Frederician state, this Lower Saxon, a man of independent and vigorous mind, early took his own course. His first work was a manifestation of character. While a student at Halle he undertook to defend one of his fellows against the terrorism of a Burschenschaft. In defiance of all the conventions of student life, he challenged the general judgment in a contentious writing, laying his grievance before the throne. Though his opponents might speak of him with scorn, he had fought valiantly in the Waterloo campaign, and they could not dispute his courage.[1] For some time thenceforward he lived as a judge, passing most of his time in official circles, associating hardly at all with artists, and, to quote Platen's mocking words, "going in the morning to his office with a sheaf of documents, and spending his evenings upon the slopes of Helicon." In this lonely life he devoured the artistic literature of all times and nations, but, notwithstanding his unwearied activities, his own imaginative work did not rise above the level of unoriginal dilettantism. No other among our notable writers produced so many failures and partial successes. The delicate musical sensibilities of the lyricist were unknown to him. His dramas, despite many merits, were unconvincing, and could not long maintain themselves on the boards. Even *Merlin*, a thoughtful work in the style of *Faust*, repelled by its excessive mysticism and its lack of form. A strong man, one who seemed born to command, in conversation he was invariably sure of himself, but in his works he was apt to appear a mere slavish imitator, and he cherished a theoretical preference for fanciful writings after the manner of young Tieck, whereas his gift lay wholly in

[1] Vide supra, vol. III, p. 61.

the depiction of real life. Nothing was in truth more alien to his essential nature than romanticist extravagance; his direct and serious faith in God had naught in common with honeyed pietism; and even the sentimentalist enthusiasm for nature characteristic of his day was extremely distasteful to him. History had taught him that mankind's finest blossoms can never flourish in the high mountains; his own experience had shown him that the most splendid natural beauties may depress the spirit just as easily as they may elevate it; and he frankly declared, "I can only strike up a friendship with nature in so far as I find that human energies can readily and freely influence nature."

Not until a friendly destiny had led him to Düsseldorf did he succeed in enfranchising himself from acquired bombast; not till then did he discover a fruitful field of work upon the borderland between poetry and prose. There, among the easy-going Düsseldorfians, who were still inspired with the love of revelry and carnival that dated from old Palatine days, under the Prussian dominion there had come into existence one of those little foci of culture to which German life owes its genial warmth. The new academy of art had attained the acme of its reputation; the concerts were under the direction of young Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Immermann had two congenial colleagues associated with him in his official activities, Schnaase, the historian of art, and Friedrich von Uechtritz, the serious-minded and pious poet. He was hospitably welcomed in the artistic circle at the house of Privy Councillor von Sybel, where he soon became an intimate; whilst during the winter Düsseldorf society was enlivened by the presence of Prince Frederick of Prussia and by that of the wealthy landowners of the neighbourhood. The environment was fresh and vigorous; there was a cheerful succession of work and play; the members of the artistic milieu were almost all young and full of hope. When Mendelssohn conducted a musical festival, or when the painters presented a masque, the new steamboats, gaily beflagged, converged on Düsseldorf from up stream and down, long trains of carts and carriages traversed the splendid roads of the thickly inhabited country, and thousands of sightseers flocked to the town as they flocked to the carnival in the neighbouring city of Cologne. In these Rhenish festivals, the free spirit of our earlier public life, which had been stifled in the confined atmosphere of the

last century, entered once more into its rights. In this new and more agreeable student life Immermann for the first time felt truly free, and now became aware of his own competence. He accepted the directorship of the Düsseldorf theatre, aiming to restore to the German stage that which it had almost completely lost in an epoch when the "star" system had become dominant, namely, the orderly and strictly trained cooperation of all concerned, encouraged by the lively participation of the cultured members of the nation. In this domain he proved a master of dramatic art, and with the assistance of actors whose talents were no more than mediocre, his insight and his iron will secured results which could meet the sternest criticism. Unfortunately, however, these brilliant days of the Düsseldorf stage endured for barely three years, for the financial resources of the town proved inadequate.

In the medley of official and theatrical work, leading a life of multifarious interruptions which seemed unfavourable to any but fragmentary writing, Immermann nevertheless had energy to spare for the preparation of his two maturest works. It was favourable to his activities as an artist that the struggles of contemporary politics left him cold. As a conservative Prussian official he was in sympathy on the whole with the established order, although its defects did not escape his satirical insight. The newspaper clamour of the liberals was extremely repugnant to him, and he had drawn apart from Heine, the friend of his youth, as soon as he had recognised the futility of the new radicalism. Standing above party, he desired in his novel *The Epigones* to describe the development of the epoch, and the book is in fact even more noteworthy as a historical picture than as an imaginative work. It is true that the writer had not yet completely overcome his old trick of imitation, so that reminiscences of *Wilhelm Meister* trouble us. Wellnigh intolerable, too, is the manifest weakness of Hermann, the epigone, a weakness which he shares with almost all heroes of romance. But with what profound talent, with how notably just an allotment of light and shade, does he describe the overthrow of the old society. On the one hand he shows us the ancient nobility which, amid the ruin it has brought upon itself, continues to display the æsthetic charm of distinction; on the other hand we see the aspiring bourgeoisie, with its intense industry, its matter-of-factness, and its pharisaical hardness of heart. These were pictures

from the life, for here in the west the new factory chimneys were already rising amid the roofs of the castles and the cloisters. With equal keenness, not without a spice of malice, does he limn the follies of the youthful demagogues and the literary preciosity of Berlin society. The impression produced is by no means a pleasing one. After a formidable social and literary revolution, after the destruction of all the traditional ideas and forms of society, there remained for this generation of epigones nothing but the unrestricted liberty of the individual, which after all had created nothing new. The barbarism of ignorance had been replaced by a barbarism yet more disastrous, by a condition of spiritual anarchy, wherein everyone believed himself to know everything. His gloomy pictures faithfully reflected moods widely prevalent during these disturbed years. Here and there only did it become evident that the writer was not himself quite so pessimistic as the title of his novel might suggest. He recognised that creative forces were also at work, and suggested on occasions that the majestic idea of the state might awaken a new idealism even in this world of ruins.

It was in *Münchhausen* that Immermann first gained perfect control of his instrument. In this work he summoned before his assize the entire spiritual life of Germany, making the merry Grand Master of Lies swing his wooden sword over all the unrighteous, and occasionally, after the poet's manner, over some of the righteous as well. The Berlinese Mother Goose upon the Capitol of gilded liberalism, the "pure idea" of the Hegelians, Raupach's plays, Gutzkow's *Wally*, the blasé wisdom of Semilasso, the elfin tricks of Bettina, the sermonising of Görres, the hobgoblins of Justinus Kerner—the whole literary medley of the day passed in a crazy masque before the eyes of the reader. Immermann unfortunately lacked the light grace of the true jester. Under his heavy touch, comedy was apt to degenerate into farce, the joke to become too broad, the mockery unduly cruel. But upon this satirical background there stood out all the more clearly the idyll of Oberhof, a true and delightful picture of Westphalian peasant life, showing it to be, despite its selfish aspects, trusty to the core. Immermann recognised that among these lower strata of the population the feelings remained under close restraint, exhibiting a trait of unæsthetic torpor of the senses. For this reason, with assured artistry, he allotted to his village story the place to which it is alone entitled in the modern novel, the place

of a modest episode, acting by the stimulus of contrast. Moreover, he did not wish to corrupt his High German by the introduction of cheap dialectical effects, permitting himself no more than trifling and transient indications of the folk speech in the language used by his peasants. It is precisely owing to this avoidance of coarse realism that the figure of the old village mayor seems so forcible, so instinct with poetic truth, as he moves among the cultured characters. It was astonishing how this Low Saxon drew fresh energies from contact with his native soil. Enormously more alive was *Münchhausen* than had been his romanticist cloak-and-dagger pieces; with far more confidence than in *The Epigones* did he now speak about "the great epoch, full of wonders."

Brentano's *Caspar and Annerl* had almost escaped notice at the time of its publication, but *Münchhausen* was issued at the right moment (1838), when the nation, weary of romanticist experiments and of the prepossessions of the Young Germans, was demanding flesh and blood figures. It became the prototype of the new literature of village stories, which unfortunately, quite contrary to the master's purpose, soon put in a claim to rank as an independent variety of art. After a few years the literary sallies of the mendacious baron were no longer fully comprehensible, and since the enormous majority of readers see only the parts of a work of art, never the whole, the book-trade did not hesitate to sin against this masterpiece, and could do so with the approval of vulgar critics. The satirical portion of the romance, upon which its entire meaning and its name depended, was simply thrown aside, and the idyll of Oberhof, vamped up with a few fragments of the other part, was put upon the market by itself. In this mutilated form, *Münchhausen* became a permanent possession of the nation. But history, which honours the hero as artist no less than in other incorporations, holds firmly to the picture of the complete man, just as he was, not extravagantly gifted, erring often, but unceasingly turning his talent to the best account, and ever pursuing the highest aims. It remains his glory that in his two novels he held up the mirror to his age, as Goethe had done before him in *Wilhelm Meister*, and as Freytag was to do after him in *Soll und Haben*. Those only who are acquainted with these topical novels can understand the inner relationships between the three epochs of our recent history.

The love story of Oberhof was characterised by a tender, intimate tone not found in Immermann's earlier work, for whilst his art was becoming ennobled, his life had grown freer and happier. For years he had had with a woman older than himself, Countess Ahlefeldt, one of those nebulous love relationships which in the circle of the romanticist poets was considered a mark of genius. It had often brought him happiness, often sorrow. Subsequently he was animated with a passion for a simple girl. In the first happiness of his wedded life he wrote *Tristan and Isolde*, a poem filled with vigorous passion and beautiful sensuous warmth, lacking only the charm of perfect euphony. But as in the case of the *Tristan* of Master Gottfried of Strasburg, this sublime love poem was to remain unfinished. In the prime of his years, in the midst of his joyful creative activities, he was snatched away by death (1840). He was one of the few artists of whom, speaking, it may be said with certainty that they humanly died prematurely.

Tieck was even more repelled by Young Germany than was Immermann. At the outset, some of the young writers hoped that the old man would espouse their cause because they were enthusiasts for *Lucinde*. But in his view their activities were merely a weak imitation of the free thought of his own youthful days, and he blamed in especial their doctrinaire attitude, saying, "There is nothing I have detested more throughout life than the dogmatic tone of a system that professes to explain everything." Before long, therefore, he was fiercely attacked by the Young Germans as an obscurantist. He took his revenge in several of his novels, *Wilfulness and Caprice*, *Wooing*, etc., describing the German radicals as a rout of rascals and cheats. In these later novels there is an unmistakable advance towards a purer style. No longer did the old writer play ironically with his figures, for now, in pursuance of the principle he had frequently enunciated but rarely followed he used irony merely as "the force which lifts the writer above the matter with which he deals." The result was that through many of his later works there seems to be blowing a chill breeze, which is not always agreeable to the reader.

As notable imaginative writer, one other figure only at this date rises above the crowd of authors of ephemeralities. Charles Sealsfield, originally named Carl Postel, had been a Moravian monk, but had fled from the cloister to America,

in which country he passed many years of his life, and where he became acquainted with the peculiar semi-foreign gibberish of the German-Americans. Through his novels, *The Legitimists* and *Virey*, our literature for the first time led German readers to the far west, introducing them to those American struggles between civilisations and races wherein so many Germans were already participating. In the ardent beauty of his pictures of tropical scenery and in the energy of his character drawing he greatly excelled Fenimore Cooper. But all his writings exhibited a febrile unrest which the mass of his readers found even more disturbing than the prolixity of Cooper. The spirit of an epoch can be most unmistakably recognised in the work of these men of undisciplined but powerful talent. Sealsfield's writings show how inexorably the age of realism was approaching.

The state of the drama confirms this impression. The comedies of Scribe and the other Parisian playwrights were now crowding across the Rhine. The Weimar stage had accustomed the German public to cosmopolitan ideas, and the Germans were now enthusiasts for French liberty. These lame translations gave widespread pleasure; people laughed at allusions which were not fully comprehensible away from the Seine; no one complained because many roles expressly written for Parisian actors were singularly ill-suited to German imitators —and all because these trivial pieces did after all give a picture of real life. The strength of the German drama has always lain in the energy of the characters; the only two classical comedies in our language, *Minna von Barnhelm* and *The Broken Pitcher* were comedies of character. The modern French, on the other hand, had long turned away from Molière's example, and endeavoured to secure the effects of comedy mainly by surprising situations. But the German spirit cannot be roused to enthusiasm by the mere stimulus of intrigue, and it was therefore long before a few writers were at length found who could adopt the calculated technique and the inventive skill of the French without abandoning their German national peculiarities. Such new comedies as now appeared were trivialities for the most part, as trivial as their French prototypes, and lacking the grace of these, Bauernfeld of Vienna being almost the only writer who knew how to make up by the cleverness of his dialogue for his lack in inventive skill. But the audiences would swallow anything that was offered them, provided only their interest was kept alive and

a sufficient appeal was made to their love of scandal The intelligent public which in earlier days had listened attentively to every word of Eckhof or Iffland had ceased to exist; the theatre was no longer a meeting place for good society, and was less and less visited by connoisseurs. After Schreyvogel had been driven from the Burgtheater in Vienna, not one of the great German stages remained under expert guidance. There was no homogeneity in the companies; everything was sacrificed to the leading performers, who undermined all order by their starring tours, adopting from the French the device of the claque and learning at the same source the value of a bastard criticism.

Tragedy was likewise at a low ebb. Grillparzer had morosely refused to have anything more to do with the stage because the Viennese had slighted one of his plays. Among the Young German writers none possessed sufficient moral energy to comply with the strict rules of the drama. All their work was hurriedly produced, and, like the young romanticists in earlier days, compliance with the conventions of stage production seemed to them nothing but a wretched corvée. It was this lack of discipline which speedily brought destruction upon the unhappy Westphalian, Christian Grabbe. He was to learn from personal experience the truth of what he had written in one of his most lucid moments, that "energy and staying power can be secured only through the avoidance of excess." He luxuriated in horrible images and depraved witticisms. Restraint and form were alien to his darkened sensibilities; in a grotesque drama, *Don Juan and Faust*, he endeavoured to amalgamate and to outdo the two greatest poetical compositions of the age. Throughout his brief and stormy career he remained an ardent German patriot and a despiser of everything dull and commonplace. All his dramas possessed realistic force, but not one of them manifested true artistic insight. When he perished amid his vices, when even Immermann's friendly assistance had proved of no avail to this "nature in ruins," there was once more exhibited the passion of the epoch for everything morbid and distorted. The feuilletonists praised the dead man to the skies, going so far as to compare him to Heinrich von Kleist, enormously his superior. They referred in mysterious terms to the kinship between genius and madness (a kinship which exists only where genius is incomplete), for no one now paid heed to Goethe's

profound saying, "Genius above all is willing to obey the law, for genius knows that art is not nature."

Since the younger men of talent held aloof from the stage, it was possible for Ernst Raupach to dominate the Berlin theatre for an entire decade. Raupach was a serious-minded, rough, coldly reasonable man of business, utterly devoid of poetic talent, but a clever craftsman. To use his own distinctive phrase, by innumerable plays "of serious and of comic kind" he proved tolerably competent to satisfy the public's insatiable demand for novelty. His straightforward character and his sound monarchical views won favour at court, whilst Hegel extended patronage to him as an opponent of the romanticists. What, indeed, could conflict with romanticism more strongly than his terrible sixteen Hohenstaufen tragedies, every piece with five acts and a prologue, all characterised by a further dilution of Friedrich von Raumer's rationalism. All the facts of the case were presented with a thoroughness which might well have shamed the historian. Absolutely nothing was left to the imagination of the audience. Inexorably the series marched forward to the final moment when Conradin laid his head upon the block, and the spectators could feel grateful to the cruel author that he did not show them the head of the last Hohenstaufen rolling in actual fact across the stage. Above all do the rhymed commonplaces at the end of the scenes and the acts display confident triteness, and for many a day there lingered in the memory of the Berlinese the last verse of all, "Fortune never favoured the Hohenstaufens." His plays were popular nevertheless; the sketchy characters gave many opportunities to gifted actors, and the dull world wherein the action moved did not lend itself to false declamatory displays. On one occasion the entire cycle was successively presented, and for more than two weeks a large and cultured audience resolutely attended night after night in order to hear to the very last word this course of lectures in iambic verse upon the history of the mediæval emperors.

Seventy years earlier, Lessing had annihilated the moralising muse, but now excess of culture had to such an extent blunted the sense of beauty that Raupach was able audaciously to maintain that the aim of the stage was to instruct. In any case the mass of his dramas served to build yet another dam against the threatening inundation from Paris, and a similar

service was performed by the genial Swabian writer, Charlotte Birch-Pfeiffer. Like Iffland, she combined the roles of player and playwright, a combination with which our modern theatre cannot dispense seeing that it has to provide for the needs of every evening in the week. Her dramatic pieces, easily staged, and for the most part adapted from novels, were more cordially received than Raupach's works. They were thoroughly German, and were never strained or unnatural, but at the same time they were undeniably humdrum.

Even the opera felt the growing influence of France. The leading dramatist among the composers, Giacomo Meyerbeer of Berlin, had removed to Paris, and thence pursued his internationalist artistic activities, remaining always in sympathy with French moods. His *Robert the Devil*, which opened the long series of his European triumphs, was closely akin to Victor Hugo's neoromanticism, and when religious differences became more accentuated, this turned his thoughts to the effective subject of *The Huguenots*. By brilliant dramatic incident and charming melody, he exercised an irresistible influence over the masses, mingling all possible forms and styles as long as they could stimulate the nerves. He had no trace of the simple greatness of German art.

Since his style expressed all the bad tendencies of the day and a few of the good ones, it would probably have become supreme in Germany as well had not a greater genius taken possession of the field. Felix Mendelssohn, like Meyerbeer, grew up in the luxurious circles of Berlin wealth, but his pure and amiable nature adopted none but the good and vigorous traits of the metropolitan environment, its many-sided culture, its free insight, its skill in the arts of social life, and its gift of sympathy. A thorough German, even the charm of the south could not permanently attract him, and, among all foreigners, the Teuton English have alone fully understood him, the French never. By his *St. Paul* he awakened the Protestant oratorio to new life, and he gave to German song a deep and ecstatic musical expression. Hardly less important than these compositions, which raised him to a rank far above that of all composers then living, was his activity as conductor. In 1829, when no more than twenty years of age, he made his debut in this field by the production in Berlin of Sebastian Bach's forgotten *Passion*, and from

that time forward he never remitted from his endeavours to revive among the cultured the taste for the noble and genuinely German artistic forms of the symphony, the oratorio, and the sonata. He made comprehensible to the nation the works of Bach and Handel, and also Beethoven's last symphonies, which had long been considered impossible of production. From the days when Mendelssohn, universally known and loved throughout Germany, began to wield his baton in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfort, and Leipzig music, which had sunk almost to the level of a pastime, regained honour as a lofty art. It was to him that the Germans owed it that when anarchy came to prevail also in the world of opera, audiences continued to preserve a kernel of sound taste. Thus did a German of Jewish descent lead back our cultured society to the old traditions of national art, in the very days when the German Jews of Paris were sinning so grossly against German nationality. Mendelssohn's noble and grand activity showed for all time that the German Jew can attain true fame only when he gives himself up wholly and without reserve to German life.

Painting, too, was affected by the realistic impulse of the day. A long time must always elapse before the world can recognise the limits imposed upon the talent of creative spirits. Happy is the artist who, like Schiller, after the production of raw and immature works, can strive steadily upwards, attaining to an ever freer development of his genius, to depart as soon as the nation begins to understand him fully. Different and tragical was the destiny of Cornelius. Impetus, nobility, greatness, a world of new ideas, were infused by him into the petrified graphic arts. The Germans looked upon him as a second Goethe; King Louis was almost inclined to regard him as a greater painter than those of the cinquecento; in 1831, when he returned from Italy, the artists of Munich received him as if he had been a prince, detaching the horses from his carriage, and drawing it themselves in triumph through the town. But to this excess of esteem a reversal was to succeed. Cornelius was no more than the Klopstock of our new painting, more richly endowed, doubtless, and more forcible than the writer of the *Messiah*, but like Klopstock rather a pioneer than one of those who complete their work, and, unfortunately there was no Goethe to follow in his footsteps,

no one to gather in the focus of a single burning glass all the rays of the newly discovered light. He lacked the true imagination of the painter, unrestrained delight in the play of form and colour. The first thing to enter his mind was always a great poetic thought, and not till then did he seek to discover the forms in which he might incorporate this freely created ideal. For this reason he lacked humour, and for the same reason feminine beauty had comparatively little charm for him, since this beauty rarely gives expression to ideas. He could teach little, for he despised the rules of technique that can be conveyed by teaching, and it was impossible for him to communicate to lesser spirits the essential charm of his works, the power of his great personality. Thus did he pursue his career, a serious little man with the vigorous head of a thinker, idolised by his pupils, but fully understood by few. It was a saying of his, "Nature is the wife, the genius is the man," but he was a masterful husband, and it did not suit him to immerse himself lovingly in the life of his wife. Those who painted simply and truly, but were unable to accept his grandiose conception of the cooperation of all the arts, were despised by the proud master as "men of one groove." Since he continued to look upon the Bavarians as savages, what did it matter to him that he never felt truly at home in Munich? What cared he for the censure of the French, who reproached him with being a poet merely, and not a genuine painter? The French were foreigners, and therefore incapable of understanding German art.

Such was his mood when he received the commission to decorate the new church of St. Louis with frescoes, and the artist at once conceived the design for a third great picture cycle which was to outdo the two first, which was to be a Christian epic, a painted Divine Comedy. Much of his draft was vetoed by the master-builder. What remained was still magnificent enough, and it was above all in the picture of the last judgment, the largest fresco in the world, that Cornelius hoped to display the spirit of enlightened Christianity. A quarter of a century earlier, when, in Rome, he had still been an enthusiast among the young Nazarenes, he might perhaps have attained success with such a production, might have achieved a work as strong in its simplicity, as profound in its faith, as Memling's last judgment in the church of St. Mary at Danzig. Since then, however, he had experienced an extensive cultural

development, traversing the world of Faust, of the Niebelungen, of Homer, passing through the entire domain of the history of art. How could he now throw himself wholeheartedly into a conception which, of all the Christian myths, is the most alien to the modern mind—for however notably the sense of responsibility before God may become accentuated with the ripening of civilisation, it is no less certain that the separation of the goats from the sheep and the graphic depiction of the punishments of hell must appear childish to an experienced and cultured century. Cornelius' genius was wrecked upon this anachronism. His work was more pious, was richer in religious sentiment, than the kindred paintings by Michelangelo and Rubens, neither of which represented anything more than a struggle of titans; and for this very reason it failed to attain the elemental sublimity of the one, or the material strength of the other. On this occasion even his well-tried talent for composition, his wonderful gift for representing a great event exhaustively in a few figures, failed; the picture fell into groups, and though some of the angelic and saintly personalities still displayed the old greatness, the arch-fiend and his servitors could awaken no horror.

The whole undertaking was ill-omened. The cheerful artistic activity which had once filled with bustle the painters' scaffolds of the Glyptothek, was not renewed in the church of St. Louis. The royal master-builder could not conceal his disappointment when he looked upon the unsuccessful and ill-painted picture, and he said sharply, "A painter ought to be able to paint." Remote were now the days when Crown Prince Louis had modestly said to Ludwig Tieck: "You too are called 'Louis.' It is a great honour to me to bear the same name as a distinguished poet." Since he had worn the crown his feeling of self-complacency had greatly increased; even as artist he imagined himself the equal of his painters and sculptors, since his poor works had found so many flattering admirers. Cornelius was not the man to accept contumelious treatment. Shortly after this manifestation of royal displeasure he left Munich for ever, and his school disappeared with him. His lofty idealism was no longer in harmony with the new time.

During his reign in Munich, some of the younger artists had valiantly displayed their own individuality. Peter Hess and the merry soldier Albrecht Adam drew their battle scenes

from the very life. In the castle of Hohenschwangau, on the lonely Alpsee, Moritz Schwind, the Uhland of our painters, drew his inspiration from the romantic world of saga, and his canvases were full of sensibility and roguish humour. Riedel's pictures of girls, painted at Rome, are permeated with the warmth of the southern sun, whilst Rottmann's Greek landscapes display a glory of light and colour which was unknown in the severe works of the Cornelian school. Among Cornelius' favourite pupils, the most gifted, Wilhelm Kaulbach, soon took his own line. It was in the terrible picture of the madhouse that he first manifested his talent for incisive characterisation, and subsequently, in his finest work, *Reynard the Fox*, he proved himself a master of satire. His power of faithfully representing animal forms was astounding, and no less astounding was the skill with which he employed these forms as masks for the depiction of human life. *Reynard the Fox* was a stormy petrel of revolution, just as had been the Low German *Reineke* of the fifteenth century. The democratic spirit of the old folk-poems breathed from Kaulbach's pictures far more strongly and boldly than from Goethe's elaboration of the same theme, which was more humanely serene, but in which social criticism was thrust into the background. The unmitigated approval awarded by the cultured classes to Kaulbach's contempt of the courts, the nobility, and the church, proved that in Germany almost every person of intelligence had joined the ranks of the malcontents. Kaulbach now began work on his great historical pictures, which were to lead him yet further from his erstwhile master.

None of these youthful energies, issuing from the old stem of Munich painting, exercised so profound an influence upon popular life as the new Düsseldorf school. To this belonged Wilhelm Schadow, son of Johann Gottfried Schadow the sculptor. Wilhelm was director of the Düsseldorf school of art, a born organiser, rarely successful in his own work, but possessing a wonderful faculty for discovering, arousing, and guiding talent in others. No one could resist this energetic man when, his pockets bulging with plans and drafts, he developed his ideas with impressive eloquence. Sculpture, found no encouragement in the modest town on the Lower Rhine. The king, moreover, whose taste had been formed in Berlin, had a preference for portrait painting. He insisted that at his academy attention should chiefly be devoted to

oil painting, not to fresco, and Schadow had to teach his eager pupils all that is teachable in this art. Thus the Düsseldorf school was from the first and remained a school of painters, having very little connection with the other plastic and graphic arts.

Its clientèle could be found among private individuals alone, and since in impoverished Germany the number of connoisseurs in a position to purchase pictures was still very small, the example set by Munich in the year 1823 of founding an art union was gradually followed in most other large towns, which held annual exhibitions and raffles. At the outset many of these unions were little more than benevolent institutions, and poor Ludwig Richter bitterly complained that it was far from easy to say whether they had been founded by hungry artists or by hunger for art. It was often difficult, in a society which had lost all sense of pleasure in form, to arouse any enthusiasm for ideal delights, and it was especially difficult in Low Saxony. When the first art exhibition was opened in Hanover in the year 1833, on the birthday of the beloved viceroy, the burghers were able to view the pictures for four groschen, but nobles and officials had to prove their respectability by buying a season ticket for one thaler. The complaint was not infrequently here: "I must go twice more or I shan't get full value for my money!" In time, however, the fashion became a pleasure, the number of participators increased, and soon the collections made by the art unions gave birth to the new municipal galleries, which, zealously promoted by the communal sense of the burghers, endeavoured to vie with the collections of old masters in the palaces. Thus did art educate its own public, but in doing so had to adapt itself to popular taste.

The Düsseldorfers painted to please average culture, producing landscapes, genre pictures, and, above all, the figures of poesy. In most nations the classical age of literature precedes a high development of the plastic and graphic arts, literature being the pioneer in the discovery of new ideals; and nowhere has painting borrowed to such an extent from the poets as in Germany. It was but quite recently that the works of our classic writers and of the resurrected Shakespeare had first become familiarly known to the great mass of cultured persons. These works were now fresh within the memories of all, and pictures of Mignon, the two Eleanoras,

and the little princes in the Tower, were acclaimed with childlike enthusiasm, for in the canvases the spectators involuntarily rediscovered the charm of the poems. Masters like Sohn, Hildebrandt, and Schirmer, were followed by a crowd of diligent young artists, who, by touching portrayal of Genevières, Cinderellas, and Red Ridinghoods, brought hot tears to the eyes of ladies. Many of them seemed to imagine that the simple contrast between brunettes and blondes, between weather-beaten men and rosy youths, comprised the entire wealth of human life.

Nevertheless, in the vigorous atmosphere of the Rhine, colour sense and feeling for nature remained active. By Schadow's school, the technique of painting, the delightful artistic diligence which makes men ever careful of detail, was restored to honour; and since the Düsseldorfers were not ashamed to learn from the French, they secured once again for German art the approval of the foreign world. Some of the more notable members of the school began to venture upon historical subjects. Somewhat sentimentally, and yet with truth and profundity, did young Bendemann, in his initial works, exhibit the poetic significance of great historical catastrophes. The Mourning Jews, and Jeremiah on the Ruins of Jerusalem, obtained a brilliant success which showed that to the modern mind the artistic charm of oils is far more comprehensible than that of fresco. Only after extensive detours did Carl Lessing, the Silesian, take to historical painting. A precocious, grave, and extremely conscientious artist, he exhibited much of the virile candour characteristic of his great-uncle, the poet. His picture of the Royal Mourners, which was far more than a coloured illustration, and had no occasion to fear comparison with Uhland's ballad, first brought him fame. Chamisso delightedly sang:

I kiss your hand, the old man greets the young!

Without allowing his head to be turned by commendation, he pushed forward unrestingly with his work, next devoting his attention to landscape. He never visited Italy and the Alps, not wishing to confuse his imagination, and fearing to undermine his love for the central hills of Germany. With these he was intimately acquainted, being especially familiar with the melancholy magic of the volcanic Eifel regions, which he loved

to reanimate with historical figures. Then, with the picture of Huss Preaching he opened the series of his historical canvases, which all dealt with notable struggles familiar to latter day sentiment, and which were quite unjustly abused by the Rhenish clericals as "Protestant tracts."

It was through the efforts of this vigorous and sincere man that the Düsseldorf school was saved from degenerating into pettiness. Nor did these artists lack humour to counteract the extremities of sentimentalism. The Brandenburger Adolf Schrödter made fun of the lachrymose romanticists in his picture of the Mourning Tanner; he created the types of Falstaff and Don Quixote; and in his Triumph of King Rhinewine he assembled all the drolleries which the young artists used to play off on one another when, upon their student tours in Rhineland, they sat of an evening in the Golden Corkscrew at Oberwesel. But before many years had passed, this happy artistic circle was riven asunder. In Rome, Schadow had joined the Catholic church, and he inclined more and more to encourage a new Nazarenism which had a better technique than the old school of that name but was even more spiritless. It was impossible that Lessing, the Protestant, should regard with a friendly eye these sugary madonnas, and a time was drawing near when modern realism was openly to break loose from the epigones of romanticism.

To the simple disposition of Eduard Meyerheim, the West Prussian, such party struggles, were practically non-existent. He lived in Berlin, entirely devoted to his easel and to music; during the summer faring on foot through the mountains of Thuringia or the Harz region, collecting there his materials among the petty bourgeois and the peasants. A man of tenderer feelings than are usual to-day, but free from false sentimentality, he loved to depict the grace and the kindliness which animate the simple folk-life, and those who visited exhibitions soon found his homelike pictures almost as indispensable as readers of that day found stories of village life. Franz Krüger, on the other hand, moved in the upper levels of society. The artist of the world of fashion, he painted princes and courtiers as admirably as he painted their fine horses, but truly and faithfully, with that joy in the real which Chodowiecki had first aroused among the painters of Berlin. In the great pictures of military reviews which the court commissioned him to do, he had to deal with the most refractory of conceivable

material, the straight lines of grenadiers with their hideous tunics and stiff stocks, the tall plumed hats of the generals and the docked tails of their horses. Yet how rich, significant, and pithy did his paintings seem. What an abundance of life was there in the history of Prussia if you only knew how to get hold of it. No one was better aware of this than young Adolf Menzel, who was still comparatively unnoted. His genius was to complete what the Berlin realists, Chodowiecki and Krüger, had begun. Pictures of manners and review pictures were to be succeeded by pictures of heroic incidents in Prussian history.

The same Prussian pride glowed in the heart of Rauch. Long ago the days of disaster and the subsequent marvellous resurgence had moved him to the depths of the soul. It was always like a breath of fresh life to him when in brass or in marble he could commemorate the men who had participated in these struggles. He spoke of his noble handicraft as the true historical art, and was fond of recalling Goethe's saying, "Man's best monument is man himself." Even in Schleiermacher's ugly head he was able to see and reproduce the living, the immortal element. He had made himself intimately familiar with the lineaments of the king, who became ever dearer to him as a man; one bust of Frederick William followed another, while the sculptor, simply for his own gratification, reproduced his memorial of Queen Louise. No labour seemed to him too trifling if done for the sake of Prussia. Again and again he shaped the eagle for the gates of fortresses and for the pillars of bridges, until at length the beloved heraldic bird secured perfect monumental representation. It was he who designed the embellished death's head for the busby of the black hussars He was delighted to accept a commission from the town of Gumbinnen to carve the statue of Frederick William I, for it gave him immense pleasure that in the grateful eastern march he could reproduce the strict soldier-king in his human worth as "the restorer of Lithuania." But he was too much the classicist to feel entirely at home in this shapeless northern world. His favourite memories were of Italy, of those happy days of youth when the new Teutonic migration had been attracted to the eternal city for the rescue of a degenerating art, just as of old for the rescue of a degenerating church. What an expansion of

mind he had experienced roaming among the statues of the Vatican, or when admiring in Carrara the snow-white peaks thrusting upwards like sugar loaves into the blue sky and when, in the company of his friend Tieck, clambering through the rifts in search of the finest marble.

Herein lies the rarely understood but splendid beauty of modern German history, that all the little streamlets of tribal history, as if impelled by a mysterious force of nature, gradually coalesced to form a single stream, until ultimately every part of the nation came to share in the greatness of the fatherland. Certainly as the south excelled the north in imaginative and poetic energy, no less certainly were the North Germans in advance of the highlanders in intellectual power and in the art of sculpture. The Low Germans, Winckelmann and Carstens, Schinkel and Rauch, were the first to awaken in Germany a sense for the formal beauties of the classical antique, their nearest collaborators in this field being Thorwaldsen, the kindred Dane, and Zoega the archæologist, a Holsteiner. In Berlin, Rauch was never happier than when with Wilhelm Humboldt, his loyal patron since Roman days, or when with Schinkel—for all three were firm believers in the affinity of the Hellenic with the Teutonic genius. It was his pride that Prussia did more than any other state for the study of the antique. He eagerly promoted the establishing of the new collections of casts at the universities of Bonn, Königsberg, and Breslau; and he had an extensive supply of marble blocks brought to Berlin.

As he grew older his pleasure in classical forms increased. With ecstatic delight, therefore, did he accept a commission from King Louis to adorn the Ratisbon Walhalla with six colossal Victories. At last he could throw into the corner "the everlasting trousers" of the statues of Prussian commanders, and feast his eyes upon "the noble nude." These magnificent female forms remained the joy of his life for years. But he still had time to spare for the realistically conceived Dürer monument at Nüremberg; whilst with touching simplicity he incorporated Christ's saying, "Suffer little children to come unto me," in the Halle statue of the pious Francke. On one occasion he was somewhat influenced by echoes of romanticism, when he produced the charming statuette of the Virgin of Tangermünde riding on the stag. His powers ripened slowly, and did not attain full development until he was

sixty years of age. Each new work was meticulously prepared, as if it had been the first. When travelling he noted every shapely tree, every graceful hill, and grew unhappy only when darkness fell. When visiting his daughter in Halle, he never failed to model reliefs to adorn the walls of the hall, making a plastic album which was to remind her of her father's life and thought. For him art was all in all. He felt like a king in his own kingdom. He was the cynosure of every eye when in winter, wrapped in his light-coloured voluminous cloak, he stalked majestically down the lime-tree avenue. Under his firm guidance the Berlin school of sculpture led the world for a generation. Many able artists, almost all born in northern and central Germany, issued from its portals. Among these may be mentioned Drake from "the little home of genius" in Waldeck which had been Rauch's own birthplace and that of Kaulbach and Bunsen; Kiss, Bläser, Wolff; and, excelling all the others, Ernst Rietschel of Electoral Saxony, a man of gentle and romantic disposition who was first introduced by Rauch to the antique world, and who soon became the master's favourite pupil.

How poor, when contrasted with this classic realism of the Berlin school, seems the crudity of Schwanthaler. He was and remained a romanticist. No one could fail to recognise this who saw him in his eyrie at Schwaneck, overhanging the Isar, where he lived like a mediæval knight. To him the self-denying industry which the severities of classical sculpture imposed upon its pupils was unknown. In the plastic arts of Munich, the sole truly living department was that of foundry. When Miller became director of the foundry it acquired world-wide fame, even the bronze doors for the capital at Washington being ordered from this distant spot.

It was fortunate for Rauch that the Bavarians gave him so much to do. Prussia had now to be sparing in her commissions, for the war preparations had swallowed all available means, and the little that still remained for artistic ends had to be mainly devoted to the completion of the museum. This building provided Schinkel with another task worthy of his genius. In most of his previous achievements he had reluctantly had recourse to the vanity of ornamentation. He knew that the architectural works of his beloved ancients owed their majesty, not solely to nobility of form, but also

to the chaste elegance of the raw material. Since the state finances were not equal to the purchase of freestone, he returned to the popular and natural architecture of the plains, and in the Berlin academy of architecture produced a fine example of unadorned brickwork, which since then has flourished once more in its old North German home. It was perhaps the most distinctive of his works, a mighty block, defiant as the mediæval palaces of Florence, and yet full of grace. The walls were dull red, relieved with stripes of blue brickwork, an entirely new scheme in these days when a colour sense had been lost; while terra-cotta decorations in the classical style harmoniously surmounted the wide windows.

Apart from these two buildings, lesser works only were entrusted to Schinkel, and it was a great distress to him that the difficulties of the time should thus have clipped his pinions. The victory of Hellenic civilisation over the darkness of the primeval age, which he depicted in his designs for the atrium of the museum, was for him the essential content of history. But even in less ambitious works he remained ever true to his saying: "Art is nothing unless it be new; those who aspire will never fail to create something truly living." If commissioned to build a church for the Berlin suburb of Moabit, or for Darkehmen, a remote Lithuanian town, he invariably endeavoured to solve the problem in a new manner, asking himself how the practical needs of the Protestant ritual might be harmonised with the laws of beauty, and it is manifest that his answers were most successful when he had recourse to southern styles. Gothic was alien to this Protestant Hellene. In the sober Werdersche church in Berlin there was little trace of the heaven-storming and rapturous mysticism of Gothic. When planning a château in the centre of a green park, Schinkel's imagination was indefatigable in its inventiveness, for, now a thorough Teuton, he felt that supreme beauty was attained only when the works of man fitted perfectly into natural surroundings. Some of these buildings, like the charming Villa Charlottenhof, were finished by his own hand; others, such as the châteaux of Babelsberg and Camenz, were completed by other architects; but the majority of his essays in this field, like the marvellously beautiful design for the castle of Orianda, were never carried out. He wished to demolish the library in the Opernplatz in Berlin, and to replace it by a fine palace for Prince William, but the prince's means were

restricted, and Schinkel had to allow his friend Langhanns to build in the corner of the square a palace which, though finely conceived, was of extremely modest proportions. No more than a fraction of his colossal energies bore fruit in German life. Down to the days of 1848 the after effects of his genius could still be traced in new churches and museums, and also in many of the pleasant country houses which, as general prosperity came, sprang up in the neighbourhood of large towns. But the quiet and peaceful generation to which he had devoted his labours passed away, and the new epoch of clamorous commerce, of railway stations, exhibitions, and banks, imposed upon architecture tasks of an entirely new character.

For all the restrictions by which it was hampered, Schinkel's work had a far profounder influence upon national life than had the febrile architectural activity of the court of Munich. In Gärtner, from Rhineland, King Louis had at length found an architect after his own heart, a nimble and hasty artist, ever ready to produce all that the impatient employer demanded. In rapid succession were now erected the romanticist structures of the Ludwigstrasse, cold and uninspiring for the most part, although the great staircase of the library is not without artistic charm. Fortunately at one end of the desert street was the gate of victory modelled upon the arch of Constantine, whilst at the other end was a somewhat unsuccessful imitation of the Florentine Loggia dei Lanzi, which, however, from a distance had a stately appearance. The street was spoken of as "the Gallery of Bavarian Generals," statues of Tilly and Wrede being erected there—but the name gave much amusement to neighbours, for Tilly was no Bavarian, and Wrede was no general. Nowhere was the artificiality of this monumental art upon a soil without a history more painfully displayed than in the bronze obelisk commemorative of the thirty thousand Bavarian soldiers who had perished in Russia. This was a masterpiece of the founder's art. On each face of the pedestal was a ram's head, while the inscription read: "They too died for the liberation of the fatherland." But the citizens of Munich who knew nothing about the Roman battering ram, enquired with pardonable astonishment why their ruler had thought of doing honour to his valiant warriors by depicting four large sheeps' heads; whilst when Czar Nicholas viewed the obelisk, King Louis had need of all his

eloquence to persuade the Russian that the inscription really had some meaning. Nevertheless, Ziebland's basilica of St. Bonifacius and Ohlmüller's Gothic church in the Au suburb showed that the architectural academy of Munich was likewise competent to train sound talent. Many of the art-loving king's undertakings which seemed strange to his contemporaries were justified in after days, when commerce grew and when stately mansions clustered round these fine buildings.

§ 4. HISTORIANS AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHERS.

Literature and the fine arts were unable to escape the morbid moods of the epoch, but science continued to preserve the pith of German genius almost unimpaired. It now simultaneously took up the heritage of the great traditions of the classical and of the romantic epoch, and the distorted evolution of our people, descending from the clouds to reality, is witnessed by the fact that in the domain of political history Germans studied the achievements of other nations at a time when the simple efficiency of Prussian statecraft (poor indeed, as yet, in striking successes) had not been sufficiently recognised either at home or abroad. Leopold Ranke, meanwhile, had set out on his travels. In Vienna he made the acquaintance of Gentz, and was confirmed in the view that the state is in the first instance power, and that dominion over Europe is exercised by a concert of the great powers. While at Vienna, freshly influenced by the memoranda and conversations of Wuk, the Serbian patriot, he wrote the *History of the Serbian Revolution*, a model of vivid narration, giving actuality to the remote and the distant, perfectly free from the cumbrousness of German professorial learning, and yet soundly critical.

He next removed to Rome, and in that city, where the art and the archæology of the Germans had created new life, research into modern history was also to find its fountain of youth. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which long remained Ranke's chosen field of work, papal policy had still been world-embracing. From Rome and Venice he could survey the changes in international relationships, if not completely, at least with an approximation to completeness, and the treasures collected in Italian archives formed the basis of his incomparable diplomatic learning. Thus equipped, he

produced the finest of his works, the *History of the Popes*, a book that only a German could have written, and among the Germans Ranke alone. The many-sidedness of his knowledge and his insight was dependent upon a brilliant power of concentration which in most cases is found only in men of unsociable and adamantine disposition. But Ranke from the first combined with a lively and receptive spirit an unruffled calm which enabled him to face what was happening with the same equanimity as if it had already happened. When a lad at Schulpforte he had had a close view of the battles of Grossgörschen and Leipzig, not regarding them unfeelingly, and yet unaffected by the ardent patriotic enthusiasm which at that day led so many young Electoral Saxons to fight in the allied ranks. Through the partition of Saxony he became a Prussian subject, and gratefully recognised the order, justice, and culture of the state in which he was newly enrolled; but the blunt Prussian manner, the characteristic mentality of the Brandenburgers, was as foreign to him as the Prussian sense of the state; and in so far as in his thoroughly independent outlook on German history traces of old traditions can be recognised, they lead back to Electoral Saxony, not to Prussia. Thus his choice of profession was determined, not by direct experience of life as in the case of notable men in general, but by a direct process of ratiocination. Having read numberless historical works, in the fulness of knowledge he resolved to show the world the reality of historical life, purely, authoritatively, and definitely, so that his own personality should completely disappear behind the picture.

When he began the *History of the Popes* he took a very low estimate of the power of the Vatican at that particular time. "The relationships of papal authority to ourselves," he writes laconically, "no longer exercises any important influence. The days when we had occasion to feel alarm have passed away, and we are convinced that we are absolutely secure." This was an error which Ranke shared with all his contemporaries. In later years he retracted it, and admitted that a new epoch of the papacy had begun. But it was precisely to this happy feeling of security that his book owed its artistic charm. With a freedom from prejudice incomparable in the ever-contentious field of religious history, he described the great tragedy of the counter-reformation, for the first

time applying Niebuhr's critical method to the study of modern history. Whether he was freely surveying the widely ramified plans of the papacy, or with fine, clear-cut strokes was depicting the good and the evil done by individual men, with everything in the historical world, great and small alike, he was equally at home. For the first time since the publication of Schiller's vigorous historical portraits did a German historian again produce pictures of living men, but these were not now merely the work of artistic imagination, but were based upon detailed knowledge. Behind the graceful narrative lay a profundity akin to the spirit of Goethe. We are reminded of that master, not only by a delight in the world, a conviction that nothing human is alien, but also by the fundamentally scientific outlook from which all historical activities are regarded as due to the interplay between general conditions and free individual energies. This book actually demonstrates what Goethe had once undertaken to show when returning from Rome, "how from the conjunction of necessity and freewill, of impulse and desire, of action and reaction, a tertium quid energies which is neither art nor nature, and yet is both at once; simultaneously necessary and accidental, purposive and blind."

It was not by chance that this first classic work on history to emanate from new Germany should deal with universal history. The time had not yet come for a national history on the grand scale. Generally recognised political ideals were still lacking, nor did there as yet exist any secure instinct of unassailable national pride, permeating flesh and blood. The free cosmopolitan sentiments of the German imagination, in accordance with which everything great in other ages and nations was considered as the property of the modern German, now manifested its power in the field also of political historiography. Since other talented historians followed Ranke's example, foreigners speedily came to assume that every vigorous learned man of German birth who wrote about another nation was likewise familiar with this foreign nationality, whereas throughout the foreign world there was but one man, Thomas Carlyle, who understood German history. Germany, wrote Emerson, thinks for Europe; these semi-Greeks grasp the science of all other peoples. Ranke's work was the first to secure world-wide renown for German historians. Niebuhr's *Roman History* had aroused enthusiasm in none but philologians who live in a cosmopolitan atmosphere; but now a thorough

modern, Macaulay, one who neither knew nor loved Germany, expressed his admiration.

At home approval was by no means unqualified. People of high culture and men with much knowledge of the world were able to appreciate the historian's distinguished calm. But not merely did common radicals, to whom nothing but crude bias was welcome, rail against him for his detachment; even unprejudiced young men like Gustav Freytag felt wounded in their Teutonic sensibilities, and rightly so. They perceived obscurely that this book, perfect as a work of art, nevertheless lacked perfection in the matter of historic truth; they recognised that the moral world would go down hopelessly to destruction were all men to think after the fashion of this distinguished observer. The historian and the philosopher, unlike the learned in any other sphere, are enabled by their science to comprehend man as a whole. Ranke seldom availed himself of this splendid privilege. Not only did he, with few exceptions, reserve his own moral judgment; but so thoroughly did he immerse himself in the mental atmosphere of the time he was describing, that many of his characterisations produced the impression that two cunning seventeenth century monsignori were mutually introducing one another. It was with reluctance that he looked down into the lower levels of society from the courts where he had acquired his knowledge of diplomacy. Yet it is beyond question that the reextinction in so many noble nations of the light of gospel truth was effected, not by the diplomatic arts of clever cardinals, but by the rude forces of stupidity, superstition, custom, and hatred, working among the blind masses, forces which proved ready instruments in the hands of the statesmen of the Vatican. Ranke was inclined to overlook these instinctive and elemental forces of history. Neither the raging outbursts of the murderous bands of St. Bartholomew's night, nor the fanatical "ni olvido ni perdon" of the Spanish soldiery, was introduced by him directly beneath the eyes of his readers. He failed to show why Martin Luther was compelled to regard the crowned priest as antichrist. Even the essential irrationality of the Jesuit order, which in the end brought inevitable destruction upon all the states in which it became dominant, was not exhibited with sufficient clearness. Thus the serious question why brute force had been able to secure a partial victory over the ideal was not completely answered.

While at work upon his history of the popes, Ranke himself became aware that the book failed to give due weight to the moral superiority of Teutonic Protestantism, and he was already entertaining the design of writing a new history, the counterpart of the first, which was to deal with the great epoch of the opening of the German reformation. He knew how much more difficult would be this task. Referring on one occasion to a book by Augustin Thierry, Ranke said that the Germans were not competent to produce such a work, for it was obviously easier for Frenchmen to grasp the full significance of their country's past. But he believed that he would be able to make up for the lack of patriotic passion by the warmth of his religious sentiments. Meanwhile he resumed his lectures at Berlin, founding there the first of those historic seminaries which since then, further developed by his pupils, have encouraged at all our universities the methodical study of original documents. His school became the nursery of a new generation of historians. Waitz, Sybel, and many other aspiring men of talent, followed in his train; and even the smaller fry soon proved unable to elude the influence of his creative spirit. Since Stein's enterprise, the great collection of the *Monumenta Germaniæ*, had made rapid progress under the guidance of Pertz, Ranke urged the younger historians to work up the raw material, and with the *Annals of the German Realm under the Saxon House* there began a long series of exhaustive treatises which placed the facts of our mediæval history upon a far more stable footing than had been possible to Raumer.

The free spirit now prevailing among historians at length began also to permeate political science. It was time, for the pupils of Niebuhr, Savigny, and Eichhorn had almost without exception devoted themselves to philology or to the history of law, and for this reason the pioneer conceptions of the historical jurists long remained entirely unknown to the professionals of political science. Liberal sociologists were content to graze upon the communal pastures of natural law, and boasted of progress when they were in the toils of reaction. What a wealth of commonplaces was brought to market by Pölitz in his book upon constitutionalist life. All earthly existence was subsumed by him in "the two ideas of religion and civism"; and the freedom of the citizen could be guaranteed in no other way than by "written charters"—

for it was impossible to get on without a scrap of paper. Even more hopeless seemed the scientific errancy of German liberalism in the *Staatslexikon* which Rotteck and Welcker had been editing since the year 1834. The well-planned and ably edited undertaking numbered among its contributors almost all the notabilities of South German liberalism, and many North Germans as well. Its vogue in middle-class circles was even more extensive than that which had previously been secured by Rotteck's *Universal History*. How much easier to read than a detailed historical disquisition were these brief articles arranged in the convenient alphabetical order which the Brockhaus encyclopædia had already made palatable to the great reading public. The bourgeois of sound views had merely to look up the key-word in order to learn without further trouble what he ought to think about every political or religious question. No objection could possibly be raised to the infallible accuracy of this oracle. In the preface Rotteck succinctly undertook "to elucidate those doctrines alone whose rejection must be regarded as a manifestation of illwill."

In the library of every diet, in every editorial office, and in every private study, the long series of volumes of the *Staatslexikon* graced the shelves; but the crown prince of Prussia and his romanticists' friends henceforward used the term "Rotteck-Welcker" as an abusive denomination for all aberrations of the zeitgeist. There were a few excellent articles in the compilation, and above all two good essays on economics by List and Mathy; but the fundamental conception was untenable and obsolete; the impassioned and verbose introductions by the two editors sang in all cases the old song of the only true law of reason, revealed by the French Revolution, and to which positive and historical law were now at length to give place. Even in the historical articles the spirit of liberal philistinism paraded with as much self-complacency as if Niebuhr had never lived. Like a parsimonious paterfamilias lecturing a prodigal son, Kobb, the Palatine radical, lectured Frederick the Great for having wasted so much blood and treasure in the conquest of Silesia. While such a work might well gain new adherents for the liberal party, it could do little to further the political culture of the nation, and least of all in Austria, where the counterpoise of living historical science was still almost completely lacking. The average reader, always a lazy thinker, was merely

confirmed in his inclination to voice in sounding catchwords his judgment upon things beyond his understanding, and was encouraged to cherish that belief in authority, a belief at once blind and opinionated, which makes the centuries of polymathy seem so much more detestable than those epochs of youthful civilisation wherein naive credulity was still well-nigh universal.

By his *Politics* (1835) Dahlmann now dragged political science from the charmed circle of the formulas of natural law. "Restoring politics to the basis and the standards of existing conditions," he at once raised the lifeless constitutionalist doctrine to the free heights which historical research had long before attained, and for the first time gave German liberalism a firm scientific foundation. Like his friend Niebuhr he rejected the fancies of natural conditions and the social contract, conceiving the state as "an original order, a necessary datum, an asset of mankind"; but whilst the historical jurists had hitherto attacked the constitutionalist state as the spawn of the illusions of natural law, Dahlmann's historical method led him to the conclusion that constitutionalist forms arose by inner necessity from the evolution of German political life. Thus was strict scientific proof at length provided for that which had been merely suggested in the political writings of the Stein period of reform. This completely new demonstration was so convincing that even Heinrich Leo, a fierce enemy of liberalism, was for a time (not, unfortunately, for always) converted, and admiringly declared, "Dahlmann was the first from whom I learned that these constitutionalist forms can embody a vigorous political life."

The bold endeavour to arrive at a historic view of the entire nature of the state was not fully successful at the outset, for political doctrine must try to discover general ideas and imperatives, whereas throughout history the incalculable freedoms of struggles for power and of the individual will are at work. Dahlmann was not always able to surmount this contradiction. Involuntarily, at times, he relapsed into the method of natural law, which regarded the living state as no more than the issue of a thought process; and although he expressly insisted that "the idealist solves riddles which he has propounded to himself," he went on to speak of constitutionalist monarchy as "the good state," thus suggesting that he himself was subject to the illusion of an absolute political ideal. In those years no thinker could as yet

completely escape the persistent influences of the old philosophy of abstract right. Even of the British state, which now, as twenty years earlier, he maintained to be the model of freedom,[1] he gave no more than an incomplete picture, for the ultra-aristocratic character of the old English methods of self-government and party rule were not as yet fully understood by any German. In the matter of the threatening social contrasts of the age, too, his judgments remained those of the self-complacent liberal bourgeoisie, for he wrote: "Almost everywhere the nucleus of the population consists of a diffused middle class, which grows continually more widely homogeneous."

These defects, however, were of trifling import when compared with the new and vivid ideas of the book. The doctrine of popular sovereignty and the fierce struggles of the day had long ere this led Rotteck's school to regard monarchical authority as nothing better than a necessary evil. But Dahlmann termed the monarchy the sole bond of custom in the world of German states, contending that for all other political elements a centre of gravity was still in process of formation. To those who sang the praises of the barricades, he said sternly: "A revolution is not merely the sign of terrible misfortunes, but is at the same time a self-imposed misfortune." He thought very little of the boasted freedom "of, if the term is to be used, constitutionalist Germany"; and for the future estates of Prussia he demanded only such rights as would be compatible with the living monarchy. All this was written in fine, thoughtful, and impressive language, strongly reminiscent of Jacob Grimm's monumental style. Throughout there was displayed a clear recognition of the freedom of historical greatness, of the nobility of our classical culture, of those pious emotional energies which combine to maintain the state—an elevated outlook which had nothing in common with the arrogance of the enlightenment. This confession of faith of cultured liberalism first found acceptance, therefore, in the north, where monarchical sentiment remained a natural growth, and where Stein's legislation had not been forgotten. Dahlmann believed that in externals also there would be a completion of human affairs at the close of history, and this belief, which in our experienced days is cherished only by youthful enthusiasts, gave his words a proud confidence

[1] Vide supra, vol. II, p. 60.

which made them irresistible to his contemporaries. Though it was more difficult for the South Germans to abandon their law of reason, in the south, too, there gradually arose a moderate liberal party which would at least hear no more of the old radical catchwords, which had outgrown talk of popular sovereignty, the social contract, and revolutionary right. Unfortunately Dahlmann's book was never finished. A taciturn man, he found writing almost more difficult than speaking, and he had no successor in his chosen field of science, for the road along which he led the way could be traversed only by men of quite unusual gifts. Down to the present day we still lack a work explaining on realist lines the whole life of the state as an issue of actual conditions, a book which deals only with demonstrable historical truths instead of with subjective political opinions.

Shortly afterwards he wrote the *History of Denmark* for the series of many volumes on the "History of European States," edited by Heeren and Ukert. Its extensive sale showed how accurately Perthes, the farseeing publisher, had gauged the newly awakened historical appetite of the day. Dahlmann's book was the pearl of the collection. Even his old enemies the Danes could not deny that the civilisations of Norway and Iceland, Denmark and Lower Saxony, had never before been subjected to so exhaustive a study, that the legal institutions which had been the outcome of the reciprocal interplay of these civilisations had never before been so thoroughly examined and so vividly described. He believed that he himself was of Swedish blood, and he had passed the greater part of his life in the frontier domain between the German and the Scandinavian worlds, so that this northern region was one in which he felt quite at home. Moreover, he was able to interweave into his narrative something of the poetic beauty of northern saga, for although with the freedom of prejudice that had been characteristic of Niebuhr he made a vigorous clearance of old traditions, he was not inclined to reject them in their entirety. Of the disputants he spoke sternly, but with a benevolent humanism, and with that genial humour which remains indispensable to the understanding of Teutonic natures. At the right moment he always took the field in person, to survey with his serious and profound gaze the upshot of the developmental process, for the historian cannot, like the epic poet, allow Nemesis free play in an imaginative fable.

The historian must candidly explain the moral significance of the confused facts with which he is dealing, and this is why the compelling force of a historical work subsists ever in the strong personality of the narrator. This book likewise remained incomplete, and the remote topic was unattractive to the mass of the reading public.

Schlosser, in the most popular historical work of the day, the new edition of the *History of the Eighteenth Century*, exercised far greater influence upon public opinion than either Ranke or Dahlmann. In Schlosser the middle classes found what they had failed to find in the other two historians: material that was universally comprehensible; unsparing moral judgments; and the defiant Frisian spirit which, with manifest delight, "democratically utters the truth" to all the mighty ones of the earth. The terrible accusations against the sovereigns and against those miserable beings who as ministers had "displayed all the vices of ministers," pleased embittered readers, although a false picture was obviously given of a great century which had furthered civilisation precisely owing to the exercise of absolute sovereign authority, introducing reforms for which as yet there was no popular demand. Even at the courts feeling was not wholly adverse towards "the friend of mankind, the contemplative philosopher," as he loved to name himself, and the grand duchess Stephanie of Baden bestowed her favour upon him, for his continuous moral indignation was the outcome of a profound and cordial disposition, and amid the petty partisan hatreds of the day, the old blusterer continued to preserve much of the broad-minded humanity of the previous century.

Nor was any objection raised to the rough-hewn character of his presentation. On the contrary, people rather admired him for his staunch courage in declaring that he "deliberately despised" all elegance and gentleness, failing to notice how closely this rude shapelessness approximated to the frivolous disregard of form characteristic of Heinrich Heine. Schlosser, like Heine, regarded style as a cloak with which content might be invested or not at will. Neither of these writers knew what Goethe had long ago shown, that an idea which has been quietly ripening evolves the right form of expression with a certainty akin to that with which the flower evolves the fruit and that fine prose arises quite spontaneously from perfect command of the subject under discussion. Schlosser's

work was formless because he scorned the self-denying industry of Ranke, and because with the aid of moral catchwords he passed facile judgments upon matters that were only half understood. The severest of his many unjust judgments were the outcome of ignorance. When he bluntly opined that the system of levying troops introduced by Frederick William I might readily have been made better and juster, he did not know what he was talking about, for he had no idea how insuperable a resistance the rude masses of the population had offered merely to the limited cantonal system. The literary sections of the book were the best, and were best liked; and since they were the outcome of fuller knowledge, they gave expression to sounder views. It is true that in this first attempt he was not yet able to demonstrate the inward connection, the continuous interaction, of literary life and political struggles. In his treatment they are still presented as altogether independent entities. Moreover, the decisive years of his own education had been before the blossoming time of our poetry, and for this reason he placed Lessing, "the originator and perfecter of German culture," high above Schiller and Goethe, whilst he was manifestly more familiar with the writings of the Anglo-French enlightenment than with later and greater works.

Wonderful was the way in which this antediluvian book floated down the midstream of modern life. For the very reason that Schlosser always held aloof from the liberal party, his cruel and often monstrously unjust severity was regarded by his contemporaries as the impartiality of an incorruptible judge. They looked upon him as a revivalist preacher of the middle ages; his sonorous voice had the note of a passing bell heralding the oncoming of the revolution for which so many were longing; and although at times he would rail against "this lax and servile generation," his readers continued to derive the welcome impression that all the evils of which the writer complained were an outflow from the higher levels of society. Although he knew how to maintain the distinction between public and private morality, he pitilessly subjected all the heroes of history to the measuring rod of his Kantian private morality. The freedom of genius remained no less incomprehensible to him than the right of the saving deed; and only to the ignoble greatness of Napoleon would he concede privileges which he denied to a Frederick. He lacked the historic insight which leads the modest thinker to recognise

the mutability of human moral ideals, so that, instead of prematurely usurping the function of the eternal judge, he appraises each epoch in accordance with its own finite aims. An aristocrat in life and inclinations, Schlosser unintentionally stimulated middle-class dissatisfaction with the existing order; despising academic professionalism, he no less unintentionally ministered to the self-conceit of the men of learning—for above the slime of princely worthlessness which he depicted for his readers, none but a few great writers rose as solitary pinnacles. Here alone did he find "truth, simplicity, tranquil life, self-control, a modest demeanour, and that virtue without which freedom remains a dream, right a shadow." Here alone did he consider himself able to breathe pure air, failing to recognise that this life of tranquil contemplation also has its arrogance, its sins and temptations, though these may seem a trifle less glaring than the sins of men of action. It was pardonable, therefore, that young Gervinus and others among Schlosser's pupils should also consider themselves enormously superior to statesmen in the field of action, so that university professors soon came to play in Germany a part similar to that played by lawyers in France, for not everyone is able as was Schlosser to master the politicians and yet with all modesty to keep out of public life. His intense moral emotion, which it was impossible to ignore, preserved German historiography from an anæmic frigidity; but his works speedily became antiquated as soon as the agitations of the time subsided.

Now that the writing of history had regained a political complexion, it was inevitable that some historians should become shrewd political partisans. Heinrich Leo, when he had outgrown the wild radicalism of his student days, had devoted himself for a time to the Hegelian philosophy, and had then returned to the romanticist outlook which was in conformity with his temperament.[1] His activities in Halle both as teacher and author were extremely fruitful, for he was an ardent spirit overflowing with energy, straightforward and amiable even in his insatiable pugnacity but unmeasured in all things, and so dominated by passion that despite his abundant learning whole epochs of history necessarily remained incomprehensible to him. Only in the world of the middle ages, and especially with the richly coloured life of mediæval towns, was he

[1] Vide supra. vol. III, p. 73.

thoroughly well versed; this is shown by his best work, *The History of the Italian States*, and still more plainly by his *History of the Netherlands* and by his *Universal History*. The formal purity of the antique world seemed to him soulless, whilst the centuries of modern history were in his view a period of "progressive decay," characterised by the prosaic dominance of material interests—as if it could be ignored that town life in the middle ages was likewise regulated by material interests. Thoughtful was his description of the stormy wedded life of Germany and Italy in Hohenstaufen days: "The man, full of energy, courage, and claims; the wife full of cunning and skill, mistress of every wile; the two continually getting on one another's nerves, and yet inseparable." But the way in which, in modern history, the old community of destiny between the two great nations had been renewed; the way in which the patriots on both sides of the Alps were displaying enthusiasm for like ideals; the way in which Piedmont was becoming the Prussia of Italy—this wonderful drama was hidden from his eyes, although the curtain was already rising upon it. In the new century he could see nothing but a manifestation of the "atomistic and mechanical tendency"; and since he was unable to do justice to its poietic energies, all that he justly alleged against its aberrations was fruitless. When in pithy phrases he countered over-refined sentimentalism by insisting upon the splendour of war and the indispensability of strict penal legislation, and when he did not hesitate to declare that "the spectre of vain liberty" would punish the French for the crimes of their revolution, the liberal world was of opinion that no one need pay any attention to the roaring of the Halle lion. His challenging manner secured for him well-deserved recognition, and since he never failed to defend authority, and therefore as far as the middle ages were concerned to defend the Roman church, this loyal supporter of the Prussian monarchy was actually suspected of Catholic leanings. But, as he himself put it, he was far too untrammelled in his thoughts "to adhere to a community so encompassed with arrogance."

The ultramontanes had at length found in Friedrich Hurter the historian to represent their side of the case. His *History of Innocent III and his Contemporaries* gave such plain expression to clericalist fanaticism that Hurter's old friend Haller declared with great satisfaction that the book did not

contain a single Protestant word. The church comprises everything, outside the church there is no salvation, such was his reiterated assurance. The gloomy religious frenzy of the centuries of the mendicant orders and of the inquisition was in his eyes the springtime of Christian love, and the more fiercely he attacked free culture, the more confidently did he say of his own recriminations: "This is not dogmatism or polemics; it is the judgment of history." He spent years in the preparation of this book. It furnished abundant material, but offered no penetrating criticism; notwithstanding the enormous assemblage of picturesque incidents, the treatment was clumsy and lifeless, whilst the fundamental outlook was false. Only a dull critic, one whose vision could not pierce beyond externals, could hold that the pope under whose regime the church attained the acme of its power was, for that very reason, the greatest of all the princes of the church. Innocent's crude lust of dominion was as greatly inferior to the sublime religious ideas of Gregory I or Gregory VII as it was inferior to the bold national policy of Alexander III. Moreover, when the panegyrist of Innocent lamented "the secular possessions" of the church, he was merely showing his own incapacity as a historian, for Innocent was the founder of the papal states!

This glorification of the arch-enemy of our Hohenstaufen emperors was all the more welcome to the clericals because it was the work of a highly placed Protestant divine. A chorus of approval and of mischievous delight resounded from the ultramontane camp. Möhler, of Tübingen, promptly brought the book to his lecture theatre to show his priestly auditors a sample of true historiography. The Protestants, on the other hand, at first exhibited towards their renegade co-religionist that weakly consideration which has always been the characteristic defect of Protestant religious freedom. Hurter had vainly knocked at the doors of several Catholic publishers, who had all been afraid to offend a reading public proud of its enlightenment. Perthes, on the other hand, a loyal Protestant, gave the book to the world as inconsiderately as he had in earlier days issued Stolberg's *History of Religion*, for he continued innocently to hope for an understanding between the two sister churches. In the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, Leo paid honour to the opponent of the Ghibellines. In 1834, after the first volume of the history of Innocent III had been

published, Hurter's strictly Protestant fellow countrymen in Schaffhausen elected him antistes, chief pastor of the canton, whilst the Protestant faculty of the university of Basle, containing among its members such men as de Wette and Hagenbach, actually conferred upon him an honorary doctor's degree "on account of the abundant knowledge he has displayed of religious history." If Hurter had had the least understanding of the spirit of the Protestant congregational church, as an honest man it would have been impossible for him to continue for an hour to preach a faith whose fundamental truths he absolutely denied. Even Haller implored his friend to break openly with heresy, seeing that his position had become untenable; and it may well be that the old man now looked back with shame upon the days when he had himself been cowardly enough to keep his conversion a secret.[1] But the antistes was entirely under the sway of old family traditions, the traditions of those who as bailiffs had in former days wrought havoc in the confederacy, and he had simply transferred these ideas of rulership to the church. Looking on himself as a priest, he held himself competent to exercise hierarchical authority at will, regardless of the opinions of errant members of his flock. Clumsy, unteachable, and mulish, like most of the Swiss reactionaries, he clung to his Protestant office, and continued the writing of his history, which became more fanatical with every volume. He entered into an alliance with the pope, with nuncios and bishops, with all the leaders of the clericalist party in South Germany, engaging unashamedly in ultramontane intrigues, until, after years had passed, the Protestant population displayed its hostility to behaviour which was tantamount to an impudent falsehood.

Whilst the notable political historians first approached German affairs by devious paths, through the domain of universal history, Jacob Grimm's attention was wholly devoted to the homeland, for he guarded the treasures of our primal age as a pious priest guards a sacred relic. He desired "to encourage more elevated ideas of the fatherland, whose tongue, laws, and antiquities are far from being adequately esteemed," foreseeing that "the future will take revenge upon the present for any contempt of primitive times." He had therefore demonstrated to his countrymen that "our forefathers spoke

[1] Vide supra, vol. II, p. 341.

a well-constructed speech and had excellent legal institutions." Now, in *German Mythology* (1835), the third of his pioneer works, he showed that they had also been "filled with the happy belief in God and gods," and that they had "not abased themselves before idols and wooden images." Never before had he written so movingly. It gave pleasure to his amiable mind to rebuild where ignorant rationalist criticism had demolished. He knew that belief in the gods was the basis of all saga, and that saga is perpetually reborn, whereas history is invariably new, and never repeats itself. He was the first to recognise that, after the conversion of the Teutons, Christianity, wishing to dispel pagan ideas, had endeavoured to conceal paganism under Christian forms, and that for this reason many of the old pagan beliefs persisted in distorted guise throughout the middle ages, as a belief in witchcraft and in the devil, and further that the sacred figures of Christian belief were likewise indued with many of the attributes of the ancient gods, so that Freya lived on in Mary, Thor in Peter, the Æsir in the apostles. Thus by his comprehensive study of pagan and Christian traditions was he enabled to reconstruct an accurate picture of the Teutonic pantheon, and to demonstrate that whilst the gods of our ancestors are obscurer figures, less shapely and more fantastical than the gods of Olympus, yet our mythology was superior to classical mythology through the persistence of a living belief in a continued existence after death and in the moral responsibility of mortals. He showed, likewise, that it was superior through its kinship with Christianity, and superior through its frank naturalness, for how much more homely and congenial are the dwarfs, elves, and giants of the Germans than the respectable and artistically decked nymphs, cabiri, and cyclops. He objected to any learned attempts at systematisation in this world of live figures, which had filled a daring race of heroes with joy in victory and contempt for death. He would not permit the imputation of pantheism to our fathers, for they had venerated many gods of varying strength and dignity; nor would he admit the charge of dualism, for in this hopeful creed the gentle and kindly gods were enormously preponderant.

No other nation now possesses so vivid and so solidly grounded a conception of the mental life of its primitive forefathers. Equally incomparable in world literature was the essay, *The Diversity in the Structure of Languages*, the

last work of Wilhelm Humboldt, wherein the brilliant forces of two epochs, the philosophic universality characteristic of the eighteenth century and the strict study of detail characteristic of the nineteenth, are united even more happily than they had been in the *Essay concerning the Task of the Historian.* In this work, which touches upon the profoundest riddles of existence, Humboldt sketched in bold antitheses a philosophic and historical picture of the nature of man, the subject which had occupied his mind throughout life. He showed that man is man solely through language, but is certainly not the creator of language, for he must be man before he could become competent to discover language. He showed that the enigma of language does not lie in speaking but in understanding, and that the enigma can only be grasped when we recognise that "I" and "thou" are in truth identical concepts. He showed that language is simultaneously foreign to the soul and subject to the soul, dependent upon the laws of thought and nevertheless free, seeing that the contradictory, though it cannot be thought, may be uttered. He showed how the organism of language is fashioned by the entire nation, whereas civilisation is fashioned by individuals, so that language is simultaneously national and individual, dominated by the remote past and yet renewed from moment to moment, not a work but an activity, progressing as a rule by gradations, but advancing suddenly on occasions owing to the direct creative energy of genius which is no less powerful in nations as a whole than it is in individuals. He showed how language may be scientifically treated as composed of mere signs of ideas, but that it may also be treated as a living entity, as an expression of all the experiences which demand the undivided application of human energy, and that all the true culture of our generation therefore is founded upon poetry, philosophy, and history.

Years before, old Blumenbach had given the materialists a knock-down blow by the simple observation, "Why can't the monkey speak? Because it has nothing to say." What is enunciated here as a mere witty hint, was definitely proved by Humboldt, namely, that language is directly given to consciousness in association with reason, that the concept cannot be detached from the word, and that differences of language inevitably imply differing outlooks on the world. With his incomparable wealth of linguistic knowledge, he then proceeded

to show in detail how through the verb thought becomes reality, and how a relative clause merely expresses the quality of a substantive, and so on—enunciating creative ideas which for a long time to come were to be guiding principles in comparative philology. This was the last heritage of that magnificent German idealism which had illumined the days of Weimar and Jena. Humboldt died on April 8, 1835, before he had completed his work upon the Kavi language to which the before-mentioned essay was to serve as introduction. The sufferings of his last illness were borne with serene composure. Close to his château, he had years before prepared a beautiful resting place for his wife and his old teacher Kunth on the hill overlooking the blue waters of Lake Tegel. The quiet place is surrounded by pines, and from a slender column a marble statue of Hope (the work of Thorwaldsen) gazes down upon the ivy-clad tombs. Here, too, the great Hellene of German descent was buried.

A generation had passed since the sap had again begun to rise in the tree of historical research, and yet this tree was still continuing with inexhaustible energy to throw out fresh shoots. There had just originated two additional and independent sciences, for Schnaase had undertaken to represent the history of art in its entirety, considered as a complete and necessary development, whilst Gervinus was performing the same task for the history of German literature. In the interim, classical philology had also entered a new domain with the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* which had been in course of issue since 1824 under the editorship of Böckh. Even during the Napoleonic wars, when Prussian finances were at such a low ebb, Frederick William had approved the expenditure upon this undertaking, for the study of the antique world was ever dear to his heart. For the first time, now, did the life of ancient Greece become personally, directly, and vividly comprehensible to moderns, comprehensible in its every-day activities, and in the multiplicity of its dialects, whose existence can be inferred merely, not directly recognised, in the study of standard classical literature. Yet more vivid became the picture of ancient life when Böckh, in his metrological investigations, discovered the oriental origin of the Hellenic systems of measurement and coinage, thus furnishing a precise demonstration of the connection between western and eastern civilisation, which had been merely a

dream vision on the minds of Creuzer and the symbolists. In Böckh's intelligence, a sober mathematical sense was associated with a liberal sentiment for beauty, which even enabled him to appreciate the dithyrambic impetus of Pindar.

These bold voyages of discovery made by "practical philologists" were regarded with increasing concern by the old Greek scholar Gottfried Hermann. It seemed to him as if a raging stream were breaking into the peaceful world of criticism and grammar. He was willing to admit that many areas had been fruitfully irrigated, but the country as a whole was made uninhabitable! The members of his school felt that their ancient possessions were being threatened, and they attacked the historians of philology with unjustified venom, for the two tendencies, far from being mutually exclusive, were mutually explanatory. Gradually, however, quite contrary to the master's intention, they succumbed to an uninspired micrology. Classical teaching at the gymnasia began to suffer. Many pedagogues of the Leipzig school came to regard the Homeric poems as merely a means of instruction, to be used in illustrating the grammatical rules of elision, crasis, and the iota subscriptum. By the end of the thirties it was already plain that pupils were ceasing to take delight in the classical world. Thus the old and strong foundations of German education began to totter at the very time when the natural sciences were blossoming, and when the interests of an expanding economic system were imperiously demanding new cultural materials.

When Lejeune-Dirichlet, the Rhinelander, went to the university in 1822, he was forced to go to Paris, for in all Germany there was but one mathematician competent to meet his extensive claims, and this one, Gauss, scorned to teach. How different was it now; how many brilliant men had devoted themselves to the study of all branches of exact science since Alexander Humboldt's return to Germany. The reign of the abstract natural philosophers was over. In 1827, in a final outburst, they visited their spleen upon the physicist Ohm. He had aroused the anger of the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, because the well-assured data of his theory of galvanism were incompatible with the cobwebs of the Hegelian system, and for this reason he was so contumeliously treated by the Hegelians of the ministry of education

that, taking offence, he relinquished his teaching post in Cologne. Since then the pride of the young natural philosophers who had assembled under Humboldt's banner had notably increased. They rejoiced to feel themselves the bearers of assured knowledge, demonstrable in its entirety, and, whilst they mocked at the arbitrary constructions of the abstract philosophers, these latter, for the most part, were afraid to retaliate by open attack. Hendrik Steffens, who taught natural philosophy after the manner of Schelling, was, indeed, summoned to Berlin because the crown prince wished to withdraw him from the odious disputes of the old Lutherans in Breslau. His princely patron believed that "such a man as Steffens needs for his own advantage to live in the capital, whilst in him the capital will acquire one who ought to be numbered among the distinguished teachers at the university." [1] But the influence of this enthusiast upon Berlinese science remained trifling, although his eloquence drew large audiences. It sounded like a mournful farewell from the old to the new time when in the year 1837, at the examination for the doctorate, Steffens said of the young geologist Beyrich: "The answers indicate that the candidate has paid more attention to objects than he has to the absolute." The other examiners did not join in this censure, for every one of them had by this time come over to the heretical view that for the student of nature the formulation of ideas concerning the absolute must be deferred until objects have been studied.

How radically this new science was destined to transform all national customs could already be recognised in the youthful manufacturing industry of Germany. In the year 1785 the first steam engine entirely constructed by Germans was erected at the Hettstedt copper mines in County Mansfeld. Now, in most branches of industry, steam power was indispensable to large-scale manufacture, and even agriculture had long ere this begun to realise the vivifying energy of the new discovery. During the lifetime of Frederick the Great, Marggraf, the Berlin chemist, had produced sugar from beetroot, but the new discovery was first turned to practical account at the opening of the nineteenth century. By the year 1840, within the area of the customs union there were 145 beet sugar refineries, whose annual yield from 4,800,000 cwt. of beetroot was more

[1] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, October 23 and December 30, 1831; January 15, 1832.

than 248,000 cwt of sugar. Professional economists, all of whom were still in the trammels of English theory and were unwittingly defending the interests of British commercial policy, made loud complaints concerning this artificially fostered industry. But the Magdeburg beet growers were delighted at the increasing return from their lands, whilst consumers were pleased at the fall in the price of sugar, and soon, too, people were to realise that in times of activity one discovery invariably leads to another. Since the sugar beet sends its roots to a depth almost four times as great as wheat, the cultivators had to plough their land much deeper, and the inference was soon obvious that if grain growers were to follow the good example they would be able, without exhausting the soil, to exploit its energies more thoroughly.

The great age of natural research now dawning was hailed by Alexander Humboldt with almost youthful optimism. It was during these years that he wrote his volumes upon Central Asia, which happily supplemented Ritter's Asiatic researches. Now, too, he was preparing his *Cosmos*. In Paris and in Berlin this old man of world-wide renown sat among the students to learn from Hase, Champollion, and Boeckh what he still needed to know in the domain of historical philology. Throughout he remained an ever-ready patron of aspiring talent. It was through his advocacy that Justus Liebig gained entry to Gay-Lussac's laboratory. Here the ardent and impassioned young Hessian learned to revere the real. Shaking off the arrogance of abstract natural philosophy, on his return to Giessen in 1826 he furnished chemistry, which in Germany hardly ranked as a science and was left to the apothecaries, with a new method. His pupils were to learn, not in the lecture theatre, but by experiment, at the furnace, and with their retorts. Restricted at the outset almost exclusively to his own scanty means, but subsequently assisted by the Hessian government, he established the first generally accessible chemical laboratory, which soon procured a European reputation for the little university of Giessen. At a considerably later date Liebig's intimate friend, Wöhler, found in Göttingen a fairly adequate centre for his investigations. Prussia, on the other hand, lagged behind in the study of chemistry, for the thrifty system which had rendered it possible to maintain no more than six universities was ill adapted to meet the extensive claims of the new science. At times Liebig's aspiring and

many-sided spirit was affected by those gloomy moods which are apt to trouble the chemist in the bad air of the laboratory where he conducts monotonous and laborious experiments. On these occasions he would despairingly exclaim: "At bottom, chemistry is nothing but an arithmetical sum; its ultimate aim is merely to discover some good boot-blacking or to learn how to boil meat." But Wöhler's tranquillising counsel never failed to restore his equanimity, and the two friends were already in a position to congratulate themselves on numerous splendid successes. Liebig was the discoverer of chloroform, although the uses of this substance were not ascertained till many years later. Wöhler rendered possible an astonishing glimpse into the ultimate secrets of nature by the synthetic production of urea without the intermediation of the energies of living animals. Thereby was refuted an error hoary with antiquity, and the proof afforded that there is no impassable boundary between the organic and the inorganic world.

Nay more, in his researches into vision (1825), the famous physiologist Johannes Müller ascended to those lofty heights where physics and metaphysics touch. By direct scientific observation, he showed what Kant had discovered through abstract speculation, that we see things, not as they are, but as they must appear to us owing to the peculiarities of our sense-organs. Like Liebig, Müller had first to discard the arrogant assumptions of abstract natural philosophy. Standing now upon the platform of exact research, he trained in Berlin a brilliant circle of pupils, and established the physiological foundations of comparative anatomy. When new ideas make their way into German life, the sensibilities too invariably demand their rights. Most of the younger men of science in Berlin associated upon terms of intimate friendship. Among them may be mentioned Dove, Mitscherlich, Magnus, and the brothers Rose. When these men met Poggendorff, the physicist, in the tower of the old observatory in Dorotheenstrasse, the minds of all were filled with the prophetic vision of a great future. The present indeed seemed modest enough; the developing sciences had first to struggle for their footing. Astronomy alone, whose position had long been established, was reckoned a distinguished pursuit, and could always rely upon financial support from the state. The Königsberg laboratory had actually been founded during the miserable days of the Napoleonic wars, and here Bessel had calculated

the position of the clock-stars, thus securing unity for astronomical determinations. Now Schinkel built the new Berlin observatory, which under Encke's direction became a model institution. Humboldt's advocacy was helpful in this field also, for he was the sun radiating warmth in the centre of the planetary circle. Not until the forties, however, did the blossoming time of German natural science come; but when it came, the French were soon overhauled, and then outstripped.

§ 5. THE YOUNG HEGELIANS. STRAUSS.

Whilst the concrete sciences were thus pursuing their victorious career, the vital energy of the older German philosophy had already been cut off at the source. Its classic age closed with the death of Hegel. A distant observer might indeed imagine that the heyday of Hegelian philosophy began after the master's death, for not till then did his name gain its greatest renown, and not till then did his writings acquire their widest circulation. His sun continued to shine long after it had dipped below the horizon. Hegel's old friend Altenstein lamented that a star of the first magnitude had disappeared, and desired at least to secure that the deceased philosopher's teaching should be dominant at the Prussian universities. Vainly did the crown prince and his romanticist friends, supported by the brothers Humboldt, demand that Schelling, as the sole worthy successor, should be appointed to the vacant chair in Berlin. The minister and his acolyte Johannes Schulze were obstinate in their resistance, seeing that Schelling had for some years severed himself from the friend of his youth, and had just publicly declared that the Hegelian system was a relapse into scholasticism, a comparatively sterile episode in German philosophy. Altenstein considered it his official duty to protect the true faith in religious matters and pure idealism in science. In 1835 he assured the king: "In the Prussian state a solidly founded philosophical system has now put an end to arrogant and deplorable doings. The ministry cannnot extend its ægis over any other philosophy, and least of all over the philosophy of Schelling." After prolonged discussions, Gabler, director of the Bayreuth gymnasium,

received the appointment. A dull, ultra-conservative Hegelian, he accepted as gospel every word of the master, and was never able to detect any contradiction between the philosophy of identity and Christian revelation. As soon as the first astonishment had subsided, the new professor was absolutely ignored.

Through this ridiculous appointment Hegel's doctrine was formally recognised as the Prussian state philosophy. A collected edition of his works was edited by Johannes Schulze in conjunction with Gans, Hotho, and others, and found countless admirers. In the foreign world, it was especially the upper class Russians and Poles that were attracted by the mighty self-assurance of this system, for the incompleteness of their culture made them look for a firm authority. The disciples, meanwhile, laboured to complete the edifice in every detail. Conscious of a historical mission, they worked with holy zeal, and proved that not in vain had Fritz Förster, an honest enthusiast, gathered them around the tomb of the master. The Alexander of philosophy had passed away; his generals were to rule as diadoches in his partitioned empire. The universality of the system and the fitness of its method to deal with every emergency facilitated this division of labour. The least presumptuous of all the Hegelians, Carl Rosenkranz of Königsberg, an excellent man who had done good service on behalf of the humanist culture of Old Prussia, continued Hegel's researches in the fields of psychology and æsthetics. Friedrich Vischer, the Swabian, gave expression in his treatise on æsthetics to new ideas that were the fruit of direct observation. If they failed to exercise as wide an influence as they deserved it was because they had been laboriously yoked to the formulas of the Hegelian system.

Most of the other diadoches were distinguished solely by their boundless pretensions. To their wisdom of the schools no riddles were left unsolved between heaven and earth, and they were ready to write a succinct answer to any question that might be propounded. How severely was Rosenkranz taken to task by the more strictly orthodox Hegelians, who stigmatised him as a man of unphilosophical intelligence because he frankly admitted that the philosopher could not construct the future apriori but must respect the God who manifests himself in the unanticipated developments of history. Michelet of Berlin had got far beyond such reservations. Boldly

transferring the Hegelian ternary to the philosophy of history, he described, first, the unknown primitive world, secondly, the life known to history, and thirdly, the history of the future, being thus enabled, in the wide deserts of the first and the third section, to give free play to the absolute idea, unhampered by any knowledge of facts. With like confidence did he attack the rabble of empirical students of nature, condemning in especial Dove's admirable investigations into the theory of colour; nor did it shame him when Alexander Humboldt, ceasing for the nonce to be the well-bred courtier, bluntly rejoined, "I am myself one of this rabble."

Notwithstanding this noisy boasting, Hegel's school produced hardly a single new idea. No one was more distressed than the good Rosenkranz, who wrote in his diary five years after the master's death: "We are fairly competent to reflect about the philosophy that has been handed down to us, but as far as original ideas are concerned we are now mere dilettantes." Such was the truth. Step by step, in a marvellously regular advance, German philosophy had unfolded the boldest ideas that the moral intelligence can conceive, Kant establishing his doctrine of duty, Fichte insisting upon the supremacy of the ego over the world of the senses, and Hegel discovering in history the temple of the omnipresent deity. But with Hegel this courageous idealism, which for all time will ensure our nation a position beside the Greeks, had spoken its last word. There could be no advance beyond a system which believed itself to have discovered the unity of existence and thought. Philosophy could only progress by relinquishing the self-deceptions of the later systems to return to their starting point, to Kant; and this return was effected in 1839 when, in his *Logical Studies*, Trendelenburg refuted, though incompletely, the fundamental ideas of the Hegelian doctrine. He proved that pure thought is a simple impossibility; that thought progresses, not per se, but by means of perception; and that consequently thought cannot generate reality. This merely expressed what the clear-minded students of empirical science had long tacitly felt, but it was a considerable time before Trendelenburg's refutation received adequate attention from the philosophers. An additional sign of the commencing transformation was that at this period Herbart was beginning to found a school in Göttingen. Some years before, in Königsberg, this keen thinker had given the first stimulus

to the study of mathematical psychology, to the scientific observation of the processes of subjective experience.

The mass of Hegelians clung to the old flag. Never weary of repeating the finished formulas of the system, they endeavoured, by exaggeration and circumlocution, and by manifold sophistical arts, to make up for their defects in point of creative energy. Since the profound proposition, the reality of the rational, positively challenged opposing interpretations, the separation into two parties, which had already become manifest during Hegel's lifetime, became more and more conspicuous. With zeal worthy of a better cause, the Young Hegelians (as the radicals were termed) and the members of the Hegelian right vied with one another in maintaining that they alone had comprehended the spirit of Hegel. This senseless quarrel round the name of the master showed all too clearly that the school had come to an end of its wisdom, and Michelet merely confirmed the bankruptcy of the system when he triumphantly exclaimed: "A party first demonstrates itself to be victorious when it splits into two parties." Hegel had always been a passionate opponent of the liberals, and shortly before his death had given a further demonstration of conservative sentiments by his fine essay on the English reform bill. He regarded the July revolution as a penalty for the sins of liberalism. He was under the illusion that his pantheistic system was in conformity with the Christian doctrine of the trinity, and was delighted when Göschel and Gabler endeavoured to make Hegelianism palatable to the orthodox. Towards the last he had expressed his detestation of the radicals' intolerance, which led them to regard as an informer every defender of state and church; and although he demanded a few reforms, his first thought was to demonstrate the rationality of the real and the inner necessity of the existing order. The men of the Hegelian right had therefore good reason to regard themselves as the master's heirs, however much they might be deceived as to certain points; and Michelet was wholly wrong when he censured the conservative Hegelians as "deserters who no longer wish to be disciples."

But to accept the real, the actually existing, as the rational, conflicts with the eternal aspirations of the human spirit, above all in times of well-grounded dissatisfaction. For this reason, in the disputes that now broke out, the Young Hegelians could count upon the approval of the crowd when, twisting the

master's words, they detected irrational elements in all existing conditions, and endeavoured by their sovereign criticism to do away with them as unreal, as unworkable. If for Hegel the unity of divine and human life had been a moral postulate, his radical successors explained that concrete man was himself a god; since Hegel had indicated constitutionalist monarchy as the ideal state, they contended that all philosophers must be constitutionalists, and that all constitutionalists, too, would speedily become philosophers. In truth, they had nothing in common with the conservative master beyond the use of his dialectical method, with which it is possible to prove anything you please; yet they were universally believed when they had the arrogance to maintain that they alone had fully understood him. Just as Napoleon, the man who had curbed the revolution, had been the first to diffuse throughout Europe the so-called ideas of '89, so was Hegel's system first made a common possession in the educated world by Hegel's renegade radical disciples, and posterity came to look upon the profound theory of the revelation of God in history as a doctrine of unhistorical radicalism. Thus merciless was the severity with which the great thinker was punished for his tragic error in using a sophistical dialectic.

Since 1838 the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, edited by Ruge and Echtermeyer, had served as a common platform for the Young Hegelians. Arnold Ruge, having atoned for the demagogic follies of his youth by a long term of imprisonment, had "spent two years quietly wandering into the newly discovered land of the modern spirit." He now considered it his vocation to advocate the Hegelian philosophy as he conceived it, "as true reality, the consciousness of the age, the genuinely positive and final historical datum"; and to advocate it pugnaciously, saying: "Struggle is life, and life must be." In the *Jahrbücher*, he hoped to offer "an entirely new and central rallying point for all the really vital and active forces of the time"; and since the younger professors zealously cooperated, he soon came to believe that Halle was a second Weimar. Absolutely straightforward, good-natured to the pitch of softness, an amiable companion, an excellent husband and father, he was equally lacking in acquirements and in fruitful ideas. His only strength lay in the dialectical skill with which he could "negate" as obsolete and superseded everything that had been thought before his day, and with which he could dismiss

his opponents as "minors and persons of arrested development." Being a houseowner and a municipal councillor in Halle, he had made close acquaintance with Prussian administration, and honestly assured his book-learned associates "our state system is free and just." Nor did he share the liberals' admiration for the Jews. Rahel, in his view, was "a detestable creature, not worth the trouble of contradiction"; and when, among intimates, with broad Pomeranian laughter, he was railing at his opponents, the "garlic eaters" inevitably came in for their share of declamation. It lay, however, in the very nature of this futile criticism, criticism which had become an end in itself, that it must overreach itself, that, escaping one error only to fall into another, it should ultimately succumb to the follies of cosmopolitan Jewish-French radicalism.

At the outset the *Jahrbücher* published a number of excellent essays, defending Prussia as the preeminently intelligent state in which Protestantism was dominant, and referring to the discipline of the Prussian officials as a necessary factor in the moulding of the future. Soon, however, it was discovered that Prussia was to a large extent abandoning her true mission; her officialdom represented merely the captive reason and her whole political system was still Catholic, for absolutism must stand or fall with Catholicism. Thus the critics—unceasingly, and with furious haste. In them the voice of conscience was still, and nothing was more agreeable to them than to declare that black which the day before they had maintained to be white. In a dictatorial *Manifesto* Ruge annihilated romanticism, and, above all, the historical school. Shortly afterwards he hurled Protestantism into the abyss after the romanticists; the enlightenment alone could be regarded as genuine Protestantism, and could alone prove the uplifting force of modern history. Every human being was merely a "principle," and was entombed in one of the innumerable pigeon holes upon whose dockets the ideas of the system were inscribed. Gentz disappeared from sight as "the principle of pleasure-seeking," Tholuck as "the principle of mysticism," Leo as "the principle of hierarchical pietism," this last being "precisely assimilated with Jesuitism; while in Erdmann of Halle, a conservative, there was simply incorporated "the corruption of the Hegelian philosophy."

In accordance with the old academic custom, fierce enemies were soon arrayed against the contentious periodical. Leo

accused "the Hegelings" of atheism in a savage booklet which contained a number of bitter truths interspersed amid gross exaggerations. The publisher of the *Jahrbücher*, Otto Wigand, the radical bookseller, favoured by the mildness of the Saxon censorship, offered an asylum in Leipzig to all the Young Hegelians, and it seemed for a time as if disintegrated German publicism was going to find an unnatural centre on the Pleisse. A number of pamphlets were issued attacking "the pietists," Leo and his fellow-fighter Kahnis, the divinity student. The *Jahrbücher* played a vigorous part in the fray, denouncing the professors at the central German universities in drastic articles, manifestly proceeding from the amiable pens of unattached professors whose merits had been inadequately recognised. Quite in Heine's unchivalrous manner, every opposing writing was stigmatised as "a new and base laying of information against the Hegelian school. All this academic swashbuckling was just as sterile as had been the rough controversial methods of Oken's *Isis*. But idealist radicalism grew with the heat of the strife and the vigour of the abusive terminology, and it was not difficult to foresee that this absolute criticism would before long negate as obsolete the fatherland, nationality, and every objective order imposed upon mankind.

Among the philosophical collaborators of the *Jahrbücher*, Ludwig Feuerbach was distinguished by the beauty of his style. A son of the great jurist, he was a sincere and ardent enthusiast, and with inexorable logic deduced the ultimate consequences from all the master's propositions as he understood them. At length, in *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), he proceeded to annihilate religion. He made a dazzling use of the dialectical method, but was utterly devoid of the historic sense which irradiated the Hegelian system and excused many of its errors. In his view the Christian faith was nothing but the rigid principle of world renunciation. The protean energy of Christianity, unremittingly at work through the centuries, and after the reformation incorporating into itself the classical ideal of the joy of life, remained inconceivable to him. He therefore considered that philosophy was necessarily unchristian. Even the church had never ventured to claim that it had a real knowledge of God; and the gospels had merely promised to the pure in heart that they should one day see God. Thinking theologians of all parties had long

known that man can only approximate to the idea of God through endeavouring to elevate the highest thing known to him, humanity, and that therefore certain anthropomorphic concepts must inevitably be included in all teaching about God. These universally familiar and, properly speaking, uncontested experiences, serve merely to prove the limitations of the human intellectual faculty. But Feuerbach's simple conclusion was that the idea of God is an illusion, that all theology is anthropology, and that theology will promptly vanish as soon as this is recognised. "The idea" is not revealed in God, but in the human species. The marvellous history of the church, which has filled so many centuries with spirit and life, was to him no more than a terrible disease; and since no man can live without faith, all that remained open to the complete atheist was to believe in the state, the true humanity, which would indeed first attain perfection in the republican form. In all these colossal fallacies there was no word that did not flatly conflict with Hegel's teaching, but every one of them was discussed with the aid of the Hegelian dialectic, and they were adduced with such cordial enthusiasm that it was easy for them to lead the rising generation astray, and to lead astray in especial the young and ambitious students of natural science.

By far the most important work of the Young Hegelians, the only one to exercise a notable influence, was *The Life of Jesus* by David Friedrich Strauss, which in the momentous year 1835 burst like a thunderclap upon the religious world. Though there were some able men among the theologians, the general condition of theology was one of insincerity which could not possibly endure. Rationalism, having become senile, had declined almost unnoticed to a crude worship of the letter. Clinging to the words of holy scripture, its idealism had been undermined by dull and foolish methods of interpretation; the rationalists believed in the descent of the dove while doubting the descent of the Holy Ghost. The conservative Hegelians, on the other hand, endeavoured to deduce dogma from the idea, whilst the followers of Schleiermacher attempted no less fruitlessly to demonstrate the facts of gospel history as utterances of the Christian consciousness. By concealing contradictions, by tenderness to the unhistorical, and by the interweaving of conflicting reports, the endeavour was made to achieve a harmony which

could be satisfactory neither to believing sentiment nor to critical understanding. The venerable Daub's work, *The Dogmatic Theology of Contemporary Times*, published at Heidelberg in the year 1833, was purely scholastic in form and content; dogma was first assumed as a datum, and was then established on speculative grounds with a great display of sterile learning. When, therefore, Strauss applied to the opening period of Christianity the strict methods of historical criticism which had long been utilised in the treatment of pre-Christian ages and of the later centuries of religious history, the effect was one of spiritual enfranchisement. Little that he said was new, but he supplied a comprehensive survey of the contradictions in the gospel narratives, contradictions which had been recognised since the days of Lessing and the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, but had again and again been artfully concealed. The shattering effect of his book was due to the unsparing way in which he gave utterance to what countless readers had been secretly thinking.

Strauss had grown up in petty-bourgeois surroundings, and remained throughout life a Swabian philistine. Having endured the stultifying discipline of the theological seminaries in Würtemberg, since his proud spirit was unable to tolerate the oppression of this Protestant cloistral life, he had, like young Schiller in earlier days, become imbued with ardent enthusiasm for liberty. By the time he was twenty-seven years of age his mental equipment was extensive and thorough. He was endowed with extraordinary critical insight; his literary style was invariably vivid, attractive, and lucid; whilst a number of thoughtful poems show that he was not entirely devoid of imaginative gifts. But he lacked the power which his blind admirers attributed to him, the power of an elementally great and therefore continually growing individuality. He was, on the contrary, one of those unfortunate men of talent whose development displays a progressive decline; and when his orthodox opponents, including the gentle Perthes, prophesied that he would come to a bad end, these vaticinations were justified by the result. With youthful audacity he ventured upon an undertaking far beyond his strength and his whole life suffered from this defect. Amid all his sagacious utterances, it is impossible to find a single word which can move a man to the depths, impossible to find any manifestation of that natural force of genius which compels the reader to exclaim,

"Such was he, and thus alone could he speak." His mind, essentially critical, was devoid of a genial understanding of human destiny and human activities; he lacked the plastic energy of the creative historian, who cannot rest until, from scanty or troubled sources, he has acquired a vidid picture of past happenings.

He made no attempt to picture the character of him who (from the purely scientific outlook) was the greatest man that ever lived, or to show why this brief and marvellous life has divided universal history into two portions and has exercised an absolutely incomparable influence upon the destinies of mankind. Instead of a life of Jesus he furnished no more than shrewdly critical detached observations which, amid incessant repetitions, serve in the end to demonstrate but one thing, that the gospels are not works of pure history—a poor result, a truth which no thoughtful historian has ever questioned. The motive force of all history, the might and the living creative work of individuality, was incomprehensible to this critic. For him these influences were replaced by a doctrinaire "mythopœic principle," which was supposed to have created something out of nothing and was therefore far more marvellous than the miracles recorded by the evangelists. His investigation, presenting a semblance of irrefutability, was in truth extremely superficial. It was a criticism of gospel history, not of the gospels themselves. The questions to answer were, What was the relationship between the gospel of St. John (hitherto regarded by theologians as the purest source of initial Christian history) and the synoptic gospels, and when and by whom these different books had been compiled; but these decisive questions were never even mooted by Strauss. Ceasing where he should have begun, he imagined his work to be finished when he had discovered the undeniable contradictions in the gospel narratives and had deduced therefrom the crude conclusion that the whole matter was mythical. He never grasped that the idea of the god-man is implanted in our souls by an inborn and ineradicable impulse, and is therefore a demand of the practical reason; he never recognised that all love, everything which brings happiness to the human heart, rests upon the conception that somewhere the ideal must be realised. For this reason he denies the certain and maintains the uncertain. He refuses to admit that the ideal of humanity can be incorporated in a single man, whilst giving positive

assurance that men, sinful individually, are blameless as a species and are in a state of continual progress, whereas it is obvious to all that a Homer or a Phidias is never reproduced; that the civilised tongues, while becoming richer and more reasonable, lose beauty in the process; and that consequently the boasted progress of our race is at best no more than conditional and limited.

This perspicacious theologian had absolutely no inkling of the essence of religion. Like all the Hegelians, he saw in religion no more than inchoate thought, although the history of thousands of years has proved that intuitive woman has ever been more religious than reflective man. Thus all unawares he arrived at the opinion of those orthodox theologians of the seventeenth century, the men whose faith was in the letter, and who believed that the essence of religion was to be found in the acceptance of a few dogmatic formulas. He imagined that he had overthrown Christianity because he had proved that certain elements in the gospel narratives are mythical. How tragical was the contradiction in the life of this talented man. In the struggle, in the justified struggle, against the theological coercion exercised by the learned teachers of the Tübingen seminary, he had acquired what he termed freedom of spirit; and yet his own book was a true child of that wisdom of the study which is unable to understand that theological criticism is null in comparison with the practical duties of the spiritual consoler, who must bring comfort to those that labour and are heavy laden, and who must be fully aware that before the majesty of the living God the hair-splitting professor is just as poor a creature as the simplest peasant.

This valiant campaigner did good service, however, in that he laid his finger upon an open sore in German theology. This was why his book aroused an indignation almost without parallel in the case of any learned work. Within a few weeks after the publication of the first volume he was deprived of his position at the theological seminary of Tübingen and was assigned a subordinate teaching post. Now Eschenmaier, whose visionary speculations upon natural philosophy had influenced Strauss in earlier years, published a work against *The Iscariotism of our Days*, a fanatical book which curtly denied that there was any justification whatever for the scientific discussion of theology. Paulus likewise arose from

the easy-chair of rationalism to attack the heretic who absolutely refused to recognise that the Jews of Christ's day had had the unpleasant habit of burying their relatives alive, and that this practice afforded a perfectly natural explanation of the raisings in the New Testament; nevertheless Paulus' language was more moderate than that of Steudel, the old supernaturalist of Tübingen. The Würtemberg pietists who held their prayer-meetings in Calw and Kornthal, took up the cudgels, and in their name Strauss' former fellow-student Wilhelm Hoffmann entered the field against his sometime friend. Hengstenberg's *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, published in Berlin, voiced its wrath, and the ministers of state were already deliberating whether the dangerous book ought not to be prohibited in Prussia when Johann Neander, in an admirable *Opinion*, declared that in accordance with Protestant custom reasons should be attacked by reasons alone. Unfortunately, however, *The Life of Christ*, which this pious author issued shortly afterwards as a counterblast to the Swabian's book, was a work rather of love than of critical insight. Strauss defended himself against all his opponents in a series of contentious writings.

So great was his scientific reputation and so widespread was the admiration felt by the academic children of this world for the unaffrighted champion, that it would hardly have been possible in the long run to refuse him a professorship of philosophy. But the obstinate Swabian wanted a theological professorship although he had already questioned almost all the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. It was as if Martin Luther had demanded that, accompanied by his wife Catherina, he should be appointed general of the Augustinian order. There were actually a few academic hotspurs ready to support this remarkable claim. The new radical government in Zurich had recently founded a university, which speedily summoned a number of vigorous professors from among the crowd of German demagogues and malcontents. Lorenz Oken, who, after his manner, had embroiled himself with the authorities in Munich, was the first rector of the university of Zurich, where he wrote the *Natural History*, his best work. Why should not this new Athens on the Limmat, which looked down with infinite contempt upon the Germans enslaved to princes, entrust the chair of dogmatics to the best hated man in the German theological craft? Some of the Zurich radicals were already hoping that the completed political revolution would be followed

by a new religious reformation. After violent opposition, the invitation was confirmed by the cantonal council, and Strauss promptly declared his willingness to accept it (1839). But it was impossible that the home of Zwingli should quietly tolerate such a lapse from all its ancient traditions. In the easy-going anarchy of this democratic system, every young goatherd considered himself entitled to express a reasoned opinion upon the competence of professors of theology. A few orthodox zealots raised the cry of "religion in danger"; Hurter and the ultramontanes in neighbouring cantons hastened to participate in the fray; all the peasantry round the lake rose in protest; and the moderate party in the town, led by J. C. Bluntschli, the young liberal freemason, joined the popular movement. The government became alarmed, rescinded its resolution, and offered to compensate for the cancellation of the appointment by the payment of an annual pension of one thousand francs, which Strauss, standing upon his rights, did not hesitate to accept, but applied to benevolent uses. To the thrifty lake-dwellers, however, the handing over of this thousand francs to a foreigner seemed criminal extravagance since their canton never paid pensions; they clamoured against "the Straussen," and did not rest until, by a riot locally known as the "Züriputsch" they had overthrown the radical government.

This tragi-comical revolution brought the name of the Swabian theologian into utter disrepute, so that no German philosophical faculty now ventured to think of offering the much-abused man a suitable sphere for the exercise of his brilliant gifts as a teacher. He was personally embittered by his unhappy experiences and was driven into unmitigated radicalism. His second great work, *The Christian Faith* (1840), in point of form even abler than the first, contained an open declaration of war against Christianity, and proved that its author, though a perspicacious critic, was neither philosopher nor historian. In an epoch when the power of the Roman church was again becoming pugnacious, he maintained the doctrinaire opinion that the opposition between Protestantism and Catholicism was now unmeaning in comparison with the struggle between orthodox and speculative theology. No less narrow in his partisanship than Rotteck or Hengstenberg, he could see nothing in the world beyond the two nations of believers and unbelievers, the servile and the free. To quote

his own distinctive phrase, he considered himself able to draw up the balance sheet of the commercial house of Christianity, and arrived at the simple conclusion that this old firm had long been bankrupt. Like Hegel, he looked upon dogmas as abstract ideas, never noticing what Schleiermacher had already proved, that this view annihilates Protestant freedom, seeing that it gives the sapient, the men of learning, a papal authority over the ignorant, who are as a rule the most pious. Thus step by step every dogma was "dissolved" as an idea belonging to an obsolete outlook. Revelation was to him merely a cortex which had formed of old around the tree of humanity, but had now become lignified and was peeling off. He knew nothing of the power of devotion and exaltation, and he therefore considered prayer to be a form of self-deception, admitting only the reasonableness of "contemplation which immerses itself in the cooling depths of the one reason of all things."

All the articles of faith having been thus dissolved, there remained nothing for the modern church to do, and it would be swallowed by the state as soon as people were able to bring themselves to the complete abandonment of the Catholic position. Not even Hegel, who was an adept in the knowledge of state life, had been willing to draw this ultimate conclusion from the premisses of his philosophy of religion. Hegel's Swabian disciple had no hesitation here, for in his student existence he was remote from the world, and failed to perceive that the coercive authority of the state necessarily becomes tyrannical should it assume control of the affective life. In theology, therefore, he could see nothing but "the science of the ignorant and idiotic consciousness." Whoever really knew theology must perforce abandon it as empty chatter—an astonishing admission in the mouth of a man of learning who had so recently been at work as a professor of the idiotic consciousness. "Religious idiots and theological autodidacts," he exclaimed, "these will be the priests of the future"; but till the future was realised, it was true that "the souls of many poor boys will be allured into the theological mousetrap by the bacon fat of the endowments."

As a result of five years of severe contests, this brilliant man had fallen prey to a mood of blind frenzy no whit inferior in intensity to the fanaticism of Eschenmaier. If his enemies termed him Iscariot, he for his part abused them as idiots.

From the abundance of his reading he endeavoured to prove that all great modern thinkers had in essentials shared the same opinion about Christianity, and in cases where the proof of this contention was difficult he condescended to sophistry. Lessing had said, "Notwithstanding all the doubts inspired by the understanding, religion persists unshaken in the hearts of those Christians who have acquired an inner conviction of its truth"—one of those splendid and elemental sayings which show us how high stood Lessing above the vulgar enlightenment of his day. But Strauss declared that the utterance had not been seriously meant, and had been a mere dialectical passado. Having thus proved with the utmost minuteness that Christianity was a nullity, he held aloof for twenty years from theological work. In this negative critic there was no trace of the constructive energy, the moral earnestness, of the reformer who spends his heart's blood to force his ideas on a reluctant world. He threw down his pen as soon as he believed himself to have discovered that the history of eighteen richly endowed centuries had been nothing but a gigantic error.

The influence of these writings upon contemporaries was two-edged, being in part beneficial and in part disastrous. Strauss awakened theology from a false quietism, and he made natural explanations of miracles and artificialised attempts at harmonising differences for ever impossible. His Tübingen teacher, Ferdinand Christian Baur, a man of less scintillating intelligence than Strauss, but far stronger and more profound, and one who, despite the boldness of his scientific explanations, never doubted the eternal truth of Christianity, was led by his pupil's controversial writings to continue the historical researches into the origins of Christianity on which he had been engaged for a number of years. Baur devoted himself to a subject that had hitherto been ignored; to a critique of the gospels, and was led to the conclusion that Christianity, which had primitively been a Judaic religion, was first raised to the status of a world religion through the work of the apostle Paul. His views were supported by a number of vigorous young professors, such men as Zeller, Schwegler, and Köstlin. By its perspicacious researches this new Tübingen school paved the way for a scientific presentation of the earliest era in Christian history, but the writers showed little understanding for the force of individuality in history, and many of their opinions have long since been refuted.

The pietists and the orthodox, on the other hand, and those above all who were chiefly interested in revelation or were mainly animated by the corporative spirit of professional theologists, were of necessity embittered by Strauss' onslaught upon the Christian idiots. This unmeasured polemic practically compelled them to condemn scientific criticism altogether, and to inscribe on their banner the motto *credo quia absurdum*. From the first, too, they had taken up so strong and intolerant a position towards the new tendency, that it was impossible for them to draw back. Public opinion, guided by the liberal newspapers, was wholly on the side of the persecuted Swabian, although Strauss was a man of moderate political views. Voss, in his *Luise*, had long ago written a kindly account of the Protestant parsonage, describing it as a centre of peace and culture, while in the Teutonising Burschenschaft of earlier days Sand, Riemann, and other men "diligent on behalf of religious learning," had invariably been the leaders. Very different was now the state of affairs. It almost seemed as if henceforward the Christian faith were to be separated from modern culture by a yawning abyss. In the favourite novels of the day every pastor was represented as either knave or fool, and at the university the prevailing attitude towards theology was one of mockery and contempt. The human weaknesses of the religious minded were spied out with ill-natured pleasure, it being overlooked that the mockers who said "the man is extremely religious and nevertheless a rascal" were in the very phrase testifying to the moral superiority of the religious mood—for no one had ever thought of saying "the man is utterly irreligious and yet a rascal." Contempt for religious matters, which had been the issue of the peculiar development of our classical literature,[1] now regained dominance in cultured circles. Since such prejudices could be overcome only by actual experience of life, they maintained their power to all appearance for an entire generation, until in a epoch of world-transforming destiny the Germans suddenly learned that their strongest and wisest men were all sincere Christians, and that their heroic youths went out to face death inspired by faith in God.

Since all the radicals took up the cudgels on behalf of speculative theology, it was inevitable that the governments should espouse the cause of orthodoxy. Altenstein, quite

[1] Vide supra, vol. II, p. 273.

without positive faith and yet permeated with the conviction that it was his official duty to maintain the ancient creed of every church, was placed in a position of hopeless perplexity by these theological struggles. Consequently the crown prince, a man of rigid religious views, but hardly entitled to interfere in questions of European policy, acquired so much influence over the suggestible minister of education and public worship that before long even the Old Hegelians ceased to receive preferential treatment, and all important posts in the Prussian state church were filled henceforward by men of orthodox views. At the crown prince's suggestion, Hahn of Leipzig, a deadly enemy of the rationalists, was summoned to Breslau.[1] By the same influence, Hengstenberg, at an exceptionally early age, was appointed professor in Berlin. It was owing to the prince, too, that the much persecuted Father Johannes Gossner at length secured a suitable sphere of activity in Berlin.

Gossner was a born preacher, and a man of ardent faith and childlike simplicity. In Bavaria, in earlier years, he had been influenced by the mystical primitive Christianity of Bishop Sailer. Later, having worked on behalf of the Bible societies, he was expelled from Russia, and had then become a member of the Evangelical church. But at this period rationalism still exercised so unchallenged an influence in Berlin, that among all the divines of that city Schleiermacher was alone willing to allow the convert the use of his pulpit. At length, however, Moblank, pastor at the Luisenstadt church, appointed Gossner as locum tenens for some months. The result was, as the crown prince wrote, that a church which had been empty for half a century now proved too small to hold its devout congregation, "because a martyr for Protestant truth as it was preached by Luther" was there expounding God's word. But the consistory forbade the interloper to use the pulpit, demanding proof of competence, though he was an ordained priest and fifty-five years of age. "To what a pass have we come," said Gossner sadly; "it is one to move God's pity. I, an old beast of burden, must submit to the questions of five examiners, and after I have preached for thirty years all over the world I am told to preach a trial sermon!" At length the Moravian brethren, the most pious congregation in the capital, appointed him pastor of Bethlehemskirche. As

[1] This fact is recorded by the prince himself in a letter to Altenstein under date March 4, 1834.

the crown prince wrote to Altenstein, it was now left to Gossner to show whether he was or was not on the right path, "to show whether he is, as I am convinced, a man of exceptional distinction, or whether he is the humbug, the false priest, the masked Jesuit or Jansenist, or whatever else his enemies describe him to be." [1] The success of his unpolished, primitively vigorous, and popular eloquence was unparalleled and his works of Christian philanthropy were no less fruitful, Gossner was the founder of the Men's Sick Club, of the Elizabeth Hospital, of various institutions for the care of children, and of a number of missionary societies.

Of like value were the activities of the crown prince's friend Otto von Gerlach, whose patron's good word secured for him a pulpit in the Rosenthal suburb,[2] after the king had decided to build four new churches in the poorest quarters of Berlin, which were now continually expanding. This gave opportunity for an abundance of religious work, for visitations and domestic prayer meetings, for the foundation of working men's clubs and savings banks, for the provision of work for the unemployed, and for the distribution of devotional books—such being the ways in which the enthusiastic young evangelist endeavoured to counteract the degradation of the poor workers. The crown prince was especially concerned about the province of Saxony, the acropolis of Prussian radicalism. On no account he said, must Grossmann, the candidate favoured by Altenstein, receive the appointment of bishop and superintendent at Magdeburg. "I regard it as inconceivable," he wrote, "that a man who is known to be a dull, heartless, and shallow rationalist, a man whose naked quasi-jacobinism has made him the mock of his colleagues *even in Leipzig!*—that *such* a man should be appointed to *such* a position in *this* province; and still less does it seem to me possible that the appointment should be approved by the king." [3] The heir to the throne was able to secure the appointment of Dräseke to the vacant see. The new bishop drew large congregations by his eloquence, and when he preached the inaugural sermon at the unveiling of the Gustavus Adolphus memorial upon the battlefield of Lützen, a chorus of enthusiastic approval arose from the province, hitherto so cold in religious matters.

[1] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, January 14, 1828; January 20, 1829.

[2] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, January 22, 1834.

[3] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, November 15, 1831.

A new spirit thus gradually came to permeate Prussian religious administration. Hengstenberg's *Kirchenzeitung* was beginning to employ a tone suggesting that the party whose views it represented was absolutely dominant in the church, and the Tübingen movement served only to increase its influence. A few months after the appearance of the *Life of Jesus*, the crown prince wrote to the minister saying that it now seemed full time to appoint an orthodox theologian at Halle, where Tholuck was quite alone. "More than two-thirds of the younger students imbibe principles which issue from rationalism (that botch of human sayings and opinions) not from the pure word of God. As emissaries of evil, as missionaries and as incumberents of official posts, they then infect the entire country." To appoint Baur was quite inadmissible, for Baur "has recently adhered to the views of a certain Dr. Strauss!" [1]

Pietism and orthodoxy, which by degrees people came to regard as synonymous, gained headway throughout Germany. They engaged in a life and death struggle with speculative theology; down to the last letter they defended "the word, the whole word, and nothing but the word"; and they manifested their strength in practical Christian works. From Basle as a centre, the German highlands were covered with a network of Christian mission stations. The Swabian pietists in Calw endeavoured to win over the faithful to their views, in part by foolish tracts, but in part by charitable works. The pious F. W. Krummacher consoled and edified the poor harassed workers of Wupperthal by kindly spiritual counsel and moving sermons—which the old Goethe indeed spoke of as "narcotic preachments." With the foundation of his Rauke Haus in the year 1833, Hinrich Wichern established an asylum of refuge for neglected children just without the gates of Hamburg. From this modest beginning there blossomed with marvellous speed a liberal Protestant order, which wrought great things on behalf of education, the care of the poor, prisons, and hospitals. Wichern refused to attach himself to any theological party. He never ceased to revere his teacher Schleiermacher, and condemned any persecution of the rationalists. Reared amid the frank and simple piety of the Hamburg petty bourgeoisie, he had subsequently made the acquaintance of two women of apostolic fervour, Luise Reichardt, musician, and Amalie Sieveking, an indefatigable

[1] Crown Prince Frederick William to Altenstein, April 20, 1836.

philanthropist. A thoroughly practical man, it was his aim to show that the Protestant church, which had hitherto proved quite unable to rival the works of welldoing performed by the Romanists or the secular activities of the Calvinists, was likewise competent to care for the poor in spirit. Nor was success denied him.

All really effective religious life was henceforward based upon the activities of the orthodox believers in Holy Writ. They alone were able to fill their churches, whilst nobody wanted to listen to the addresses of the speculative theologians; they alone satiated the weary soul, and replenished every sorrowful soul. On the other hand, many of the members of the Tübingen school, following Strauss' example, and taking little interest in the church, soon abandoned theology. But since religion is not rooted in learning but in the domain of sensibility, in the living energy of love, it was inevitable that this revived orthodoxy, however deficient from the scientific point of view, should as a religious force prove enormously more effective than the learned theological critics.

The chasm between the two parties widened from year to year. On both sides respect and mutual consideration were soon relinquished. Many of the orthodox were so thoroughgoing in their denial of the Protestant right of free investigation as to declare that all unprejudiced historical criticism in the theological field was simply pagan. What a caricature of Swabian pietism, on the other hand, was sketched by Vischer, the Tübingen writer on æsthetics, in his able essays on Strauss and the Würtembergers. Scarcely a human lineament was left in the picture. To the liberal newspapers "piety" became a sarcastic expression, as if the quality were a disgrace. The Rauke Haus and all the other flourishing works of Christian love were stigmatised by them as institutions founded by hypocrites for hypocrites. The struggle between the knowers and the believers was as full of misunderstandings and of distortions as had been the equally sterile dispute between the law of reason and historical law. It paralysed German Protestantism at the very moment when the papacy was returning to the attack. It accentuated political differences to such an extent that within a few years all prospect of reconciliation had disappeared, and a forcible revolution had become inevitable.

APPENDIXES

TO

VOL. V.

XXII.—TREITSCHKE'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH VOLUME OF THE GERMAN EDITION.

[In the English edition, the matter corresponding to this volume comprises the whole of vol. V and the first three chapters of vol. VI.]

A FOURFOLD myth-cycle has entrenched itself in the history of the thirties. It is true that the Franco-Polish fable and the kindred particularist-liberal fable are gradually passing into oblivion, but the Anglo-Coburg legend and the legend circulated by the literary world continue to exercise some of their ancient influence. Through this atmosphere of fiction it is difficult to make one's way to the attainment of an unprejudiced and straightforwardly German conception of events. It is still more difficult to recognise and to describe with fidelity the continuous determinism of historical life as displayed even in the confused party struggles of this decade. It is far from easy to demonstrate, what is the fact, that Germany's unity was not brought about by liberalism, and yet could never have been secured in the absence of liberalism; nor is it easy to display the manner in which, now the crowns, and now the opposition parties, have respectively advanced or retarded the progress of national life. I have endeavoured to the best of my ability to be just in the apportionment of light and shade.

The work has been facilitated by an unexpected abundance of confidential communications from fellow-countrymen alike of the north and of the south, to whom my sincerest thanks

are hereby tendered. Besides making use of the archives to which I had access in the preparation of the preceding volumes, I have on this occasion learned much from the national archives in Hanover.

I have received numerous letters of censure, and have in every case given them my serious consideration, but have not always been able to endorse their strictures. In most cases all that they amounted to was a general approval, with one reserve—that the critic's homeland had been unfairly treated. Of his own Electoral Hesse, Jacob Grimm declared that no other German territory was so passionately beloved by its sons. But the East Prussian and the Silesian, the Bavarian and the Swabian, the Westphalian and the Electoral Saxon, one and all say the same thing of their respective provinces. It is impossible that a historical treatise which aims at a worthy presentation of the life of the whole nation, should ever furnish full satisfaction for the high claims of this local patriotism.

As far as foreign critics are concerned, be they friendly or be they hostile, the entire tone of my book has aroused disfavour. Nor could I expect otherwise. I write for Germans. Much water will flow down the Rhine before foreigners will permit us to speak of our country with the pride that has ever characterised the treaties on national history composed by Englishmen and by Frenchmen. But even the foreign world will some day have to accustom itself to the sentiments of New Germany.

The opening chapters of this volume describe a number of glorious successes achieved by Prussian policy; the closing chapters deal with two momentous failures of the same policy. I hope, however, that the reader will realise that by the end of the decade the confusion in German affairs was beginning to clear. Henceforward Prussia occupies the foreground of German history; what Prussia does or leaves undone determines the destinies of the nation.

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE.

BERLIN, *November* 30, 1889.

XXIII.—THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND AND THE STATE FUNDAMENTAL LAW.[1]

(APPENDIX TO P. 198, VOL V.)

There can be no dispute among fair-minded men as concerns their political judgment of the breach of the constitution committed by Ernest Augustus of Hanover. Despite all possible ingenuity in the way of excuse or explanation, the fact remains that the brief history of the independent kingdom of Hanover opened with a scandalous coup d'état. To us Prussians it is one of the most painful memories of the history of the Germanic Federation that King Frederick William III was unable to make up his mind to oppose the Hanoverian Guelph no less resolutely than he had shortly before opposed the Brunswick Guelph, Duke Charles. Personal judgment of the case is a less easy matter. Are we justified in assuming that Ernest Augustus was at least an honest fanatic? Did he, as heir presumptive, exhibit unambiguous hostility to the fundamental law which he abrogated on ascending the throne, or had he prepared for his illegality by secretiveness and subterfuge? An adequate answer to these much disputed questions is afforded by certain documents superscribed *Statement of the Duke of Cumberland Concerning the Fundamental Law.* I recently discovered these in the royal archives at Hanover, and now reproduce their most essential contents.

The well-known declaration, composed by Privy Councillor Falcke, and made by Ernest Augustus in the Bundestag on June 27, 1839, contains the following assurance:

"King William IV was unwilling to enter into a preliminary consultation with the heir presumptive concerning the fundamental law. The tenour of the constitution was not communicated to the then duke of Cumberland by the king's command until *after the royal decision concerning contents and form had been arrived at.* Consequently representations made by the constitution were necessarily left unheeded, seeing that the heir presumptive as soon as he was informed concerning the king was bound by an assurance previously given to the estates. The present king of Hanover, when informed by a ministerial

[1] First printed in the Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, vol. I.

despatch of October 16, 1833, concerning the first summoning of the general assembly of the estates of the kingdom in accordance with the new constitution, with a view to his participation in the sittings of the upper house, rejoined on the 29th of the same month: 'Seeing that I have not been duly informed concerning all the antecedent circumstances, I cannot consider myself bound by the new law.'"

These assertions, in which truth and fable are artfully interwoven, are obviously intended to produce the impression that the duke had not been informed concerning the fundamental law of September 26, 1833, until shortly before its promulgation, some time during the summer of that year. The truth, however, is that King William had held a "preliminary conversation" with the heir presumptive as early as October, 1831, with the personal collaboration of the aforesaid Privy Councillor Falcke, the man who at a later date drafted the declaration to the Bundestag. It is well-known that the king, in response to a petition from the diet of 1831, had promised to grant a new constitution, and that to this end the government and its advisers (Rose, Dahlmann, and others) had formulated suggestions which in the autumn of the same year were submitted to the monarch for his provisional approval. Subsequently this draft was considerably altered during the deliberations of the estates, but it already contained the decisive reform which was afterwards to give King Ernest Augustus the principal excuse for his coup d'état. It provided for the so-called amalgamation of the treasuries, as promised to the diet, for the uniting of the royal domain treasury with the tax treasury of the estates. The king now commanded Minister von Ompteda and Privy Councillor Falcke to communicate the design of the constitution to the heir presumptive, at that time in England. King William awaited his brother's reply with some anxiety, for the negotiations concerning the reform bill were then in progress, and Cumberland, as a high tory, was strongly opposing the whig ministry. Contrary to expectation, however, the duke, both verbally and in writing, expressed his most cordial approval of the draft.

On October 30, 1831, writing from Kew to his younger brother, the duke of Cambridge and viceroy of Hanover, Ernest Augustus recounted how the draft had been given him by Ompteda and Falcke, and continued as follows: "I must say, that it does both the king and the government the highest

honour the manner in which they have drawn up their proposals, and there was not one single objection that I could find or alteration to propose except in three points." He then enumerates his three objections. First of all he demurs to publicity of the proceedings of the diet, seeing that this would lead to the democratic members addressing their speeches to the public. It does not suffice that the government and any individual member are entitled to demand that a sitting should be private, for such a proposal would render the government unpopular, whilst any deputy who should venture it would become "a marked man." Secondly the duke censures the granting of daily allowances to the members of the lower house, since this will encourage them to waste their time. Thirdly he demands that soldiers on furlough shall remain under military law—an objection which, in truth, has nothing to do with the case, for the draft constitution touches upon the question only in an indirect manner. He concludes by saying: "These are the only three points I have to remark upon, and the King, whom I saw on Friday and who had heard my remarks in a letter from Ompteda, said: 'He agreed most perfectly and entirely with me and had stated the same to Ompteda.' It is impossible for any man to have behaved more nobly and disinterestedly than the King has done in this whole business, and both his head and his heart have shone on this occasion. ERNEST." There was good reason for praising the king's nobility and disinterestedness, for the draft constitution provided extremely liberal appointments for the royal house, and specified that these appointments should be paid in full to the heir while resident in the country, whereas King William, remaining in England, was to content himself for the rest of his life with a smaller allowance.

Next day, October 31, 1831, the duke wrote from Kew to the King, marking the letter "private," expressing thanks for the sending of Ompteda and Falcke, and saying: "I cannot sufficiently declare my perfect satisfaction in all and every point." No one, he said, could have acted more nobly and disinterestedly than the king, "proving thus that Your sole object is to place the finances of the country of Hanover on a footing that Your successors may not have difficulties." He then returns to his three objections, gratefully recognising that in respect of these the king agrees with him; refers to the fact that even King Louis of Bavaria had been led

by painful experience to disapprove of public proceedings of the diet; while, in respect of the daily allowances to the deputies, he remarks that this point can perhaps be conceded: "then at least the expense must fall upon the country and not on the sovereign, and with such restrictions that the States cannot protract the business in order to be paid so longer." In conclusion he explains with considerable knowledge of military details what ought to be done in the future regarding soldiers on furlough.

Rose's account reported by L. Weiland (*Rede auf Dahlmann*, Göttingen, 1855, p. 34) obviously relates to these two letters, but Pertz is responsible for a few trifling slips of memory.

The well-meaning king was delighted. The heir to the Hanoverian throne had raised but three objections against the draft. The second of these, the one concerning the daily allowances, he himself declared to be of trifling importance. The third, that which concerned soldiers on furlough, was hardly relevant. On the other hand, the duke had with overwhelming gratitude accepted the only article of the draft to which the assent of the agnates was perhaps requisite, that, namely, relating to the amalgamation of the treasuries. King William therefore considered that he was guaranteed henceforward against further objections, and on November 3, 1831, wrote from Brighton to his brother in the most friendly terms. He declared that in this matter he had especially had in mind the interests of his successors, "Yourself and Your promising son. It had appeared to Me of the utmost importance to the welfare and prosperity of the country . . . and to Your own comfort and tranquillity that You should be fully informed of what has been proposed to Me." The plan for a constitution had originated in a just and liberal view, but it might be hoped not a timorous view, of the situation in Hanover, out of the general circumstances which had evoked the desire for a constitution, and out of the need to respect the manifestations of public opinion in individual classes. Falcke should discuss further with the viceroy and the Hanoverian ministry the objections to publicity and to daily allowances, "and I have no doubt that such consideration will be given to them as circumstances may seem to admit." The position of soldiers on furlough should be reconsidered by experts. The king had the correspondence between himself and the duke despatched to the viceroy by his secretary,

Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Taylor, who wrote from Brighton under date November 7, 1831: "His Majesty considers it advisable that Your Royal Highness and the Hanoverian government should be in possession of these documents, and He trusts they will prove satisfactory to you."

The Hanoverian government conscientiously obeyed the king's commands. Simply out of respect for the heir presumptive, the grant of daily allowances was erased from the constitution, and was incorporated in a provisional regulation which could easily be altered. It was impossible that the provision regarding publicity of debate should be entirely withdrawn, for in this matter the king had already given a pledge to the diet; but to satisfy the heir presumptive it was so far weakened that the chambers were merely to be empowered to admit an audience, not compelled to do so, and the consequence was that the sittings of the upper house always remained private. Therewith the ministers believed that they had exhibited all conceivable considerations for the views of the duke, who possessed no right of co-regency, and henceforward they pursued unconcernedly the establishment of the constitution. In November, 1831, the draft was submitted to a joint committee of representatives of the government and of the estates; in May, 1832, it was laid before the new diet; and finally, in the spring of 1833, after repeated elaboration, it was once more submitted to the king. When the constitution, thus prepared with the thoroughness characteristic of Electoral Hanover, had been promulgated in September, 1833, it was sent to the duke of Cumberland on October 16, 1833, with the enquiry whether he would be inclined to take his seat in the upper house. Simultaneously, Minister Ompteda in London addressed the same question to the duke of Sussex. Sussex raised no objection on point of principle, but Cumberland replied as follows:

"Berlin, October 29, 1833. Gentlemen, I have received your despatch of the 16th inst. per the envoy von Münchhausen, and hasten to express my thanks to you for this communication. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from pointing out to you that in the year 1819 I protested to my brother King George IV of blessed memory against the introduction of the states general, since in my view these ought not to have been established without the previous approval and assent of all the male agnates, seeing that this innovation involved a total change

in the constitution of the country. I have not been duly informed regarding all the other and subsequent preliminaries, and therefore I cannot consider myself bound by the new law.

"Yours sincerely

"ERNEST."

The ministers, Stralenheim, Alten, Schulte, and von der Wisch, were in every sense noblemen of the respectable but dull old Hanoverian school. It is, therefore, not surprising that they should have been utterly nonplussed by this unexpected declaration on the part of the heir presumptive. The duke's earlier utterances had all been confidential. Now, in the only formal despatch he had ever written concerning the fundamental law, not only did he refuse his assent to this new law, thus simply repudiating the earlier proceedings; but further, in so far as his words could be understood, he seemed to desire a return to the old provincial diets, to the condition of affairs that had obtained in the year 1803; for the general assembly of the estates, which he rejected as illegal, had merely been modified in the year 1819, but had been first established in the year 1814, simultaneously with the foundation of the royal crown of Hanover. In their anxiety the ministers did not venture to question the duke directly as to whether he was prepared to recognise the fundamental law, or desired to enter a formal legal protest. Instead of doing this, they wrote to Ompteda, Hanoverian minister in London, under date November 14, 1833, relating what had occurred, and adding that they had absolutely no knowledge of any earlier protest on the part of the duke. Moreover, they considered it doubtful whether such a protest could still have been possible in the year 1819, since the general assembly of the estates of the kingdom had been summoned five years earlier. No less questionable did it seem whether the approval of the agnates was requisite for the present alteration in the constitution; their assent had not been asked in the year 1801, when the territories of Calenberg and Grubenhagen had been amalgamated. Besides, it could not be denied that the old provincial diets had possessed more extensive rights, and rights more dangerous to the crown, than those now assigned to the general diet. In conclusion, they innocently opined that, after all, the duke's

observations seemed to refer rather to the form than to the content of the fundamental law. His conversations with Ompteda and Falcke, his letters to the king and to the duke of Cambridge, showed clearly that two years earlier he had approved the draft constitution, with the sole exception of the provisions concerning publicity and daily allowances.

The king displayed no surprise at his brother's change of mind. He had long known that the duke had associated himself with Baron von Schele, leader of the Hanoverian nobles, and that he had expressed extremely hostile opinions upon the fundamental law. On November 28th, when Privy Councillor Lichtenberg had audience of the king at Brighton, William definitely declared that he knew nothing of any protest made by the duke in the year 1819, and that he knew nothing of any verbal exchange of views on this subject between Cumberland and King George IV. He approved the ministers' view that a protest on the part of the agnates was inadmissible, and remarked (with manifest allusion to Cumberland's notorious debts): "His Royal Highness' dissent will certainly prove disadvantageous to the country, but I cannot fail to see that it is likely to react still more unfavourably to His Royal Highness' own disadvantage." The king desired the viceroy to send a moderately worded and accommodating rejoinder to his brother, but added that he feared a satisfactory result was hardly to be expected. (Lichtenberg's Report to the cabinet ministry, December 3, 1833.)

After further deliberations, the Hanoverian ministers wrote to Lichtenberg as follows (Ministerial Despatch, December 13, 1833): "We find ourselves unable to regard the before-mentioned reply as per se, in respect either of form or content, a real protest against the fundamental law. We are unable, however, to free ourselves from concern lest, sooner or later, this document may not be interpreted as having had a different intention, so that we may lay ourselves open to reproach should we suffer it to pass without comment." Consequently, and because an autograph rejoinder from the king would give the matter more importance than it deserved, the ministers determined to answer the heir presumptive themselves, hoping for the king's subsequent approval.

The ministry's reply to Cumberland (under date December 11, 1833) was very delicately worded, although the writers must have been aware that in the interim (in a letter of

November 29th) the duke had declared to the viceroy that he would never give his sanction to certain articles of the fundamental law, specifying in particular the amalgamation of the treasuries. The ministers contented themselves with pointing out to the duke that the assent of the agnates, though desirable, was not essential, and that, apart from this, the fundamental law was now protected by article 56 of the final act of the Germanic Federation. They further indicated to him that the royal authority was strengthened, not weakened, by the amalgamation of the treasuries, and reminded him how careful they had been to cede to his objection to the daily allowances. "We have," they wrote, "been able to eliminate from the fundamental law everything relating to these allowances." In addition, the publicity of debate had been greatly limited, in accordance with the duke's wishes. They went no further. Even now they did not venture to tell the heir presumptive that they must ask from him an unambiguous Yes or No, so that in case of need they might take further steps with the aid of the diet or of the Bundestag.

The king expressed his "full approval" of this despatch (Lichtenberg's Report, January 17, 1834). The heir presumptive, however, did not reply to it, for it miscarried and failed to reach him. When Cumberland returned to England shortly afterwards, Privy Councillor Lichtenberg had three conversations with him concerning the fundamental law, on January 24th, February 27th, and March 24th, and read to the duke a transcript of the lost despatch (Lichtenberg's Reports, February 28 and March 27, 1834). In these conversations the duke's arrières pensées were plainly manifest.

The very prince who two years earlier had approved the fundamental law except upon three points, now declared: "I have always been opposed to a general assembly of the estates of the kingdom. In 1814 I expressed my objection in a memorial to the prince regent, and subsequently I made a further protest by word of mouth. It was on this account that in the year 1822 I refused to receive the assembly of the estates when that body wished to pay its respects to me through the instrumentality of Count Merveldt, responding to the application by explaining that I could only receive individual members as private persons. Thus my views on this matter are notorious. It does not follow from the union of Calenberg and Grubenhagen that a union of the estates for

the entire kingdom can be established without the agnates' approval. Why cannot we have provincial diets like Prussia?" All this was accompanied by solemn assurances characteristic of the old soldier, to the effect that he was one who never failed to speak his mind freely, one who thought always of the public welfare, never of himself. The man who had previously declared his "perfect satisfaction in all and every point, except in three points," now had the audacity to maintain that if in the interview with Ompteda and Falcke he had lodged objections concerning two points only, "it must not be inferred from this that I gave my approval to all the rest." The amalgamation of the treasuries, which he had formerly hailed with such ardent gratitude, now seemed to him the most undesirable of all, for it would make the royal income dependent upon the approval of the estates. Vainly did Lichtenberg represent to him that the effect was rather to secure for the crown, and for the first time, an absolutely independent income. The duke also recurred to his earlier objections. Had no daily allowances been granted and had for this reason the estates failed to meet, "it was possible that the government would not in the end have found it necessary to summon the assembly again." He fulminated once more against the publicity of debate and against the new organisation of the cavalry, and refused to be pacified by Lichtenberg's assurances that the diet could only approve the military budget as a whole, not in detail. Even the respectful privy councillor, in closing his report, could say no more than this: "that, *if* the most humble and obedient undersigned may venture to describe the impression made upon his royal highness by the long interview, he would say that this impression *seemed* not entirely unfavourable."

This is the last of the documents. The ministry was satisfied with the gentle Lichtenberg's "seemed," and with incredible recklessness went forward to encounter the coup d'état. The Guelph tragicomedy subsequently found a worthy conclusion when King Ernest Augustus arbitrarily reimposed upon his country the very constitution of the year 1819 which the duke of Cumberland had formerly stigmatised as utterly illegal.

The fundamental law was followed on November 19, 1836, by a domestic law of the royal house. I have nothing new to report concerning the origin of this measure. All that we

know is that Dahlmann, who elaborated the domestic law, received from the ministry on April 21, 1834, an official communication to the effect that the assent of the royal princes of full age had been accorded. It is likewise known that on December 18, 1835, the duke of Cumberland wrote to Privy Councillor Falcke saying that as a man of honour he could not at present attach his signature to the domestic law, which was so closely connected with the fundamental law, and adding: "I must have much more aid and advice before I can allow myself to take so serious a step as you propose me doing." Since the above-mentioned ministerial assurance cannot have been devoid of foundation in fact, the impression inevitably arises in our minds that the duke's actions had been identical in respect of both these laws, that he first gave his approval to both in a form that could not be considered binding, and afterwards, instead of making a straightforward protest, did his best to postpone the decision indefinitely.

XXIV.—PRUSSIA AND THE FEDERAL MILITARY SYSTEM OF 1831.[1]

(APPENDIX TO P. 266, VOL. V.)

J. G. Droysen, in an instructive essay entitled *Zur Geschichte der preussischen Politik in den Jahren* 1830-32 [2] was the first to give a detailed account of the federal history of these years, and was led to the conclusion that at this epoch "the positive and the negative pole of German history, the system of a more restricted league under Prussia's leadership, and the system of the old federal constitution under Austrian presidency," manifested themselves in sharp contrast. Little as I am inclined to begin a polemic against my deceased teacher and colleague, I feel bound to say that, after a study of the documents, I regard this view as an exaggeration, and that I am unable to attribute so notable a significance to the negotiations then in progress regarding a possible war with France.

In his fine patriotic zeal, Droysen had a strong tendency

[1] First printed in the Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, vol. II.

[2] First printed in the Zeitschrift für Preussische Geschichte, 1874; reprinted in Droysen's Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschichte, 1876.

to discover the ideas of our modern national policy in an earlier epoch animated by very different sentiments. His judgment is speciously confirmed by an obvious and yet inapt comparison, namely, by a comparison with the year 1859. At that time Austria had suffered serious reverses in Italy, but by all human reckoning Prussia could count with certainty upon defeating France, since the latter country was almost completely destitute of troops. The Prussian court, therefore, animated by a magnanimous and disinterested spirit, and offering assistance to the harassed neighbour, was able to impose its own conditions. When it demanded the leadership of the federal army, it could count upon the support of public opinion in Prussia, and to a great extent in the rest of Germany as well, for since the year 1848 the idea of a more restricted federation had struck deep root. Thus the surrender of Lombardy by Austria in the treaty of Villafranca becomes easy to understand, for Austria was unwilling to allow her northern rival a military leadership which, in the event of a fortunate issue of the war, would probably have established Prussia's permanent supremacy in Germany. Very different was the situation in the year 1831. Then also, if the universally anticipated war had broken out, Austria would have been compelled to devote the greater part of her military forces to controlling the revolution in Italy and to resisting in that country an invasion by French troops; but the dangers and the burdens of the war would have fallen chiefly upon Prussia, for indubitably the ultimate aim of the war party in Paris was to extend the French frontier to the Rhine. Consequently Prussia had not a free hand in negotiations with the court of Vienna, and had to content herself with the prospect that Austria might possibly be able to despatch an auxiliary army to the German theatre of war. Neither in the nation at large nor in the court of Berlin did there as yet exist any clear thought of Prussian hegemony. Motz, Prussia's only statesman of the first rank, died in June, 1830. The king, Bernstorff, and Eichhorn were all devoid of far-reaching ambitions. The foreign office had its energies fully engaged in measures for the maintenance of peace and in the difficult task of expanding the customs union. When we take all these facts into consideration we look in vain for the sources from which Prussia's German policy could have derived energy to attempt a grandly conceived reform of the federal military system.

A writer of classical or of mediæval history, employing a synthetising perspicacity whose calculations are obvious to every instructed reader, endeavours, utilising a record in which the gaps are numerous, to furnish an approximately complete picture of events. But the nearer we approach to our own day, the more immeasurable becomes the mass of historical material; and the writer of recent history, unmarked by the majority of his readers, does the hardest part of his work before beginning to write. He must allow his mind to roam at large through the chaos of available documents until he is in a position to distinguish the great from the small, and until, contemplating the medley of diplomatic incidents, intrigues, and soap bubbles, he can form a precise opinion as to which details are worthy of historical record. When we stand at the right distance from the picture, the course of the negotiations relating to a possible federal war appears fairly simple, and the historical upshot of these negotiations seems to us comparatively insignificant.

The German military organisation of the year 1821 was a triumph for the middle-sized states, a triumph secured by the tacit collaboration of Austria. The vanity of the minor courts was gratified by allowing them to dispose on paper of more federal troops than either of the two great powers. They had to supply four corps comprising 120,000 men; Austria, only three corps, comprising 97,000 men; Prussia only three corps, comprising 80,000 men. In the event of war this federal army was to be led by a federal commander appointed by the Bundestag. Votes were so distributed in Frankfort that this commander-in-chief would probably have been an Austrian, and might have been one of the petty princes, but could not possibly have been a Prussian. No one, and least of all the Prussian court, dreamed of formally abolishing this preposterous arrangement. Since the opening of the twenties, Count Bernstorff had been guided by the well-considered principle that all measures of general utility requisite for Germany's safety and welfare must be brought to pass not through the instrumentality of the Federation, but by means of negotiations with the individual states. Yet there could be no thought of carrying this military organisation into practical effect. At all the courts a tacit determination prevailed that in the event of war they would ignore these void paragraphs and would act as circumstances might dictate. It was

universally recognised that the personal existence of Prussia would be endangered by every menace to federal territory, and that Prussia would therefore be compelled to despatch to the German theatre of war the whole mass of her nine army corps, a force three times as great as her federal contingent—whereas Austria and the lesser states might well prove incompetent to perform the modest tasks prescribed for them by the federal law.

When the Germanic Federation was threatened with war as the outcome of the July revolution, the response of the lesser courts to the secret allurements of French diplomacy was in every case above reproach, for some were inspired by German patriotism, and the others detested the revolution. It is true that they could offer the fatherland little more than praiseworthy sentiments. To the south of Mainz and Würzburg there was not a single fortress, for the Bundestag had been unable to come to an agreement concerning the highland federal fortresses. The wide stretch from the Bohemian forest to the Upper Rhine lay naked to attack, and owing to the parsimony of the diets the military forces of South Germany were in such pitiful case, that had war then broken out there can be no doubt they would have made an even poorer showing than in the Main campaign of 1866. The Austrian army was in little better case. The progress of military preparations was extremely slow, and so sinister was the Italian situation that no one could foresee what proportion of its troops the Hofburg would have to spare for the protection of the German south-west. Such being the posture of affairs, the South German courts were perfectly willing, should necessity arise, to permit Prussia to come to their rescue, and they entered into confidential conversations with the envoys concerning the possibility of joint preparations for war. At this stage Prussia first attempted to spur on the court of Vienna, but here a mood of profound discouragement prevailed, and did not yield to more vigorous sentiments until the autumn of 1831, after the fall of Warsaw. Metternich promised to send Prince Schönburg, the envoy in Stuttgart, to discuss matters with the South German courts, but from November, 1830, onwards Schönburg remained for months in Vienna, doing nothing.

Berlin therefore resolved to take the initiative, and in December General von Röder was sent to the Hofburg. In

January, 1831, the general, who had no political commission, unfolded his military proposals. Prussia declared herself ready, should circumstances make it desirable, to enter the war with all the forces at her disposal. She demanded the constitution of three armies: a Prussian and North German army on the Moselle; a South German army, strengthened by Prussian troops, on the Upper and Middle Rhine; an Austrian army in Swabia. These suggestions were far in advance of any demands previously made by Prussia. Should they be carried into effect, the northern federal army would be under Prussia's direct command; the second army would, indirectly at least, be under the same command; Austria would have to be satisfied with the modest role of auxiliary power. In earlier negotiations relating to the federal military system, Prussia had contented herself with asking for the bipartition of the federal army, Austria leading the South German and Prussia the North German contingents. But this new and extensive claim was dictated solely by military considerations. There was no political design whatever, and it related merely to the possibility of a campaign in the near future. Since Metternich was by no means sure that Austria would be able to play an effective part in the German war, he was at the outset friendly towards Röder's proposals, and this favourable disposition was shared by Count Gyulay and the Austrian war council. Metternich was loath to relinquish the privilege of appointing a federal commander-in-chief, but even upon this matter he did not take a firm stand, for Archduke Charles, upon whom it had been proposed to confer the distinguished position, was now an elderly man, and had little inclination for such arduous duties. The Austrians did not betray suspicions until Lieutenant-General Langenau, who had in earlier days been Prussia's sworn enemy at the Bundestag, was called in counsel. Langenau demanded the formation of two federal armies under the supreme command of Austria and Prussia. Even this was a great concession, for hitherto the Viennese court had secretly resisted the plan of military dualism.

Whilst the Viennese negotiations were thus indecisively protracted, and while Prince Schönburg still remained inactive at the Hofburg, King Frederick William determined to treat directly with his South German federal allies. General Rühle von Lilienstern visited Munich in February, proceeding thence

to the other highland courts, and being received everywhere with open arms. The military help of North Germany was essential, and since the negotiations about the customs union were still in suspense it was extremely desirable to be on friendly terms with Prussia; moreover, Bavaria and Baden hoped to settle the dispute about the Sponheim succession through the mediation of the Berlin court. King Louis of Bavaria, exuberant with delight, wrote to Berlin as follows on March 17th: "I have to assure your majesty of the great pleasure with which I have received your majesty's envoy General Rühle von Lilienstern, for shortly after the revolution in Paris last year I desired to open communications with Prussia. I know nothing of 'North Germany' or 'South Germany'; I know Germany alone. I am convinced that salvation is only to be found in a close union with Prussia. In my opinion, between our two countries there is absolutely no conflict of interests, and nothing but a common aim—a thing that can hardly be said of any other two countries." The South German courts were in full agreement with the design to form three armies. They considered it indispensable that the line of retreat for the troops should be upon the Main and not, as Langenau proposed, upon the Lech, for all of them doubted Austrian efficiency, many of them were by no means satisfied concerning Austria's good faith, and with all of them the bitter memories of the revolutionary wars were still fresh. They decided to entrust to Field-marshal Wrede the command of the Bavarian and of the eighth federal army corps, and something was done to give this eighth corps a more homogeneous structure. Confidential negotiations were undertaken concerning the detailed conduct of the expected campaign. But here matters rested. The South German courts did not venture to prepare seriously for war, whereas Austria was now beginning the vigorous reinforcement of her army, and the greater part of the Prussian forces were already engaged in guarding the Belgian and Polish frontiers.

At the Hofburg, meanwhile, a somewhat irritable mood began to manifest itself, nor was the discontent in this quarter entirely unjustified. Doubtless Austria, through her own dilatoriness, was solely responsible for Berlin's taking single-handed action. But the league of the three great eastern powers was the corner-stone of Prussia's European policy. Only in conjunction with Austria could and would the court of Berlin

conduct the war against France. Inasmuch as the old imperial state, its momentary weakness notwithstanding, could throw a far heavier weight into the scale than could the petty states, which were practically without military equipment, it was natural that Emperor Francis should take offence when Prussia ignored him and entered into independent negotiations with the South Germans. Upon this question there was a conflict of opinion among the Prussian generals. General Krauseneck, chief of general staff, a man inclined towards liberal ideas, hoped that some undefined political advantage might result from an alliance between enlightened Prussia and the constitutionalist states of South Germany. On the other hand, General Clausewitz, whose first thoughts turned always towards the wider interests of European policy, was strongly of opinion that the primary aim must be to come to terms with powerful Austria, for then the lesser German powers would spontaneously come into line. All these differences were of trifling importance, for there was no conflict upon matters of essential principle Vienna harboured no suspicion that Prussia was secretly aiming at military hegemony—for the simple reason that no such aspirations were cherished by the court of Berlin. In the private letters of the Austrian statesmen which deal with these military negotiations we find not a word of ill-feeling which even distantly resembles Metternich's passionate and comprehensible outbursts against Prussian customs policy. Gentz, in complaints to his faithful friend Rothschild, speaks merely of errors in point of form, of the inconsiderateness of Prussian procedure The Austrians were out of humour because Prussia had taken the lead, and their aim now was to regain the premier position.

General Röder returned from Vienna in April, without having reached any conclusion. By Röder's hand, under date of April 2nd, Emperor Francis sent a letter to the king, full of soft words. Having thanked Frederick William for the confidence manifested by the mission to Vienna, he continued: "Il n'est pas une de mes pensées qu' Elle ne connaisse, tout comme j'ai le sentiment de ne pas me tromper sur aucune des Siennes. Plus les dangers du jour sont grands, plus je suis convaincu que le salut encore possible ne peut se trouver et ne se trouvera que dans l'union la plus intime et l'union la plus franche et la plus complète entre nous deux." The aim of all these asseverations was, of course, to exhort the king to come to an understanding in the first instance with his

old intimate. Metternich wrote in similar terms. Simultaneously, Prince Schönburg, returning at length to his post, brought the South German courts an invitation to confidential military deliberations in Vienna. King Louis, however met this proposal by a blunt refusal.

Prussia, at first, felt no uneasiness at these manifestations of Austrian sensitiveness, for Prussian conduct towards the Hofburg had been perfectly frank and quite devoid of hostility. When, on July 1st, General Witzleben sent to the foreign office the reports furnished by Röder and by Rühle, he declared in cordial terms that Prussia must respond "largement" to the confidence displayed by her South German neighbours. Germany's true interest could never fail to be Prussia's interest as well. He naively declared in conclusion: "It is impossible to doubt that an understanding with Austria will readily be secured." On August 15th, in two ministerial despatches to the South German embassies, Bernstorff gave a summary account of Rühle's mission, and recommended that, to secure a definitive agreement, a conference of officers should be held in Vienna, Berlin, or Würzburg, or perhaps best of all in Bayreuth. The members of the conference were to come from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and perhaps some of the lesser states. On August 21st, in an instruction to Maltzahn, a direct invitation was sent to Austria. It was plain that the minister hoped that Austria would comply in a friendly spirit with the arrangements outlined by Rühle in the conversations with the South German courts, and that the Hofburg would approve the creation of three armies.

But during these very days of August, there was quietly preparing a new turn in affairs. At Teplitz spa the king was waited upon by Councillor von Werner, Metternich's confidant, who begged Frederick William to consent that an Austrian officer should visit Berlin, with the prime object of bringing about an understanding between the two great powers. The king was painfully surprised, but acceded, for such a request from his old ally could hardly be refused without offence, especially seeing that the danger of war was at the moment far from imminent. The South German courts were informed of what was in progress, and in September General Count Clam arrived in Berlin to discuss matters with Bernstorff Krauseneck, and Röder. The wearisome dispute recommenced. Was the federal army to be divided into two sections or into

three? The discussions made no progress, the responsibility for this failure accruing mainly, as far as I can see, to the Austrian plenipotentiary. An insufferable person, invariably garrulous, now dictatorial and now again displaying a would-be friendly urgency, he was absolutely unable to win the confidence of the Prussians. Bernstorff, ailing and irritable, was ultimately reduced to despair, and in March, 1832, retired from participation in the discussions. Like Prokesch von Osten, Clam was one of those speciously great diplomatists who abounded in old-time Austria, men who were greatly admired by the Hofburg but whom Germans could regard with nothing but contempt. Since Krauseneck and Rühle proved unable to come to terms with the Austrian, the king gave his imperial friend a yet further proof of his willingness to oblige by commissioning General Knesebeck to continue the negotiations. Yet even this devotee of the Viennese court could yield but little of Prussia's modest demands, based as they were upon the realities of the situation. He, too, required the institution of three armies, the only difference being that the second army, the one to be concentrated in the neighbourhood of Mainz, was to be the principal force, and was to be composed in equal proportions of contingents from Austria, from Prussia, and from the minor states. This plan would give Austria a part to play in two of the three armies.

In the end, after the discussions had been protracted throughout the winter, Clam agreed to this compromise; and in May, 1832, two South German generals were invited to participate in the deliberations. But the South Germans proved to be of tougher fibre than even the Prussian negotiators, and insisted on the adoption of the original Prussian plan, considering it impossible for Austria to reinforce the German central army by adequate masses of troops. In June, Saxony and Hanover were summoned to the council table. Since they shared the opinion of the South Germans, Austria at length gave way. The negotiations continued until December, 1832, but when they closed Prussian policy had triumphed. The Prussian plan was adopted almost in its entirety. Three armies were to be formed, two on the Lower and Middle Rhine respectively, each composed of Prussian and federal troops, while an Austrian army was to be stationed on the Upper Rhine. All these conversations related merely to the possible outbreak of a war which never actually occurred, and

the secret was so well kept that von Leonhardi, the federal envoy, had not a word to say about the matter in his semi-official *History of the Federal Military Organisation.*

If we take a sober view of these proceedings, it is impossible to consider that they had any far-reaching political significance. Droysen, indeed, maintains that Prussia sacrificed "the political side" of her proposals in order to save the military side. Yet nowhere does he tell us what the nature of this "political side" really was, and I have sought long and vainly in the relevant Prussian documents for any indication of a political arrière pensée. The modest aim of the Berlin court was that the next federal war, when it came, should be initiated in such a manner as to secure at least an essential minimum of unity in the leadership of the main mass of the federal forces. With this end in view, Prussia was to assume direct leadership of the northern army; she was to control the second army indirectly by her influence over the friendly South German states; and only the third army was to be abandoned to Austria's leadership. At the Berlin conferences, after manifold oscillations, this modest military aim was completely attained. At the time with which we are concerned, Prussia could cherish no higher ambition, for who could then regard it as possible that the kings of Bavaria and of Würtemberg, vying each with the other in jealous assertion of their sovereign rights, would ever voluntarily agree to the permanent military hegemony of Prussia? Who could imagine that even the crowns of Saxony or Hanover would accede to any suggestion of the kind? Bernstorff's retirement in May, 1832, had no connection, however remote, with these military negotiations. It took place merely because the minister, being seriously ill, renewed the petition to be allowed to resign which he had repeatedly made during recent years. With extreme regret, and giving all possible signs of his favour, the king granted the petition, expressly reserving the right to ask the count's advice when occasion should arise. Nor did this reservation remain an empty letter. It was thanks mainly to Bernstorff that in the year 1833, at the time of the Münchengrätz meeting, Prussia once again frustrated the warlike designs of Czar Nicholas. Bernstorff's resignation did not inaugurate any change of system, although it was natural that the comparative weakness of Ancillon, his successor, should before long make itself noticeable. But the king, who after

the July revolution had taken into his own hands the supreme guidance of foreign affairs, continued to exercise that guidance after Bernstorff's retirement.

The only matter of historical significance to be discovered in these military negotiations is the evidence they afford that beneath the surface the natural tendency towards German unity was powerfully at work. As soon as the lesser crowns felt themselves seriously menaced, they too recognised that protection was to be secured from Prussia alone, and showed themselves ready, in preparation for the day of danger, to concede certain privileges to the Prussian state. But no power in the world could induce them to draw the logical conclusion, and to modify the impracticable federal military constitution by means of a federal decree. Hence, in the end, it became necessary that the military strength of Prussia should be used for the destruction of this federal law which had proved itself incompetent to develop in due legal form.

XXV.—KING WILLIAM OF WÜRTEMBERG TO MINISTER WANGENHEIM.

(APPENDIX TO P. 350, VOL. IV.)

September 9, 1832.

Herr von Wangenheim! During your career as minister I had more than one occasion for dissatisfaction owing to your lack of discretion, but I could never have imagined that you would venture without my permission to publish an autograph private letter sent by me to you. I cannot do otherwise than express to you my full indignation at conduct which would be in the highest degree inadmissible even as between persons in private life, but which is all the more intolerable in a relationship wherein you have never ceased to work against me. Equally disagreeable to me have been the commendations you expressed regarding that portion of my letter which you failed to reprint—for in existing circumstances I cannot but find extremely offensive the favourable opinion of a man who is a member of the party to which you have openly acknowledged your adhesion.

WILLIAM.

XXVI.—THE FRANKFORT RISING.

(APPENDIX TO P. 363, VOL. IV.)

I append here a few extracts from Dr. Eimer's relation. At the students' convention held in Stuttgart at Christmas, 1832, our delegates were informed that there were plans for a revolution in Germany, and that the time had been fixed for next spring. The cooperation of the students was counted on, and the Burschenschafts ought everywhere to make ready for it. We did this in the following manner. The most resolute members of our association formed a political club which held special discussions with the above end in view. On two occasions, also, two old Burschenschafters, Körner and G. Bunsen, came over from Frankfort to keep us informed as to the progress of the scheme. It seemed, we were told, that in almost all the universities the Burschenschafts were ready for action. The Frankfort soldiery had been made sure of through their captain, Jungmichel by name. Some of the Würtemberg regiments, and especially that of Ludwigsburg, had likewise been won over. The most trusty among the German popular leaders would take the van. Ultimately we were informed that the rising was to take place on April 3rd, and that a number of students from the various universities were to go to Frankfort to deliver the main attack in that city, and to abolish the Bundestag while it was engaged in a plenary sitting. Of late the Bundestag had made itself more and more detested by police ukases (a sequel of the Hambach festival), by the federal decrees of June, 1832, and above all by its action in annulling the Badenese press law. At the end of March, I drove to Frankfort in the company of three Heidelberg students on vacation, men personally unknown to me. On the way there was some political talk, and one of the students surprised us greatly by exhibiting himself as one of the aristocratic party and as a minion of the Bundestag, this leading to a dispute between him and us others. He did, in fact, subsequently become a clerk in the Frankfort police office; and this Frankfort republican (his name was Stellwag) remembered me when he saw me again late in the year 1834, and in the most odious manner denounced me as a revolutionary.

I went to Frankfort before the appointed time, on March 24th or 25th, since I could stay there with relatives, or could go to Nahern or Kehnel, to stay with the pastor at one or other of these places, for both were uncles of mine, and expected me on a visit during vacation. But first of all I went to see certain among the conspirators who were known to me by name, and Oehler, the bookseller, took me with him to a meeting of the Frankfort revolutionaries, where I speedily became convinced that the project was very slenderly supported, and that its prospects of success were extremely dubious. Above all it seemed to me that the understanding with the military (the revolutionaries even hoped that the soldiers at Mainz would join them) was most precarious. The only thing that could really be counted upon was the participation of the countryfolk of Electoral Hesse to the north of Frankfort, for here, owing to the activities of a lawyer named Neuhoff, a very revolutionary sentiment prevailed. It appeared from the discussions that the participation of the Burschenschafts at Würzburg and Erlangen could not be counted upon with certainty, and ultimately I determined to go to these places to ascertain what was the state of feeling there. Next day, therefore, I took the diligence to Würzburg, where I stayed with R. von Wels. Some of the Würzburgers designed to come to Frankfort on April 3rd; they also proposed to send one of their number immediately to Erlangen, to invite the participation of the Erlangen Burschenschaft.

I returned to Frankfort on April 1st, and as I stepped out of the diligence I happened upon my acquaintances from Heidelberg, who had just arrived from Rhenish Bavaria. We went together to take rooms in Donnersberg. We were told that on April 2nd we were to assemble at noon at an inn in Bockenheim, where there was an upper room on which we could count on being alone. On this occasion various students were present, with Dr. Bunsen, Körner, etc., of Frankfort, and Rauschenplatt of Göttingen, and our roles were assigned to us. Thirty students, more or less, we were divided into three bands. With the others from Heidelberg I was to turn up at the mint in the evening, and there, under Bunsen's leadership, we were to seize the main guard. A second division was to storm the police station, and to open the adjoining arsenal and get possession of the two cannon and the muskets stored there; to this section belonged some of the students,

for the most part Bavarians, who had studied in artillery schools; cartridges were prepared for the firearms. The third division was to occupy some of the minor posts, and in especial to open the Pfarrturm with the aid of some of the Frankforters, and to sound the tocsin. Other Frankforters were to seize various municipal officials and certain police officers.

On the evening of the 3rd, we who were members of the first band assembled at Bunsen's dwelling in the mint. We there received muskets and a supply of cartridges, and precisely at nine o'clock, fifteen in number, we crossed the Rossmarkt to the main guard, where the force on duty was stronger than usual, for the Frankfort authorities had had wind of the affair, and knew that it was for to-night. We seized the muskets hanging in the anteroom. A few shots were exchanged with the guard. The officer in command, a lieutenant, escaped by a back window as we thronged into the room. So ended our part in the affray. We heard the tocsin sound. A crowd assembled in front of the guard room, but no one would accept a captured musket, no one would take a hand with us in the liberation of Germany. The attitude of the disarmed soldiers was equally passive. For a time we rested inactive, awaiting developments, until we heard shots from the Zeil, and the report spread that soldiers were approaching. We now made our way down the Zeil towards the police station, and here there was a trifling skirmish, shots being exchanged. Fortunately no use could be made of the cannon, for the official in charge could not find the key of the arsenal. We students who had assembled in front of the police station soon considered it expedient to retire in face of a greatly superior force. We went along Allerheiligenstrasse as far as the Hanau gate, where all was quiet. Here, for the time being, we left our muskets in a partly finished house, and returned towards the Zeil. We found both the police station and the main guard in the hands of a strong force of soldiers. Patrols were going about the streets, and the burgomaster drove up in an open carriage to deliver a tranquillising speech to the assembled crowd. Ultimately, at about half past ten, I returned to the inn, where I met my friends. We discussed what to do, and came to the conclusion that we would quietly wait upon events before deciding. I had no thought of going into hiding, as I could have done quite easily with our cousins at

Ebenau. We went to bed. When I undressed I found that my left shirtsleeve was torn and bloodstained. There was a flattened bullet in a superficial wound on the left arm; I had been hit by ricochet, and during the excitement had never noticed it. I dressed the wound with some court-plaster I had with me, and was at least cautious enough to throw away the bloody shirt in the privy. I slept soundly. Awakened in the middle of the night, I found policemen at my bedside. They asked my name and my business in Frankfort. I said that I was on my way to visit relatives in Nassau. I was told to consider myself under arrest, and that I could not continue my journey for the present. Policemen were stationed in the passages to keep an eye on us. Next morning we were taken away severally to the police station. Here I was placed in the lock-up, and owing to lack of room I had to occupy a cell jointly with a Frankfurt burgher named Rottenstein who had been arrested for an offence against the press laws. His wife brought him beer daily, and coffee at dinner time—like a good fellow, he shared these luxuries with me, and also his bed. The tin coffee-pot had a false bottom, and in this way such little things as paper and pencils were smuggled into the lock-up, and I was able to correspond with the outside world, especially with a certain Fräulein Stolze, whom I had never seen. We also got a needle and thread, with which Rottenstein cleverly mended the hole in my left coatsleeve.

On April 5th I saw from my window (which was at this time still free from blindage) a number of peasants going down the Friedberger Strasse under military guard. They were the men, from Bonames for the most part, who on the evening of April 3rd had stormed the Friedberger Gate, and had now been arrested. Filled with commiseration for these poor devils, who had all unwittingly become guilty of high treason, I quite forgot my own situation. When I was examined from time to time, I naturally continued to repeat that I had come to Frankfort while en route for Nassau, and since this information was confirmed by official enquiries in Nassau and at my home, the authorities were on the point of releasing me.

In the beginning of May Rottenstein was discharged, but my correspondence, and above all that with Fräulein Stolze, was not interrupted, for the barber, who visited me twice or thrice a week, carried notes out and in, although two soldiers

and three warders always stood round or passed to and fro whilst I was being shaved. Besides, letters were continually being smuggled in to me in the hollowed-out corks of the two bottles of beer which were sent me daily by wellwishers in Frankfort. On one occasion, however, it seemed to me that the warder was endeavouring to get hold of a cork, so I sent out a message to my friends telling them to relinquish this plan, and to make use in future of the kick of the beer bottles to conceal the notes, covering them with a layer of black wax. This went on for about a fortnight, when I was suddenly forbidden to receive any more beer. At the next hearing, a cork was shown me, in which had been concealed a note of trifling importance which I was supposed to have written. But for a whole fortnight after this discovery the bottles with the notes hidden in the kick had been taken to the court of enquiry and then sent on to me without anything being discovered. Rottenstein had left me a small mirror, containing a concealed repository in the left part of the frame, and here I had hidden a pencil with some paper which I was thus able to take with me whenever my place of imprisonment was changed. On one occasion a cherry cake in which a watch-spring saw had been hidden was sent me in the prison. The slyboots of a warder was suspicious, cut into the cake, and found the saw. I knew nothing about the affair at this time, but was informed of it later.

After a lengthy description of prison life, the hearings at the court of enquiry, and his repeated attempts at escape, Eimer continues as follows:

Towards the spring of 1834 a plan for escape was in progress. We were all to break prison simultaneously towards the Zeil and in part towards the Pfarrgasse. There were eight of us, and a cell between every two of us to hinder communications. A new privy had been built in the court yard, and I found a space here behind the boarding. In this hiding place our friends outside had deposited watch-spring saws and the needful accessories, so that each one of us could get what he required. In eight weeks we all of us succeeded in cutting through the window bars, there being two sets of these in each cell, for there was a second grating, by no means easy to get at, between the first grating and the blindage. When everything was ready, the attempt was fixed for ten o'clock on the evening of May 2nd. Owing

to structural alterations at this time in progress in the prison, each of us in turn was allowed no more than half an hour's exercise in the courtyard between six and seven, and unluckily it was our turn this very evening. The three comrades who had been arrested before me signalled to me by knocking that they were to be taken into the courtyard, but that it was absolutely impossible for them to go, for if they went they could not get through their work in time. Since it would have been extremely suspicious if all of us had refused to take our walk, seeing that this was one of our chief pleasures, and since I was comparatively ready, I let the others know that I would go when my turn came. I sacrificed myself for them. For when I got back to my cell at seven o'clock it soon became dark. First of all I finished sawing through the grating, and then, the night being now pitch-dark, I set to work preparing the cord I was to let myself down by, this being made of the coverlet torn into strips, with a few neckerchiefs and handkerchiefs. At about nine, Pfretschner, the Erlangen student whose cell was outside mine, knocked through saying that the opening he had made in the grating, was too small. Since my work was done, I got through the grating into the blindage in front of the window, removed the wire grating at the top, and made my rope fast to the blindage. All this time our friends were having heavy drays driven up and down the Zeil, making a tremendous racket, so that we could not be heard at work. Moreover, the soldiers in the guard room had been supplied with an abundance of wine, I know not on what excuse, and were thoroughly drunk. Ten o'clock had now struck. I climbed on to the coping, began to let myself down by the rope—and when I regained consciousness two days later I found myself back in prison with a violent headache, a lacerated scalp, and a broken leg. The cord, badly made, had torn asunder, and I had fallen into the street. It is probable that the drunken soldiers had knocked me about; they had fired blindly among the assembled crowd, wounding a few, and also shooting some of the burghers living in the houses opposite. One only of us students, Lizius, I was told, had made good his escape; some of the others had also had falls, and all had been promptly recaptured. I was seriously ill with concussion of the brain, vomiting blood, and so on. The medical officer, Kestner, was most attentive; a surgeon was called in consultation, the broken limb was done up in

a Hagedorn apparatus, and I was allotted a hospital attendant. On May 6th my brother came to Frankfort, and made every effort to visit me, or only to catch sight of me from a distance. The court of appeal was absolutely firm in its refusal, so my brother came in vain. On May 13th, being now out of danger, I was examined as to the attempted escape, being asked where I had procured the files, etc. I refused to answer. My comrades who had been recaptured were equally stubborn, and the enquiry gave the authorities nothing to act upon against our friends outside. The fracture set very well, and in two months I was able to stand and to begin to hobble about. The limb was very little shortened, only about half an inch, so that I had no permanent limp. The court of appeal ordered that those who had attempted escape should wear fetters at night. The authorities had repeatedly asked my doctor whether I was able to wear fetters yet. Now these were applied to the left leg and the right arm—an abominable piece of barbarity, for I was only just beginning to get about, and continued to use crutches for another three months. But I had to wear fetters at night all the rest of the time I was in prison in Frankfort.

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